Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The appellant was charged with misdemeanor assault in County Criminal Court during the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court allowed the complainant to testify while wearing a surgical mask that covered her nose and mouth, over the appellant’s objections. The appellant argued that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him. The trial court overruled the objection, and the complainant testified with the mask. The jury convicted the appellant, and he was sentenced to 300 days’ confinement and fined $4,000.The Second Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated because the trial court did not make case-specific, evidence-based findings to justify the complainant wearing a mask while testifying. The appellate court found that the trial court’s general pronouncements about the COVID-19 pandemic were insufficient to meet the requirements set forth in Maryland v. Craig, which allows for the denial of face-to-face confrontation only if it furthers an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation was denied because the complainant’s mask covered a significant portion of her face, affecting the ability to observe her demeanor. The court found that the trial court’s findings were insufficient to justify the denial of face-to-face confrontation, as they did not provide a case-specific reason why the complainant needed to wear a mask. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the complainant was the sole witness to the alleged assault, and her testimony was crucial to the prosecution’s case. View "FINLEY v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

David Asa Villarreal was convicted of murder with a repeat offender enhancement and sentenced to sixty years in prison. During his trial, the judge issued an order preventing Villarreal from discussing his ongoing testimony with his attorneys during an overnight recess, though he could discuss other aspects of the case. Villarreal argued that this order violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.The trial court's order was challenged, and the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Villarreal's conviction. The appellate court was divided on whether the trial court's order constituted an abuse of discretion or should be reviewed de novo. The case was then brought before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas for discretionary review.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the trial judge's limited no-conferral order did not violate Villarreal's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court distinguished between prohibiting discussions about ongoing testimony, which is permissible, and prohibiting all communication, which is not. The court noted that the trial judge's order was narrowly tailored to prevent coaching while allowing discussions on other trial-related matters. The court emphasized that the right to counsel includes the ability to discuss trial tactics and other legal matters, but not the ongoing testimony itself. The court affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial judge's order did not meaningfully interfere with Villarreal's right to counsel. View "VILLARREAL v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Democratic Party activist and former candidate for Plano City Council, was indicted for violating Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code. This statute prohibits knowingly representing in a campaign communication that the communication emanates from a source other than its true source, with the intent to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election. The appellant sent text messages that appeared to come from a Republican or conservative campaign, identifying Republicans in local nonpartisan races. In response, the appellant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as it regulated core political speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.The trial court denied the appellant's application. On appeal, the Fifth Court of Appeals agreed with the appellant, finding that the statute was not narrowly tailored and did not survive strict scrutiny. The appellate court held that the statute's broad reach was problematic and ordered the trial court to dismiss the indictment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case upon the State's petition. The State argued that the statute was narrowly drafted and survived strict scrutiny. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. The court found that the statute was a content-based restriction on protected speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard. It was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of preventing dishonest conduct in elections. The court affirmed the Fifth Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the statute violated the First Amendment. View "EX PARTE STAFFORD" on Justia Law

The case involves Waymon Jaeshell Stepherson, who was convicted by a Brazoria County jury. The former District Clerk, Rhonda Barchak, used a race-based system to create jury panels by sorting prospective jurors by race and residence. Stepherson, who is black, claims this process violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and an impartial jury, as well as the statutory requirement for a randomly selected jury panel.Stepherson was convicted of aggravated robbery in 2016. He did not object to the jury composition at trial. On appeal, he raised issues unrelated to jury selection, and the court of appeals upheld his conviction. After his conviction was affirmed, Stepherson filed a habeas corpus application, alleging newly discovered evidence of a race-based jury selection process. The habeas court found that while race was a factor in creating the jury panels, there was no evidence of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of any racial group. The court concluded that Stepherson's jury panels represented a fair cross section of the community and recommended denying relief.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that to prove a due process violation based on racial discrimination in jury selection, a defendant must show systematic exclusion of a particular group and that this exclusion rendered the jury plainly illegal. The court found that Barchak's process was designed to include, rather than exclude, racial groups proportionally. Therefore, Stepherson did not meet the criteria for a due process violation. The court also found no violation of equal protection or the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, as there was no evidence of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of non-whites. The court denied Stepherson's application for habeas corpus relief. View "EX PARTE STEPHERSON" on Justia Law

Investigators from the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force conducted an undercover operation and found child pornography on the appellant's cell phone. The appellant was indicted under Section 43.262(b) of the Texas Penal Code for knowingly possessing visual material depicting the lewd exhibition of the pubic area of a clothed child under 18 years old, which appealed to the prurient interest in sex and had no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.The appellant filed a pretrial writ application arguing that Section 43.262(b) was unconstitutional on several grounds, including that it was an impermissible content-based restriction on protected speech and was overbroad. The trial court denied the application, concluding that the statute was a content-based restriction but passed strict scrutiny, regulated only obscenity and child pornography, and was not void for vagueness.The First Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Section 43.262(b) was unconstitutional because it regulated protected speech, did not survive strict scrutiny, and was overbroad. The court of appeals concluded that the statute did not regulate only child pornography or obscenity and that the State failed to show a compelling interest in regulating child erotica.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the court of appeals' decision. It held that Section 43.262(b) regulates only child pornography, an unprotected category of speech. The court concluded that the statute was not an unconstitutional restriction on protected speech because it met the criteria established by the United States Supreme Court for regulating child pornography. The court also held that the appellant failed to preserve his overbreadth claim for appellate review. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to address the remaining points of error. View "EX PARTE LOWRY" on Justia Law

