Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

In early 2000, the victim and four of her friends traveled from Port Arthur to Houston to go to the rodeo. They checked into their hotel around 10:00 p.m. and decided to ride around the Richmond/Westheimer area. The group drove around until about 2:30 a.m., at which point they stopped at a 24-hour diner so some of them could go to the restroom before going back to the hotel. When the victim returned and started to get into her car, a man in a hooded sweatshirt approached her and asked for a cigarette. Before she could respond that she did not smoke, the man told her, “Let me have your car,” and she felt something pushing against her side. It was a gun. The man pushed her into the car and across the center console into the passenger seat. After a second man entered the car and sat down in the backseat, the first man drove the car away. While they were driving, the victim was forced into the backseat, and the man in the backseat sexually assaulted her. The victim testified that the two people who kidnapped her met up with two more people, and three of them sexually assaulted her at gun point while she was blindfolded. Eventually they stopped and drove away, leaving her in an empty field. The victim walked to a nearby business and asked someone to call the police. When police arrived, they took her to the hospital where a nurse performed an examination, collected samples, and took the victim’s clothes. The evidence was outsourced to Reliagene for genetic testing, and the DNA profile it developed was entered into CODIS, but police were not able to identify a suspect until 2017 when Appellant Wilber Molina voluntarily gave a cheek swab to the Houston Police Department. Appellant was subsequently indicted for aggravated sexual assault and convicted based on a DNA analyst’s testimony that the profile developed from the victim’s clothing by Reliagene was probably Appellant’s because the chances that a random person other than Appellant was the contributor were in the trillions and quadrillions. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' review was whether the admission of expert testimony about a DNA-comparison analysis violated the Confrontation Clause when the analysis was based on computer-generated data from the expert’s laboratory and data from another laboratory. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that it did not, and affirmed its judgment. View "Molina v. Texas" on Justia Law

