Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Applicant Al Smith waited for ten years to claim in his request for habeas relief that his rights to direct appeal and effective assistance of counsel were denied. Although the State did not plead laches in its answer, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a court may consider sua sponte whether laches should bar an applicant’s claim. Furthermore, the Court held that the record in this case supported a sua sponte laches inquiry. Smith’s application was remanded to the habeas court to give Smith an opportunity to explain his delay and for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Smith v. Texas" on Justia Law

After Appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress was denied, he pled nolo contendere pursuant to a plea bargain. The written plea agreement, signed by all parties, included awaiver of appeal, and Appellant asserted that he understood this when the trial judge asked about it. The judge then sentenced Appellant as agreed and entered a certification that stated Appellant had no right of appeal. One month later, Appellant filed a motion to amend the certification to reflect that he did have a right to appeal, which the court of appeals granted, ordering the trial court to correct the certification. With the amended certification, Appellant then appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion, but also asserted that the State had not preserved its argument that the amended certification was defective, and concluded that the evidence did not support the State’s argument that Appellant had waived his right to appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure required the State to preserve its argument that Appellant waived his right to appeal, whether the court of appeals erred in dictating to the trial court the content of Appellant’s new certification, and whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that Appellant did not specifically waive his right to appeal as part of the plea bargain. The Court agreed with the State that the record showed that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the motion to suppress. The signed plea agreement that explicitly sets out the waiver, combined with Appellant’s verbal acknowledgments of the waiver support this conclusion. Given this evidence, the Court concluded the court of appeals’ conclusion that the record did not indicate that Appellant waived his right to appeal was not well supported. The court of appeals erred in failing to recognize what was a clear waiver of appeal. View "Marsh v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Delay was convicted of: (1) money laundering (a first-degree felony at the time), and (2) conspiracy to commit money laundering (then a second degree felony). At the time he allegedly committed these offenses, appellant was the Republican Majority Whip of the United States House of Representatives. The trial court sentenced appellant to five years’ confinement for first-degree laundering, though that sentence was suspended and he was placed on community supervision for ten years. The trial court sentenced the appellant to three years’ confinement for the conspiracy offense and did not suspend that sentence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed both convictions and rendered a judgment of acquittal with respect to each, having determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to support them. The State appealed, arguing that the appellate court failed to consider all of the evidence and failed to view the evidence it did consider with the proper respect for the jury’s fact-finding function. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Delay v. Texas" on Justia Law

During two vehicle burglaries, a number of items were stolen. Appellant was charged with and convicted of misdemeanor theft for stealing some items during two vehicle burglaries. The trial judge placed her on probation and, as a condition of probation, imposed restitution for some of the missing items that appellant had not been charged with stealing. Although the issue of restitution and the basis for imposing it were thoroughly discussed at trial, appellant raised no objection to the restitution requirement. The issue before the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether appellant could claim for the first time on appeal that the restitution was for items that she was not charged with stealing. The Court held that she could not, because she accepted the restitution requirement as a condition of probation by failing to object when she had an opportunity to do so. View "Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Laura Carsner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Appellant shot her mother and stepfather after a family dispute concerning visitation with appellant's minor daughter. The court of appeals held that she was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After its review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the court of appeals neglected to analyze two prongsof the applicable four-pronged test and to address the State’s arguments regarding those prongs. Consequently, it vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remand the case to that court for further consideration. View "Carsner v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals granted the State Prosecuting Attorney’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred when it held that there was insufficient evidence to sustain Appellant Clister Ray Thomas' conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. Appellant was required to as a sex offender due to a 1987 conviction for aggravated sexual assault. Appellant registered his address, 1900 South Green Street, Apartment 210, with the Longview Police Department, the local law-enforcement agency responsible for sex-offender registration. That apartment was leased by the daughter of Appellant’s girlfriend, but Appellant and his girlfriend stayed at the apartment “off and on.” Officer Jeff Hall of the Longview Police Department contacted the property manager of the apartment complex to ask if she was aware that Appellant (as a registered sex offender) was living on the premises. The manager told Hall that she was not aware of that, and she subsequently called the Longview Police Department to ask officers to issue a criminal-trespass warning to Appellant. When the officers arrived, the manager, Appellant’s girlfriend, and her daughter were present. At that time, the manager told the daughter that she would be evicted if Appellant continued to reside with her and her mother. Ultimately, the officers issued Appellant a criminal-trespass warning and arrested him on other outstanding warrants. When Appellant was booked into the county jail, he told officers that he lived at a different address, 1703 Houston Street. After reviewing the evidence in this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the appellate court, finding sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The case was remanded for consideration of whether Appellant was harmed by any error in the jury charge. View "Ray v. Texas" on Justia Law

Elisa Wilson was convicted of telephone-harassment conviction. On appeal, she claimed that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that she made repeated telephone communications in a manner reasonably likely to annoy or alarm another. The court of appeals acquitted Wilson, finding that Wilson’s calls were neither repeated nor reasonably likely to harass or annoy. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that: (1) the phrase “repeated telephone communications” did not require the communications to occur within a certain time frame in relation to one another; and (2) a facially legitimate reason for the communication did not negate per se an element of the statute. View "Wilson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with twenty-six counts of improper photography or visual recording. Each count of the indictment alleged appellant, “with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of THE DEFENDANT, did by electronic means record another . . . at a location that was not a bathroom or private dressing room.” Each count further specified the name of an “.avi” file that was recorded. Some of the counts contained additional information regarding the subject matter and location of the recording. Appellant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that the statute on which his prosecution was based was facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. The trial court denied the application, and appellant appealed. The “improper photography or visual recording” statute makes it a crime to, among other things, photograph or record by electronic means a visual image of another person under certain circumstances. Subsection (b)(1) of the statute makes such acts a crime if: (1) the person being photographed or recorded is not in a bathroom or private dressing room; (2) the photograph or recording of the person is made without that person’s consent; and (3) the photograph or recording is made with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, to the extent that it proscribed taking photographs and recording visual images, Subsection (b)(1) of the statute was facially unconstitutional in violation of the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Thompson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Applicant of capital murder for the death of a four-year-old child she and her husband were in the process of adopting. The trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment without parole. Her conviction and sentence were upheld by the court of appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals refused her petition for discretionary review. Applicant filed an article 11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that she was actually innocent based upon newly discovered evidence, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. A hearing was ordered, a habeas judge conducted the hearing and entered findings of facts and conclusions of law, ultimately recommending that relief be denied. The Court of Criminal Appeals ordered the application be filed and set for submission to determine whether: (1) Applicant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Because the Court concluded that Applicant did receive ineffective assistance of counsel, relief was granted. View "In re Overton" on Justia Law

Appellant Roman Ramirez-Memije was charged with fraudulent possession of identifying information under Texas Penal Code Section 32.51(b). A jury found him guilty and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary conduct under Section 6.01 and on presumptions under Section 2.05 of the Penal Code, and erred in admitting testimony that he was from Mexico and was working illegally in the United States. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review to address whether defendant was entitled to an instruction on voluntary possession when he claimed he did not know the forbidden nature of the thing he possessed, or was his defense merely a negation of his knowledge of surrounding circumstances that is required by Section 6.03(b). The Court held that Appellant was not entitled to the requested instruction, and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Appellant’s remaining issues. View "Ramirez-Memije v. Texas" on Justia Law