The case involves William Alan Null, who was convicted of second-degree felony sexual assault. A DNA analyst testified that Null was linked to a previous sexual assault by comparing his DNA profile to profiles developed by a third-party laboratory. Null objected, arguing that the analyst's testimony was unreliable as she had no personal knowledge about the third-party laboratory or its data. The trial court overruled Null's objection, and he was sentenced to 60 years' confinement. Null appealed, and the court of appeals ordered a new punishment trial.The court of appeals had previously affirmed the trial court's decision, but later overturned part of its decision, granting a new punishment trial. The State petitioned for discretionary review, arguing that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court held that the DNA analyst's testimony was reliable under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, as she had relied on data produced by technicians and a forensic analyst employed by a well-known and accredited third-party forensic laboratory. The court also held that the court of appeals should not have decided the judicial notice issue, as it was moot given that Null had forfeited the arguments the issue was based on. View "Null v. Texas" on Justia Law

The case involves Darren Tramell Hughes, who was on deferred adjudication community supervision. The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, alleging that Hughes had violated the terms of his supervision by committing two forgery offenses and failing to pay required fees. The hearing on the motion was conducted via Zoom due to COVID-19 restrictions. During the hearing, Hughes was muted several times when he attempted to speak. Hughes was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.On appeal, Hughes argued that his right to be present under the Due Process Clause was violated due to his muting during the hearing. The court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that his right to be present under the Confrontation Clause was violated, even though Hughes did not raise this issue in his brief. The court of appeals found that Hughes was turned into a passive observer, unable to communicate with his counsel and participate in his own defense.The case was then brought before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The court agreed with the lower court's decision that Hughes's right to be present was violated. However, it clarified that the right to be present under the Due Process Clause, not the Confrontation Clause, applies in hearings on motions to adjudicate guilt. The court further explained that this right is waivable, not forfeitable, and that Hughes did not waive this right. The court concluded that the trial court's action of muting Hughes was not harmless and affected his ability to defend himself. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "HUGHES V. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

In a case reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the trial court mistakenly permitted an alternate juror to participate in the jury's deliberations and vote on the defendant's guilt. The defendant, charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, argued that this violated constitutional and statutory provisions requiring a jury to consist of twelve people and prohibiting any person from being with the jury while it was deliberating. On review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the presence and participation of an alternate juror during jury deliberations did not violate the constitutional or statutory requirements regarding the size of a jury. However, the Court held that the alternate juror’s presence and participation during deliberations did violate the statutory prohibitions against a “person” being with the jury while it is deliberating and conversing with the jury about the case. As such, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to conduct a harm analysis, i.e., to determine whether the alternate juror's presence and participation during deliberations had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict. View "BECERRA v. STATE" on Justia Law

The Appellants in consolidated cases filed pretrial writs of habeas corpus challenging the facial constitutionality of portions of the statutes they were charged under. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide the cognizability of their pretrial claims and the meaning of “immediate release”—release from what? The Court held the facial challenges were cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if a grant of relief would result in immediate release from prosecution for an alleged offense. Release from prosecution for every alleged offense is not required. In Appellant Tonya Couch's case, the claim was not cognizable: if her indictments alleged one offense committed via four different, alternative, statutory manner and means, she challenged the constitutionality of two of those purported manner and means in her habeas application, leaving two unchallenged. If she were granted relief, her single-count indictment would still stand, and trial on it could still proceed. A grant of relief on her claim would not result in her release from prosecution for the offense alleged in her indictment. In Appellant Glenda Hammons’ case, her claim was cognizable because she challenged the constitutionality of the statute defining two counts of her three-count indictment. If she were granted relief, she would be released from prosecution for two alleged offenses, and trial on those counts could not proceed though trial on the third one could. View "Ex parte Couch, Hammons" on Justia Law

The Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW) sought and received two sealed ex parte orders from the District Court of Jones County on behalf of Real Party in Interest, Dillion Compton. One order compelled Relator University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston (UTMB) to conduct brain imaging on the Real Party in Interest and directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to arrange transportation for that brain imaging. The other order (which was no longer at issue), compelled TDCJ to provide certain confidential records to OCFW. OCFW sought the orders pursuant to its post-conviction investigation into the Real Party in Interest’s capital murder conviction and sentence. UTMB and TDCJ challenged the ex parte orders by filing a motion to set aside the discovery orders in the trial court. After initially granting the motion to set aside the discovery orders and then holding a hearing, the trial court ultimately denied the motion to set aside the discovery orders and entered an order reinstating the original ex parte orders. Relator sought leave from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to petition for mandamus relief: to vacate the remaining ex parte order regarding the brain imaging and transportation for the brain imaging of the Real Party in Interest. Because the trial court was without authority to enter the order at issue ex parte, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted Relator’s motion for leave to file and conditionally granted mandamus relief. View "In re University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston" on Justia Law