Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Albert Turner was charged with capital murder. At trial, he was represented by Patrick McCann and Tyrone Moncriffe. Turner was found guilty and sentenced to death. The trial court appointed counsel for Turner's direct appeal and the Office of Capital Writs ("OCW") to handle Turner's postconviction writ. As part of its investigation, OCW asked Turner to authorize the release of his trial file from McCann. Turner refused to sign the release because OCW is a "state agency," and he wanted to speak with his sister before moving forward. Lacking Turner's authorization, McCann refused to release the file believing that his client was invoking his right to keep his privileged information confidential. In response, OCW filed a motion asking the trial court to order McCann to turn the file over. After a hearing, the trial court ordered trial counsel to relinquish Turner's trial file, and McCann refused. He then petitioned the Supreme Court for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition. While McCann's motion was pending, OCW withdrew as Turner's habeas counsel. Subsequently, the Supreme Court dismissed McCann's motion as moot because OCW, a "state agency," no longer represented Turner. The trial court then appointed new habeas counsel, James Rytting, to represent Turner in his postconviction application, and Rytting sought Turner's trial file for investigatory purposes. Rytting stated that he visited Turner twice in person after his appointment, and he agreed that McCann's characterization of Turner was correct in that Turner did not want the file turned over. Rytting also explained that, based on his visits with Turner, if McCann gave the file to Turner, Rytting would never see it. For his part, McCann continued to refuse to relinquish the trial file based on his understanding of his client's wishes. In a second hearing, the trial court ordered McCann to turn over his file again. After failing to comply with the trial court's second order, the court found McCann in contempt. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court conditionally granted McCann relief on his petition for writs of mandamus and dismissed his petition for a writ of prohibition. View "In re PATRICK McCANN et al." on Justia Law

Tommy and Charlie Gill were arrested for murder and held in custody for over ninety days without being formally charged. They applied for habeas relief, arguing that under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.151, they were entitled to release on a personal bond or a reduction of bail. The trial judge denied appellants' applications and the court of appeals affirmed those decisions. Because the court of appeals erred in holding that the judge properly considered factors outside of article 17.151 in denying Appellants relief under that provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the habeas court. View "Ex parte Gill" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon. The indictment also included allegations that appellant previously had been convicted of two felony offenses. After finding appellant "guilty of aggravated assault, as charged in the indictment," the jury found the enhancement paragraphs true and assessed punishment of thirty years' confinement. On direct appeal, appellant raised several claims, including a claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that the second enhancement paragraph was true: that paragraph should not have been used to enhance her punishment range because the alleged offense did not occur in the sequence alleged in the indictment. The court of appeals held that the evidence supported the enhancement of appellant's sentence under the habitual-offender statute and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the opinion of the majority of the First Court of Appeals erroneously relied on an unpublished memorandum opinion as controlling precedent rather than on a published opinion from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals that involved the same issue regarding enhanced sentences and finality of the convictions in enhancement paragraphs. Appellant suggested that the majority opinion in the court of appeals appeared to contradict the Supreme Court's subsequent adoption of the rationale of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Roberson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Leroy Coty was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 400 grams of a controlled substance. After the malfeasance of a laboratory technician that worked on his case was discovered, Applicant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief in a per curiam opinion. However, before mandate issued, the Court withdrew its opinion, granted rehearing, and issued a briefing order to the parties. The Court then issued a second opinion in which it set forth a new analytical framework to resolve claims of forensic technician misconduct. The Court then remanded the case to the habeas court to apply the principles laid out in that opinion. The habeas court issued new findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Court of Criminal Appeals deny relief. After reviewing the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and denied relief. View "Ex parte Coty" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether an amendment to the evading-arrest statute in the Texas Penal Code was enacted in violation of the "single-subject rule" of the Texas Constitution, thereby rendering that enactment void. Concluding that it was not, the Court determined that the court of appeals properly upheld the trial court's denial of the pre-trial application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by appellant Richard Jones. Appellant alleged that the amendment to the evading-arrest statute that became effective on September 1, 2011, was facially unconstitutional because it was enacted in violation of Section 35 of the Texas Constitution, which states, "No bill . . . shall contain more than one subject." The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that this bill did not violate the single-subject requirement. Therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Ex parte Jones" on Justia Law

