Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and sought habeas relief to avoid prosecution, arguing she had already been prosecuted and punished for contempt for the same DWI. The contempt order was void for lack of notice and was withdrawn by the trial court. However, her claim of multiple punishments was found to be meritorious.The trial court initially charged the appellant with misdemeanor DWI in November 2021, with bond conditions including not committing any crimes. In 2022, while the first DWI was pending, she was charged with additional offenses, including a second DWI. The trial court ordered her to show cause for contempt for violating bond conditions, specifically for the second DWI. Despite objections to the notice, the appellant was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to three days in jail, probated for nine months. The contempt judgment was later withdrawn due to lack of notice. The trial court denied her habeas corpus application, and she appealed.The First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the contempt judgment was void and that the appellant had not been placed in jeopardy since the contempt order was vacated.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that the appellant's successive prosecution claim was without merit due to the void contempt order. However, the court found that her multiple punishments claim was valid. The court determined that the appellant was punished for the second DWI through the contempt judgment, and any further punishment for the same offense would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the DWI charge. View "EX PARTE ESTEVEZ" on Justia Law

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Texas electronic communications harassment statute, arguing that his prosecution was based on the content of his messages, which he claimed were protected under the First Amendment. The State contended that the prosecution was not content-based and, even if it was, it served a compelling interest in protecting individuals from abuse.The appellant was convicted in a trial court for sending approximately three dozen electronic messages to his former therapist over a 15-week period. The messages were sent to her professional accounts and contained content that the therapist found disturbing and harassing. The trial court admitted the messages into evidence and overruled the appellant's objections based on First Amendment protections. The jury found the appellant guilty of two counts of harassment, and he was sentenced to 180 days in jail and a $500 fine.The Seventh Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute regulated conduct rather than speech and that the appellant's messages were integral to criminal conduct, thus not protected by the First Amendment. The court of appeals concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the appellant.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the appellant was indeed prosecuted for the content of his messages, which violated his First Amendment rights. The court held that the statute, as applied to the appellant, was a content-based restriction on speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required to justify such restrictions. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the indictment. View "OWENS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The relator was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. While his direct appeal was pending, he filed an initial habeas application and a motion to recuse the district judge from presiding over post-conviction proceedings. The motion was granted, and a visiting judge, Judge Wright, was assigned to the habeas proceeding. The District Attorney objected to Judge Wright’s assignment under Texas Government Code § 74.053(d), leading to her replacement by another visiting judge, Judge Reed. The relator sought mandamus relief, arguing that the State should not have an automatic veto over the assignment of the habeas judge.The 112th Judicial District Court in Upton County initially handled the case. The relator's motion to recuse the district judge was granted without issue. However, the District Attorney's objection to Judge Wright's assignment was sustained, and Judge Reed was appointed instead. The relator then sought mandamus relief, contending that the administrative presiding judge lacked the authority to grant the State an automatic veto over the assignment of the habeas judge.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The court held that Texas Government Code § 74.053(d) applies only to civil cases, as established in the precedent Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals. The court found no sufficient justification to overrule Lanford, despite amendments to the statute. Consequently, the administrative presiding judge was incorrect to remove the visiting judge under that provision. The court granted mandamus relief, ordering the administrative presiding judge to rescind the order removing Judge Wright. The court did not address the State's alternative argument regarding Judge Wright's qualifications, as it was not considered by the administrative presiding judge. View "In re GREEN" on Justia Law

A vehicle was stopped by Trooper Ryan Wilkinson in Smith County for speeding, having an expired temporary tag, and an inoperative brake light. The driver, Bridgett Tobler, did not have a valid driver’s license, and the passenger, Justin Heath Pettit, was on probation. After confirming there were no warrants for either individual, Trooper Wilkinson prolonged the stop to wait for a K-9 unit, which arrived nearly an hour later. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search that uncovered prescription medication, syringes, and a sawed-off shotgun. Pettit was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon.The trial court granted Pettit’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the detention was unreasonably prolonged without reasonable suspicion, violating the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed, arguing that Pettit, as a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the search. The Twelfth Court of Appeals agreed with the State, reversing the trial court’s decision and holding that Pettit did not have standing to contest the search.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that Pettit had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. The court reasoned that both drivers and passengers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being detained longer than necessary for a traffic stop. The search of the vehicle was deemed the fruit of the unreasonably prolonged detention. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration of whether the prolonged detention was reasonable. View "State v. Pettit" on Justia Law

