Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Mario Castillo filed his notice of appeal one day late. His notice of appeal and motion for extension of time were picked up by Federal Express after business hours on the last day of filing and delivered to the trial court the next day. The court of appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Appellant argued that the "timely mailed, timely filed" mailbox rule of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure (TRAP) 9.2(b) is antiquated and should be read to include private couriers, such as Federal Express. Upon review, the Court concluded that the plain, unambiguous language of the rule requires timely mailing with the U.S. Postal Service, not a private courier. "Until and unless the Supreme Court of Texas and this Court change the language of Rule 9.2(b), the 'timely mailed, timely filed' mailbox rule applies only to documents delivered to the U.S. Postal Service." View "Ex Parte Mario Castillo v. Texas" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant Joseph Dangelo pled guilty to the felony offense of injury to a child. In accordance with a plea agreement and after accepting his plea, the trial court placed Appellant on deferred-adjudication community supervision for seven years. Appellant signed a document that stated that the trial court could modify the conditions of supervision at any time during the period of community supervision. The original terms of appellant's community supervision did not require him to complete sex-offender treatment. In May 2008, the trial court modified those conditions to include provisions that required appellant to submit to sex-offender treatment and evaluation, as directed by his supervision officer, complete sex-offender psychological counseling, and submit to, and show no deception on, any polygraph examination ordered by the court or his supervision officer. In January of 2009, the trial court again modified appellant's conditions and required appellant to reside in Tarrant County and to restart his sex-offender treatment, as directed by the supervision officer, but it dismissed the state's petition to proceed to adjudication of appellant's guilt. In March 2009, appellant's attorney sent to Appellant's mandated psychological testing center a letter that stated his objections to any required treatment programs that lay outside those required or have no relationship to the crime to which Appellant plead, stating that Appellant "ha[d] no objections to polygraph examinations which in the course of your program he may be subjected to," but that he "has Fifth Amendment protection against making any incriminating statements and has a right to so state, relating to any conduct for which he has not pled or for which he is not on deferred adjudication." The state subsequently filed its second petition to proceed to adjudication, which alleged that Appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his supervision by failing to complete a sex-offender evaluation and that he had been discharged from sex-offender treatment without completing it. Appellant filed a motion to quash the second petition. The court of appeals held "that appellant may not be compelled, over the invocation of his Fifth Amendment right, to participate in any portion of the objected-to community supervision conditions, including the requirement of answering questions two through four of the planned polygraph examination, that would provide a link to his criminal prosecution for any offense unrelated to the injury to a child offense that he pled guilty to." But it also held that appellant "may be compelled to discuss the facts particularly related to counts one through four of his indictment because the State may not use those facts in a future criminal prosecution." The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review of the first two grounds of Appellant's petitions for discretionary review. In light of the State's concession that double-jeopardy principles precluded it from prosecuting Appellant for the four sex-related offenses, the Court agreed with the court of appeals's determination that "appellant may be compelled to discuss the facts particularly related to counts one through four of his indictment because the State may not use those facts in a future criminal prosecution." Appellant had no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer legitimate questions that were a condition of his community supervision regarding those offenses. Accordingly, the Court overruled Appellant's grounds one and two and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Ex Parte Joseph Dangelo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Court in this case was whether the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar a prosecution for a criminal offense in one county after a prosecutor in another county unsuccessfully attempted to revoke the defendant's community supervision on the ground that he commmitted the same offense. The Third Court of Appeals "h[e]ld that it does not, as [a] Brazos County [community-supervision] revocation hearing did not involve the same parties that the Travis County theft prosecution does." Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the two prosecutions did involve the same parties. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Dustin Doan" on Justia Law

Appellant Deborah Bowen's father died in 2001. Her father's will established a family trust, and Appellant's mother was named as the primary beneficiary. The trust was to terminate at her mother's death, and the trust assets were to be distributed equally, per stirpes, to Appellant and her brother, Jackie. Jackie predeceased his mother, leaving three children. Appellant was appointed co-trustee in 2004. The balance of the trust at the time of appointment was $620,065. Appellant distributed the entire balance of the trust to herself when her mother died, rather than distribute one-half of the assets to Jackie's children, as required by the trust provisions. Jackie's daughter, Dana White, had power of attorney to act on behalf of her two brothers. Appellant was charged with misapplication of fiduciary property owned by or held for the benefit of White for the value of $200,000 or more. Tex. Penal Code section 32.45(b) & (c)(7). She was convicted by a jury, sentenced to eight years in prison, and ordered to pay a fine and restitution to White and her brothers. No lesser-included