Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant David Spillman, Jr. was convicted by jury of two counts of assault of a public servant and one count of possession of methamphetamine. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support his assault of a public servant convictions. The Court found the evidence could enable a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed assault of a public servant. Accordingly, the convictions were affirmed. View "Spillman v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Ruben Gutierrez planned and, with two accomplices, committed the robbery and murder of eighty-five-year-old Escolastica Harrison, the owner of a mobile-home park in Brownsville. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a motion for DNA testing, seeking to have various items of biological evidence tested. Appellant was attempting to show that Harrison’s nephew, Avel Cuellar, was the true perpetrator of the offense. In this, Appellant's direct appeal of his third motion for post-conviction DNA testing, Appellant’s sought to test the same biological materials he sought to have tested in his first two motions, both of which the convicting court denied, and both of which denials the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently affirmed. In response to Appellant’s third motion for DNA-testing, the State filed a motion styled a “Plea to the Jurisdiction,” in which it asked the convicting court to dismiss Appellant’s third DNA motion on the ground that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate it. Because the federal district court declared Article 64.03 to be unconstitutional, the State contended, there was no longer any legitimate statutory authority for DNA testing at all, and so there was no legal basis for Appellant to claim entitlement to such testing, and no “special” jurisdiction in the convicting court to permit it. The convicting court granted the State’s motion and dismissed Appellant’s motion for DNA testing “for want of jurisdiction.” The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined "resolution of this case turns first and foremost on the principle that state courts are not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts." The trial court in this case was not divested of its jurisdiction to entertain and resolve Appellant’s third motion for post-conviction DNA testing by the federal district court’s opinion. For that reason, the Court of Criminal Appeals held the trial court erred to dismiss Appellant’s motion “for want of jurisdiction.” View "Gutierrez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Kevin Ratliff, the Llano chief of police, was convicted by a jury of two counts of official oppression (a third-degree felony), and one count of the misdemeanor offense of tampering with a governmental record. The issue is case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' review centered on whether the evidence was sufficient to support those convictions. As to the official oppression counts, the Court concluded the evidence was sufficient: a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant subjected Cory Nutt to an arrest that he knew was unlawful and intentionally subjected Cory Nutt to mistreatment, knowing that his actions were unlawful, by criminally trespassing in Nutt’s home. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals as to those two counts. As to tampering with a governmental record, the Court concluded the evidence was insufficient, and the court of appeals erred in relying on omissions to support its holding because including the specific facts of the arrest in an offense report was not required by any statute or rule, and any facts not stated in the offense report were provided through video evidence. As to this count, the Court rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Ratliff v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Gonzales appealed a trial court order denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing filed pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 64.1 Specifically, the trial court determined that Appellant failed to: (1) show that identity was or was an issue; (2) establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing; and (3) establish by a preponderance that his request for DNA testing was not made to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice. After reviewing the record, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found Appellant was not entitled to relief. Consequently, it affirmed the trial court’s order denying testing. View "Gonzales v. Texas" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim stemming from allegedly bad advice about probation eligibility. Specifically, the issue was the measure of prejudice when an attorney mistakenly tells his client that he was eligible for probation from the trial court: does the defendant have to show a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome if he had elected the jury for punishment instead of the court? Or does the measure of prejudice focus on the defendant’s decision making? The Court concluded the correct measure should focus on the impact of the bad advice on the defendant’s decision making and does not require a showing of a different outcome. Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals was asked to decide whether the court of appeals required Appellant to show a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome from the jury than he got from the trial court. The Court held that even if the court of appeals used the wrong standard, it reached the right result because the record was silent about the effect of the attorney’s advice on Appellant’s decision making. Consequently, the court of appeals' judgment was affirmed. View "Swinney v. Texas" on Justia Law

