Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The applicant was convicted of felony theft in 1994 and received a six-year probated sentence. In 2000, his community supervision was revoked due to a new charge of aggravated sexual assault, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. The applicant did not appeal either conviction. In 2010, he was convicted of two new offenses in Hunt County, and his 2000 aggravated sexual assault conviction was used for enhancement, resulting in life sentences.After his Hunt County convictions were upheld on appeal in 2013, the applicant began post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings. In 2018, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief on his 2000 aggravated sexual assault conviction due to a Brady violation, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. Subsequently, the applicant challenged his Hunt County convictions, arguing that the enhancement was illegal. The court granted partial relief, ordering resentencing for one conviction but finding the enhancement harmless for the other due to the applicant's prior theft conviction.In October 2023, the applicant filed his first habeas corpus application challenging the revocation of his community supervision for the theft conviction, arguing that his plea was part of a "package deal" with the now-invalidated aggravated sexual assault plea. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief based on the doctrine of laches, citing the applicant's lengthy delay in challenging the revocation and the resulting prejudice to the state. The court emphasized the state's compromised ability to contest the claim and the potential impact on the finality of the Hunt County convictions. The court concluded that the applicant's delay and the resulting prejudice to the state warranted denying relief. View "EX PARTE HILL" on Justia Law

The appellant was observed stealing items from a convenience store and was confronted by an employee, Parks, outside the store. During a struggle over the stolen items, the appellant pulled out a pocketknife and used it to cut the strap of a cooler he was trying to take. Parks testified that he feared the appellant might use the knife against him, although the appellant did not swing or point the knife at him. The appellant was later arrested with a folding knife in his possession, which officers described as sharp and capable of causing serious injury.The jury convicted the appellant of aggravated robbery, finding that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon (the knife) during the robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the use of the knife as a deadly weapon. The Fifth Court of Appeals agreed with the appellant, finding the evidence insufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery. The court reformed the judgment to reflect a conviction for the lesser offense of robbery and remanded the case for resentencing.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals. The higher court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the appellant used or exhibited the knife as a deadly weapon. The court noted that the knife's presence and the appellant's actions could reasonably be interpreted as a threat capable of causing serious bodily injury. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, upholding the conviction for aggravated robbery. View "GLOVER v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with and convicted of two counts of super aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony with a minimum sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment. The indictment contained grammatical errors, but it tracked the required language in the aggravated sexual assault of a child statute under Section 22.021(a)(2)(B) of the Texas Penal Code.The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the grammatical errors in the indictment rendered it indeterminate as to which aggravating element was being alleged. The court modified the judgment to reflect convictions for lesser-included offenses and remanded the case for a new punishment hearing.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and addressed whether Subsection (f) in Section 22.021 of the Penal Code is an element of the offense or a punishment enhancement. The court concluded that Subsection (f) constitutes separate elements of a distinct super aggravated sexual assault of a child offense. The court found that the indictment, despite its grammatical errors, sufficiently alleged a super aggravated sexual assault of a child offense with an aggravating factor under Section 22.021(a)(2)(A)(ii). Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's conviction. View "GUTIERREZ v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Eliott Nathaniel Guerrero was serving two consecutive sentences: a 12-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance and a 28-year sentence for aggravated assault. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) initially calculated his sentences to run concurrently instead of consecutively. This error was discovered after Guerrero completed his first sentence and the Parole Board voted for his release on parole for the second sentence. Guerrero requested the Parole Board to designate the date he would have been released on his first sentence had the sentences been calculated correctly, but received no response.Guerrero filed an application for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, seeking to compel the Parole Board to comply with Section 508.150 of the Government Code and designate the date he would have been eligible for release on his controlled substances conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus against the Parole Board, as the case involved a criminal law matter.The Court held that Guerrero did not have an adequate remedy at law other than mandamus and that the Parole Board had violated a ministerial duty by failing to designate the parole eligibility date as required by law. Consequently, the Court conditionally granted Guerrero’s petition for writ of mandamus, directing the Parole Board to comply with the statutory requirement. The writ would issue only if the Parole Board failed to comply with the Court's opinion. View "IN RE GUERRERO" on Justia Law

