Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, appellant Anthony Davison entered an open plea of guilty to burglary of a building. Prior to accepting his plea, the trial court admonished appellant as to the range of punishment for such an offense. Both in a written "Guilty Plea Memorandum" and orally, the trial court informed appellant that "a state jail felony has a possible punishment of not less than 180 days and no more than two years in a state jail facility and a fine not to exceed $10,000." But appellant also pled true to three felony enhancement paragraphs, which made him susceptible to punishment as a second-degree felon. On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellant contended that the court of appeals erred in holding that: (1) the failure to administer one of the admonishments of Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was harmful under Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure; (2) his guilty plea was therefore rendered involuntary for the purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore forfeited because not raised by objection at trial; and (3) any constitutional error was harmless under the same rule that governs the standard for harm analyses for claims of statutory error under Article 26.13. Though the Supreme Court rejected certain aspects of the court of appeals' reasoning, the Court ultimately affirmed its judgment. View "Davison v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2005, the two complainants in this case went to Applicant William Denton's residence. While there, they were assaulted and robbed by applicant and two other men. Each of the two indictments at issue here charged applicant with one count of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated robbery. The jury found applicant guilty of all four charges, with the sentences to run concurrently. The court of appeals affirmed. In his application for habeas corpus, applicant asserted that the convictions for both aggravated robbery and aggravated assault on each complainant violated his constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Finding that applicant has shown that two of his four convictions were in violation of his constitutional double-jeopardy protections that preclude multiple punishments for the same offense., the Supreme Court granted applicant's request for relief, retained the aggravated-robbery convictions and set aside the aggravated-assault convictions. View "Ex parte William Denton" on Justia Law

According to appellant Chidiebele Gabriel Okonkwo, he received $60,000 dollars in the mail from a man in Nigeria whom he had never met, who told appellant that he needed assistance in making purchases in the United States. Appellant claimed that he believed the money was authentic currency. He took the money to three different locations with the intent of obtaining money orders. After he successfully obtained two money orders, he was arrested when a clerk who was suspicious about the authenticity of the money called the police. The police confirmed that the money had been forged. At trial, the sole issue was whether appellant knew that the money was forged. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review to ask whether appellant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on the defense of mistake of fact. Answering in the affirmative, the court of appeals reversed appellant's conviction for forgery of money. On appeal, the State raised two issues: (1) that the court of appeals erroneously used a subjective standard to assess whether defense counsel was ineffective; and (2) under an objective standard, counsel could not be held ineffective for failing to request a mistake-of-fact instruction because the State had to prove that appellant knew the money was forged as an element of its case. The Supreme Court disagreed with the State on its first challenge and agreed on its second. "The court of appeals did properly apply an objective standard, although it erred by failing to weigh the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Furthermore, the court of appeals erred by determining that counsel was objectively ineffective in light of the record in this case, which shows that it was an inconsistent, alternative theory asserted by appellant's trial counsel, and its inclusion may have lessened the State's burden of proof. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals." View "Okonkwo v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant James Gelinas was charged with driving while intoxicated following a roadside stop conducted by Department of Public Safety Trooper Diego Marquez. At trial, Marquez testified that he stopped appellant because he believed appellant failed to signal out of a private parking lot and that the light illuminating the license plate on appellant's car was not white, as required by law. Marquez conceded that the initial ground for the stop proved insupportable because the Transportation Code does not require drivers to signal when turning out of private lots. As a result, the sole ground for the stop became appellant's license plate light. Once stopped, Marquez contended that appellant exhibited a number of signs of and performed poorly on the standardized field sobriety tests. Based on his observations, Trooper Marquez concluded that appellant was intoxicated. The jury instructions given at trial were clearly erroneous in that they stated the exact opposite of what the law provided. "In truth, if the jury found that Gelinas was driving on a public road and failed to comply with the law requiring a white light, the stop would have been legal, not illegal, and thus the jury could have properly considered the testimony and conclusions of Trooper Marquez." Appellant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to 180 days confinement probated for fifteen months and fined $1000. On appeal, appellant asserted, among other things, that he suffered egregious harm as a result of the charge error. In its analysis, the court of appeals noted the similarities between the facts of the instant case and those in the Supreme Court's "Hutch v. State" plurality opinion. The court of appeals opted to follow the Court's reasoning in Hutch, "offering little more than an account of [the Court's] analysis in Hutch and a blanket conclusion of egregious harm." That court reversed and remanded the case accordingly. