Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael Kleinman and his business, Auspro Enterprises, L.P., were charged with multiple violations of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, resulting in Class C misdemeanor convictions in municipal court. They appealed for a trial de novo in the Williamson County Court at Law No. 5, posting appellate bonds totaling $64,881.72. They also filed pretrial applications for writs of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances on vagueness grounds. The county court at law denied relief on the merits, but acknowledged that the appellants were restrained by the cash appeal bonds.The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the county court at law’s denial of habeas relief, but did not address the merits of the appellants' arguments. Instead, it concluded that pretrial habeas relief was not available to applicants charged with fine-only offenses who were not in custody or released on bond. The court of appeals reasoned that the potential for re-arrest due to non-payment of fines was too speculative to constitute sufficient restraint.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The higher court held that the appellants were indeed restrained within the meaning of the habeas corpus statutes due to the combination of the complaints, preliminary convictions, and the appellate bonds requiring their appearance in court. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of "restraint" is broad and includes any control that subjects a person to the general authority and power of the state. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "EX PARTEAUSPRO ENTERPRISES, L.P." on Justia Law

Michael Kleinman and his business, Auspro Enterprises, L.P., were charged with multiple violations of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, operating a "head shop," which are Class C misdemeanors. Both were convicted in municipal court and sought a trial de novo in the Williamson County Court at Law No. 5. They posted appellate bonds totaling $64,881.72 and filed pretrial applications for writs of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances on vagueness grounds. The county court at law denied relief on the merits, finding that the appellants were restrained in their liberty due to the cash appeal bonds.The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the county court at law's denial of relief but did not address the merits. Instead, it concluded that pretrial habeas relief was not available to applicants charged with a fine-only offense who were not in custody or released from custody on bond. The court of appeals found that the potential for re-arrest was too speculative to constitute a sufficient restraint to justify habeas relief.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' judgment. The court held that the appellants were indeed restrained within the meaning of the habeas corpus statutes due to the combination of the complaints filed against them, their preliminary convictions, and the appellate bonds they posted. The court emphasized that the definition of "restraint" under Texas law is broad and includes any control that subjects a person to the general authority and power of the state. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "EX PARTE KLEINMAN" on Justia Law

In this case, the applicant was convicted of capital murder for the 2004 killing of an elderly man, James Tomlin, during a robbery. The applicant and his girlfriend, Leketha Allen, were implicated in the crime, with the applicant providing statements to the police detailing their involvement. The medical examiner, Dr. Nizam Peerwani, testified that Tomlin's death was caused by smothering with positional asphyxia, which was critical in proving the applicant's intent to kill.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals previously affirmed the applicant's conviction and death sentence. The applicant's first post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. In his subsequent application, the applicant raised claims that his due process rights were violated by the presentation of false or misleading testimony by Dr. Peerwani and that new scientific evidence contradicted the evidence presented at trial.The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the lower court to review the merits of these claims. The habeas court held evidentiary hearings and considered testimony from various experts, including Dr. Peerwani, who reaffirmed his trial testimony. The habeas court recommended granting relief based on the new evidence and alleged false testimony.Upon review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the habeas court considered evidence beyond the scope of the claims raised in the application. The court determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate that Dr. Peerwani's testimony was false or misleading and that the new scientific evidence did not meet the requirements for relief under Article 11.073. Consequently, the court denied the applicant post-conviction habeas relief. View "EX PARTE CARTER" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of evading arrest with a prior conviction, making it a state-jail felony. He was present in person for the guilt-innocence phase but appeared remotely via videoconferencing for the punishment phase due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He did not object to this remote appearance during the trial but later argued on appeal that it violated his constitutional and statutory rights to be present at trial.The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the appellant did not need to object at trial to preserve his complaint about the remote appearance for appeal. The court held that the right to be personally present at sentencing is a waivable-only right, meaning it must be affirmatively waived and is not subject to forfeiture by failing to object at trial. The court found no evidence of such a waiver and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case on the State's petition for discretionary review. The court agreed with the lower court that the right to be personally present at the punishment phase is a waivable-only right. The court held that this right cannot be forfeited by inaction and must be affirmatively waived. The court rejected the State's argument that the appellant's failure to object constituted a waiver and affirmed the lower court's decision to remand for a new sentencing hearing. The court clarified that the statutory right to personal presence at trial and sentencing is fundamental and requires an explicit waiver to be relinquished. View "TATES v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Robert Hallman was convicted of multiple sex crimes against his daughter, Amy. During the punishment phase, Hallman moved for a mistrial after discovering that the State had failed to timely disclose thirteen pages of a family violence packet and his then-wife Kim’s handwritten statement related to a domestic assault extraneous to the case. The key issues before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas were the appropriate standard of review for such a violation and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Hallman a mistrial.The trial court denied Hallman’s motion for a mistrial, observing that the newly disclosed information was cumulative to the existing evidence. On direct appeal, the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth reversed the conviction, holding that the untimely-disclosed evidence was material under Article 39.14 and prejudiced Hallman’s ability to demonstrate that his accusers were lying. The State then petitioned for discretionary review, and the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Watkins v. State, which defined “material” under Article 39.14. On remand, the Second Court of Appeals again reversed the trial court, applying the Mosley three-factor test to conclude that the non-constitutional harm was severely prejudicial.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the non-constitutional harmless error analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) was the appropriate standard of review. The Court found that the State’s failure to timely disclose the documents had only a very slight effect on the jury’s verdict, given the abundance of inculpatory evidence against Hallman. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the Second Court of Appeals’ decision and affirmed the trial court’s denial of mistrial. View "HALLMAN v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A 15-year-old girl ran away from home and was taken in by the appellant, who coerced her into having sex with men for money, which he kept. The appellant was convicted of trafficking a child by compelling her to engage in prostitution.The appellant appealed, relying on the Fourteenth Court of Appeals' decision in Turley v. State, which held that a 4-year-old could not commit prostitution due to age. The appellant argued that this should extend to children aged 14 to 17, as they generally cannot consent to sex. The State argued that Turley was incorrectly decided. The First Court of Appeals declined to extend Turley to older children and upheld the conviction, noting legislative intent to treat older teens differently regarding consent.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The court held that under the plain language of the trafficking and compelling-prostitution statutes, a child under 17 can be a victim of trafficking by compelled prostitution. The court emphasized that the focus should be on whether the statutes criminalize the conduct, not on the child's ability to consent. The court found that the statutes are unambiguous and must be interpreted according to their plain meaning, which supports the prosecution of the appellant. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's conviction. View "MILTON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and sought habeas relief to avoid prosecution, arguing she had already been prosecuted and punished for contempt for the same DWI. The contempt order was void for lack of notice and was withdrawn by the trial court. However, her claim of multiple punishments was found to be meritorious.The trial court initially charged the appellant with misdemeanor DWI in November 2021, with bond conditions including not committing any crimes. In 2022, while the first DWI was pending, she was charged with additional offenses, including a second DWI. The trial court ordered her to show cause for contempt for violating bond conditions, specifically for the second DWI. Despite objections to the notice, the appellant was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to three days in jail, probated for nine months. The contempt judgment was later withdrawn due to lack of notice. The trial court denied her habeas corpus application, and she appealed.The First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the contempt judgment was void and that the appellant had not been placed in jeopardy since the contempt order was vacated.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that the appellant's successive prosecution claim was without merit due to the void contempt order. However, the court found that her multiple punishments claim was valid. The court determined that the appellant was punished for the second DWI through the contempt judgment, and any further punishment for the same offense would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the DWI charge. View "EX PARTE ESTEVEZ" on Justia Law

