Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police responded to a business after several 911 hang-up calls and found the defendant’s mother covered in transmission fluid. The defendant, after a verbal exchange with officers, retreated into an office and refused commands to come out. Officers entered, and a struggle ensued as they attempted to arrest him. The defendant resisted, was tased, and continued to resist while being handcuffed. During the struggle, he bit an officer, causing a serious injury. The defendant claimed he bit the officer because he feared for his life, alleging the officer was impeding his breathing.At trial in the 207th District Court of Comal County, the defendant was charged with assault on a public servant. He requested a jury instruction on the necessity defense, arguing his actions were immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm. The trial court denied this request but included a self-defense instruction. The jury convicted him. On appeal, the First Court of Appeals held the defendant was not entitled to the necessity defense because he provoked the difficulty and, under the self-defense statute, was not justified in using force to resist arrest after he had already resisted. The court also found any error in the self-defense instruction was harmless, as the defendant was not entitled to it under the law.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether a defendant who illegally resists arrest and then claims necessity to justify assaulting an officer can use that defense. The court held that if a defendant is barred from using self-defense to resist arrest under the statutory resisting-arrest exclusion, he is likewise barred from using the necessity defense for the same conduct. The court overruled its prior decision in Bowen v. State, clarified that the resisting-arrest exclusion in the self-defense statute also applies to the necessity statute, and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "NAVARRO v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death after a jury found she intentionally killed a pregnant woman, Reagan Hancock, and removed the unborn child, Braxlynn, in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping. The evidence showed the appellant had a history of faking pregnancies and went to great lengths to convince her boyfriend she was expecting a child, including purchasing a fake belly and staging events. On the day of the offense, she attacked Hancock, inflicted numerous fatal injuries, performed a crude C-section to remove the baby, and was later stopped by law enforcement with the infant, who was not breathing and later died.The case was tried in the 202nd Judicial District Court of Bowie County, Texas. The appellant raised multiple pretrial motions, including for a change of venue and a continuance, both of which were denied. She also challenged the admission of various pieces of evidence and the conduct of the prosecution. The jury found her guilty of capital murder and answered special issues in favor of the death penalty. The conviction and sentence were subject to automatic direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed twenty-five points of error, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the kidnapping element, pretrial publicity, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial conduct, and the scope of expert testimony. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find the aggravating element of kidnapping or attempted kidnapping, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary or procedural rulings. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction and sentence of death. View "PARKER v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A state trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding in Waller County, Texas. The driver and passenger appeared nervous, and the trooper noticed strong odors of food and cigarillo smoke, with a possible faint smell of marijuana. After the occupants denied consent to search, a backup officer arrived with a drug-detection dog. During an open-air sniff, the dog’s handler directed the dog to various parts of the vehicle. The dog repeatedly jumped up and stuck its nose through the open passenger window into the car’s interior. After the third intrusion, the dog alerted, and officers searched the vehicle, finding a large quantity of pills. The driver was charged with possession of a controlled substance.The 506th District Court of Waller County initially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion and that the dog’s alert provided probable cause. Upon reconsideration, however, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the dog’s nose entering the vehicle constituted a trespass and an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence found should be excluded. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the dog’s intrusion into the vehicle’s interior was an unreasonable search.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals’ decision. The court held that the repeated physical intrusion of the drug-detection dog’s nose into the interior of the vehicle during an open-air sniff constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Because this search was conducted without probable cause, the trial court properly suppressed the evidence obtained as a result. The court clarified that such an intrusion is distinct from a routine exterior sniff and is subject to constitutional protections. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. ORGAN" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was stopped by a Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy for a traffic violation. The individual, who was a convicted felon with an active warrant for a parole violation, was driving a car borrowed from his sister and was armed with her handgun. During the stop, the individual lied about his identity and, after his passenger left the scene, shot and killed the deputy at close range while the deputy was standing by his patrol car. The individual fled, disposed of the weapon, and was later apprehended at a nearby shopping center. At trial, he admitted to the shooting but claimed it was accidental, asserting he was attempting a citizen’s arrest.The 230th Judicial District Court of Harris County tried the case. The jury found the individual guilty of capital murder and, after considering evidence of his extensive criminal history and lack of remorse, answered the special issues in a manner that resulted in a death sentence. The individual represented himself at trial after waiving his right to counsel, but later unsuccessfully sought to withdraw that waiver and have counsel reappointed. He raised several points of error on appeal, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his request to withdraw his waiver of counsel, the admission of certain punishment-phase evidence, and the constitutionality of Texas’s death penalty statute.