On August 12, 2019, Officer Logan Rogers received a dispatch call about a white Chevrolet pickup driving erratically in the Steeple Chase apartment complex. The vehicle was registered to Joshua Armstrong. Witnesses described the driver as a white male with dark hair, a goatee, tattoos, and wearing a red shirt. Officer Rogers located the vehicle and, based on information from a resident, went to an apartment where Armstrong was found. Armstrong appeared intoxicated, admitted to taking Suboxone, and was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) without a warrant.The trial court denied Armstrong's motion to suppress the blood-test results, arguing that his warrantless arrest was not supported by exigent circumstances as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.03. Armstrong was found guilty by a jury of DWI. On appeal, the Fifth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the State failed to establish exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless arrest, relying on State v. McGuire.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case to determine if Article 14.03(a)(1) requires exigent circumstances for a warrantless arrest. The court concluded that the statute does not impose an exigency requirement. The court emphasized that the plain language of the statute and its legislative history do not support an exigency requirement. The court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Armstrong's arrest was justified under the totality of the circumstances test without considering exigency. View "ARMSTRONG v. THE STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

After stealing a pickup truck and a gun from a ranch in Odessa, the appellant was stranded at a convenience store in McCamey. His suspicious behavior drew the attention of Upton County sheriff’s deputies Thomas Stiles and Billy Kennedy. When the deputies began investigating, the appellant instigated a shootout, resulting in the death of Deputy Kennedy.A Nueces County jury convicted the appellant of capital murder for killing Deputy Kennedy. Based on the jury’s answers to special issues during the punishment phase, the trial court sentenced him to death. The appellant raised two points of error challenging his conviction and seven points challenging his sentence.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The appellant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder, claiming a juror could have doubted whether he knew Kennedy was a peace officer. The court rejected this argument, stating the appellant did not preserve the issue and that no evidence supported the need for such an instruction. The appellant also claimed that the trial court’s refusal to submit the murder instruction violated his constitutional rights, but the court found no evidence to support this claim.The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his future dangerousness, arguing his injuries and inevitable incarceration mitigated this risk. The court found the evidence legally sufficient, citing the circumstances of the offense, the appellant’s history of violence, lack of remorse, and misbehavior in custody.The appellant also contested the admission of hearsay evidence and the denial of a mistrial due to the State’s failure to provide notice of extraneous misconduct evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion in these rulings. Additionally, the court deemed the prosecutor’s improper argument referencing facts outside the record as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the appellant’s constitutional challenge to the future dangerousness special issue was not preserved for review. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence. View "GREEN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A domestic violence incident involving Jeremiah Gonzalez and his girlfriend led to the girlfriend reporting the incident to the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD). Gonzalez, an SAPD officer, confronted and assaulted his girlfriend again after learning about the report. The girlfriend reported the assault and the leak of her initial report. Detective Aisha Jackson obtained a warrant for Gonzalez’s phone, revealing incriminating messages and a payment to a number belonging to Gonzalez’s friend, Erik Rodriguez, also an SAPD officer. Jackson then obtained a warrant to seize Rodriguez’s cell phone, which he voluntarily handed over. Rodriguez consented to a search, leading to further incriminating evidence and additional warrants.The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Rodriguez’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the initial warrant lacked probable cause and rejecting the State’s arguments that the evidence was legally obtained. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, deferring to its conclusion that the plain view doctrine did not validate the seizure of Rodriguez’s cell phone.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard of review. The court held that the plain view doctrine validated the seizure of Rodriguez’s cell phone. The court determined that Detective Jackson had probable cause to associate the phone with criminal activity and that the seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "THE STATE OF TEXAS v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

