Ex Parte Adam Wayne Ingram

In an appeal of the denial of relief of a pretrial habeas application, appellant Adam Ingram raised various facial challenges to the constitutionality of the pre-2015 version of subsection (c) of the “Online Solicitation of a Minor” statute. Some of these challenges depended on the interaction between subsection (c), which proscribed the offense, and subsection (d), which provided certain facts were “not a defense to prosecution.” Appellant also contended subsection (a)’s definition of “minor,” which included “an individual who represents himself or herself to be younger than 17 years of age,” makes subsection (c) overbroad because the definition results in penalizing constitutionally protected roleplay between adults. Appellant also contended that subsection (c) placed an undue and impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the United States Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded appellant’s claims were without merit because: (1) constitutional attacks on free-standing anti-defensive issues were not cognizable on pretrial habeas; (2) without the anti-defensive issues and under a narrowing construction of the word “represents,” subsection (c) was not unconstitutionally overbroad; and (3) subsection (c) did not violate the Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. View "Ex Parte Adam Wayne Ingram" on Justia Law