Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The trial court found appellant was indigent and appointed trial counsel for him. Subsequently, the court accepted appellant's guilty plea for hindering apprehension and sentenced him to eight years' confinement in the penitentiary. Thereafter, the trial court suspended the appellant's sentence and imposed eight years' community supervision. Without making a finding that the appellant had the present resources to repay the county for his court appointed trial attorney, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay court costs, which, according to a bill of costs attached to the written judgment, included attorney fees. Appellant did not appeal at the time of the imposition of community supervision. But when the appellant's community supervision was later revoked and he was sentenced to eight years' incarceration, that's when appellant raised the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's order to repay attorney fees. The court of appeals acknowledged that the evidence was insufficient to order the repayment of those initial attorney fees, but held that the appellant procedurally defaulted this claim by failing to raise an objection in the trial court at the time that community supervision was imposed. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded appellant procedurally defaulted his claim. View "Wiley v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of second-degree felony possession of marijuana. She initially preserved error by way of a motion to suppress the evidence, which she claimed had been seized during the course of an illegally prolonged roadside detention. But when the evidence was later proffered by the State during the punishment portion of the unitary proceeding following her non-negotiated plea of guilty to the charge, her attorney expressly declared that he had "no objection" to the admission of the evidence. The trial court nevertheless manifested its understanding that the appellant persisted in her wish to appeal the denial of her pretrial motion to suppress and expressly granted her permission to do so. The court of appeals refused to reach the merits of her claim, relying upon longstanding precedent that her attorney had "waived" the previously preserved objection to the evidence for purposes of appeal when he declared that he had "no objection" to its admission. Given the record as a whole, the Supreme Court concluded court of appeals erred by stating that when appellant stated she had "no objection" to the introduction of certain evidence during the punishment portion of the proceedings in this case, she "waived" appellate review of the propriety of the trial court's ruling on her pretrial motion to suppress. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant Vaughn Bell contended the court of appeals erred in finding the trial judge's error that ordered him shackled during trial was harmless. Over a lunch break during the guilt phase of Bell's trial for the offense of possession of a controlled substance, the judge ordered Bell shackled. Accordingly, Bell was shackled with cuffs and "a chain that is linked between his two ankles." Bell objected to the shackling, arguing that using the device in front of the jury, if seen, would deprive him a presumption of innocence, fair trial, "and his rights under United States and Texas Constitution." The State responded by asking the judge to have the court's bailiff sit in various seats in the jury box to see if jurors would be able to see Bell's shackles. Complying, the bailiff told the judge that he could not see the chain or ankle cuffs. Bell countered that the jury would be able to hear the chains rattle if Bell moved during the trial. The judge overruled Bell's objection. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in shackling Bell, but that the error was not constitutional error because there was no evidence the jury saw his restraints. Despite the court of appeals' erroneous application of a constitutional-error harm analysis, the Court affirmed its judgment. View "Bell v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Paul Pawlak was convicted of various counts of prohibited sexual activities including sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, and attempted sexual assault. The court of appeals held that the trial court properly admitted thousands of digital pornographic images at Appellant's trial, including images of child and homosexual pornography. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion when it improperly admitted thousands of extraneous-offense pornographic images over Appellant's objection under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for a harm analysis in the first instance. View "Pawlak v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant of murder for killing his friend, Jeromie Jackson. At trial, appellant admitted that he stabbed Jeromie, but claimed he did so in self-defense. The trial judge instructed the jury on the issue of self-defense, but over appellant's objection, he also instructed the jury on provocation as a qualification on the self-defense issue. The jury rejected appellant's self-defense claim, found him guilty of murder, and sentenced him to eighteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, appellant raised one claim: whether the trial court erred in including the provocation instruction over his objection. The court of appeals found appellant had suffered some harm, reversed appellant's conviction, and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the SPA's petition to review only the court of appeals' determination that appellant suffered harm from the inclusion of the provocation instruction. After its review, the Court agreed with