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case on direct appeal. The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support both the conviction for capital murder and the jury’s finding of future dangerousness. It found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request to withdraw the waiver of counsel, nor in the admission of the challenged evidence. The court also determined that the constitutional challenges to the death penalty statute were not preserved for review and, in any event, lacked merit. The conviction and sentence of death were affirmed. View "SOLIS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after a contentious visit to San Antonio Police Department headquarters regarding a child custody issue, returned later that day and fatally shot a police detective who was sitting in his patrol car. The defendant was apprehended the following day by a SWAT team, and during and after his arrest, he made several incriminating statements to law enforcement, a detention officer, and a mental health assessor. At trial, the defendant challenged the admissibility of these statements, arguing they were involuntary or obtained in violation of his rights. He also raised issues regarding jury selection, the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations, and the constitutionality of certain aspects of Texas’s capital sentencing scheme.The 379th District Court of Bexar County conducted the trial. The jury convicted the defendant of capital murder for killing a peace officer in the line of duty and, based on their answers to special sentencing issues, imposed a sentence of death. The defendant raised multiple points of error on direct appeal, including claims that his statements should have been suppressed, that the State’s peremptory strike of a Black venireperson was racially motivated, that the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations violated statutory and constitutional rights, and that the Texas capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case on automatic direct appeal. The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s statements, as they were either voluntary or not the product of custodial interrogation. The court found no clear error in the trial court’s rejection of the Batson challenge, concluding the State’s reasons for the peremptory strike were race-neutral. The court determined that the presence of alternates during deliberations, while a statutory violation, was harmless error. The court also rejected the constitutional challenges to the sentencing scheme. The conviction and death sentence were affirmed. View "MCKANE v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of engaging in organized criminal activity and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He filed three post-conviction motions under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking DNA testing on a golf club used in the offense. The trial court denied all three motions, finding that identity was not an issue and that exculpatory DNA results would not have affected the outcome. The appellant received notice of the denial of his third motion several months after the order was signed.The Thirteenth Court of Appeals previously affirmed the trial court’s denial of the first two DNA testing motions. When the appellant attempted to appeal the denial of his third motion, he filed two separate motions for extension of time to file his notice of appeal: one under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.6, which is specific to DNA appeals, and another under Rule 26.3, which applies generally to criminal appeals. The Rule 26.3 motion was filed in the court of appeals, while the Rule 4.6 motion was filed in the trial court. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, noting that the notice of appeal was untimely and that the Rule 4.6 motion was pending in the trial court.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing the general motion for extension while the DNA-specific motion was pending. The court held that neither motion properly invoked the appellate court’s jurisdiction: the Rule 26.3 motion was untimely, and the Rule 4.6 motion was unsworn and therefore did not meet the requirements to serve as a notice of appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "HERNANDEZ v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A man named Desoto rode his motorcycle to Kitchens’s auto shop, entered, and was shot by Kitchens after a brief, heated encounter. The incident was captured on surveillance video without audio. Testimony at trial described Desoto as a large, intimidating man who used threatening language toward Kitchens. Kitchens and his employees testified about Desoto’s size, appearance, and behavior, emphasizing that he was not a typical customer and that his actions were menacing. Kitchens claimed he acted out of sudden terror, fearing for his life due to Desoto’s threats and demeanor.After Kitchens was convicted of murder, the First Court of Appeals in Houston reversed and remanded for a new punishment trial, finding error in the trial court’s failure to submit a “sudden passion” instruction. At the new punishment trial, defense counsel continued to focus on Desoto’s intimidating appearance and alleged threats. During closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that Kitchens was prejudiced against Hispanics and that Desoto was perceived as “scary” because he was Hispanic. Defense counsel objected, arguing there was no evidence of racial motivation, but the trial court overruled the objection. The court of appeals later held that the prosecutor’s comments were a reasonable inference from the evidence and a permissible response to defense arguments.