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Hutch lacked the persuasive value to which the court of appeals attributed it and reversed. View "Gelinas v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Mauricio Celis was never licensed to practice law in Texas or any other jurisdiction, but he continuously held himself out as a lawyer in Texas over a period of several years in a lucrative business. Appellant acknowledged that he did not have a "cedula," nor a certificate from Mexico's Ministry of Education. Rather, he testified that he had a diploma in judicial sciences and that he, therefore, believed that he was "considered a lawyer in Mexico." He called two witnesses who testified that every Mexican citizen who was of legal age and sound mind is a "licenciado." Appellant was charged with 23 counts of falsely holding himself out as a lawyer in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 38.122 (the "false-lawyer statute"). With respect to a culpable mental state, the trial court's instructions required the jury to determine only whether appellant intended to obtain an economic benefit for himself in holding himself out as a lawyer. The instructions did not include a culpable mental state with respect to the remaining elements that alleged that appellant had held himself out as an attorney, was not currently licensed to practice law, and was not in good standing with the State Bar of Texas and other applicable authorities. In deciding appellant's petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court considered three issues: (1) whether the offense of falsely holding oneself out as a lawyer does not require an instruction as to a culpable mental state beyond the intent expressly prescribed by the plain language in that statute; (2) whether appellant was not entitled to an instruction on a mistake-of-fact defense because his requested instruction did not negate the culpability required for the offense; and (3) whether the appellate court properly determined that the trial court's instruction on the definition of "foreign legal consultant" was not an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Celis v. Texas" on Justia Law

Deputy Jesse Garza of the Victoria County Sheriff's Office was observing a house known for illegal-narcotics activity. He saw a sports-utility vehicle ("SUV") approach the house and observed a passenger, appellee Shirley Copeland, got out, left the deputy's sight, and quickly returned to the SUV. After the SUV left the house, the deputy stopped the driver of the SUV for a traffic violation. Suspecting possible narcotics activity, the deputy asked the driver for consent to search the SUV. Danish agreed, but appellee refused. She claimed to be the owner of the SUV even though she was not listed as the owner on the vehicle registration. Appellee and the driver also informed the deputy that they were married under common law. Although appellee continued to refuse consent, the driver again consented, and the deputy searched the SUV. During his search, the deputy found two white pills, later identified as Tramadol, in the middle console. Appellee was arrested and charged with possession of a dangerous drug. Appellee filed a motion to suppress on two grounds: (1) the deputy's extended detention of her was not a permissible "Terry" stop; and (2) "Randolph" applieed to the search of vehicles just as it did to the search of residences. The trial court's order generally granted the motion, but its findings of fact and conclusions of law addressed only the second ground. The State appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by finding that appellee and the driver were married under common law, (2) that appellee had standing to challenge the search; and (3) that the police officer did have valid consent through the driver. Because it held in appellee's favor, the court of appeals did not reach the first alternative ground in appellee's motion to suppress with respect to the length or scope of the detention. The sole ground on which the Supreme Court granted review in the State's petition for discretionary review challenged the court of appeals's application of "Randolph" to consensual searches of vehicles stopped on a public roadway. The Court agreed with the State that Randolph did not apply to vehicular searches and, therefore, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The case was remanded to appellate court so that it could determine whether the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress should be upheld on the alternative ground asserted in appellee's motion. View "Texas v. Copeland" on Justia Law

On January 26, 2011, appellant was involved in a vehicle accident and was arrested for driving while intoxicated. One of the other people involved in the accident was taken to the hospital. Because of this, without the police obtaining a warrant, appellant was taken to a hospital so that a mandatory, involuntary blood specimen could be taken. Appellant's blood was drawn by Rachel Lopez, an employee of the hospital and an Emergency Medical Technician-Intermediate ("EMT-I"). Appellant moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that Lopez was not a person authorized by section 724.017 of the Transportation Code to take a blood specimen. Specifically, appellant contended that Lopez was not a "qualified technician" within the meaning of the statute because she was part of the hospital's "emergency medical services personnel." Two courts of appeals have held that phlebotomists were "qualified technicians" within the meaning of section 724.017, provided that their qualifications were established on the record. The record in this case showed that Lopez's primary duties were that of a phlebotomist and that