the appellate court that appellant did suffer actual harm when his self-defense claim was improperly limited by the inclusion of an unwarranted provocation instruction. View "Reeves v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was observed taking photographs of patrons at a municipal swimming pool at a public park. The subjects of these photographs included women and children who were wearing swimming suits. Police were notified, and patrol officers responded. In the statement, appellant acknowledged taking photos of women and a girl in bathing suits, but asserted that the photos were taken "just to see if the pictures come out good." Appellant was charged with multiple offenses of improper photography, a state-jail felony. The trial court denied his motions to suppress, and appellant then plead nolo contendere to both indictments. After a punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced him to twenty months' confinement in state jail and imposed a $2,500 fine in each case, with the sentences to run concurrently. On direct appeal, appellant raised one issue: "Does merely taking photographs at a public pool give police reasonable suspicion to stop appellant's vehicle?" The court of appeals overruled that single issue and affirmed the trial court's judgments. The issues before the Supreme Court on appeal of that order was whether a crime "is afoot" when a person takes pictures at a public pool permitting a police officer to conduct an investigative detention?" The Supreme Court responded in the negative, and reversed the court of appeals' judgments. View "Arguellez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Raul Parra was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to lifetime confinement and a one-dollar fine. The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed Parra's conviction, finding that Parra did not preserve any error stemming from the judge's jury admonishment and no juror misconduct occurred. Parra sought habeas relief on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial judge's response to a jury note and for failing to adequately question the venire to reveal one juror's alleged experience as the victim of both domestic violence and sexual assault of a child. Because Parra failed to satisfy the requirements of "Strickland v. Washington," the Supreme Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Parra" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant of fraudulent possession of identifying information, found two enhancement paragraphs in the indictment to be true, and assessed appellant's punishment at 50 years' incarceration. Appellant appealed, but the record that was transmitted to the court of appeals did not contain a certification of the defendant's right of appeal. Because of the absence of the certification, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that instead of dismissing the appeal, the court of appeals should have ordered the trial court to supplement the trial record with a certification of the defendant's right of appeal. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals' dismissal and remanded this case to that court so that it may order the trial court to submit a supplemental record that contains the certification. View "Cortez v. Texas" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether state or federal law disallows the execution of a mentally ill inmate who was previously found incompetent to be executed and later became competent only after he was involuntarily medicated pursuant to a court order. Appellant Steven Kenneth Staley applied for the writ of habeas corpus. Texas law provides that a "person who is incompetent to be executed may not be executed" and permits appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's order mandating involuntary medication of appellant was not permitted under the competency-to-be-executed statute and did not meet the requirements of other statutes that may permit involuntary medication. Because the trial court lacked authority to render it, the trial court's involuntary-medication order was vacated. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that, but for that unauthorized order, the evidence conclusively showed that appellant was incompetent to be executed, and, therefore, vacate dthe trial court's order finding appellant competent to be executed. View "Staley v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2008, appellant was involved in a violent altercation with a friend in which he stabbed the friend 11 times. Appellant was charged with aggravated assault. Appellant's case was reset several times because the appellant had difficulty getting and keeping counsel. Finally, on January 30, 2009, the trial court appointed counsel. After that, the case was reset for pretrial hearings and conferences. On January 2, 2010, the State filed an agreed motion for continuance because a witness was sick. The next day, the judge granted the State's motion and added the notation, "Def. ready." The case was reset seven more times before the trial began on March 4, 2011. In total, the case was reset 25 times over three years. Appellant agreed to every reset in this case. The State, appellant, and (when appellant had one) his trial counsel signed each reset form. At no point throughout this process did appellant object to these delays or file a speedy-trial motion. The first time the appellant raised the issue of a speedy-trial violation was on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to address whether a defendant must raise a speedy-trial claim in the trial court in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. Holding that he must, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals. View "Henson v. Texas" on Justia Law