In May 2017, a jury convicted Applicant Joseph Colone of capital murder, murder of more than one person during the same criminal transaction. From this, he was sentenced to death. As was noted in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion on direct appeal, the State’s case against Applicant included evidence that police investigators found a “dark knit glove” and a “blue towel” at the crime scene. DNA analysis by the DPS Crime Laboratory showed that Applicant “could not be excluded as a contributor to DNA found on the glove and blue towel.” In June 2019, Applicant filed his initial postconviction application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing, among other things, that the State suppressed material evidence showing that the DPS Crime Laboratory had mishandled the glove and towel prior to their being subjected to DNA testing. He also claimed that, whether knowingly or unknowingly, one of the DPS analysts who testified at trial gave the jury a false impression when he suggested that there was nothing “awry” with the manner in which DPS handled the glove and towel. In March 2021, the parties jointly submitted agreed findings of fact and conclusions of law that, if adopted, would counsel in favor of relief on Applicant’s Brady and Chabot claims. In July 2021, the habeas court adopted the parties’ agreed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and forwarded those findings and conclusions to the Court of Criminal Appeals, recommending that Applicant be granted relief on the basis of his Brady and Chabot claims. Deferring to the habeas court's findings, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief. View "Ex parte Joseph Colone" on Justia Law

Appellant Daniel Garcia was convicted by jury of aggravated sexual assault. He was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $1,000 in restitution to the Office of the Attorney General. The court of appeals modified the trial court’s judgment to delete the restitution requirement and affirmed Appellant’s conviction as modified. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to consider, among other things, whether an objection was required to preserve Appellant’s challenge to the restitution order. The Court concluded that an objection was required, none was made, and Appellant forfeited his challenge to the restitution order, so it did not reach the remaining grounds for review. View "Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Ray Hicks pled guilty to attempted forgery of a government instrument in 2013 and was sentenced, under a plea agreement, to 180 days of confinement in a state jail facility. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus, contending he was actually innocent because subsequent analysis showed the $100 bill he possessed was genuine. Applicant was charged with forgery but ultimately pled guilty to attempted forgery. More than five years later, the United States Secret Service notified the Webster Police Department by letter that Applicant’s $100 bill was genuine. The habeas court found Applicant was actually innocent of the charged offense and any possible lesser included offenses based on newly discovered evidence neither introduced nor available to the defense at trial. Specifically, the habeas court found the State could not have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Applicant had intent to defraud because the bill was not actually forged. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not find Applicant was actually innocent, but instead, granted relief on the ground of an involuntary plea. View "Ex parte Ray Hicks" on Justia Law

Before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals were two distinct issues, one at the guilt stage and one at the punishment stage. The guilt stage issue was whether Appellant Happy Pham was entitled to a “threat of deadly force” instruction under Penal Code section 9.04. To this, the Court concluded he was not entitled to such an instruction because, by shooting the victim, he acted contrary to the statute’s requirement that his purpose in threatening deadly force be “limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary.” The punishment stage issue was whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call punishment stage witnesses to give positive character testimony about Appellant. The Court concluded prejudice was not established because Appellant’s status as a fugitive and drug dealer made the proposed positive character testimony by these witnesses "problematic." Concluding that Appellant’s guilt and punishment stage contentions are without merit, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Pham v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jace Laws was charged with two counts of assaulting a peace officer. When defense counsel received the proposed jury charge, he learned that the judge intended to require an alternate juror to retire with the jury while it deliberated. Appellant objected to the alternate juror’s presence during deliberations, and the trial judge overruled the objection. Appellant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to thirty years’ confinement for the first assault and forty years’ confinement for the second assault. Appellant appealed and argued that the trial court erred under Article 36.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court of appeals refused to address the merits of Appellant’s claim, instead holding that Appellant’s objection was general because he could have been referring to a constitutional claim that alternate jurors could not be present during deliberations based on the “No More Than Twelve Jurors” Clause of Article V, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution. The court of appeals also faulted Appellant for not saying “Article 36.22” when he objected. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the record showed that the legal ground for Appellant’s objection was apparent to the prosecutor and the trial judge. Appellant repeatedly said that the alternate juror should not be allowed to retire with the jury because the danger that the alternate juror might participate in the deliberations was too high, that possible violations could not be “policed,” and that he did not understand why the alternate could not be in another room and “brought up to speed” in the unlikely event that a juror became disabled. While the Court also granted review to determine if Article 36.22 was violated when the alternate juror retired with the jury while it deliberated, and if so, whether Appellant was harmed, it declined to address those issues at this time. Instead, the Court remand this case for the court of appeals to address the merits of Appellant’s claim in the first instance. View "Laws v. Texas" on Justia Law