Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Whitney S. Villa, who was cited for Class C assault following an incident at a youth football game in Mesquite, Texas. Villa pleaded not guilty but was convicted by a jury in the Municipal Court of the City of Mesquite, a municipal court of record (MCOR), and fined $331. Villa filed a pro se motion for a new trial, citing jury charge error, which was denied. She then appealed, arguing the municipal court erred by not providing a self-defense instruction. The County Court of Criminal Appeals No. 1 for Dallas County reversed the municipal court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.The State of Texas sought further review in the Dallas Court of Appeals. After initial briefings and oral arguments, the court of appeals requested additional briefing on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, the court of appeals dismissed the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Section 30.00027 of the Texas Government Code did not provide the State the right to appeal to the court of appeals from an intermediate appellate court's decision.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals' dismissal. The court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the State's appeal. The court reasoned that the State's right to appeal is governed by Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows the State to appeal an order granting a new trial. Since the County Court of Criminal Appeals' decision effectively granted a new trial, the State was entitled to appeal that decision. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the court of appeals to address the merits of the State's appeal. View "STATE v. VILLA" on Justia Law

The case involves the appellee, Sedrick Johnson, who was arrested on outstanding warrants. Before being given Miranda warnings, Johnson stated, "I need to talk to a lawyer." Later, after receiving Miranda warnings and waiving his rights, he was questioned by the police about a missing child, Junior, who lived with Johnson and his girlfriend. Johnson eventually led the police to Junior's body, and he was charged with injury to a child by omission and capital murder of a child under ten years of age. Johnson moved to suppress his statements and evidence obtained as a result.The trial court granted Johnson's motion to suppress, finding that his statement, "I need to talk to a lawyer," was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Johnson was subjected to custodial interrogation and that his right to counsel was violated when police questioned him after his invocation.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the right to counsel under Miranda cannot be invoked anticipatorily, meaning it cannot be invoked before custodial interrogation begins. Since Johnson was not in custody when he initially requested a lawyer and was given Miranda warnings before any custodial interrogation commenced, his subsequent waiver of rights and statements to the police were valid. The court emphasized that the police complied with Miranda by providing the warnings before the custodial interrogation and that Johnson had the opportunity to invoke his right to counsel at that time but chose not to. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "STATE v. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

The case involves James Earnest Floyd, Jr., who was charged with aggravated robbery after an incident on March 28, 2017, where he shot Diane Porter and her husband John during a robbery at their home. Floyd demanded the PIN for their debit card and threatened to return and kill them if the number was incorrect. Diane identified Floyd as the intruder both at the hospital and in court. Floyd was charged under Texas Penal Code sections 29.02 and 29.03 for aggravated robbery by threat and causing bodily injury.The trial court instructed the jury that they could convict Floyd if they found he committed either form of aggravated robbery. The jury found Floyd guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Floyd appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous in deciding whether he committed aggravated robbery by threat or by causing bodily injury. The Second Court of Appeals held that the two methods of committing aggravated robbery are different means of committing a single offense, and thus, a special unanimity instruction was not required.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the different methods of committing aggravated robbery (by threat or by causing bodily injury) are merely different manners and means of committing the same offense. Therefore, the jury did not need to be unanimous on the specific method used, as long as they unanimously agreed that Floyd committed aggravated robbery. The court concluded that there was no jury unanimity problem and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "FLOYD v. STATE" on Justia Law

Randy Ethan Halprin, a member of the "Texas Seven," escaped from prison in December 2000 and was involved in the murder of Irving Police Officer Aubrey Hawkins during a robbery. Halprin was charged with capital murder and, in 2003, was convicted and sentenced to death by Judge Vickers Cunningham. Halprin's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his initial habeas application was denied. Subsequent applications were dismissed. In 2019, Halprin filed a new writ application alleging that Judge Cunningham was biased against him because he is Jewish, violating his right to due process and the free exercise of his religion.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed Halprin's claim after the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. The trial court found that Judge Cunningham exhibited actual bias against Halprin due to his Jewish faith and recommended granting Halprin a new trial. The State agreed that the evidence showed Cunningham's bias. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals independently reviewed the record and confirmed that Cunningham's anti-Semitic remarks and behavior demonstrated actual bias.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Halprin had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Judge Cunningham was biased against him at the time of the trial. This bias constituted a structural due process violation, entitling Halprin to a new trial. The court granted Halprin a new trial and dismissed his second claim challenging the constitutionality of the future dangerousness special issue as an abuse of the writ. View "In re Halprin" on Justia Law