Jimmy Giddings, a drug dealer, was murdered during a home invasion at his residence in Dallas. Security cameras captured four masked men loitering near the scene before the crime. When Giddings arrived home, the men attacked, resulting in Giddings being fatally shot and his girlfriend, Nikita Dickerson, sustaining non-life-threatening injuries. The police used a "geofence" warrant to obtain location data from Google, which identified a device belonging to the appellant, Aaron Rayshan Wells, at the crime scene. This led to the identification of the other three assailants.The trial court denied Wells' motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the geofence warrant, ruling that the warrant was sufficiently particular. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that the warrant was narrowly tailored to capture only relevant data and that there was probable cause to believe the suspects carried cell phones with Google location services enabled.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the geofence warrant was supported by probable cause and met the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. The warrant was deemed sufficiently specific in terms of time and location, minimizing the risk of capturing data from uninvolved individuals. The court concluded that the warrant's three-step process did not require additional judicial oversight due to its narrow scope. View "WELLS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Tony Egbuna Ford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The trial court ordered El Paso County to pay for the collection and testing of a blood sample from Ford and directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to provide access to Ford for this purpose. TDCJ sought mandamus relief from both orders.Ford's conviction was affirmed on appeal, and his first habeas application was denied. Two subsequent habeas applications were dismissed. With no habeas proceeding pending, Ford filed a motion for funding for genetic testing, claiming it could prove he did not personally shoot the victim. The trial court granted the motion, ordering El Paso County to pay for the testing and TDCJ to provide access to Ford for the blood sample.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The court concluded that TDCJ did not have standing to challenge the Funding Order, as it did not demonstrate a justiciable interest in El Paso County's finances. However, the court found that TDCJ was entitled to mandamus relief on the Access Order. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the Access Order because Ford's conviction was final, and no pending proceeding or statute conferred authority on the trial court to issue such an order.The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to rescind the Access Order. The writ of mandamus would issue only if the trial court failed to comply with the opinion. View "IN RE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted for assault, with the indictment specifying that the victim was a Menard County Deputy Sheriff. The key issue was whether this indictment allowed for a conviction of assault on a peace officer. The trial court's voir dire and jury instructions referred to the offense as assault on a peace officer, and the appellant did not object until after the trial began. The jury found the appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to twelve years in prison, which is within the range for assault on a peace officer, a second-degree felony.The Fourth Court of Appeals found that the indictment only supported a conviction for assault on a public servant, a third-degree felony, and not assault on a peace officer. They concluded that the indictment did not explicitly state the victim was a peace officer and thus could not support the higher charge. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial on punishment, as the sentence exceeded the range for a third-degree felony.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals. They held that the indictment, which described the victim as a deputy sheriff, did indeed support a conviction for assault on a peace officer. The court reasoned that a deputy sheriff is defined as a peace officer under Texas law, and thus the indictment contained all necessary elements for the higher charge. The court also noted that the appellant's objections were untimely and that the jury charge and verdict form, which included the deputy sheriff designation, sufficiently supported the conviction for assault on a peace officer. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "CRAWFORD v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The applicant pled guilty to robbery and received a ten-year confinement sentence. He later filed for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his plea was involuntary because he believed he would receive shock probation after an initial period of incarceration. He also argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for shock probation, which was necessary for him to be considered for it.The 453rd District Court of Hays County reviewed the application and forwarded it to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The habeas court concluded that the applicant's plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, citing Ex parte Bittikoffer. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals found this reliance misplaced, as Bittikoffer did not address involuntary plea claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the applicant's plea was not involuntary because the counsel's advice and representation before the plea were competent. The court explained that a plea is not rendered involuntary due to counsel's post-plea actions. However, the court found that the applicant's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file the motion for shock probation, which the applicant was entitled to under his plea agreement. This failure deprived the applicant of a hearing on shock probation.As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted habeas corpus relief, vacated the applicant's sentence, and remanded him to the custody of the Sheriff of Hays County for a new punishment hearing. The court ordered that copies of the opinion be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division and Board of Pardons and Paroles. View "EX PARTE MOSQUERA" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder in July 2018 by a Harris County jury for killing Gelareh Bagherzadeh and Coty Beavers in different criminal transactions but as part of the same scheme or course of conduct. The trial court sentenced him to death based on the jury's answers to special issues. The appellant raised thirty points of error on direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.In the lower court, the appellant was tried and convicted in the 184th Judicial District Court of Harris County. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. The appellant's conviction and sentence were automatically appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the appellant's thirty points of error and found no reversible error. The court addressed various issues, including the admissibility of evidence, the conduct of the trial, and the constitutionality of the capital murder statute as applied. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior bad acts, including his attempts to kill his daughter and his involvement in drug smuggling. The court also found that the trial court properly handled the appellant's objections to the prosecution's questions and the conduct of the jurors. Additionally, the court rejected the appellant's claim that the capital murder statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "MAHMOUD v. STATE" on Justia Law

The State of Texas charged the appellee with felony assault of a peace officer. During plea negotiations, the State offered to dismiss the felony charge if the appellee agreed to plead guilty to two DWI charges. However, the appellee never agreed to this plea deal. Despite this, the State dismissed the felony and DWI charges but later refiled the felony under a new cause number. The appellee filed a motion for specific performance, seeking to enforce the dismissal of the refiled felony, alleging that the prosecutor had promised not to refile the charge.The trial court granted the appellee’s motion for specific performance, directing the State to dismiss the refiled felony assault charge. The State appealed, arguing that no enforceable plea agreement existed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that there was an immunity from prosecution agreement between the State and the appellee, which the trial court approved. Justice Jewell dissented, arguing that no such agreement existed and that there was no consideration for the prosecutor’s promise.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that there was no enforceable plea agreement. The court held that the prosecutor’s promise to dismiss the felony assault case and not refile it did not constitute an immunity agreement or a binding plea bargain agreement. The court noted that the appellee never agreed to the terms of the plea offer, and the trial court never approved any such agreement. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and entered a judgment reversing the trial court’s order granting the appellee’s motion for specific performance. View "STATE v. HATTER" on Justia Law