In a single trial, Appellant Enrique Ramos was convicted both of continuous sexual abuse of a child, under Section 21.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code, and of prohibited sexual conduct under Section 25.02(a)(2). The latter conviction was for an act he committed against the same victim (his stepdaughter) as in the continuous sexual abuse of a child offense. It was also committed within the same timeframe during which he committed the acts comprising the continuous sexual abuse. The jury imposed his punishment at forty years and five years, respectively, and the trial court ordered his sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, Appellant argued that punishment for both offenses violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court of appeal agreed and vacated Appellant's conviction for prohibited sexual conduct. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding that continuous sexual abuse of a child and prohibited sexual conduct were not the same offense for purposes of a multiple-punishments double-jeopardy analysis. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that it vacated Appellant’s conviction and punishment for the offense of prohibited sexual conduct, and the case was remanded for that court to consider Appellant’s remaining point of error with respect to that offense. View "Ramos v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether a trial court has never-ending jurisdiction to grant “judicial clemency” after discharging a defendant from community supervision. In 2016, Appellee Lakesia Brent was convicted of Class B misdemeanor theft, and the trial court assessed her punishment at six months in jail but suspended the sentence and placed her on community supervision for a year. In 2017, the trial court entered an order terminating community supervision on a form that gave the trial court a number of options. The court chose, “The period having expired, defendant is discharged by operation of law.” It did not not choose, among other possibilities, “The Court finds defendant has satisfactorily fulfilled the conditions of supervision. Accordingly, this Court ORDERS the verdict set aside; the indictment, complaint, or information dismissed; and defendant discharged from supervision.” This latter option was often called “judicial clemency.” On November 1, 2019, Appellee moved the trial court to enter an order granting judicial clemency. The State objected for lack of jurisdiction because the motion was filed more than 30 days after Appellee was discharged from supervision. The trial court concluded that it had jurisdiction because the statute at issue expressed no time limit, policy considerations support the lack of a time limit, and Appellee was “rehabilitated and ready to re-take her place in law-abiding society.” The court of appeals saw “no textual basis for” requiring discharge and judicial clemency to occur together. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded a trial court does not have never-ending jurisdiction to grant judicial clemency: under the plain terms of Article 42A.701(f), judicial clemency "hangs on a defendant’s performance on and discharge from community supervision. In the absence of any other source of jurisdiction, a trial court’s power to grant judicial clemency is limited to its 30-day plenary power." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to rescind its order setting aside Appellee's conviction, and to dismiss her motion for judicial clemency. View "Texas v. Brent" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of September 26, 2015, Appellant Carlos Lozano shot and killed Jorge Hinojos in the parking lot outside Pockets Billiards and Fun in El Paso. Appellant went to Pockets to meet Fernanda Avila, whom he was dating at the time. According to people in the group, Appellant was in a good mood until he noticed that one of the guys at the table had been talking to Avila, at which point he got angry. Hinojos, his girlfriend Diana Ruiz, and their friend Carolina Rocha went to Pockets the same night. They arrived in Carolina’s car around midnight. While they were there, they ran into three of Carolina’s friends—David Torres, "Carlos," and "Chrystyan." At closing time, Avila went home in her own car; Appellant remained in his in the parking lot. Carolina went to the restroom, then met Hinojos and Diana outside. They walked to one of Carolina’s friend’s car to make plans for later. After meeting at Carolina’s friend’s car, Carolina continued walking to her car, distracted from texting on her phone. Appellant nearly hit Carolina in his truck. Once Appellant stopped the truck, Applicant rolled down the passenger-side window but did not say anything. Hinojos then threw a full beer can through the open passenger-side window. Diana said that the can “exploded,” spilling beer everywhere. Torres testified that he then saw Appellant get a backpack from the backseat of his truck, pull out a gun, and point it in the direction of the open passenger window. According to Torres, Hinojos did not see the gun because by the time Appellant removed the gun from his backpack, Hinojos had already begun to run around the truck to the open driver’s-side window, where he punched Appellant. Diana and Carolina said that Hinojos punched Appellant once. When Hinojos punched Appellant through the window, Appellant turned towards Hinojos and shot him three times, killing him. The question in this case was whether Appellant was egregiously harmed by erroneous self-defense instructions when he was not entitled to deadly force self-defense instructions in the first place. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals answered that question no and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Lozano v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Bethany Maciel was convicted by jury of driving while intoxicated (DWI) with an alcohol concentration level of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court assessed punishment at twenty days in jail and a $2,500 fine. Appellant claimed the trial court erred by denying her requested jury instruction on the defense of necessity. The court of appeals held that there was no error in refusing the jury charge on necessity. After review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and held that Appellant was entitled to a jury instruction on necessity, and the failure to include it was harmful. View "Maciel v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Martin Lopez spend 112 days in jail on felony charges, that was reduced after 85 days to a Class A misdemeanor. After the trial court granted Appellee’s motion for speedy trial and dismissed the case, the State appealed. The court of appeals considered the Barker v. Wingo factors - length of delay, reasons for delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to defendant - and upheld the trial court’s dismissal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding that: (1) counsel for Appellee requested an improper remedy – asking for a speedy trial while simultaneously acknowledging Appellee’s incompetence and asking for a dismissal 112 days after his arrest (both at the bench and in the speedy trial motion he filed), and (2) that the second visiting trial judge exceeded her authority by granting that motion and then dismissing the case. The Court found that during the “non-evidentiary” hearing on August 8, 2017, state statutes and precedent were not followed, and some of the factual and legal assertions were inaccurate. Accordingly, based on its independent review of the record and the unique circumstances in this case, judgment was reversed. View "Texas v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Appellant Phi Van Do was charged with DWI. A first-time DWI is a Class B misdemeanor unless the Stat also proves that an analysis of a specimen of the person’s blood, breath or urine showed an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time the analysis was performed (in which event, it becomes a Class A misdemeanor). Appellant’s charging instrument included the 0.15 allegation, but the State did not read the allegation until the punishment stage of trial. The parties agreed the 0.15 allegation was an element of the offense of Class A misdemeanor DWI. They also agreed that an error occurred, but they disagreed on what kind of error it was. The State also contended the court of appeals erred in its harm analysis. Assuming the parties were correct that 0.15 allegation was an element, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the error would be the denial of the right to a jury determination of that element. The Court also concluded this purported error was harmless because the 0.15 allegation was uncontroverted and the record indicated defendant could not bring forth facts to contest it. Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to address Appellant’s remaining point of error. View "Do v. Texas" on Justia Law

At his trial for aggravated sexual assault of a child, Appellant Roberto Hernandez unsuccessfully sought jury instructions on lesser offenses of indecency with a child. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and ordered a new trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals because a separate offense, even if it is a lesser offense, is not an included offense. More specifically, an allegation that a defendant penetrated a child’s mouth with his penis does not include claims that he touched the child’s torso with his penis or touched her vagina with his hand. “Although they are lesser, those are not included offenses because they are separate crimes for which the defendant could be prosecuted in addition to the greater, charged offense.” View "Hernandez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jerod Roland pled no contest to official oppression, a Class A misdemeanor. The court of appeals held that the county court at law had no jurisdiction over the case because district courts and criminal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over misdemeanors involving official misconduct. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that, because of changes in the Texas Constitution and because of the wording of relevant statutes, some county courts at law did have concurrent jurisdiction over misdemeanors involving official misconduct, and the Fort Bend County Court at Law was one of those courts. View "Roland v. Texas" on Justia Law

The issue in this case is whether the trial court should have permitted Appellant Jose Sanchez to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial that was executed in anticipation of a negotiated plea that was never consummated. After overruling several requests by Appellant to withdraw his jury waiver, the trial court afforded him a bench trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the trial court abused its discretion by failing to permit the withdrawal of appellant’s jury-trial waiver. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Sanchez v. Texas" on Justia Law