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Texas electronic communications harassment statute, arguing that his prosecution was based on the content of his messages, which he claimed were protected under the First Amendment. The State contended that the prosecution was not content-based and, even if it was, it served a compelling interest in protecting individuals from abuse.The appellant was convicted in a trial court for sending approximately three dozen electronic messages to his former therapist over a 15-week period. The messages were sent to her professional accounts and contained content that the therapist found disturbing and harassing. The trial court admitted the messages into evidence and overruled the appellant's objections based on First Amendment protections. The jury found the appellant guilty of two counts of harassment, and he was sentenced to 180 days in jail and a $500 fine.The Seventh Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute regulated conduct rather than speech and that the appellant's messages were integral to criminal conduct, thus not protected by the First Amendment. The court of appeals concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the appellant.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the appellant was indeed prosecuted for the content of his messages, which violated his First Amendment rights. The court held that the statute, as applied to the appellant, was a content-based restriction on speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required to justify such restrictions. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the indictment. View "OWENS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The relator was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. While his direct appeal was pending, he filed an initial habeas application and a motion to recuse the district judge from presiding over post-conviction proceedings. The motion was granted, and a visiting judge, Judge Wright, was assigned to the habeas proceeding. The District Attorney objected to Judge Wright’s assignment under Texas Government Code § 74.053(d), leading to her replacement by another visiting judge, Judge Reed. The relator sought mandamus relief, arguing that the State should not have an automatic veto over the assignment of the habeas judge.The 112th Judicial District Court in Upton County initially handled the case. The relator's motion to recuse the district judge was granted without issue. However, the District Attorney's objection to Judge Wright's assignment was sustained, and Judge Reed was appointed instead. The relator then sought mandamus relief, contending that the administrative presiding judge lacked the authority to grant the State an automatic veto over the assignment of the habeas judge.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The court held that Texas Government Code § 74.053(d) applies only to civil cases, as established in the precedent Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals. The court found no sufficient justification to overrule Lanford, despite amendments to the statute. Consequently, the administrative presiding judge was incorrect to remove the visiting judge under that provision. The court granted mandamus relief, ordering the administrative presiding judge to rescind the order removing Judge Wright. The court did not address the State's alternative argument regarding Judge Wright's qualifications, as it was not considered by the administrative presiding judge. View "In re GREEN" on Justia Law

A vehicle was stopped by Trooper Ryan Wilkinson in Smith County for speeding, having an expired temporary tag, and an inoperative brake light. The driver, Bridgett Tobler, did not have a valid driver’s license, and the passenger, Justin Heath Pettit, was on probation. After confirming there were no warrants for either individual, Trooper Wilkinson prolonged the stop to wait for a K-9 unit, which arrived nearly an hour later. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search that uncovered prescription medication, syringes, and a sawed-off shotgun. Pettit was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon.The trial court granted Pettit’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the detention was unreasonably prolonged without reasonable suspicion, violating the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed, arguing that Pettit, as a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the search. The Twelfth Court of Appeals agreed with the State, reversing the trial court’s decision and holding that Pettit did not have standing to contest the search.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that Pettit had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. The court reasoned that both drivers and passengers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being detained longer than necessary for a traffic stop. The search of the vehicle was deemed the fruit of the unreasonably prolonged detention. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration of whether the prolonged detention was reasonable. View "State v. Pettit" on Justia Law