Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant George Blackshear was charged with possession of a controlled substance enhanced by two prior convictions for state-jail felonies. The guilt phase of the trial consisted of approximately three hours of testimony from five witnesses. After deliberating for approximately an hour and a half, the jury returned a guilty verdict. During the punishment phase, the State presented no new witnesses, and appellant stipulated to ten prior convictions. After an hour of deliberation, the jury was released for the day. The following morning, after two additional hours of deliberation, the jury informed the trial judge that they were unable to reach a verdict on punishment. The trial judge granted appellant's motion for a mistrial as to the punishment phase and informed the parties that the retrial on punishment would commence later that same day. Appellant's defense counsel stated on the record, "it's my understanding that I should ask for a continuance based on the fact that I do not have a copy of the transcript from the prior trial, and it would be ineffective assistance of counsel without having it, unless she can make it at lunchtime, a copy of the transcript to refer to the testimony." The court denied the "motion." After a new trial on punishment, appellant was sentenced to eight years in prison. On appeal, he claimed that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a continuance. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, finding that, because the State presented the same witnesses at retrial on the punishment as it presented at the guilt phase of the first trial, the defense could have used the transcript from the first trial to impeach those witnesses on retrial. As a result, the court concluded that the State had failed to rebut the presumption that a defendant needs a transcript of prior mistrials to mount an effective defense. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that because the alleged error was not properly preserved, the court of appeals erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court. View "Blackshear v. Texas" on Justia Law

Realtor Darrell Stanley filed a motion for leave to file a writ of mandamus pursuant to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In it, he contended that he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the 264th District Court of Bell County, but the District Clerk refused to accept the writ application for filing because he added pages to it. The Clerk's response acknowledged that Relator's statement was correct. Although the District Clerk has the authority to return an application when an applicant is not using the correct form, the Supreme Court determined that the Relator appeared to have used the correct form and appeared to have substantially complied with the instructions. Mandamus relief was therefore conditionally granted, and the District Clerk of Bell County was instructed to accept Relator's application for filing with the additional pages. View "Stanley v. Bell Cty. District Clerk" on Justia Law

The State's petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review of this case to determine whether the common-law requirement that the State exercise due diligence in prosecuting a motion to revoke community supervision survived codification. The court of appeals ruled in favor of appellant Victor Martinez Garcia, by applying the common-law due-diligence requirement, which the State argued was superseded by statute. After review of the applicable statute as well as the appellate court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the common-law requirement has indeed been replaced by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.12, section 24, referred to as the "due-diligence statute." Furthermore, the due-diligence statute applies to only two alleged community-supervision violations: "failure to report to a supervision officer as directed or to remain within a specified place." Because the court of appeals analyzed the case under common law instead of under the statute, it erred. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision. The appellate court's decision was reversed and the trial court's judgment was reinstated. View "Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2011, Applicant Michael Gaither pled guilty to one count each of burglary and engaging in organized criminal activity and was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment for the burglary and ten years' imprisonment for engaging in organized criminal activity. The sentences were ordered to run concurrent with each other, but consecutive to applicant's sentence for a 2006 burglary. Under the terms of the plea agreement, applicant waived his appellate rights. In 2012, applicant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, applicant claimed that counsel was constitutionally deficient for giving him factually incorrect information about his sentences and for failing to object to the imposition of consecutive sentences. After reviewing the trial judge's findings, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that applicant presented no meritorious issues. Furthermore, the Court shared the trial court's concern that applicant had abused the writ process, so the Supreme Court remanded the case and instructed the judge to make additional findings of fact to help it determine if applicant's statements were indeed perjurious. The Court adopted these supplemental findings and agreed with the trial judge that, in using information he knew to be false to fill out his application, applicant has abused the writ process. The Court denied relief applicant's habeas application and cited him for abuse of the writ. View "Ex Parte Gaither" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Applicant on two counts of capital murder for terminating his girlfriend's pregnancy by stepping on her abdomen, causing her twins to be delivered stillborn. His convictions and life-imprisonment sentences were upheld on appeal by both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. Applicant filed a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his trial and appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing and taking additional evidence, the habeas judge filed findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Supreme Court grant relief on two ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) for failing to present the expert testimony at trial; and (2) failing to raise sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. However, rather than provide the Court with findings of fact that resolve the disputed facts, the trial judge made findings that were largely a recitation of the evidence presented at the writ hearing. Because these findings were not helpful to the Court in resolving the issues for which the case was remanded, the Court conducted its own independent review of the evidence. After so doing, the Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Flores" on Justia Law

