Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted in 2012 of capital murder, specifically the intentional murder of Nancy Weatherly in the course of committing or attempting to commit burglary or robbery. Based upon the jury's answers to special issues (set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e)), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Appellant raised eighteen points of error in this automatic appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals found all to be without merit and affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence of death. View "Soliz v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Mark Fleming was charged with four counts of aggravated sexual assault. He filed a motion to quash the indictment on the basis that the aggravated sexual assault statute was unconstitutional for failing to require the State to prove that he had a culpable mental state related to the victim's age and for failing to recognize an affirmative defense based on the defendant's reasonable belief that the victim was 17 years of age or older. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant entered a plea of "no contest," filed an application for community supervision, and invoked his right to have the jury determine punishment. On the second day of testimony, one of the jurors informed the court that his son had dated the victim. In order to avoid a mistrial, the State and Appellant entered into a plea agreement for a ten-year probated sentence. Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to quash. The court of appeals overruled Appellant's federal constitutional claims and affirmed the trial court's judgment. We remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider Appellant's state constitutional claims, and the court of appeals again affirmed the trial court. Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review, which the Court of Criminal Appeals granted to consider whether Penal Code Section 22.021 is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Course of Law provision of the Texas Constitution because it failed to require the State to prove that the defendant had a culpable mental state regarding the alleged victim's age, and failed to recognize an affirmative defense based on the defendant's reasonable belief that the alleged victim was 17 years of age or older. Finding the statute constitutional, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals. View "Fleming v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Juan Guerra of the offense of unlawful use of a criminal instrument with the intent to commit the offense of aggravated kidnapping or aggravated sexual assault and assessed punishment of twenty years' confinement. The jury also found that appellant personally used or exhibited a deadly weapon, specifically a firearm, during the commission of the offense. On direct appeal, appellant claimed that the trial court erred when it denied his motions to suppress evidence that was obtained from the initial stop of his vehicle and his subsequent detention. The court of appeals overruled that claim and ultimately affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Guerra v. Texas" on Justia Law

Although applicant Frank Navarijo provided some new evidence in support of his claim that he was actually innocent of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that he failed to meet this standard because his new exculpatory evidence, which came in the form of a recantation from the complainant some thirteen years after his conviction, did not unquestionably establish his innocence when that evidence was considered in light of other incriminating evidence in the record. Though the habeas court in this case determined that the complainant's recantation testimony was more credible than her trial testimony and recommended granting relief on that basis, the Court disagreed with the habeas court's assessment that the matter of a recanting witness's credibility is the sole deciding factor in an actual-innocence case, and further disagreed with its related determination that applicant has unquestionably established his innocence under "Ex parte Elizondo," 947 S.W.2d 202, 206, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). View "Ex parte Frank Navarijo" on Justia Law

Appellee Mark Meru was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to 25 years in prison. He filed a motion for new trial, complaining that the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. The trial court granted appellee's motion for new trial. The State appealed, arguing that criminal trespass could not be a lesser-included offense of burglary because trespass required intrusion of the defendant's entire body, while burglary only requires a partial intrusion. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order for a new trial. The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals that Appellee was entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass and reversed.View "Texas v. Meru" on Justia Law

Appellant Rodney Anderson was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and aggravated assault of a public servant. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to 40 years for the possession offense, and life imprisonment for the aggravated assault. Appellant appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated assault of a public servant. The court of appeals held that a rational jury could find that Appellant was guilty of aggravated assault of a public servant under the conspiracy theory of party liability. After granting appellant's petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction for the aggravated assault charge under the conspiracy theory of the law of parties. Therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.View "Anderson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana and sentenced to three days' confinement and a fine. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that there were no specific, articulable facts in the record to support reasonable suspicion for the stop. After its review, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals's judgment, and remanded the case so that court could determine the effect, if any, of the Supreme Court's decision in "Texas v. Mendoza" had on this case. The appellate court again reversed, and the Supreme Court granted the State review on two grounds. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's explicit language made it clear that the court found the officer's offense report credible. Therefore, the Court found the remand to the trial court for additional fact-finding was unnecessary. However, the court of appeals read the report too narrowly and disregarded reasonable inferences from the included facts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress. View "Delafuente v. Texas" on Justia Law

In November 2011, a jury convicted appellant James Garza of capital murder for his involvement in the stabbing death of the complainant for the purpose of stealing the complainant's car. The State waived the death penalty because appellant was a juvenile at the time of the murder. Immediately upon conviction, appellant was sentenced to life without parole. No sentencing hearing was conducted, and "[n]o objection was voiced to the procedure employed or to the imposition of the sentence imposed." On appeal, appellant challenged the imposition of his life-without-parole sentence arguing that, because he was a juvenile, the sentence violated his Eighth Amendment rights as defined by the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama." The Court of Appeals refused to review his claim and held that, by failing to lodge an objection in the trial court, appellant forfeited this claim on appeal. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals' decision because it conflicted with the Court's subsequently delivered opinion in "Ex parte Maxwell." View "Garza v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Cornelious Matthews was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine. He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the crack cocaine that officers found during a warrantless search of a van that appellant had borrowed. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge ruled that appellant's original detention was reasonable and that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the van. A jury then found appellant guilty and sentenced him to twenty-two years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that appellant lacked standing to challenge the van's search and upholding appellant's detention, even though it was based largely on information from an anonymous tip. The issues this case presented to the Court of Criminal Appeals was: (1) whether a person who legitimately borrows a vehicle has standing to challenge its search; and (2) if appellant's initial and continued detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. The Court concluded that, although appellant originally had standing to challenge the search of the borrowed van, he abandoned any expectation of privacy (and hence his standing) when he fled from the officers and the van. Second, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant that was not based solely on the anonymous tip, and appellant's act of fleeing increased their suspicion and further justified his continued detention to await the arrival of a drug dog. View "Matthews v. Texas" on Justia Law

The City of Plano adopted the 2003 International Property Maintenance Code (IMPC) as part of its local Property Maintenance Code. Appellee was charged by complaint with two violations of section 6-46 and the specific subsections of the IPMC for: (1) not maintaining the exterior of a structure in good repair and in a structurally sound manner; and (2) not supplying hot and cold running water to plumbing fixtures in a house. He was convicted of both counts after separate bench trials. Appellee appealed both cases to the county court at law for trial de novo and filed motions to dismiss the complaints because the State failed to allege that he was given notice that he was in violation of the code and then continued to violate the code as required under subsection 106.3. Appellee's motions were granted, and the State appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, which consolidated the two cases. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, holding that individual provisions of the code could not be taken in isolation and that, when taken as a whole, the code clearly required notice. The City filed a petition for discretionary review, arguing that the municipal code created two offenses: the one contained within the original IMPC and the one created by Plano that did not require notice. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether appellee was entitled to notice of violations of a municipal code before his subsequent violations of the code could result in convictions. Holding that he was, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the courts below. View "Texas v. Cooper" on Justia Law