The appellant moved to Texas in 2009 and married Wasam Moussa in Jordan in 2018. Moussa requested a divorce shortly after their marriage but did not follow through. In May 2019, Moussa moved to Texas to live with the appellant. Three days later, the appellant called a friend, Vernie “Alicia” Smith, and confessed to hitting Moussa, covering her mouth, and that she stopped breathing. Moussa was found unresponsive and later pronounced dead. The appellant was charged with murder, with the indictment alleging two theories: intentional or knowing causation of death and intent to cause serious bodily injury resulting in death.The trial court presented a jury charge that failed to include the element "causes the death of" in the second theory of murder. The appellant did not object to this omission. The jury convicted the appellant of murder. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals found that the omission resulted in egregious harm, since it allowed the jury to convict without finding that the appellant caused Moussa’s death. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court's finding of egregious harm. The court held that the jury charge error affected the very basis of the case, depriving the appellant of a fair trial. The court emphasized that the omission of the causation element in the jury charge's application paragraph allowed the jury to convict without determining whether the appellant's actions caused Moussa's death. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, maintaining that the appellant suffered egregious harm due to the jury charge error. View "Alkayyali v. State" on Justia Law

In May 2016, a jury convicted the appellant of two counts of capital murder for fatally shooting his son and his partner's son. The trial court sentenced him to death based on the jury's punishment phase verdicts. The appellant raised twenty-six points of error and five supplemental points of error on direct appeal.The trial court's judgment of conviction was affirmed, but the death sentences were reversed and remanded for a new punishment trial. The appellant's competency to stand trial was challenged, leading to a retrospective competency trial where a jury found him competent during his 2016 trial. The appellant's supplemental points of error regarding the retrospective competency proceedings were overruled, including the trial court's determination of feasibility, evidentiary rulings, denial of a mistrial, and cumulative error claims.The appellant's requests for substitute counsel and to represent himself were denied, with the court finding he did not clearly and unequivocally assert his right to self-representation and suffered from severe mental illness. His pro se motion for a speedy trial was disregarded as he was represented by counsel. The trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a hotel room and a Jeep was upheld, as he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in both.The appellant's absence from the courtroom during certain proceedings did not constitute constitutional error. The jury charge errors in the punishment phase, including the incorrect formulation of the verdict form and the erroneous burden of proof on the mitigation issue, resulted in egregious harm, leading to the reversal of the death sentences and a remand for a new punishment trial. Other punishment phase issues raised by the appellant were dismissed as moot. View "BLUNTSON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The applicant was convicted of felony theft in 1994 and received a six-year probated sentence. In 2000, his community supervision was revoked due to a new charge of aggravated sexual assault, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. The applicant did not appeal either conviction. In 2010, he was convicted of two new offenses in Hunt County, and his 2000 aggravated sexual assault conviction was used for enhancement, resulting in life sentences.After his Hunt County convictions were upheld on appeal in 2013, the applicant began post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings. In 2018, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief on his 2000 aggravated sexual assault conviction due to a Brady violation, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. Subsequently, the applicant challenged his Hunt County convictions, arguing that the enhancement was illegal. The court granted partial relief, ordering resentencing for one conviction but finding the enhancement harmless for the other due to the applicant's prior theft conviction.In October 2023, the applicant filed his first habeas corpus application challenging the revocation of his community supervision for the theft conviction, arguing that his plea was part of a "package deal" with the now-invalidated aggravated sexual assault plea. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief based on the doctrine of laches, citing the applicant's lengthy delay in challenging the revocation and the resulting prejudice to the state. The court emphasized the state's compromised ability to contest the claim and the potential impact on the finality of the Hunt County convictions. The court concluded that the applicant's delay and the resulting prejudice to the state warranted denying relief. View "EX PARTE HILL" on Justia Law