Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Christina Jones claimed her conviction for fraudulent use or possession of identifying information violated the doctrine of in pari materia because that statute conflicted with the statute defining the offense of failure to identify, carrying a lower penalty. Specifically, Appellant asserted that fraudulent use or possession of identifying information (Texas Penal Code 32.51(b)), a state jail felony, and failure to identify (Texas Penal Code § 38.02(b)), a class B misdemeanor, were in pari materia and thus she should have been charged under 38.02(b), the more lenient statute. The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that these two statutes are not in pari materia because they have different purposes, require different elements of proof, and carry different penalties. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Jones v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Jefferie Daniel was charged with the offense of forgery of a check in cause number 2000CR1247, allegedly committed on September 27, 1999. 2011, the Bexar County District Clerk issued a "Bill of Cost" with respect to that cause. In addition to the $295.25 that were specifically assessed in the judgment as court costs in 2002, the belated "Bill" also assessed a cost for "APPOINTED ATTY" in the amount of $7,945.00. The applicant subsequently filed a pleading denominated as a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus challenging the district clerk's apparently unilateral assessment of appointed attorney fees as a cost of court on due process grounds. Rather than immediately accepting that recommendation, and without specifically addressing the trial court's concern with the cognizability of the applicant's claim, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further fact development. The trial court forwarded amended findings of fact and conclusions of law. Relying upon "personal recollection," but without addressing whether the applicant was indigent and represented by appointed counsel at trial, the trial court made an express finding of fact that the applicant was determined to be indigent for purposes of appeal on May 6, 2002, and that counsel was duly appointed to represent him for appellate purposes on May 21, 2002. Moreover, the trial court determined, "[t]here [was] no record that the court conducted any hearing or findings into [the applicant's] ability to pay his court-appointed attorney fees after [he] was determined to be indigent." On the basis of these amended findings, the trial court recommended that the Supreme Court grant habeas corpus relief by deleting the "Bill of Cost." Mandamus relief was conditionally granted. View "In re Jefferie Daniel, Relator" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Lemuel Burt of misapplication of fiduciary property and assessed his punishment at 14 years' incarceration and a $10,000 fine. The trial court orally pronounced this sentence on January 15, 2009, after which the trial court commented to the parties, "The sooner we can get that restitution matter taken care of, the better." The judgment, dated January 16, 2009, contains a restitution order for $591,785. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on January 15, 2009, but it was denied. Appellant appealed, arguing that the restitution order must be vacated because the trial court did not orally pronounce restitution in open court, and the written judgment therefore did not properly reflect the orally pronounced sentence. Appellant argued in the alternative that the trial court improperly calculated restitution to include losses from individuals not named in the indictment. The court of appeals held that appellant failed to preserve the restitution issues by failing to raise them in the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because appellant did not have an opportunity to object to the restitution order in the trial court, he could not have preserved the error for review and that the error was therefore not forfeited. The court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for consideration of the merits of the appellant's restitution claims. View "Burt v. Texas" on Justia Law

"Anne" was six years old at the time of an incident with appellant, her step-grandfather. Anne and her young relatives, Emily and Charlotte, were watching television with appellant in his living room. While Charlotte and Emily sat across the room from them, appellant touched Anne's genitals as she sat on his lap. When she pushed his hand away, he restrained Anne so that she could not leave. Charlotte started yelling, "He won't let her go, he won't let her go." The commotion was heard by several adults who were outside of the house, including appellant's wife, who is also Anne's grandmother, and Anne's parents. Appellant was charged with indecency with a child by contact and he pleaded not guilty. The case was tried to the bench along with other accusations of sexual abuse committed against Emily and Charlotte. At trial, the State called a designated outcry witness and offered a 30-minute videotape of Anne's interview. Over appellant's hearsay objection, the trial court admitted the recording in its entirety, and it was played for the court. The outcry witness did not testify about any of Anne's statements; the sole evidence of the statements Anne made to the witness was the videotape of the interview. On the State's petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court held that Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (the outcry statute) is a hearsay exception statutorily limited to live testimony of the outcry witness. The child-complainant's own videotaped statement did not meet the requirements for being admitted under that statute. Because the trial court impermissibly admitted the child's videotaped statement under the outcry statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's judgment reversing appellant's conviction. View "Bays v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Tony Betts was indicted for cruelty to animals. The trial court granted appellee's motion to suppress, which complained of a warrantless search and seizure. The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to address: (1) whether an accused has standing to challenge a search and seizure conducted in a relative's backyard where he had permission to house dogs when he did not live at the house and the yard was entirely exposed to the public; (2) whether the majority of the court of appeals improperly ignored the trial court's dispositive factfinding in ruling that the search and seizure was not justified under the plain view doctrine; and (3) whether the majority erred by failing to follow the mandates of "State v. Elias," (339 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)), and remanding the case to the trial judge to make fact findings and legal conclusions on the issue of whether entry onto the property was justified under the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Court concluded appellee had standing to contest the warrantless search and seizure conducted in his aunt's backyard. The search and seizure were not justified by the plain view doctrine, and the State could not rely on the community caretaking doctrine, which it did not raise to the trial court or the court of appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Texas v. Betts" on Justia Law

