Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an individual who was stopped by a Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy for a traffic violation. The individual, who was a convicted felon with an active warrant for a parole violation, was driving a car borrowed from his sister and was armed with her handgun. During the stop, the individual lied about his identity and, after his passenger left the scene, shot and killed the deputy at close range while the deputy was standing by his patrol car. The individual fled, disposed of the weapon, and was later apprehended at a nearby shopping center. At trial, he admitted to the shooting but claimed it was accidental, asserting he was attempting a citizen’s arrest.The 230th Judicial District Court of Harris County tried the case. The jury found the individual guilty of capital murder and, after considering evidence of his extensive criminal history and lack of remorse, answered the special issues in a manner that resulted in a death sentence. The individual represented himself at trial after waiving his right to counsel, but later unsuccessfully sought to withdraw that waiver and have counsel reappointed. He raised several points of error on appeal, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his request to withdraw his waiver of counsel, the admission of certain punishment-phase evidence, and the constitutionality of Texas’s death penalty statute.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case on direct appeal. The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support both the conviction for capital murder and the jury’s finding of future dangerousness. It found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request to withdraw the waiver of counsel, nor in the admission of the challenged evidence. The court also determined that the constitutional challenges to the death penalty statute were not preserved for review and, in any event, lacked merit. The conviction and sentence of death were affirmed. View "SOLIS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A state trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding in Waller County, Texas. The driver and passenger appeared nervous, and the trooper noticed strong odors of food and cigarillo smoke, with a possible faint smell of marijuana. After the occupants denied consent to search, a backup officer arrived with a drug-detection dog. During an open-air sniff, the dog’s handler directed the dog to various parts of the vehicle. The dog repeatedly jumped up and stuck its nose through the open passenger window into the car’s interior. After the third intrusion, the dog alerted, and officers searched the vehicle, finding a large quantity of pills. The driver was charged with possession of a controlled substance.The 506th District Court of Waller County initially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion and that the dog’s alert provided probable cause. Upon reconsideration, however, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the dog’s nose entering the vehicle constituted a trespass and an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence found should be excluded. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the dog’s intrusion into the vehicle’s interior was an unreasonable search.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals’ decision. The court held that the repeated physical intrusion of the drug-detection dog’s nose into the interior of the vehicle during an open-air sniff constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Because this search was conducted without probable cause, the trial court properly suppressed the evidence obtained as a result. The court clarified that such an intrusion is distinct from a routine exterior sniff and is subject to constitutional protections. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. ORGAN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after a contentious visit to San Antonio Police Department headquarters regarding a child custody issue, returned later that day and fatally shot a police detective who was sitting in his patrol car. The defendant was apprehended the following day by a SWAT team, and during and after his arrest, he made several incriminating statements to law enforcement, a detention officer, and a mental health assessor. At trial, the defendant challenged the admissibility of these statements, arguing they were involuntary or obtained in violation of his rights. He also raised issues regarding jury selection, the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations, and the constitutionality of certain aspects of Texas’s capital sentencing scheme.The 379th District Court of Bexar County conducted the trial. The jury convicted the defendant of capital murder for killing a peace officer in the line of duty and, based on their answers to special sentencing issues, imposed a sentence of death. The defendant raised multiple points of error on direct appeal, including claims that his statements should have been suppressed, that the State’s peremptory strike of a Black venireperson was racially motivated, that the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations violated statutory and constitutional rights, and that the Texas capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case on automatic direct appeal. The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s statements, as they were either voluntary or not the product of custodial interrogation. The court found no clear error in the trial court’s rejection of the Batson challenge, concluding the State’s reasons for the peremptory strike were race-neutral. The court determined that the presence of alternates during deliberations, while a statutory violation, was harmless error. The court also rejected the constitutional challenges to the sentencing scheme. The conviction and death sentence were affirmed. View "MCKANE v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was initially indicted for murder following the stabbing death of an individual in El Paso, Texas. The defendant was accused of killing the victim after a dispute during a sexual encounter, subsequently stealing the victim’s truck, and fleeing to Mexico. After his arrest, the defendant’s counsel repeatedly requested discovery and asserted readiness for trial, while the State delayed providing evidence and sought continuances, citing reasons such as incomplete forensic testing and missing witnesses.The 210th District Court of El Paso County first handled the case, where the defendant moved for dismissal on speedy trial grounds. In response, the State dismissed the murder indictment and reindicted the defendant for capital murder, announcing its intent to seek the death penalty. The defendant then moved to dismiss the new indictment, alleging prosecutorial vindictiveness—arguing that the State escalated the charges in retaliation for his assertion of speedy trial rights. The trial court found the State’s justifications not credible, determined that the reindictment was vindictive, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The State appealed, and the Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the State acted vindictively and that dismissal with prejudice was warranted to neutralize the taint.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice. The court held that, while the record supported a finding of prosecutorial vindictiveness, dismissal with prejudice was not necessary to neutralize the constitutional violation because the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not actually violated. The court concluded that the trial court exceeded its authority and modified the dismissal to be without prejudice, allowing the State to reindict the defendant for murder or a lesser-included offense at its discretion. The judgment of the Eighth Court of Appeals was reversed. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. GABALDON" on Justia Law