The appellant was tried and convicted of capital murder for killing more than one person in the same criminal transaction. The victims were his girlfriend, Nicole Gonzales, and her mother, Vickie Gonzales. The murders occurred after Nicole had left the appellant and taken their two children with her. On the day of the murders, Nicole and her family returned home to find the appellant had broken in. Both women were found dead with zip ties around their necks and multiple stab wounds. The appellant was arrested later that evening.The trial court denied the appellant's pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment and to disqualify the Hunt County District Attorney’s Office, which were based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct involving the intrusion into attorney-client privilege. The court also denied a motion for a formal competency hearing, finding no evidence to support a claim of incompetency. The appellant was sentenced to death based on the jury's findings.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case on direct appeal. The appellant raised four points of error, including the trial court's refusal to dismiss the indictment, the denial of a formal competency hearing, the conditions of his pre-trial detention, and the exclusion of certain mitigating evidence during the punishment phase. The court found no reversible error in any of these claims.The court held that the appellant failed to show prejudice from the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and that the trial court did not err in its competency determination. The court also ruled that the appellant's pre-trial detention conditions did not constitute grounds to set aside his conviction. Finally, the court found that the exclusion of parts of a deposition from the appellant's grandmother was either not an abuse of discretion or, if it was, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with assault causing bodily injury. The information did not specify any relationship between the appellant and the complainant, and the plea paperwork only listed the offense as "assault bodily injury." The appellant pled "no contest" to the charge. During the plea hearing, the trial court included a family-violence finding in the deferred adjudication order, despite the lack of evidence or admissions regarding the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the complainant.The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's inclusion of the family-violence finding. The appellate court agreed that an order of deferred adjudication is not a "judgment" and thus Article 42.013 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply. However, it held that the trial court had discretion to enter the family-violence finding based on Articles 42A.104(a) and 42A.504(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which allow the imposition of reasonable conditions of community supervision and fines for offenses involving family violence.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and found that there was no admissible evidence to support the family-violence finding. The court noted that the appellant's plea to ordinary assault bodily injury did not include any allegations of a family or dating relationship. The only possible evidence, a hearsay statement in the officer's probable cause affidavit, was insufficient to establish a dating relationship under the statutory definitions. Consequently, the court held that the trial court lacked discretion to enter the unsupported family-violence finding. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and struck the family-violence finding from the trial court's deferred adjudication order. View "ZAPATA v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was placed on deferred adjudication probation. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to adjudicate, citing the appellant's custody on other charges. The trial court adjudicated the appellant guilty and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment, ordering the sentence to run consecutively with sentences from a prior case involving possession of child pornography. The appellant objected to the cumulation of sentences, but the objection was overruled.The appellant appealed to the 7th Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to stack the sentences was insufficient. The appellate court agreed, noting that the record lacked necessary details such as the cause number, court of conviction, date of conviction, term assessed, and nature of the conviction. Consequently, the appellate court reformed the judgment to reflect that the sentences should run concurrently.The State then petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, arguing that the appellate court erred in deleting the cumulation order and that the proper remedy should be a remand for further development of the record. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State, holding that if a cumulation order is not sufficiently specific, a remand may be permitted to allow the trial court to remedy the order. The court sustained the State’s grounds, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court as reformed. View "STRICKLAND v. STATE" on Justia Law

The applicant was convicted by a jury of injury to a child and sentenced to 35 years’ confinement. The prosecution's theory was that the applicant caused serious bodily injury to the infant victim through Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) or Shaken Impact Syndrome. The defense argued that the injuries were due to an old brain injury that began bleeding again either spontaneously or due to accidental trauma.The applicant's conviction was affirmed by the Dallas Court of Appeals, and a petition for discretionary review was refused. The applicant filed a second state writ application, which was dismissed at his request. He then filed a third writ application under Article 11.073 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, arguing that new scientific evidence contradicted the State’s evidence at trial. The habeas court recommended granting relief based on this new evidence, and the case was remanded for further hearings.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and found that scientific knowledge regarding SBS, short-distance falls, rebleeds of subdural hematomas, and retinal hemorrhaging had evolved significantly since the applicant's trial. The court noted that new scientific evidence showed that short-distance falls could cause serious injuries, shaking alone was unlikely to cause such injuries, and rebleeds of subdural hematomas were common and could occur spontaneously or due to minor trauma. The court also found that the retinal hemorrhaging observed in the victim was not specific to SBS and could be caused by increased intracranial pressure.The court concluded that if the new scientific evidence had been presented at trial, it was more likely than not that the applicant would not have been convicted. Therefore, the court granted relief under Article 11.073, vacated the applicant’s conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "Ex Parte Roark" on Justia Law

David Asa Villarreal was convicted of murder with a repeat offender enhancement and sentenced to sixty years in prison. During his trial, the judge issued an order preventing Villarreal from discussing his ongoing testimony with his attorneys during an overnight recess, though he could discuss other aspects of the case. Villarreal argued that this order violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.The trial court's order was challenged, and the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Villarreal's conviction. The appellate court was divided on whether the trial court's order constituted an abuse of discretion or should be reviewed de novo. The case was then brought before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas for discretionary review.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the trial judge's limited no-conferral order did not violate Villarreal's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court distinguished between prohibiting discussions about ongoing testimony, which is permissible, and prohibiting all communication, which is not. The court noted that the trial judge's order was narrowly tailored to prevent coaching while allowing discussions on other trial-related matters. The court emphasized that the right to counsel includes the ability to discuss trial tactics and other legal matters, but not the ongoing testimony itself. The court affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial judge's order did not meaningfully interfere with Villarreal's right to counsel. View "VILLARREAL v. STATE" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Public Safety detained and arrested the appellant for criminal trespassing as part of Operation Lone Star in Maverick County. Unlike the appellant, the two women in his group were transferred to the custody of the U.S. Border Patrol. The appellant claimed selective arrest and prosecution based on his sex and sought relief through pretrial habeas proceedings.The trial court held a hearing and heard testimony from various witnesses, including DPS officers and a client advocate. The court found that the appellant, along with other adult males, was arrested for criminal trespass while the women were transferred to federal custody due to jail capacity issues. The trial court denied the appellant's pretrial writ and motion to dismiss, concluding there was no sex discrimination.The Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the appellant's claim was cognizable on pretrial habeas and found that he had demonstrated a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case to allow the State to rebut the presumption of sex discrimination under strict scrutiny.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and agreed that the appellant's claim was cognizable. However, the court found that the appellant failed to meet the demanding burden of showing a prima facie case of selective enforcement or prosecution. The court noted that the evidence suggested the discriminatory effect was due to logistical issues during an ongoing state of emergency, rather than intentional sex discrimination. The court reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. View "EX PARTE APARICIO" on Justia Law