Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Applicant applied for a writ of habeas corpus where he pled guilty to two counts of reckless injury to a child where his two baby girls suffered serious physical injuries in applicant's care and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Parole Division ("TDCJ") placed "Special Condition X" ("sex-offender conditions") on him after he had been released on mandatory-supervision parole. At issue was whether TDCJ improperly, and without due process, placed the sex-offender conditions on applicant. The court agreed with the habeas judge and held that applicant was entitled to the relief he sought in light of Meza v. Livingston and entitled to immediate reinstatement of his release on mandatory supervision and removal of the sex-offender conditions from the terms of his parole.

Appellant was convicted of evading arrest or detention and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. At issue was whether the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals in light of the court's recent opinion in Brooks v. State holding that the Jackson v. Virgina standard of legal sufficiency was the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining that evidence was sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted only ground six of the state's petition for discretionary review and vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to be considered in light of Brooks.

Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his participation in the robbery and murder of an 85-year-old woman. Appellant raised five issues on appeal related to the denial of his motion for counsel and the denial of the motion for DNA testing. The court affirmed and held that appellant was not entitled to appointed counsel where reasonable grounds did not exist for the filing of a motion for post-conviction DNA testing. The court also held that because DNA testing was available to appellant before trial on the very items that he requested to be tested now, the trial judge did not err in finding that appellant failed to meet unavailability requirements. The court further held that appellant had not shown that the "single loose hair" that he would like to have tested currently existed or could be delivered to the convicting court. The court also held that the trial judge acted within his discretion in finding that identity was not and is not an issue in the case. The court finally held that appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been convicted of capital murder if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence found in a pill bottle containing marijuana where a police officer stopped appellant's car for a traffic offense and during a consensual search of appellant's pocket, found the pill bottle. At issue was whether the trial court was due deference in its factual findings of voluntary consent to search under the totality of the circumstances. The court reversed the court of appeals and held that the trial judge, in viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the trial judge's ruling, did not abuse his discretion in finding that appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his car.

Appellant filed a pre-trial application for writ of habeas corpus where, after the jury was empaneled and sworn in his misdemeanor prosecution for driving while intoxicated, but before trial commenced, one of the jurors became temporarily indisposed for health reasons and the trial court ultimately declared a mistrial over appellant's objection. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court should not have granted the mistrial without first exploring the option of proceeding with trial with only five jurors and where the appellant expressed at least a tentative willingness to waive his constitutional right to a full complement of six. The court affirmed the court of appeals and held that there was no manifest necessity for the trial court to declare a mistrial without at least exploring the option to wait a week, possibly then to conduct the trial with five jurors. So long as the appellant could waive his constitutional right to a six-member jury, it could not be said that it was impossible to arrive at a fair verdict, impossible as a practical matter to continue with the trial, or that reversal on appeal would automatically ensue.

Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death after murdering a 5-year-old girl and abandoning her partially burned body in an alley. Defendant raised 49 issues on appeal regarding the sufficiency of future dangerousness; limitations on voir dire questioning; denial of challenges for cause; cumulative voir dire error; exclusion of testimony; Fifth Amendment claims; exclusion of parole evidence; denial of parole instruction; improper jury argument; and death penalty statutes. The court affirmed the conviction and held that defendant's points of error were all without merit.