Michael Kleinman and his business, Auspro Enterprises, L.P., were charged with multiple violations of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, resulting in Class C misdemeanor convictions in municipal court. They appealed for a trial de novo in the Williamson County Court at Law No. 5, posting appellate bonds totaling $64,881.72. They also filed pretrial applications for writs of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances on vagueness grounds. The county court at law denied relief on the merits, but acknowledged that the appellants were restrained by the cash appeal bonds.The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the county court at law’s denial of habeas relief, but did not address the merits of the appellants' arguments. Instead, it concluded that pretrial habeas relief was not available to applicants charged with fine-only offenses who were not in custody or released on bond. The court of appeals reasoned that the potential for re-arrest due to non-payment of fines was too speculative to constitute sufficient restraint.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The higher court held that the appellants were indeed restrained within the meaning of the habeas corpus statutes due to the combination of the complaints, preliminary convictions, and the appellate bonds requiring their appearance in court. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of "restraint" is broad and includes any control that subjects a person to the general authority and power of the state. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "EX PARTEAUSPRO ENTERPRISES, L.P." on Justia Law

Michael Kleinman and his business, Auspro Enterprises, L.P., were charged with multiple violations of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, operating a "head shop," which are Class C misdemeanors. Both were convicted in municipal court and sought a trial de novo in the Williamson County Court at Law No. 5. They posted appellate bonds totaling $64,881.72 and filed pretrial applications for writs of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances on vagueness grounds. The county court at law denied relief on the merits, finding that the appellants were restrained in their liberty due to the cash appeal bonds.The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the county court at law's denial of relief but did not address the merits. Instead, it concluded that pretrial habeas relief was not available to applicants charged with a fine-only offense who were not in custody or released from custody on bond. The court of appeals found that the potential for re-arrest was too speculative to constitute a sufficient restraint to justify habeas relief.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' judgment. The court held that the appellants were indeed restrained within the meaning of the habeas corpus statutes due to the combination of the complaints filed against them, their preliminary convictions, and the appellate bonds they posted. The court emphasized that the definition of "restraint" under Texas law is broad and includes any control that subjects a person to the general authority and power of the state. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "EX PARTE KLEINMAN" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of evading arrest with a prior conviction, making it a state-jail felony. He was present in person for the guilt-innocence phase but appeared remotely via videoconferencing for the punishment phase due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He did not object to this remote appearance during the trial but later argued on appeal that it violated his constitutional and statutory rights to be present at trial.The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the appellant did not need to object at trial to preserve his complaint about the remote appearance for appeal. The court held that the right to be personally present at sentencing is a waivable-only right, meaning it must be affirmatively waived and is not subject to forfeiture by failing to object at trial. The court found no evidence of such a waiver and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case on the State's petition for discretionary review. The court agreed with the lower court that the right to be personally present at the punishment phase is a waivable-only right. The court held that this right cannot be forfeited by inaction and must be affirmatively waived. The court rejected the State's argument that the appellant's failure to object constituted a waiver and affirmed the lower court's decision to remand for a new sentencing hearing. The court clarified that the statutory right to personal presence at trial and sentencing is fundamental and requires an explicit waiver to be relinquished. View "TATES v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and sought habeas relief to avoid prosecution, arguing she had already been prosecuted and punished for contempt for the same DWI. The contempt order was void for lack of notice and was withdrawn by the trial court. However, her claim of multiple punishments was found to be meritorious.The trial court initially charged the appellant with misdemeanor DWI in November 2021, with bond conditions including not committing any crimes. In 2022, while the first DWI was pending, she was charged with additional offenses, including a second DWI. The trial court ordered her to show cause for contempt for violating bond conditions, specifically for the second DWI. Despite objections to the notice, the appellant was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to three days in jail, probated for nine months. The contempt judgment was later withdrawn due to lack of notice. The trial court denied her habeas corpus application, and she appealed.The First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the contempt judgment was void and that the appellant had not been placed in jeopardy since the contempt order was vacated.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that the appellant's successive prosecution claim was without merit due to the void contempt order. However, the court found that her multiple punishments claim was valid. The court determined that the appellant was punished for the second DWI through the contempt judgment, and any further punishment for the same offense would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the DWI charge. View "EX PARTE ESTEVEZ" on Justia Law

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Texas electronic communications harassment statute, arguing that his prosecution was based on the content of his messages, which he claimed were protected under the First Amendment. The State contended that the prosecution was not content-based and, even if it was, it served a compelling interest in protecting individuals from abuse.The appellant was convicted in a trial court for sending approximately three dozen electronic messages to his former therapist over a 15-week period. The messages were sent to her professional accounts and contained content that the therapist found disturbing and harassing. The trial court admitted the messages into evidence and overruled the appellant's objections based on First Amendment protections. The jury found the appellant guilty of two counts of harassment, and he was sentenced to 180 days in jail and a $500 fine.The Seventh Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute regulated conduct rather than speech and that the appellant's messages were integral to criminal conduct, thus not protected by the First Amendment. The court of appeals concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the appellant.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the appellant was indeed prosecuted for the content of his messages, which violated his First Amendment rights. The court held that the statute, as applied to the appellant, was a content-based restriction on speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required to justify such restrictions. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the indictment. View "OWENS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A vehicle was stopped by Trooper Ryan Wilkinson in Smith County for speeding, having an expired temporary tag, and an inoperative brake light. The driver, Bridgett Tobler, did not have a valid driver’s license, and the passenger, Justin Heath Pettit, was on probation. After confirming there were no warrants for either individual, Trooper Wilkinson prolonged the stop to wait for a K-9 unit, which arrived nearly an hour later. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search that uncovered prescription medication, syringes, and a sawed-off shotgun. Pettit was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon.The trial court granted Pettit’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the detention was unreasonably prolonged without reasonable suspicion, violating the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed, arguing that Pettit, as a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the search. The Twelfth Court of Appeals agreed with the State, reversing the trial court’s decision and holding that Pettit did not have standing to contest the search.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that Pettit had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. The court reasoned that both drivers and passengers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being detained longer than necessary for a traffic stop. The search of the vehicle was deemed the fruit of the unreasonably prolonged detention. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration of whether the prolonged detention was reasonable. View "State v. Pettit" on Justia Law