Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police were told that the house at 318 Avenue A in South Houston was a site of drug dealing. During a week of surveillance, narcotics K-9 officers arrested four people leaving the house in possession of methamphetamine, and police got a warrant to search the house. While uniformed officers in marked police cars blocked both ends of the street, 20 to 25 HROU officers surrounded the house, announced via loudspeaker from an armored vehicle that they had a search warrant, and directed occupants to exit the house. Appellant Suzanne Wexler came out and was detained by HROU officers and put in the back of a patrol car. While HROU did a protective sweep of the house, narcotics detective Jerome Hill questioned Appellant. Hill suspected that Appellant and someone named Jimmy were involved in distributing drugs, but Hill did not tell Appellant that she was a suspect, and he did not give her any warnings. Hill testified that he said, "We have a search warrant. Tell me where the narcotics are. It will save us some time doing the search. We're going to find it no matter what." Appellant told him that the drugs were Ain her bedroom in a dresser drawer. Appellant challenged the admissibility of that statement she made to police during the execution of a search warrant, claiming that the statement was a product of custodial interrogation. The court of appeals determined that Appellant made the statement before she was in custody, and it was properly admitted by the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court. View "Wexler v. Texas" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old girl was kidnapped. Appellee Ricardo Mata called the girl’s mother and demanded a ransom of $300 for her release. He said this was the amount he had “paid” for her. A sheriff's investigator posed as a friend of the mother to negotiate the trade. While on the phone, the investigator had Appellee's cell phone "pinged," and they were able to trace the phone's location. Appellee left the house in a vehicle, and the phone’s “pinged” location matched his movements. At some point Appellee mentioned that his battery was dying; investigators had a marked police car stop Appellee’s vehicle. Investigators arrived on the scene and questioned Appellee regarding the kidnapped girl. They did not administer Miranda warnings. One investigator immediately accused Appellee of being the kidnapper and said that “they got him.” After further “aggressive interrogation,” Appellee said he would help locate the girl if they let him go. The investigator responded that Appellee would not be free to leave. After continued interrogation, Appellee revealed the child’s location. Once she was found, Appellee was transported to the sheriff’s office. Appellee filed a motion to suppress statements made by him to law enforcement, contending the investigators did not give him Miranda warnings. The trial court agreed, suppressing any “statements alleged to have been made by [Appellee] at the time he was detained on the side of the road and in response to direct questioning from Investigator Porraz, Chavez, and or Deputy Canales.” The trial court found that Appellee was “not free to leave the side of the road” at the time he gave the roadside statements and that Miranda warnings had not been given. On appeal, the State argued that the roadside questioning fell within the public safety exception to the Miranda rule and that the resulting statements were admissible. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the public safety “exception is a narrow one, and it has only been used in situations involving the use of guns.” The appellate court concluded that “the officers had no indication of a weapon or gun being involved or used to endanger the safety of the public,” and the court declined to construe the public safety exception more broadly because that “may lessen the clarity of the Miranda rule.” The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both the trial and appellate courts, finding the "public safety" exception to Miranda extended to attempts to find a kidnapped child. View "Texas v. Mata" on Justia Law

After hotel management smelled marijuana smoke coming from a guest room, a hotel employee knocked on the door in an attempt to evict the guests. After this attempt was unsuccessful, a manager later requested police assistance with evicting the guests. In assisting with the eviction, police entered the hotel room and witnessed drugs in plain view. Police then arrested the occupants of the room, conducted a search of the room incident to arrest, and seized the drugs. Appellant Michael Tilghman appealed his ultimate conviction, arguing police's entry into his rented room violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals, which held the trial court erred in failing to grant Appellant's motion to suppress evidence of the drugs. View "Tilghman v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2016, complainant Veronica Lopez and her husband, Jorge, drove their truck to a tire store called Truck Zone. Jorge went into the store while Veronica waited in the passenger seat of the truck. The truck was unlocked, with the keys in the ignition, and the motor running. A short time later, Veronica saw Appellant Jamaile Johnson riding his bicycle toward the truck. Appellant opened the driver’s side door of the truck and got inside. Veronica noticed that Appellant had a screwdriver, and although he did not point it directly at her, she testified that he threatened her with it and that she was very scared. Veronica asked if Appellant worked for the store and he told her that he did not, and then was asked by Appellant if she wanted to go for a ride. Veronica testified that she was scared and she yelled and attempted to get out of the truck by opening her door and hanging onto it while Appellant accelerated backwards and forward. She landed on her feet, uninjured, and Appellant drove off. Jorge called the police, who located the truck a short time later. As the officers approached the truck, Appellant drove off. Law enforcement followed Appellant for about forty-five minutes until he pulled over and was arrested. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ review was whether the court of appeals failed to apply the standard of review correctly in its analysis of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To this, the Court responded in the affirmative: the medical records that the court of appeals relied upon were not included in the record; it was unclear that counsel’s performance was actually deficient; and it was equally unclear as to whether there was prejudice in the failure to secure admission of those medical records. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed that of the trial court. View "Johnson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Kedreen Pugh was arrested pursuant to a warrant. At the time he was arrested, he was the driver and sole occupant of a car registered to his wife. On the way to the police station, he volunteered to an officer he was going to be “honest” and had “stuff” in the car. When asked what he had in the car, Appellant responded that he had drugs and a handgun. Heroin and a loaded gun were found together in a shopping bag on the front passenger floorboard. Assuming, without deciding, that the police officer’s question about what was in the car constituted custodial interrogation and elicited an inadmissible answer, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that any error in admitting this answer was harmless. View "Pugh v. Texas" on Justia Law

