Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Anthony George was convicted of capital murder in the course of a robbery. One of the theories of Appellant’s liability for capital murder was a conspiracy theory under Penal Code Section 7.02(b) for an offense committed by a co-conspirator. The facts at trial showed that Appellant and three others entered into an agreement to rob the victim in his hotel room. The victim was later found dead in his hotel bed, having been severely beaten, bound, and left unconscious lying face-down in a pool of his own blood. On direct appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court’s refusal of a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery, arguing that testimony from two of his co- conspirators suggested that he did not participate in the beating and only intended to rob the victim. Based on this evidence, he argued that the jury could have rationally concluded that he should not have anticipated the murder and, therefore, robbery was a valid alternative to the charged offense. In upholding the refusal of the lesser-included-offense instruction, the court of appeals appeared to create a bright-line rule applicable to conspirator-liability capital- murder-in-the-course-of-a-robbery cases. Appellant challenged the court of appeals’ decision to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, who rejected the applicability of this type of bright-line rule. The Court agreed, however, with the court of appeals’ ultimate conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction on robbery based on the particular facts presented here. "The record contains no evidence that rationally refutes the conclusion that Appellant should have anticipated the victim’s murder, and the totality of the circumstances objectively show that the murder was reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, robbery was not a valid, rational alternative to the charged capital murder." View "George v. Texas" on Justia Law

At trial, Appellant Raul Bahena objected that a State’s witness was not the custodian of records for a disc containing recordings of jailhouse calls. On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the witness was the proper custodian of records and upheld the trial court’s admission of the disc. However, the majority noted that Appellant failed to challenge, at trial and on appeal, that the State’s witness was not another qualified witness, and this failure forfeited any appellate review on that issue. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed Appellant’s failure to object on the specific ground that the State’s witness was not another qualified witness foreclosed consideration of review on that prong of Rule of Evidence 803(6)(D). However, the Court agreed with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the State satisfied the hearsay exception through the in-court testimony of the custodian of records. The Court went one step further and held the State’s witness was qualified to testify to authenticate the jail call recordings. Therefore, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s judgment upholding the trial court’s admission of the evidence. View "Bahena v. Texas" on Justia Law

Using a confidential informant, the Hays County Narcotics Task Force (Task Force) conducted a controlled drug buy from Joel Espino, who was a narcotics dealer along with his roommate, Andrew Alejandro. Three months later, Appellee Reynaldo Lerma and several co-defendants allegedly attempted to rob Espino and Alejandro. During the attempted robbery, Alejandro shot and killed his roommate Espino and wounded two of the alleged robbers. Alejandro was the only person to fire a weapon during the incident. Appellee was charged with the capital murder of Espino. The trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 508. On appeal, the court of appeals decided that the trial court abused its discretion. "But a defendant’s burden under Rule 508 is not a high one," and, based upon its review of the record, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined Appellee made the necessary plausible showing required by the rule. The trial court’s dismissal was not an abuse of discretion; the court of appeals' judgment was reversed. View "Texas v. Lerma" on Justia Law