The complainant was appellant's stepdaughter. In 2006, then eight years old, she told a forensic interviewer that appellant had, on one occasion, told her to sit on his face, at which point he made oral contact with her anus. The complainant also said that appellant had, on one occasion, showed her various "sex toys" and placed one between her legs so that she could "feel the vibration." Appellant responded to these accusations by providing a written statement to police that was admitted at his trial. His statement indicated that, based on prior comments by the complainant, he suspected that she had been sexually active with her brothers. He said that on one occasion, the complainant entered his bedroom, lifted her dress, and exposed herself, causing him to notice that she was not wearing underwear. Appellant stated that he decided to examine her to see if she had any physical evidence of sexual contact or injury. To examine the complainant, appellant laid her down on the bed and spread her legs while she was on her stomach. After that, he opened her buttocks to visually check her anus and labia. He determined that the "examination was inconclusive and her anus did not appear to be streached/ripped [sic]." He maintained that there was no intent for any sexual gratification. This case addresses whether a trial court's omission of a "medical care" defensive jury instruction was harmless error. The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the entire record that the jury rejected appellant's statements invoking the medical-care defense, and, therefore, he was not actually harmed in this case. Furthermore, although the court of appeals erred by referring to the sufficiency of the evidence, it reached the correct disposition.View "Cornet v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine). He filed a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the evidence (the cocaine) was illegally obtained. He also filed a motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. The latter motion cited two bases for disclosure: (1) that the informant's identity was needed to show that the officers who conducted the arrest and search did not have probable cause based upon a reliable and credible informant, and (2) that the informant's identity was necessary because the informant was a material witness to the defendant's guilt or innocence and upon the possible defense of entrapment. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the dispositive nature of the motion to suppress was a term of appellant's plea agreement and that it rendered moot the second basis for appellant's motion to disclose. Furthermore, the Court concluded that appellant failed to sufficiently apprise the trial court of his intent to challenge the motion to disclose on this second basis or to challenge the dispositive nature of the plea agreement. View "Bland v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault. The jury found Appellant not guilty of indecency with a child but guilty of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced him to confinement for fifty years. On appeal, Appellant claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the medical-care defense. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Appellant would have been entitled to an instruction on the medical-care defense if he had requested it. The State filed a petition for discretionary review which the Texas Supreme Court granted on two grounds: (1) whether in this case Appellant was entitled to the instruction on the medical-care defense; and (2) is it necessarily ineffective assistance of counsel to not request a defensive instruction that depends upon convincing the jury that the defendant lied to them under oath when he denied committing the prohibited conduct? The Court determined that, in his trial testimony, Appellant admitted to penetration (as defined by Texas law) which was sufficient to satisfy the admission requirement of the confession and avoidance doctrine as it related to the medical-care defense. Further, the Court concluded that Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel because the defense was properly raised and trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the issue. View "Villa v. Texas" on Justia Law

Following his arrest for driving while intoxicated, appellee filed a motion to suppress "all evidence seized as a result of illegal acts by the state." Specifically, he alleged that his arrest was illegal and that the circumstances under which breath testing for blood-alcohol concentration was conducted rendered the results as illegally obtained. At a pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, the State presented testimony from one of the arresting officers and then rested. The trial court determined that the appellee's arrest was legal, but nevertheless granted the appellee's motion to suppress on the basis that "[t]he State failed to present any testimony regarding the breath test results[.]" The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, holding that the arrest was legal and that the appellee had failed to establish any illegalities in the way the breath-test results were obtained. The Supreme Court granted appellee's petition for review of his contention that the court of appeals erred in failing to uphold the trial court's ruling as "correct under any theory of law applicable to the case." The Supreme Court acknowledged that appellants can be deprived of an adequate opportunity "to develop a complete factual record" with respect to an alternative legal theory, and it would be incongruous with case law to treat a purported alternative legal theory as truly law "applicable to the case" under those circumstances. "If the alternative legal theory that an appellee proffers for the first time on appeal as a basis to affirm a trial court's otherwise faulty judgment turns upon the production of predicate facts by the appellant (here, the State) that he was never fairly called upon to adduce during the course of the proceedings below, then application of the 'Calloway' rule to affirm that otherwise faulty judgment works a manifest injustice. An appellee's alternative legal theory should not be considered 'law applicable to the case' under these circumstances, and this is so regardless of whether the appellee was the defendant or the State at the trial court level." Accordingly, the Court held that, because the State was never confronted with the necessity of meeting its burden to establish the scientific reliability of its breath-test results at the hearing on the appellee's pretrial motion to suppress, and for that reason the record was undeveloped with respect to admissibility as a function of scientific reliability, inadmissibility of that evidence under Rule 702 was not a "theory of law applicable to the case" that was available to justify the trial court's otherwise erroneous ruling on the appellee's motion to suppress. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment.View "Texas v. Esparza" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2003. Shortly before his scheduled execution in 2012, he filed a motion to determine competency to be executed under Article 46.05. The trial court held an informal hearing, found that Appellant had not made a "substantial showing" of incompetency, and denied the motion. As a result of denying Appellant's motion, there was no formal hearing on the merits to determine if Appellant was incompetent to be executed. Appellant moved to send the record to the Supreme Court, and the trial court granted that motion. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court determined that further review was needed and stayed the execution. Upon further review, the Court found Appellant made a substantial showing of incompetency to be executed, and so he was entitled to further proceedings, including the appointment of "at least two mental health experts" and a determination regarding competency.View "Druery v. Texas" on Justia Law