Issac Williams was convicted by jury of continuous trafficking of persons and was sentenced to fifty years in prison. Williams testified that he committed no offense at all. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of human trafficking of persons, reversed the trial court, and remanded for a new trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held previously that a trial court has no duty to sua sponte instruct on a lesser-included offense. “Requests for such instructions are matters of trial strategy that are treated like defensive instructions.” Here, the Court found Williams failed to preserve error in this case because he failed to point to the specific evidence in the record that raised the lesser-included offense, even after he was asked to do so by the trial court. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded. View "Williams v. Texas" on Justia Law

This case was remanded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals from the United States Supreme Court. Regarding one of Applicant Terence Andrus’ ineffective-assistance claims, the federal Court held Applicant satisfied the deficient-performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, but the Court remanded to the Texas Court for further proceedings because it perceived that the Texas Court might not have engaged in a prejudice inquiry. In addition, the Supreme Court criticized the concurring opinion by the Texas Court for unduly relying upon Wiggins v. Smith in its prejudice analysis. The Court of Criminal Appeals reiterated, to the extent its holding was not clear, that it decided the issue of prejudice when the case was originally before it. In an abundance of caution, the Court set forth its reasoning on the issue of prejudice and did so based on an independent review of the circumstances to determine whether there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of Applicant’s sentencing proceeding would have been different. “Although the concurrence did use Wiggins as a guide, that opinion nevertheless made some valid points with respect to the mitigating and aggravating evidence, and our prior order outlined some of the evidence consistent with those points. The mitigating evidence is not particularly compelling, and the aggravating evidence is extensive.” Based on its independent review, the Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that Applicant failed to show prejudice, and denied relief. View "Ex parte Terence Andrus" on Justia Law

In 2018, a school counselor contacted the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department” or “TDFPS”) regarding her concerns about potential child abuse involving Appellant Michael Hammack’s sixteen-year-old daughter. Department Investigator Amber Davidson opened a case and called Appellant, telling him about the investigation. Later that day, Davidson went to Appellant’s home to investigate, but Appellant told her to get off his property and to come back with a court order. Davidson did obtain: (1) an Order of Protection of a Child in an Emergency (“the Order”) that awarded custody of Appellant’s child to the Department; and (2) a Writ of Attachment that commanded any sheriff or constable in Texas to take the child and deliver her to the Department’s possession. This order granted sole managing conservatorship of the child to TDFPS as well as sole right of possession and custody of the child. That same day, Davidson returned to Appellant’s residence, accompanied by another investigator, to serve Appellant the Order. The investigators identified themselves and explained to Appellant that, pursuant to the Order, they were there to take custody of the child. Appellant immediately became aggressive and ordered them off his property. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ review centered on whether the State had to prove that a defendant was served with a copy of an emergency protection order to establish that a person “Interfere[s] with Child Custody.” The Court held no: the plain terms of the statute only required proof that the person who takes or retains a child in violation of a judgment or order, including a temporary one, knows that he or she is doing so in violation of such an order. “Proof that the person has been served with a temporary order may satisfy the State’s burden to prove such knowledge, but it is not required if knowledge can be proven through other means.” In this case, the State presented sufficient evidence that Appellant knew about the existence and relevant terms of the emergency protection order even though the evidence showed he had successfully avoided service. View "Hammack v. Texas" on Justia Law

An officer activated his emergency lights and approached a parked vehicle at a “park and ride” lot. The main use of the park-and-ride was “during the daytime for people that go into plant traffic and park,” but it was open twenty-four hours. The park-and-ride was close to a bar, and because the bar’s own parking lot was small, patrons often parked at the park-and-ride and walked over. Sergeant Robert Cox knew that the park-and-ride was a place where “a variety of criminal activity” took place, including burglaries of motor vehicles, public lewdness, and illicit drugs. In his ten years of patrolling the area. When patrolling the park-and-ride, the sergeant’s general practice was to drive around the lot and shine a spotlight on the vehicles. Sergeant Cox saw a vehicle parked by itself away from where other vehicles were parked. This solitary vehicle’s headlights and other outside lights were off, and there were no lights on inside the vehicle. When he shined his spotlight on the vehicle, Sergeant Cox could tell that there were two occupants and that there was movement inside the vehicle. He approached the vehicle on foot, made contact on the driver’s side using caution, and identified himself. At some point, the driver’s side window was rolled down, and once that occurred, Sergeant Cox smelled marijuana. Appellant Jacob Johnson appealed the charges against him (presumably for drug possession) and the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained after his encounter with Sergeant Cox, arguing the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain him, making the whole encounter unconstitutional. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention because the parking lot had a significant association with criminal activity and because the occupants of the vehicle engaged in activity that appeared secretive and was unusual for the time and place. Consequently, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Johnson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Alberto Montelongo was charged with one count of attempted capital murder of Jesus Rodriguez and Angelica Parra, five counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of continuous family violence against Parra. Appellant was tried on the attempted capital murder count and the continuous family violence count, and the jury found him guilty of both charges. The jury assessed punishment at 99 years on the attempted capital murder charge and 10 years on the continuous family violence charge. The trial court entered the judgment of conviction and imposed the sentence in open court on September 30, 2015. Appellant timely filed and presented a motion for new trial in which he requested a hearing. The trial court initially scheduled a hearing, but it later sua sponte cancelled the hearing without rescheduling. No hearing was held, the trial court made no rulings on the motion, and the motion was overruled by operation of law. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that timely filing and presenting a motion for new trial that requests a hearing preserves, for appellate review, the issue of whether the trial court abuses its discretion in failing to hold such a hearing. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the court of appeals to consider Appellant’s first issue. View "Montelongo v. Texas" on Justia Law