offense instructions were submitted to the jury. The State filed a petition for discretionary review, asking the Court to overrule "Collier v. Texas" (999 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)) in which the Court held that the court of appeals cannot reform a conviction of a greater offense to a lesser-included offense unless the lesser-included offense was requested by the parties or included in the jury charge. Further, the State argued that the judgment of the Eastland Court of Appeals be reversed and remanded to reflect a conviction for the appropriate lesser-included offense. Upon review, The Court overruled "Collier" and its progeny. Appellant's conviction stood, and the Court reversed the judgment of the Eastland Court of Appeals. The case was remanded to the trial court to reform the conviction to reflect the felony of misapplication of of fiduciary property in the second degree and to conduct a new punishment hearing. View "Bowen v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jeri Montgomery caused a three-car collision, during which a passenger in one of the other vehicles was killed. The grand jury indicted Appellant for criminally negligent homicide, alleging that she had made an unsafe lane change and had failed to keep a proper lookout. A petit jury found Appellant guilty and also found that her vehicle was a deadly weapon. The jury assessed punishment of ten years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, probated for ten years, and a $10,000 fine. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction and rendered a judgment of acquittal. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the four grounds raised in the State's petition for review: (1) the court of appeals erred in holding that "cell phone usage while operating a vehicle" does not constitute morally blameworthy conduct and does not justify criminal sanctions; (2) the court of appeals erred in presuming that the negligent act in a criminally negligent homicide must itself be an illegal act; (3) the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove criminally negligent homicide where the appellant was traveling less than 39 miles per hour and was 92 feet past the interstate highway entrance ramp at the time that she attempted to cross in front of other vehicles to enter the freeway; and (4) the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove criminally negligent homicide where the Appellant was admittedly distracted by talking on a cell phone at the time that she attempted to cross in front of other vehicles to enter the interstate highway ramp, which she had already missed by 92 feet. Upon review, the Court found that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for criminally negligent homicide, and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Montgomery v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jamie Moore challenged the court of appeals' decision to affirm the trial court's judgment that included an order cumulating his sentence in this case for possession of methamphetamine with an earlier sentence he had received for possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. The trial court and court of appeals determined that cumulation of the sentences was mandatory under Texas Health and Safety Code section 481.134(h). Because the record did not support mandatory cumulation under that provision and because the record revealed that the trial court did not otherwise intend to cumulate the sentences, the Court of Criminal Appeals modified the judgment of the court of appeals to delete the cumulation order and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Moore v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Paul Tucker was charged by information with possession of two ounces or less of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone in violation of Texas Health and Safety Code sections 481.121 and 481.134(f). Appellant filed two pre-trial motions to suppress, which were denied following a hearing. Appellant pled nolo contendere, and the trial court found him guilty. He was sentenced to ninety days' confinement and a $1,000 fine. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's implied findings. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review to consider whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's implicit finding that Appellant's consent to the search of his residence was voluntary. Because the court of appeals failed to evaluate all of the evidence that was admitted into the record by the trial court, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "Tucker v. Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated and the court of appeals reversed the conviction, remanding for a new trial. The state petitioned for discretionary review on two grounds: Did defendant preserve his complaint for appeal and if he did, did the trial court err by commenting on his failure to testify at trial. The court held that the complaint was not preserved for appeal where none of the three complaints at issue met the requirements for preservation. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court so that it could consider defendant's other claims of error. View "Brewer v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder for the death of his girlfriend's two-year-old son. The court of appeals determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the child and, accordingly, reversed the capital murder conviction and acquitted defendant of that charge. That court also determined that there was jury-charge error and remanded the case for a new trial on the lesser-included offense that had been included in the jury charge. The court subsequently granted review of all seven grounds raised by the state prosecuting attorney's petition. The court overruled grounds one through six and dismissed ground seven, affirming the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Louis v. State" on Justia Law

The state petitioned for discretionary review challenging the court of appeals' judgment acquitting defendant for her conviction for endangering a child on the basis of insufficient evidence. The court concluded that the court of appeals properly determined that the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant placed her child in imminent danger of bodily injury or physical impairment, and therefore, affirmed the judgment. View "Garcia v. State" on Justia Law