Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Investigators from the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force conducted an undercover operation and found child pornography on the appellant's cell phone. The appellant was indicted under Section 43.262(b) of the Texas Penal Code for knowingly possessing visual material depicting the lewd exhibition of the pubic area of a clothed child under 18 years old, which appealed to the prurient interest in sex and had no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.The appellant filed a pretrial writ application arguing that Section 43.262(b) was unconstitutional on several grounds, including that it was an impermissible content-based restriction on protected speech and was overbroad. The trial court denied the application, concluding that the statute was a content-based restriction but passed strict scrutiny, regulated only obscenity and child pornography, and was not void for vagueness.The First Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Section 43.262(b) was unconstitutional because it regulated protected speech, did not survive strict scrutiny, and was overbroad. The court of appeals concluded that the statute did not regulate only child pornography or obscenity and that the State failed to show a compelling interest in regulating child erotica.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the court of appeals' decision. It held that Section 43.262(b) regulates only child pornography, an unprotected category of speech. The court concluded that the statute was not an unconstitutional restriction on protected speech because it met the criteria established by the United States Supreme Court for regulating child pornography. The court also held that the appellant failed to preserve his overbreadth claim for appellate review. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to address the remaining points of error. View "EX PARTE LOWRY" on Justia Law

The case involves William Alan Null, who was convicted of second-degree felony sexual assault. A DNA analyst testified that Null was linked to a previous sexual assault by comparing his DNA profile to profiles developed by a third-party laboratory. Null objected, arguing that the analyst's testimony was unreliable as she had no personal knowledge about the third-party laboratory or its data. The trial court overruled Null's objection, and he was sentenced to 60 years' confinement. Null appealed, and the court of appeals ordered a new punishment trial.The court of appeals had previously affirmed the trial court's decision, but later overturned part of its decision, granting a new punishment trial. The State petitioned for discretionary review, arguing that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court held that the DNA analyst's testimony was reliable under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, as she had relied on data produced by technicians and a forensic analyst employed by a well-known and accredited third-party forensic laboratory. The court also held that the court of appeals should not have decided the judicial notice issue, as it was moot given that Null had forfeited the arguments the issue was based on. View "Null v. Texas" on Justia Law

The case involves Darren Tramell Hughes, who was on deferred adjudication community supervision. The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, alleging that Hughes had violated the terms of his supervision by committing two forgery offenses and failing to pay required fees. The hearing on the motion was conducted via Zoom due to COVID-19 restrictions. During the hearing, Hughes was muted several times when he attempted to speak. Hughes was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.On appeal, Hughes argued that his right to be present under the Due Process Clause was violated due to his muting during the hearing. The court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that his right to be present under the Confrontation Clause was violated, even though Hughes did not raise this issue in his brief. The court of appeals found that Hughes was turned into a passive observer, unable to communicate with his counsel and participate in his own defense.The case was then brought before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The court agreed with the lower court's decision that Hughes's right to be present was violated. However, it clarified that the right to be present under the Due Process Clause, not the Confrontation Clause, applies in hearings on motions to adjudicate guilt. The court further explained that this right is waivable, not forfeitable, and that Hughes did not waive this right. The court concluded that the trial court's action of muting Hughes was not harmless and affected his ability to defend himself. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "HUGHES V. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

In a case reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the trial court mistakenly permitted an alternate juror to participate in the jury's deliberations and vote on the defendant's guilt. The defendant, charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, argued that this violated constitutional and statutory provisions requiring a jury to consist of twelve people and prohibiting any person from being with the jury while it was deliberating. On review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the presence and participation of an alternate juror during jury deliberations did not violate the constitutional or statutory requirements regarding the size of a jury. However, the Court held that the alternate juror’s presence and participation during deliberations did violate the statutory prohibitions against a “person” being with the jury while it is deliberating and conversing with the jury about the case. As such, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to conduct a harm analysis, i.e., to determine whether the alternate juror's presence and participation during deliberations had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict. View "BECERRA v. STATE" on Justia Law

