Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of capital murder by stabbing the victim with a knife 107 times in the course of attempting to commit or committing kidnapping or robbery. Based upon the jury's answers to the special punishment issues, the trial judge sentenced him to death. Defendant raised seven points of error on appeal but the court found no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence was affirmed. View "Gobert v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant testified to an alibi defense at the guilt phase of his aggravated robbery trial and then exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at the punishment phase. The prosecutor, in her final punishment argument, stated that defendant was not worthy of probation because he had not taken responsibility for the crime. The court held that, by testifying that he was not the person who committed the aggravated robbery, defendant expressly denied responsibility for the crime. Therefore, the State was entitled to comment on that denial of responsibility at either the guilt or punishment stage. The State did not comment on defendant's failure to testify at the punishment case. The court also found that the was case distinguishable from Swallow v. State and declined the State's invitation to overrule Swallow. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court to address defendant's remaining points of error. View "Randolph v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal but his sentence was later vacated by a federal district court. A new punishment hearing was held and defendant was again sentenced to death. Direct appeal was automatic and defendant raised five issues: in his first issue, defendant claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the trial judge granted his motion to quash the indictment; in issues two and three, defendant complained about matters related to parole eligibility; in issue three, defendant contended, in the alternative, that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury an instruction that it could not consider parole after the jury sent out a note inquiring whether a life sentence in this case would be with or without parole; in issue four, defendant contended that the trial judge erred in denying his challenge for cause to a prospective juror; in issue five, defendant contended that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding defendant's future dangerousness. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment. View "Brewer v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant of driving while intoxicated after the trial judge denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant for blood. The court of appeals held that the search-warrant affidavit established probable cause to believe that evidence of intoxication would be found in defendant's blood even though the officer did not specify when, on the day before he obtained the search warrant, he had stopped defendant. At issue was whether a search-warrant affidavit for blood must contain the time the DWI arrestee was stopped. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances standard set out in State v. Jordan, the affidavit in this case was not sufficient to show probable cause because there could have been a twenty-five-hour gap between the time the officer first stopped defendant and the time he obtained a search warrant for blood. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Crider v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose when a fight broke out between the Kirby Block gang and the Manett Boys gang. Defendant was indicted and went to trial for murder. The jury charge contained instructions on defense of a third person and defendant objected to the instruction as not consistent with the current self-defense statute. The jury charge did not contain any instructions regarding a presumption of reasonable conduct in the self-defense context, nor did defendant request any such instructions. Defendant was convicted and appealed. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the trial judge erred in failing to delete the complained-of references to a duty to retreat and that the trial judge erred in failing to include instructions regarding a presumption of reasonable conduct. Defendant subsequently claimed that the court of appeals erred in disposing of his complaints with respect to the defense-of-others instructions in the jury charge. The court held that the trial court erred in submitting the italicized portions of the jury charge because those instructions were not authorized by statute and they constituted comments on the weight of the evidence. The court also held that the court of appeals' analysis on whether defendant was entitled to a presumption charge was incomplete. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Morales v. State" on Justia Law

In these applications for post conviction writs of habeas corpus, applicant contended that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel misinformed him about the terms of a plea offer made by the State. Applicant argued that counsel was deficient for incorrectly conveying the terms of the State's plea offer and that, but for counsel's error, applicant more than likely would have accepted the offer. The court held that, although counsel did convey the State's plea offer to applicant, the information as to a deadly-weapon finding was incorrect and therefore, this constituted a deficient performance and satisfied the first prong of the Strickland v. Washington test. The court also held that applicant had suffered prejudice from counsel's deficient performance and therefore met the second prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly, relief was granted. View "Ex parte Alvin Royce Wells" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and she appealed. The Fifth Court of Appeals found error in the trial court's "synergistic effect" instruction to the jury. While the court agreed with the outcome of the court of appeal's judgment, that court's harm analysis simply repeated its error analysis. The court held that the "synergistic effect" instruction delivered in this case introduced a specific mode of action and supported the State's theory that the combination of hydrocodone and alcohol produced intoxication. Under the facts of this case, the court did not find such an instruction harmless and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Barron v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction, holding that the trial judge erred by denying his request for a lesser-included-offense instruction on criminal trespass. The court agreed that defendant was entitled to an instruction on criminal trespass where the evidence supported an instruction on that lesser-included offense. Therefore, the court affirmed the court of appeal's judgment. View "Goad v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three offenses of indecency with a child by exposure. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting defendant's double jeopardy argument that he received multiple punishments for the same offense. The court held that defendant's right against double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted on three counts of indecency with a child by exposure that resulted form a single act of exposure. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to reform the judgment and sentence. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant for murder and for engaging in organized criminal activity. In a petition for discretionary review, defendant contended that the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial court did not improperly comment on the weight of the evidence in its answer to the jury's question. The court held that, although it would usually constitute a comment on the weight of the evidence for a trial court to focus on a particular piece of evidence in its initial charge to the jury, a trial court's answer to a question a jury asked during deliberations would not necessarily constitute an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the court of appeal's judgment. View "Lucio v. State" on Justia Law