Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury rejected Appellant Codiem Wooten's self-defense claim and convicted him of murder, for which he was sentenced to sixty years' confinement. At the punishment phase of trial, appellant requested a "sudden passion" jury instruction. The trial court denied that request. The Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction, but reversed with respect to punishment, holding the trial court erred by not giving the sudden passion instruction. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the appellate court erred in finding "some harm" simply because appellant was subjected to a greater range of punishment than he would had the jury been instructed on sudden passion. View "Wooten v. Texas" on Justia Law

During voir dire, the trial judge said that he personally would want to testify if accused of a crime but admonished the prospective jurors that others might have a different perspective, that a defendant could have good reasons not to testify that were unrelated to guilt, and that the law prohibited the jurors from holding a defendant's failure to testify against him. Defense counsel belatedly requested a mistral but did not ask for an instruction to disregard the trial judge's comments. Holding that the comments constituted fundamental error, the court of appeals reversed the conviction. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the trial judge's comments constituted fundamental error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that appellant's request for a mistrial did not preserve error because any harm flowing from error in this case could have been cured by an instruction to disregard and in fact was cured by the totality of the trial judge's instructions. Accordingly the appellate court was reverse and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Unkart v. Texas" on Justia Law

The appellee was convicted of driving while intoxicated, and he timely filed a motion for new trial. The motion stated, in relevant part, that the appellee was requesting a new trial, in the interest of justice, because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. The judge recused himself because the appellee had donated to his campaign, and a visiting judge was appointed to hear the motion. While the appellee's counsel was in the visiting judge's home courtroom and while no representative of the State was present, the judge requested that both parties file memoranda of law on the motion. No one informed the State of the judge's request. The day before the hearing appellee filed a "memorandum of law" in support of his motion. During the hearing, the State strenuously objected to the appellee's memorandum of law on the grounds that it was an untimely amendment to the appellee's motion for new trial and alleged new grounds. The State further argued that the original motion, standing alone, was not sufficient to put the State on notice that pretrial matters would be argued. Counsel for appellee responded that one of the grounds in the original motion (that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence) was a sufficient pleading because it encompassed the evidentiary issues. Counsel said that the memorandum was not an amendment to the motion but merely a more detailed argument as requested by the judge. The judge overruled the State's objections and allowed the hearing to proceed. The appellee argued only that the verdict was "contrary to the law and the evidence" because of the suppression issues. At the end of the hearing, the trial court granted a new trial. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the test in "State v. Herndon" for reviewing granted motions for new trial. A trial court generally does not abuse its discretion if the defendant (1) sets forth a specificˇand valid legal ground for relief in their motion, (2) points to evidence in the record (or sets forth evidence) that substantiates the same legal claim, and (3) shows prejudice under the harmless-error standards of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this case, the appellee did not present evidence of the same claim that was raised in his motion, and the State properly objected. Consequently, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the appellee's motion and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming. View "Texas v. Zalman" on Justia Law

Appellee, an undocumented alien seeking to remain eligible for "cancellation of removal" from the United States, filed a motion to vacate his 1998 deferred-adjudication misdemeanor judgment for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. The motion alleged that appellee's guilty plea had been involuntary because it was made without an attorney giving appellee advice regarding deportation. After hearing from appellee's current counsel, the trial judge granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, pointing to "evidence" that appellee did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's (SPA's) petition to answer two questions: (1) could counsel's statements be considered "evidence"?; and (2) was appellee's 1998 waiver of counsel constitutionally invalid because he was not informed of the possible deportation consequences of his plea? After a brief note on the nature of the pleading filed here, the Court answered both questions no. Therefore the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's original judgment. View "Texas v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Applicant Jesus De Leon filed two applications for the writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to plea agreements, Applicant pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child, one count of sexual performance by a child, and twenty-two counts of possession of child pornography. The trial court granted Applicant permission to appeal, even though the State argued that Applicant waived all rights to appeal pursuant to a waiver in the plea agreements. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Applicant's guilty pleas were rendered involuntary because the State reindicted Applicant's brother. Accordingly, the Court granted relief. View "Ex parte Jesus de Leon" on Justia Law