The Appellants in consolidated cases filed pretrial writs of habeas corpus challenging the facial constitutionality of portions of the statutes they were charged under. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide the cognizability of their pretrial claims and the meaning of “immediate release”—release from what? The Court held the facial challenges were cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if a grant of relief would result in immediate release from prosecution for an alleged offense. Release from prosecution for every alleged offense is not required. In Appellant Tonya Couch's case, the claim was not cognizable: if her indictments alleged one offense committed via four different, alternative, statutory manner and means, she challenged the constitutionality of two of those purported manner and means in her habeas application, leaving two unchallenged. If she were granted relief, her single-count indictment would still stand, and trial on it could still proceed. A grant of relief on her claim would not result in her release from prosecution for the offense alleged in her indictment. In Appellant Glenda Hammons’ case, her claim was cognizable because she challenged the constitutionality of the statute defining two counts of her three-count indictment. If she were granted relief, she would be released from prosecution for two alleged offenses, and trial on those counts could not proceed though trial on the third one could. View "Ex parte Couch, Hammons" on Justia Law

The Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW) sought and received two sealed ex parte orders from the District Court of Jones County on behalf of Real Party in Interest, Dillion Compton. One order compelled Relator University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston (UTMB) to conduct brain imaging on the Real Party in Interest and directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to arrange transportation for that brain imaging. The other order (which was no longer at issue), compelled TDCJ to provide certain confidential records to OCFW. OCFW sought the orders pursuant to its post-conviction investigation into the Real Party in Interest’s capital murder conviction and sentence. UTMB and TDCJ challenged the ex parte orders by filing a motion to set aside the discovery orders in the trial court. After initially granting the motion to set aside the discovery orders and then holding a hearing, the trial court ultimately denied the motion to set aside the discovery orders and entered an order reinstating the original ex parte orders. Relator sought leave from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to petition for mandamus relief: to vacate the remaining ex parte order regarding the brain imaging and transportation for the brain imaging of the Real Party in Interest. Because the trial court was without authority to enter the order at issue ex parte, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted Relator’s motion for leave to file and conditionally granted mandamus relief. View "In re University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston" on Justia Law

Appellant Francisco De la Rosa was tried by jury for the non-consensual sexual assault and sexual assault of a child. The body of Appellant’s indictment charged him with three counts of sexual assault for non-consensual contact between his sexual organ and that of "LAM," and the abstract portion of the jury charge defined “sexual assault of a child” in terms of non-consensual sexual contact. The indictment’s caption called the counts sexual assault of a child, its application paragraph authorized conviction for sexual assault of a child, and the case was tried as if it were such a case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold the convictions. To this, the Court concluded the appellate court did, reversed the lower court’s judgments and entered a judgment of acquittal for each count of sexual assault. View "De La Rosa v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant DeSean McPherson was convicted of tampering, but the court of appeals agreed with him that the evidence of concealment was legally insufficient. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals misapplied the standard of review. To this, the Court found that it did: it re-weighed the evidence, rationalized its result by hypothesizing a weaker case than that presented in the record, and overlooked dispositive distinctions between this case and Stahmann v. Texas, 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The Court therefore reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed that of the trial court. View "McPherson v. Texas" on Justia Law

The United States Supreme Court remanded this case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider Applicant Areli Escobar’s false-testimony claim in light of the State’s confession of error. After receiving a motion suggesting that the parties had evidence not previously considered in these habeas proceedings, the Texas Court held the case for 30 days to allow supplementation of the record. Applicant filed supplemental materials with a cover sheet that listed five items. He failed to comply with the applicable appellate rule because he did not explain the significance of any of these items or why they could not have been filed earlier, but the Court nevertheless considered the new material. Upon consideration, the Court concluded the new material did not change its original assessment of Applicant’s false-testimony claim. View "Ex parte Areli Escobar" on Justia Law

In July 2021, Appellant Lucas Vieira was indicted for aggravated assault by threat while acting as a public servant. The indictment alleged that the offense occurred on or about July 7, 2019. Appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, claiming the indictment was time-barred because it was filed more than two years after the date of the offense. The trial court denied Appellant’s habeas application, and Appellant appealed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the indictment was not brought within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and reversed judgments of the courts below. View "Ex parte Lucas Vieira" on Justia Law