Sara Cassandra Nelson (“Cassie”) witnessed her boyfriend, Kris Maneerut (“Jimmy”), being shot. Immediately afterward, Appellant Santhy Inthalangsy and associates escorted her from the crime scene. Later that day, she was killed. Appellant was charged with capital murder of Jimmy while in the course of kidnapping Cassie. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ review centered on whether evidence of Cassie’s death was admissible for a proper purpose and sufficiently relevant to the charge of capital murder. The Court held that indeed the evidence was relevant, tended to prove an element of the charged offense, and provided necessary context for the charged offense. Furthermore, the Court held that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. View "Inthalangsy v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jessie Brooks, Jr. was charged with aggravated assault. The indictment alleged the underlying assault as assault by threat, with the threat being verbal. The court of appeals held that the evidence did not show a verbal threat and that the nonverbal use of a deadly weapon varied from the allegations in the indictment. In its petition for discretionary review to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the State contended that the nonverbal use of a deadly weapon sufficiently conformed to the indictment. The Court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found the statement “I need to hit” constituted a verbal threat. Consequently, the Court held the court of appeals erred in concluding the evidence did not shoe a verbal threat, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2015, Appellant Brian Middleton pled guilty to three theft offenses pursuant to an agreement, and he was placed on deferred adjudication. He later committed two new thefts. He was charged with the two new offenses, and the State filed motions to adjudicate guilt in the three earlier cases. Appellant pled guilty to the two new offenses, but the trial court did not formally accept the pleas, instead ordering a presentence investigation report. On January 9, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on all five offenses. The issue Appellant's case presented on appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals asked that when a defendant is placed on deferred adjudication, and he is later charged with a new offense, and the punishment stage for both the deferred-adjudication offense and the new offense occur in the same proceeding, have the two cases been tried in the same criminal action for the purpose of determining whether the sentences can be stacked? The Court answered that question “yes” and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Middleton v Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Christopher Rion crashed his vehicle into another vehicle, leading to injuries to the other vehicle’s driver and the eventual death of its passenger. For that death, Appellant was charged with manslaughter, but the jury found him “not guilty” of that offense and of the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide. The State proceeded to prosecute Appellant for the injuries to the driver on a charge of aggravated assault for intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon. Appellant challenged the second prosecution as barred by collateral estoppel. The court of appeals held that collateral estoppel applied and barred the subsequent prosecution for reckless aggravated assault because the jury in the manslaughter trial decided that Appellant was not reckless in causing the collision, which would be an essential element in the aggravated assault trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed: although both trials involved the issue of whether Appellant was reckless, manslaughter and aggravated assault causing bodily injury were “result of conduct” offenses. The results, death and bodily injury, were different, and the culpable mental state of recklessness attached to those results. "By its verdict of 'not guilty' in the first trial, the jury necessarily determined that Appellant was not reckless and therefore necessarily determined that Appellant was not aware of a risk of death as a result of his conduct. But the jury did not necessarily determine that Appellant lacked awareness of a risk of bodily injury as a result of his conduct. Collateral estoppel does not prohibit the subsequent prosecution for reckless aggravated assault causing bodily injury." View "Ex parte Christopher Rion" on Justia Law

After the trial court denied Appellant Nelson Diaz's motions to suppress evidence, a jury convicted him of burglary of a habitation and assessed his punishment at 32 years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s suppression rulings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide the materiality of misrepresentations in a warrant affidavit under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The Court found the misrepresentations here were not material, and one of the disputed statements was not proven to be false. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Diaz v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Timothy West was charged with three counts of knowingly possessing or attempting to obtain the drug Tramadol by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge. The indictment alleged that the three counts were committed on or about January 21, 2015; April 2, 2015; and June 5, 2015. On June 5, 2018, three years to the day after the last alleged offense, the State refiled the indictment against Appellee, containing the same allegations word-for-word except that the alleged drug was changed from Tramadol to Oxycodone, and the State filed a motion to dismiss the original indictment which was granted on June 13. Appellee moved to quash the second indictment, and, in a June 21 hearing, the trial court granted the motion because the second indictment lacked tolling paragraphs. On June 26, more than three years after the alleged offenses, the State filed a third indictment containing the same allegations but also including tolling paragraphs as to each count. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to quash the third indictment. The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling granting the motion to quash. The court of appeals concluded that the statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of the first indictment which had alleged Tramadol. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' review was whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of an initial indictment charging a completely different drug than the subsequent indictment and charging not only possession, but also attempting to possess that drug by all of the possible statutory manners and means. The court of appeals concluded that, although the drugs alleged were different, both indictments employed the same language mirroring the statute, and therefore the statute of limitations was tolled. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and reversed the court of appeals: "the 'gravamen of law-offending conduct' in each indictment was not necessarily the same. ... the subsequent indictment does not necessarily charge the same act, conduct, or transaction as the first. The statute of limitations was not tolled, and the trial court did not err when it granted Appellee’s motion to quash." View "Texas v. West" on Justia Law

Applicant Michael Hill was convicted of second-degree felony sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. Based on an enhancement, he was automatically sentenced to life imprisonment for the sexual-assault offense, and his punishment range for the indecency offense was enhanced to that of a first-degree felony. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently vacated Applicant’s enhancing conviction on involuntary-plea grounds. Applicant argued on appeal of his sentence that his enhanced life sentences were illegal and that he should be resentenced. The habeas court recommended that the Court of Criminal Appeals deny relief. The Court concluded Applicant was entitled to be resentenced for aggravated sexual assault but not indecency with a child. View "Ex parte Charles Michael Hill" on Justia Law