Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in December, 2014
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A jury convicted appellant of felony driving while intoxicated (DWI), found that appellant did “use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle during the commission of the offense or during immediate flight therefrom,” and assessed punishment at forty years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, appellant claimed that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the deadly-weapon finding. The court of appeals sustained that claim, struck the portion of the trial court’s judgment that found use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, and affirmed the judgment as modified. Both the state and Brister appealed. On this record, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the court of appeals correctly determined that there was no reasonable inference that appellant used his motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. The Court overruled the state’s grounds for review. View "Brister v. Texas" on Justia Law

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The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary review in this case to address several questions related to the appellate review of a juvenile court’s waiver of its otherwise exclusive jurisdiction over a person alleged to have committed a murder at the age of sixteen. In 2008, the State filed a petition alleging that the appellant engaged in delinquent conduct by committing an intentional or knowing murder. On the same date, the State also filed a motion for the juvenile court to waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer the appellant to criminal district court for prosecution as an adult, alleging as grounds for the transfer that, because of the seriousness of the offense alleged, ensuring the welfare of the community required waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. The juvenile court granted the State’s request for a hearing on the motion and, pursuant to Section 54.02(d) of the Juvenile Justice Code in the Texas Family Code, ordered that the Chief Juvenile Probation Officer obtain a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the appellant’s background and the circumstances of the alleged offenses. The juvenile court also ordered the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Authority of Harris County to conduct an examination and file its report. The juvenile court ultimately waived jurisdiction thereby transferring the case to the jurisdiction of the district court where appellant was tried as an adult for first-degree felony murder. The jury convicted, and sentenced appellant to thirty years' confinement. On appeal, appellant argued that the juvenile court’s stated “reasons for waiver” were supported by insufficient evidence and that the juvenile court therefore abused its discretion by waiving jurisdiction over the appellant. In a published opinion, the court of appeals agreed with appellant that the evidence supported neither the juvenile court’s “sophistication-and-maturity” finding nor its “adequate-protection-of-the-public-and-likelihood-of-rehabilitation” finding. The court of appeals vacated the district court’s judgment of conviction, dismissed the criminal proceedings, and declared the case to be still “pending in the juvenile court. The State appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded after its review that court of appeals did not err to undertake a factual-sufficiency review of the evidence underlying the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction over the appellant. But because the juvenile court made no case-specific findings of fact with respect to the seriousness of the offense, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that the evidence failed to support this as a valid reason for waiving juvenile-court jurisdiction and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Moon v. Texas" on Justia Law

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Appellant Henry Taylor, Jr. was convicted of theft following a contract dispute he had over the installation of some commercial signs. Jeff Reich owned a construction company in Longview, and he also owned certain commercial properties in Longview and Kilgore. For several years, Reich had done business with the appellant and appellant’s father, who ran several commercial sign businesses, and Reich had been satisfied with their work. The father stepped down from the business and turned over operations to appellant. Through Reich’s office manager, Vicki Yocum, appellant negotiated a deal by which he agreed to order four LED signs and install them at two of Reich’s commercial properties. When a significant time had passed and Yocum continued to hear nothing from appellant, she began to “hound” him, mostly via text messages, but appellant remained evasive. Frustrated that the LED signs had still not been installed at his properties, Reich contacted the police. Appellant discovered that a warrant had been issued for his arrest, and he turned himself in. Appellant argued that he was convicted of theft solely because his apparent “ineptitude” prevented him from adequately fulfilling his contractual obligations. In a published split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction for theft in an amount between $1,500 and $20,000, a state-jail felony. The majority found that the evidence would support a rational inference that, by the time the appellant took a second installment payment on the contract in the amount of $10,000, on a false premise, he had formulated the requisite intent to deprive his customer of that amount. The dissent argued that the evidence, while certainly sufficient to support the inference that the money was taken under false pretenses, was insufficient to show that the appellant ever intended to renege on the contract. In light of this disagreement among the appellate justices, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted the appellant’s petition for discretionary review and, finding no error with the outcome, affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. View "Taylor v. Texas" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Appellant of capital murder and sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Her conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to examine the court of appeals’ holding that Appellant was not entitled to a lesser-included instruction on manslaughter and, if necessary, to reconsider the Court's jurisprudence on lesser-included offenses. However, because the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the court of appeals that Appellant was not entitled to the lesser-included instruction, it affirmed its judgment. View "Hudson v. Texas" on Justia Law

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Appellant was indicted for five counts of aggravated assault and one count of capital murder. The first five counts of the indictment alleged aggravated assaults of five patients of a dialysis clinic who suffered adverse episodes but did not die. The sixth count charged her with capital murder by murdering more than one person during the same criminal transaction or during different criminal transactions but pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct. The jury acquitted the appellant on two of the aggravated assault charges. It found her guilty of three aggravated assaults and of capital murder. During closing arguments, the State told the jury, “The State has the burden of proof to prove that the Defendant caused the death of at least two of the five victims. You don’t have to agree as to which two.” Appellant argued for the first time on appeal that the language in the jury charge and the State’s closing argument allowed the jury to convict her of capital murder without agreeing on which two or more of the five named individuals were murdered by the appellant, violating the requirement that jury verdicts be unanimous. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to consider whether a jury charge on capital murder under Penal Code Section 19.03(a)(7) must require the jurors to agree as to the identities and the number of the victims. Upon review, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. View "Saenz v. Texas" on Justia Law