Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). When the trial court denied his pre-trial motion to suppress, Appellant pled guilty and was convicted of DWI. The Sixth Court of Appeals held that Appellant acted voluntarily when he submitted a breath specimen and thus affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the evidence. Finding no merit to Appellant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Fienen v. Texas" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a plea of "true" to failure to pay "fees" as required under conditions of community supervision waived or forfeited a claim if the defendant was unable to make those payments. Appellant Raimond Kevon Gipson pled true to the failure-to-pay allegation without raising any argument or evidence that he was unable to pay and, on appeal, made that argument for the first time. Without addressing whether his argument was preserved, the court of appeals determined that there was no evidence that appellant had willfully refused to make the community-supervision payments and held that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision. The State argued, however, that a court of appeals may not reverse on the merits of a claim without first determining that it had been preserved for appeal. The Supreme Court agreed: because the court of appeals found the evidence insufficient to support revocation without addressing the State's procedural argument, the case was remanded back to that court for further proceedings. View "Gipson v. Texas" on Justia Law

The State sought the issuance a writ of mandamus to require a trial judge to submit the entire case--both guilt and punishment--to the jury after the defendant pled guilty to the jury. Cary Faulkner was charged with felony DWI. He reached an agreement with the State to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of four years in prison, a $2000 fine, a two-year driver's-license suspension, and a deadly-weapon finding. Judge Waldrip said he was not inclined to make a deadly-weapon finding so that he could have "all options available to us as need be." The prosecutor would not agree to remove the deadly-weapon finding from the plea agreement, even in exchange for the higher sentence of five years. Judge Waldrip asked why, and the prosecutor responded that, without the deadly-weapon finding, the defendant "would then be eligible for shock probation, and I have no plans for Mr. Faulkner being on probation." Ultimately, Judge Waldrip rejected the plea agreement and set the case for a jury trial. Before the beginning of trial, Faulkner elected to have the trial judge assess punishment. At trial, after the jury was sworn, Faulkner pled guilty. The prosecutor then asserted that Faulkner's plea rendered the trial a unitary proceeding, and therefore, the jury was to assess punishment. But Judge Waldrip ruled that punishment would be assessed by himself, not the jury. The State thereafter filed an application for emergency stay and a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Third Court of Appeals, which denied relief. The State then filed with the Supreme Court an application for emergency stay of the proceedings, a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus, and a petition for a writ of mandamus. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with Judge Waldrip's contention that the law did not clearly provide for the relief the State sought: both statute and caselaw were unequivocal that a plea of guilty causes the trial to become unitary. "Even if Faulkner pled not guilty, and that plea were accompanied by a defense concession at trial that Faulkner was in fact guilty, the jury would at least have something to decide, even if that decision seems like a foregone conclusion." The Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed Judge Waldrip to proceed with trial, submitting all relevant issues, including punishment, to the jury so long as Faulkner's plea of guilty remained in place. View "Texas ex rel. Tharp " on Justia Law

Appellant Becky Elizondo was charged with theft of fifty to five hundred dollars. She filed a motion to suppress a written confession obtained by a loss-prevention officer. After a suppression hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's motion. She appealed, claiming that there was an agency relationship between the loss-prevention officer and law enforcement, and thus her statement was inadmissible under Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted Appellant's ground for review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress the written confession obtained by the loss-prevention officer. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that no agency relationship existed between law enforcement and the loss-prevention officer, and affirmed. View "Elizondo v. Texas" on Justia Law

During the course of a traffic stop, Appellee Octavio Ortiz made incriminating statements. The trial court suppressed the statements, finding that appellee was in custody when the statements were made and that he had not been properly Mirandized. The State appealed, and the Seventh Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's determination that appellee was in custody when he made the incriminating statements. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review to examine the court of appeals' determination that the initial traffic stop had shifted into a custodial detention. Agreeing with the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Texas v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

A jury found Mark Crabtree guilty of the second-degree felony offense of failing to comply with sex offender registration requirements. Crabtree claimed that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction because the evidence failed to demonstrate that the Department of Public Safety (DPS) determined his extra-jurisdictional conviction was substantially similar to a Texas offense requiring registration; therefore the State did not prove that he was required to register as a sex offender in Texas. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Crabtree v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant Abraham Cavazos, guilty of murder and imposed a punishment of twenty-eight years' confinement and a $5,000 fine. Appellant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction on the charge of manslaughter. The court of appeals held that manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of murder under Texas Penal Code Section 19.02(b)(2) and thus the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on manslaughter. Furthermore, the court of appeals concluded that even if manslaughter were a lesser-included offense of the type of murder charged in this case, there was no evidence in the record that if Appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of manslaughter. Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review asking the Supreme Court to consider whether the court of appeals erred in holding that manslaughter was not a lesser-included offense of the charged murder and in holding that the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's request to instruct the jury on manslaughter. Upon review, the Court agreed with Appellant that the court of appeals erred in concluding that manslaughter was not a lesser-included offense of the charged murder. However, because the Court concluded there was no evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that, if Appellant was guilty, he was guilty of only the lesser offense, the court of appeals properly held that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's request for a jury instruction on manslaughter. View "Cavazos v. Texas" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether defense counsel's misstatement in voir dire about the concurrent-sentencing law denied his client the effective assistance of counsel. The appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and two counts of indecency with a child. The Second Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment as to punishment and remanded for a new punishment trial. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review on five grounds, all of which centered on the issue of ineffective assistance. Upon review, the Court held that the misstatement did not deny appellant the effective assistance of counsel. View "Cox v. Texas" on Justia Law

In its petition for discretionary review, the State challenged the court of appeals's judgment in favor of Appellant Robert Bryant. The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking appellant's deferred-adjudication community supervision for failure to pay restitution and that appellant preserved this issue for appeal. The court of appeals applied former Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.037(h), which required that, "[i]n determining whether to revoke probation," (1) a trial court "shall" consider five factors pertaining to a defendant's financial circumstances. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals properly determined that appellant preserved his challenge and that the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applied to the trial court's decision to revoke community supervision, including its consideration of the defendant's financial circumstances. However, the Court concluded that by revoking appellant's deferred adjudication and placing appellant on regular community supervision with the continued opportunity to fulfill the restitution obligation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Because the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Bryant v. Texas" on Justia Law

The state filed a motion for rehearing in this case; the Supreme Court withdrew its opinion on original submission, substituted this opinion, and denied the state's motion for rehearing. Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. During a recess in jury deliberations on the second day of appellant's trial, the jury foreman sent a note to the trial judge stating, "We have one juror who refuses to deliberate this case any further nor take the facts, testimony, of this case into account. I request she be removed from the jury." After questioning the foreman about the juror's actions, the trial judge indicated an intent to dismiss the juror and to seat an alternate. Defense counsel requested that the trial judge question the juror directly, which the trial judge refused to do. Instead, the trial judge again questioned the foreman about the juror's issues and, finding the foreman credible, dismissed that juror over defense counsel's objection and seated an alternate. Within half an hour of replacing the juror, the jury reached a verdict. It later assessed appellant's punishment at 20 years' confinement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in removing the complaining juror and that appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to question the dismissed juror or move for a mistrial after the dismissal. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial judge and remanded the case for a new trial. The court of appeals withdrew its original opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50 and issued a revised memorandum opinion with the same results as its original opinion. The state then filed a second petition for discretionary review, and the Supreme Court granted two of the state's three grounds for review. After review, the Court found that the court of appeals correctly held that the juror was not "disabled" as defined in Art. 33.011. Even using the standard set out in Rule 44.2(b), the Court found that the error was reversible and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Scales v. Texas" on Justia Law