Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

A confidential informant employed by a police agency arranged to purchase methamphetamine from Appellant Darren Biggers. When Appellant arrived in his vehicle at the arranged place and time, officers detained him for a narcotics investigation. The investigating officer saw a Sprite bottle and a white Styrofoam cup, both filled with “a purple-type substance.” Appellant admitted that it was “lean” (a term for codeine cough syrup mixed in a beverage). The substance field-tested positive for codeine, and officers arrested Appellant for possession of a controlled substance. The State charged Applicant with possession of a Penalty Group 4 controlled substance (codeine) in an amount over 400 grams. During the State’s case-in-chief, the State proffered testimony from a chemist regarding the contents of the Sprite bottle and a Styrofoam cup. The chemist explained that she was not asked to quantify the amount of codeine and promethazine in the Sprite bottle or the Styrofoam cup, and she did not know the concentration level of codeine in either sample. The chemist testified that promethazine was a nonnarcotic active medicinal ingredient, but she never testified as to “whether the combination of promethazine and codeine had valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the codeine alone.” On appeal, Appellant argued that, at best, the State only established the mere presence of promethazine, and that by failing to prove the level of concentration of codeine in the substances possessed by Appellant, as required by the statute, the State failed to establish an essential element of the offense. The court of appeals agreed, finding the evidence was insufficient to establish that (1) the concentration level of the codeine was not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters, and (2) the presence of promethazine was in a sufficient proportion to convey on the mixture valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the codeine alone. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concurred the evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant possessed Penalty Group 4 codeine, but was not negated beyond a reasonable doubt as required for Penalty Group 1 codeine, therefore the Court held Appellant did not possess Penalty Group 1 codeine. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that Appellant was entitled to an acquittal. View "Biggers v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Marvin Rodriquez was charged with murder. At trial he requested jury instructions on the defenses of necessity, self-defense, and defense of a third person. The trial court denied his request, and he was convicted. The court of appeals affirmed on grounds that Appellant failed to satisfy the confession-and-avoidance doctrine. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellant’s petition for discretionary review to consider whether his actions and admissions satisfied the doctrine of confession and avoidance, whether Martinez v. Texas, 775 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), was still good law, and whether the facts leading to the charged conduct were relevant. The Court concluded he did satisfy the requirements of confession and avoidance in that his testimony equivocated about his commission of the charged conduct, Martinez still stands, and all the facts surrounding the charged conduct may be relevant in deciding whether a defensive issue has been raised. Consequently, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for a harm analysis. View "Rodriguez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Christopher Simms was convicted of aggravated assault for causing a fatal head-on car accident. At trial, Appellant acknowledged that he was speeding immediately before the accident, but testified that he dozed off or passed out, which then caused him to veer into oncoming traffic and resulted in the collision. Despite this testimony, the trial court refused Appellant’s request for a lesser-included-offense instruction on deadly conduct. Appellant contended such refusal violated his right to have a valid lesser-included offense submitted to the jury for consideration. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed, because there was some evidence that would have allowed the jury to rationally conclude that the cause of the accident and the injury to the victim was Appellant’s involuntary loss of consciousness, rather than Appellant’s reckless speeding. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals which upheld the trial court’s ruling denying Appellant’s requested instruction, and remanded the case for a harm analysis. View "Simms v. Texas" on Justia Law

At the punishment stage of AppellantJuan Macedo’s trial, a police report regarding an extraneous offense was admitted into evidence over a hearsay objection. Although the judgment convicting Appellant of that extraneous offense was also admitted into evidence, the police report was the only item of evidence that included details of the offense. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that in light of the evidence of the offense and the severity of the other punishment evidence, any error in admitting the police report was harmless. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Macedo v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jesse Villafranco, Jr. was charged with aggravated sexual assault, attempted indecency with a child, and indecency with a child by exposure. At trial, Appellant sought to ask the victim about a previous incident of sexual abuse by someone else to rebut medical evidence offered by the State. The trial court questioned the victim outside the presence of the parties and ruled the evidence of prior sexual abuse inadmissible. The State and defense agreed the trial court failed to follow the proper procedure for a hearing under Rule of Evidence 412 (the “rape shield” rule), and erred in excluding the State, defense counsel, and Appellant from the hearing. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, concluding that Appellant did not show harm. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to consider whether the court of appeals erred in failing to remand this case to the trial court to remedy its error as required by LaPointe v. Texas, 225 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), and whether the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To this, the Court held the court of appeals erred in failing to follow LaPointe. The appeal was abated and the case remanded to the trial court for an adversarial hearing on the admissibility of the evidence of prior sexual abuse. This resolution rendered moot Appellant’s second ground for review, and the Court did not consider the issue of harm. View "Villafranco v. Texas" on Justia Law

