Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and sought habeas relief to avoid prosecution, arguing she had already been prosecuted and punished for contempt for the same DWI. The contempt order was void for lack of notice and was withdrawn by the trial court. However, her claim of multiple punishments was found to be meritorious.The trial court initially charged the appellant with misdemeanor DWI in November 2021, with bond conditions including not committing any crimes. In 2022, while the first DWI was pending, she was charged with additional offenses, including a second DWI. The trial court ordered her to show cause for contempt for violating bond conditions, specifically for the second DWI. Despite objections to the notice, the appellant was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to three days in jail, probated for nine months. The contempt judgment was later withdrawn due to lack of notice. The trial court denied her habeas corpus application, and she appealed.The First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the contempt judgment was void and that the appellant had not been placed in jeopardy since the contempt order was vacated.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that the appellant's successive prosecution claim was without merit due to the void contempt order. However, the court found that her multiple punishments claim was valid. The court determined that the appellant was punished for the second DWI through the contempt judgment, and any further punishment for the same offense would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the DWI charge. View "EX PARTE ESTEVEZ" on Justia Law

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Texas electronic communications harassment statute, arguing that his prosecution was based on the content of his messages, which he claimed were protected under the First Amendment. The State contended that the prosecution was not content-based and, even if it was, it served a compelling interest in protecting individuals from abuse.The appellant was convicted in a trial court for sending approximately three dozen electronic messages to his former therapist over a 15-week period. The messages were sent to her professional accounts and contained content that the therapist found disturbing and harassing. The trial court admitted the messages into evidence and overruled the appellant's objections based on First Amendment protections. The jury found the appellant guilty of two counts of harassment, and he was sentenced to 180 days in jail and a $500 fine.The Seventh Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute regulated conduct rather than speech and that the appellant's messages were integral to criminal conduct, thus not protected by the First Amendment. The court of appeals concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the appellant.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the appellant was indeed prosecuted for the content of his messages, which violated his First Amendment rights. The court held that the statute, as applied to the appellant, was a content-based restriction on speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required to justify such restrictions. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the indictment. View "OWENS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A vehicle was stopped by Trooper Ryan Wilkinson in Smith County for speeding, having an expired temporary tag, and an inoperative brake light. The driver, Bridgett Tobler, did not have a valid driver’s license, and the passenger, Justin Heath Pettit, was on probation. After confirming there were no warrants for either individual, Trooper Wilkinson prolonged the stop to wait for a K-9 unit, which arrived nearly an hour later. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search that uncovered prescription medication, syringes, and a sawed-off shotgun. Pettit was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon.The trial court granted Pettit’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the detention was unreasonably prolonged without reasonable suspicion, violating the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed, arguing that Pettit, as a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the search. The Twelfth Court of Appeals agreed with the State, reversing the trial court’s decision and holding that Pettit did not have standing to contest the search.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that Pettit had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. The court reasoned that both drivers and passengers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being detained longer than necessary for a traffic stop. The search of the vehicle was deemed the fruit of the unreasonably prolonged detention. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration of whether the prolonged detention was reasonable. View "State v. Pettit" on Justia Law

After stealing a pickup truck and a gun from a ranch in Odessa, the appellant was stranded at a convenience store in McCamey. His suspicious behavior drew the attention of Upton County sheriff’s deputies Thomas Stiles and Billy Kennedy. When the deputies began investigating, the appellant instigated a shootout, resulting in the death of Deputy Kennedy.A Nueces County jury convicted the appellant of capital murder for killing Deputy Kennedy. Based on the jury’s answers to special issues during the punishment phase, the trial court sentenced him to death. The appellant raised two points of error challenging his conviction and seven points challenging his sentence.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The appellant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder, claiming a juror could have doubted whether he knew Kennedy was a peace officer. The court rejected this argument, stating the appellant did not preserve the issue and that no evidence supported the need for such an instruction. The appellant also claimed that the trial court’s refusal to submit the murder instruction violated his constitutional rights, but the court found no evidence to support this claim.The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his future dangerousness, arguing his injuries and inevitable incarceration mitigated this risk. The court found the evidence legally sufficient, citing the circumstances of the offense, the appellant’s history of violence, lack of remorse, and misbehavior in custody.The appellant also contested the admission of hearsay evidence and the denial of a mistrial due to the State’s failure to provide notice of extraneous misconduct evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion in these rulings. Additionally, the court deemed the prosecutor’s improper argument referencing facts outside the record as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the appellant’s constitutional challenge to the future dangerousness special issue was not preserved for review. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence. View "GREEN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Jimmy Giddings, a drug dealer, was murdered during a home invasion at his residence in Dallas. Security cameras captured four masked men loitering near the scene before the crime. When Giddings arrived home, the men attacked, resulting in Giddings being fatally shot and his girlfriend, Nikita Dickerson, sustaining non-life-threatening injuries. The police used a "geofence" warrant to obtain location data from Google, which identified a device belonging to the appellant, Aaron Rayshan Wells, at the crime scene. This led to the identification of the other three assailants.The trial court denied Wells' motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the geofence warrant, ruling that the warrant was sufficiently particular. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that the warrant was narrowly tailored to capture only relevant data and that there was probable cause to believe the suspects carried cell phones with Google location services enabled.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the geofence warrant was supported by probable cause and met the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. The warrant was deemed sufficiently specific in terms of time and location, minimizing the risk of capturing data from uninvolved individuals. The court concluded that the warrant's three-step process did not require additional judicial oversight due to its narrow scope. View "WELLS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder in July 2018 by a Harris County jury for killing Gelareh Bagherzadeh and Coty Beavers in different criminal transactions but as part of the same scheme or course of conduct. The trial court sentenced him to death based on the jury's answers to special issues. The appellant raised thirty points of error on direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.In the lower court, the appellant was tried and convicted in the 184th Judicial District Court of Harris County. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. The appellant's conviction and sentence were automatically appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the appellant's thirty points of error and found no reversible error. The court addressed various issues, including the admissibility of evidence, the conduct of the trial, and the constitutionality of the capital murder statute as applied. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior bad acts, including his attempts to kill his daughter and his involvement in drug smuggling. The court also found that the trial court properly handled the appellant's objections to the prosecution's questions and the conduct of the jurors. Additionally, the court rejected the appellant's claim that the capital murder statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "MAHMOUD v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with misdemeanor assault in County Criminal Court during the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court allowed the complainant to testify while wearing a surgical mask that covered her nose and mouth, over the appellant’s objections. The appellant argued that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him. The trial court overruled the objection, and the complainant testified with the mask. The jury convicted the appellant, and he was sentenced to 300 days’ confinement and fined $4,000.The Second Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated because the trial court did not make case-specific, evidence-based findings to justify the complainant wearing a mask while testifying. The appellate court found that the trial court’s general pronouncements about the COVID-19 pandemic were insufficient to meet the requirements set forth in Maryland v. Craig, which allows for the denial of face-to-face confrontation only if it furthers an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation was denied because the complainant’s mask covered a significant portion of her face, affecting the ability to observe her demeanor. The court found that the trial court’s findings were insufficient to justify the denial of face-to-face confrontation, as they did not provide a case-specific reason why the complainant needed to wear a mask. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the complainant was the sole witness to the alleged assault, and her testimony was crucial to the prosecution’s case. View "FINLEY v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