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case and held that the prosecutor’s comments about Kitchens’s alleged prejudice against Hispanics were improper because there was no evidence in the record to support a finding of racial motivation. The court found that the prosecutor’s argument was not a reasonable deduction from the evidence nor a legitimate response to defense counsel. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for a harm analysis. View "KITCHENS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was initially indicted for murder following the stabbing death of an individual in El Paso, Texas. The defendant was accused of killing the victim after a dispute during a sexual encounter, subsequently stealing the victim’s truck, and fleeing to Mexico. After his arrest, the defendant’s counsel repeatedly requested discovery and asserted readiness for trial, while the State delayed providing evidence and sought continuances, citing reasons such as incomplete forensic testing and missing witnesses.The 210th District Court of El Paso County first handled the case, where the defendant moved for dismissal on speedy trial grounds. In response, the State dismissed the murder indictment and reindicted the defendant for capital murder, announcing its intent to seek the death penalty. The defendant then moved to dismiss the new indictment, alleging prosecutorial vindictiveness—arguing that the State escalated the charges in retaliation for his assertion of speedy trial rights. The trial court found the State’s justifications not credible, determined that the reindictment was vindictive, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The State appealed, and the Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the State acted vindictively and that dismissal with prejudice was warranted to neutralize the taint.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice. The court held that, while the record supported a finding of prosecutorial vindictiveness, dismissal with prejudice was not necessary to neutralize the constitutional violation because the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not actually violated. The court concluded that the trial court exceeded its authority and modified the dismissal to be without prejudice, allowing the State to reindict the defendant for murder or a lesser-included offense at its discretion. The judgment of the Eighth Court of Appeals was reversed. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. GABALDON" on Justia Law

A woman who operated a daycare center for infants was charged with felony murder after a four-month-old child in her care died. Toxicology tests revealed a fatal level of diphenhydramine (an ingredient in Benadryl) in the infant’s blood. The prosecution’s theory was that the woman administered the drug to the child via a baby bottle, causing the child’s death. Evidence at trial included testimony from medical experts, daycare employees, and parents, as well as circumstantial evidence about the woman’s control over bottle preparation and the presence of diphenhydramine and related equipment in her home.After her initial conviction and a series of appeals, the Texas Seventh Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed her conviction following a retrial. The appellate court also upheld the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained from electronic devices seized from her home and ruled that she had not preserved certain evidentiary objections for appeal because she failed to request a limiting instruction.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the felony murder conviction, finding that a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the woman administered a lethal dose of diphenhydramine to the infant, constituting an act clearly dangerous to human life. However, the court found that the search warrants for the electronic devices lacked a sufficient nexus between the alleged offense and the devices, making the search unconstitutional. The court also determined that the appellate court erred in its application of evidentiary rules regarding preservation of objections. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "FRASER v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A man owned several pit bulls on his rural property near Texarkana, Texas. Despite a fence, the dogs repeatedly escaped and attacked people and animals in the area. After a series of incidents—including attacks on a neighbor’s horse and a woman on a scooter—the owner was formally notified by law enforcement that his dogs were considered dangerous under Texas law. Despite this notice, the dogs continued to escape and, in September 2022, attacked a ten-year-old boy, causing serious injuries that required surgery.The owner was indicted for injury to a child by omission, with the prosecution alleging he failed to restrain or enclose his dangerous dogs as required by Section 822.042(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code. A jury in the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to thirty-five years in prison. On appeal, the Sixth Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the State failed to prove the owner had a statutory duty to protect the child, reasoning that only duties arising from the Texas Family Code had previously been recognized for this type of offense.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case to determine whether Section 822.042(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code can serve as a statutory duty to act for purposes of the injury to a child by omission statute. The court held that Section 822.042(a) does impose a mandatory statutory duty on owners of dangerous dogs to restrain or enclose them, and that this duty can be imported to satisfy the statutory duty element required for conviction under Penal Code Section 22.04(b)(1). The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "COCKRELL v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law