The only evidence against Appellant in his prosecution for aggravated robbery was the identification testimony of the victim. Appellant offered testimony from a forensic psychologist intended to educate the jury about the so-called "weapon focus effect." The trial court ruled that this expert testimony was not relevant, however, because it was insufficiently tied to the particular facts of the case, and the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review in order to examine the court of appeals's holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion to exclude the expert's testimony for a lack of "fit." Upon review, the Court reversed. View "Blasdell v. Texas" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted pursuant to an indictment charging him with the offense of possession of cocaine in an amount less than one gram, a state-jail felony, and the jury assessed his punishment at one year's confinement. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to submit a jury instruction under Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires the jury to find that the testimony of the accomplice witness was corroborated before it could rely on that testimony for a conviction. Although the appellant did not object in the trial court to the absence of such an instruction, he argued on appeal that his conviction should nevertheless be overturned because, under "Almanza v. Texas," he suffered egregious harm from the defective jury charge that lacked an accomplice witness instruction. The appellant also argued, alternatively, that he should be acquitted because the evidence was legally insufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice witness. In an unpublished opinion, the Eighth Court of Appeals reversed the appellant's conviction. The court of appeals agreed with the appellant that the lack of an accomplice-witness instruction egregiously harmed him. Additionally, the court of appeals sua sponte noted that the trial court had neglected to read the jury charge out loud to the jury as required by Articles 36.14 and 36.16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although the appellant neither objected to this second deficiency at trial, nor even raised it as a point of error on appeal, the court of appeals recognized it as jury-charge error that is also subject to "Almanza" analysis and found it also to be egregiously harmful. The court of appeals failed to reach the appellant's legal sufficiency claim, even though if successful, such a claim would have resulted in his acquittal. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review in order to examine the court of appeals's finding of egregious harm with respect to the two jury charge errors. Finding merit to appellant's arguments on appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Casanova v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged by indictment with multiple counts of intoxication assault stemming from his involvement in a crash that injured the members of a family, one of them severely. The indictment included enhancement paragraphs that incorporated appellee's three convictions in Iowa for the offense of "operating under the influence, unintentionally causing serious injury." Under Iowa law, this offense is an "aggravated misdemeanor." The state appealed the trial court's refusal to let it use the Iowa convictions to enhance the punishment range of the charged offense. The court of appeals dismissed the state's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the state petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Upon review, the Court found that the plain language of article 44.01(a)(1) compels the Court to hold that the court of appeals had jurisdiction in this case. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remand this case to that court for consideration of the merits of the state's claim. View "Texas v. Le Richardson" on Justia Law

In November 2009, a jury convicted appellant of the 2006 capital murder of Renee Urbina Hernandez and Arturo Fonseca. Based on the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. After reviewing appellant's twelve points of error, the Supreme Court found them to be without merit. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence of death. View "Hernandez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Sheriff's deputies arrested appellant for possession of a controlled substance. She filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the controlled substance was illegally obtained as the result of a warrantless search of her apartment. The trial judge held a hearing and denied relief, and appellant then plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain. On appeal, appellant challenged the trial judge's denial of her motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Appellant raised three issues in her Petition for Discretionary Review: (1) the Fourth Court of Appeals erred in holding that a warrantless search was justified under the emergency doctrine when the emergency doctrine was not a theory urged by the State at the suppression hearing and when there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing that officers remained in Appellant's home pursuant to the emergency doctrine; (2) are law enforcement officers justified in remaining in a person's residence without a warrant under the guise of conducting a "warrant check" after the homeowner unequivocally tells officers to leave the residence?; (3) when law enforcement officers remain in a person's residence without a warrant under the guise of conducting a warrant check after the homeowner unequivocally tells officers to leave the residence, are they committing the offense of Criminal Trespass which would render any evidence seized after the intrusion inadmissible? Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision. The Court concluded that the trial court's factual finding that the police presence in the appellant's apartment was part of a reasonable domestic-violence investigation is accurate with respect to the officers' initial entry, but it did not support a legal conclusion that the officers were still completing their investigation of domestic violence at the time they remained in appellant's apartment while waiting for a return on the warrant check and at the time that the illegal substance was found. At that point, the appellant had told them four times to leave, and the officers, by their own admission, were planning to leave the apartment after the results of the warrant check came back because their domestic-violence investigation had been completed. Having revoked her consent to enter, the officers had no probable cause to arrest her until after the fourth iteration of her revocation of consent, and that, by remaining in her apartment, the officers were not at a vantage point where they had the right to be. The trial court should have granted appellant's motion to suppress, and the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's denial of that motion. Because of the Court's conclusions on appellant's first and second grounds, the Court did not address her third issue on appeal. View "Miller v. Texas" on Justia Law