David Asa Villarreal was convicted of murder with a repeat offender enhancement and sentenced to sixty years in prison. During his trial, the judge issued an order preventing Villarreal from discussing his ongoing testimony with his attorneys during an overnight recess, though he could discuss other aspects of the case. Villarreal argued that this order violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.The trial court's order was challenged, and the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Villarreal's conviction. The appellate court was divided on whether the trial court's order constituted an abuse of discretion or should be reviewed de novo. The case was then brought before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas for discretionary review.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the trial judge's limited no-conferral order did not violate Villarreal's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court distinguished between prohibiting discussions about ongoing testimony, which is permissible, and prohibiting all communication, which is not. The court noted that the trial judge's order was narrowly tailored to prevent coaching while allowing discussions on other trial-related matters. The court emphasized that the right to counsel includes the ability to discuss trial tactics and other legal matters, but not the ongoing testimony itself. The court affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial judge's order did not meaningfully interfere with Villarreal's right to counsel. View "VILLARREAL v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Democratic Party activist and former candidate for Plano City Council, was indicted for violating Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code. This statute prohibits knowingly representing in a campaign communication that the communication emanates from a source other than its true source, with the intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election. The appellant sent text messages that appeared to come from a Republican or conservative campaign, identifying Republicans in local nonpartisan races. In response, the appellant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as it regulated core political speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.The trial court denied the appellant's application. On appeal, the Fifth Court of Appeals agreed with the appellant, finding that the statute was not narrowly tailored and did not survive strict scrutiny. The appellate court held that the statute's broad reach was problematic and ordered the trial court to dismiss the indictment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case upon the State's petition. The State argued that the statute was narrowly drafted and survived strict scrutiny. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. The court found that the statute was a content-based restriction on protected speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard. It was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of preventing dishonest conduct in elections. The court affirmed the Fifth Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the statute violated the First Amendment. View "EX PARTE STAFFORD" on Justia Law

The case involves Waymon Jaeshell Stepherson, who was convicted by a Brazoria County jury. The former District Clerk, Rhonda Barchak, used a race-based system to create jury panels by sorting prospective jurors by race and residence. Stepherson, who is black, claims this process violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and an impartial jury, as well as the statutory requirement for a randomly selected jury panel.Stepherson was convicted of aggravated robbery in 2016. He did not object to the jury composition at trial. On appeal, he raised issues unrelated to jury selection, and the court of appeals upheld his conviction. After his conviction was affirmed, Stepherson filed a habeas corpus application, alleging newly discovered evidence of a race-based jury selection process. The habeas court found that while race was a factor in creating the jury panels, there was no evidence of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of any racial group. The court concluded that Stepherson's jury panels represented a fair cross section of the community and recommended denying relief.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that to prove a due process violation based on racial discrimination in jury selection, a defendant must show systematic exclusion of a particular group and that this exclusion rendered the jury plainly illegal. The court found that Barchak's process was designed to include, rather than exclude, racial groups proportionally. Therefore, Stepherson did not meet the criteria for a due process violation. The court also found no violation of equal protection or the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, as there was no evidence of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of non-whites. The court denied Stepherson's application for habeas corpus relief. View "EX PARTE STEPHERSON" on Justia Law