she was qualified to be so. Lopez was trained to draw blood, and her primary duty at the hospital for the six years she was employed there was to draw blood. The Supreme Court concluded that Lopez was indeed qualified within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, the Court concluded that functionally, Lopez was not emergency medical services personnel; "that training and her license and title had little to do with what she actually did at the hospital, which was almost exclusively drawing blood." Because Lopez did not function as emergency services personnel, section 724.017(c) and its restrictions on emergency services personnel are not applicable in this case. The Court reversed the appellate court that misapplied the statute to this facts of this case, and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Krause v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Dansby, Sr. argued on direct appeal that his deferred adjudication community supervision was revoked unconstitutionally as a penalty for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to answer questions during the course of a court-imposed sexual history polygraph examination about past sexual assault offenses. In an unpublished opinion, the Dallas Court of Appeals declined to reach that issue, holding that the appellant's community supervision had been legitimately revoked on another basis-that he failed to successfully complete the court-ordered sex offender treatment program that the sexual history polygraph was designed to facilitate. The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to address his contention that he was essentially discharged from the treatment program because he refused to answer incriminating questions during the course of the sexual history polygraph, and that the court of appeals therefore improperly dodged his constitutional claim. View "Dansby v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Gregg Baird hired Dawn Killian to stay at his home and care for his dog while he was away on vacation. During her stay, Killian used appellant's computer in his master bedroom and found child pornography. At a pre-trial suppression hearing, appellant claimed that Killian's access to his bedroom and computer was illegal; therefore, the State could not use the evidence against him at his trial. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress the images taken from his computer. Specifically, the trial court found that appellant did not explicitly exclude Killian from his bedroom or from his computer; that he walked her through the master bedroom and bathroom; and that he told her to "[h]elp [her]self to anything." Based on these fact findings, the trial court determined that Killian had the appellant's effective consent to enter the bedroom and use the computer, and held that, without establishing that Killian violated the law, appellant could not exclude the material. Appellant challenged the trial court's finding, pointing to his own testimony that this comment was only made in the kitchen, and specifically in reference to food. However, after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that appellant repeated that statement at least once during the tour of the home and told her also to "[h]elp herself to everything." That supported the trial court's finding that appellant gave Killian his apparent consent: "[. . .] He did not expressly banish her from the bedroom, nor did he forbid her to use his computer. He showed her how to operate the television and stereo. He did not power the computer down or password-protect it, and he admitted that he allowed his roommate to use it regularly. Given this convergence of facts, the trial court was justified in concluding that Killian had the appellant's apparent consent--that is to say, it is clear and manifest to the understanding that she had his assent in fact-to enter his bedroom and use his computer." View "Baird v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant was found guilty of murder, and his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals in 1992. In 2011, applicant filed this application for post-conviction relief pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07. Applicant contended that he was denied the opportunity to pursue discretionary review by the Supreme Court because his appellate counsel failed to notify him of his conviction's affirmance in the court of appeals until June 1993, by which time the deadline for filing a petition for discretionary review (PDR) had passed. Applicant further contended that counsel's failure to timely notify him of his conviction's affirmance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and that he should now be afforded the opportunity to file an out-of-time PDR. In response, the State invoked the equitable doctrine of laches and argued that applicant be barred from proceeding with his application for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that appellate counsel did not provide applicant with notice of the court of appeals's opinion until after the deadline for filing a PDR, and that applicant had the information necessary to seek an out-of-time PDR as early as 1993 but failed to do so until almost two decades later. The trial court concluded that applicant failed to show that, absent counsel's conduct, he would have timely filed a PDR. "Recognizing that our current approach to laches in the habeas corpus context has imposed an unreasonably heavy burden upon the State, we now adopt a revised approach that is consistent with the Texas common-law definition of that doctrine." The Court expanded the definition of prejudice under the existing laches standard to incorporate all forms of prejudice so that a court may consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to hold an application barred by laches. In light of the revised approach to the doctrine of laches, the Supreme Court remanded this case to the trial court to give both applicant and the State an opportunity to present additional evidence. View "Ex parte Alberto Perez" on Justia Law