The trial court suppressed two of Appellee Erlinda Lujan's three recorded, custodial statements, and the State appealed those rulings. The court of appeals upheld the suppression of one of the statements. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the suppression of that one statement. The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment because the statement at issue was not "warned and waived." View "Texas v. Lujan" on Justia Law

Appellant Oscar Sanchez, Jr. was convicted of failure to stop and render aid, and he was placed on probation. He filed an Article 11.072 habeas proceeding, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce testimony from passengers who were in his car at the time of the alleged offense. He provided habeas affidavits from some of the passengers. The trial court denied relief after reviewing the trial record and the habeas affidavits. In its review of the trial court’s determination, the court of appeals stated that a de novo review was appropriate because “the habeas judge was not the trial judge and there was no evidentiary hearing” and consequently, “the judge is not in an appreciably better position than the reviewing court to resolve the matter.” But because a court of appeals acts solely as an appellate court in reviewing a trial court’s ruling in an Article 11.072 proceeding, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the court of appeals’s statement of the standard of review was inaccurate. "Even affidavits and documentary evidence must be viewed with deference to the trial court’s ability to resolve questions of fact." Consequently, the court of appeals' judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Oscar Sanchez, Jr." on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether an incarcerated defendant was entitled to the 10-day grace period for filing a notice of appeal when he omitted the words “district clerk” from the envelope he used to send his notice of appeal. In this case, no. Because Appellant’s notice of appeal does not satisfy the mailbox rule or the prisoner mailbox rule, the notice was untimely. Without timely notice of appeal, the court of appeals properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Anderson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Herron, a sex offender, was released on parole after signing pre-release paperwork reflecting that upon release he would reside in a halfway house in El Paso County. The pre-release paperwork also indicated that Appellant should register as a sex offender with the Horizon City Police Department upon establishing his residence at the halfway house. But instead of going to El Paso County, Appellant absconded to another county where he was apprehended a few weeks later. Appellant was subsequently charged with and convicted of failure to register as a sex offender in El Paso. The question presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether Appellant could be convicted of that offense when the uncontested evidence showed that Appellant never went to El Paso following his release. "The answer is no." The Court found the evidence failed to establish that Appellant resided or intended to reside in El Paso County for more than seven days. Therefore, pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 62.051(a), Appellant was not statutorily obligated to register as a sex offender in El Paso as alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, as a matter of law, he cannot be guilty of the failure-to-register offense as alleged. The Court affirmed the court of appeals holding the evidence insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and rendering a judgment of acquittal. View "Herron v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Allen Lanclos was arrested on August 23, 2020, for assault on a public servant. The trial court set his bonds at a total of $2,250,000. Appellant could not post bonds in that amount and unsuccessfully sought their reduction. After he had been detained for 90 days without having been indicted, he filed an application for writ of habeas corpus under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.151 seeking reduction of the bonds to an amount he could afford or release on personal bond. The habeas court then reduced the bonds to $1,500,000. Appellant appealed the habeas court’s failure to reduce the bonds to an amount that he could afford, and the court of appeals affirmed the habeas court’s order. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed: "Article 17.151 is mandatory; if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days of the beginning of the defendant’s detention, the defendant accused of a felony must be released on personal bond or by reducing the required bail amount. ... Under those circumstances, the judge has only two options: either release the accused on personal bond or reduce the required bail amount. If the court chooses to reduce the amount of bail required, it must reduce it to an amount that the record reflects the accused can make." The court of appeals erred in failing to require Appellant’s release on bond that he could afford. View "Ex parte Lanclos" on Justia Law