Charged with offenses committed against two complainants, appellee Robert Rosseau was indicted for 29 counts of sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child. In his petition for discretionary review, appellee challenged the judgment of the court of appeals that reversed the trial court's order quashing a portion of his indictment. On appellee's motion, the trial court quashed multiple paragraphs of the indictment, which were based on a "bigamy provision" that elevated the range of punishment for sexual assault whenever "the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under [Texas Penal Code] Section 25.01." With respect to appellee's jurisdictional challenge, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that it had jurisdiction to address the State's appeal of the trial court's order granting the motion to quash. With respect to appellee's argument that the bigamy provision at Texas Penal Code Section 22.011(f) was facially unconstitutional, the Court disagreed with the court of appeals's conclusion that appellee did not present a facial challenge, but agreed with its alternative holding that appellee failed to show that the statute operates unconstitutionally in all its applications. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Rosseau" on Justia Law

When appellee Anthony Duran made a left-hand turn in front of a speeding police car, the police officer braked, turned to follow, pulled the car over, and eventually arrested appellee for DWI. Appellee filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. The trial judge granted the motion, the State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the trial judge's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an appellate court must defer to a trial judge's factual findings which, when viewed piecemeal and in isolation, may be ambiguous, but, when read in their totality, reasonably support his legal conclusion. The Court concluded it must. "A reviewing court must apply the same non-technical, common-sense deference-not only to the trial judge's individual factual findings, but also to the totality of those findings-that it uses to assess a magistrate's determination of probable cause. This case depends upon a single fact, not any legal issue: Did the police officer actually see a traffic violation before he detained Mr. Duran? The trial judge's findings indicate that he did not. We must defer to that determination of fact." View "Texas v. Duran" on Justia Law

The State applied for the Supreme Court's discretionary review to address what constituted exigent circumstances permitting police officers to enter a home without a warrant. The Court agreed with the appellate court's holding that probable cause to believe that illegal drugs were in a home coupled with an odor of marijuana from the home and a police officer making his presence known to the occupants did not justify a warrantless entry. However, because the court of appeals did not address the State's alternative ground for finding exigent circumstances regarding child safety, the Court remanded the case to that court to do so. View "Turrubiate v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Herring was 16 years old when he was arrested for, and charged with, aggravated robbery. Because he was a juvenile, he was given his Miranda warnings by a magistrate. There was conflicting testimony as to whether two armed police officers were present when appellant was given these warnings. After the warnings, appellant was questioned by two police officers, and he confessed to the charged robbery, as well as other robberies and burglaries. The confession was reduced to writing by one of the officers, and appellant signed it. At trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the signed statement, and argued, among other things, that the statement was taken in violation of Family Code Section 51.095 because armed law-enforcement officers were present when he was given the magistrate's warnings. The motion was denied, and a jury found appellant guilty, sentencing him to 20 years' confinement. Appellant appealed and asserted that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed appellant's conviction. Appellant argued one issue to the Supreme Court: whether Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) permitted law-enforcement officers to be present when a juvenile is initially read his rights. The Court concluded that Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) does not prohibit the presence of law-enforcement officers, and accordingly affirmed. View "Herring v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to ninety-nine years' imprisonment. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal. Applicant's petition for discretionary review was denied by the Supreme Court. Applicant then filed this application for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel when trial counsel failed to preserve the issue of the validity of the search warrant for appellate review. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Supreme Court deny relief. After review, the Supreme Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Darron Moore" on Justia Law