Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and was sentenced to thirty years. On the morning that jury selection was scheduled to begin, the trial court heard argument on appellant's pretrial motion for a hearing to determine the six-year-old child-complainant's competency to testify. Over appellant's objection, the trial court decided to conduct its Rule 601(a)(2) competency examination in camera, with the court reporter in attendance but in the absence of appellant and the attorneys for both sides. Following the examination, the trial court found the child-complainant to be a competent witness. On appeal, appellant raised numerous instances of where he thought the trial court erred, principal among them was that by excluding him and his attorney from the competency examination, the trial court violated his constitutional rights. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals discovered that appellant's principal constitutional argument was the only one the court of appeals did not address in its decision. Although the Court does not ordinarily review issues that the court of appeals does not , the Court made an exception in this case, and still affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Gilley v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellants Andres Nava and Xiomara Mendez were each indicted and convicted for felony murder and organized criminal activity. Nava was sentenced to sixty years and seven years, and Mendez was sentenced to sixty years and twenty years. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to determine whether the appellants suffered egregious harm as a result of error in the jury instructions on the law of parties, and whether their appeals were prejudiced due to a missing portion of the voir dire record. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Nava v. Texas" on Justia Law

A police anti-narcotics unit had been conducting surveillance of a residence for approximately thirty days when officers received a call from a confidential informant advising them that the occupants were preparing to manufacture methamphetamine. Several hours after receiving that call, officers entered the residence without a search warrant and without consent. The officers encountered several individuals, including appellant, whom they handcuffed and escorted to the front yard. Officers performed a protective sweep of the residence, and determined that no methamphetamine was being "cooked" at that time. Two investigators then prepared the search-warrant affidavit. The affidavit relied only on information provided by the confidential informant and did not mention the officers' warrantless entry into the residence. Appellant was arrested and charged with possession of chemicals with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine weighing more than 4 but less than 200 grams. The trial court granted in part and denied in part appellant's motion to suppress, holding that the officers' initial entry into the residence was "without a lawful warrant, exigent circumstances, or other lawful basis." Appellant subsequently pled guilty pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement and was sentenced to five years' confinement on each count, to run concurrently. Appellant expressly reserved his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the federal independent source doctrine was applicable in Texas. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that because the independent source doctrine did not circumvent or avoid the statutory exclusionary rule's requirement that evidence obtained in violation of the law be suppressed. As such, the court of appeals erred by rejecting that doctrine as a basis for upholding the trial court's suppression ruling. View "Wehrenberg v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant's appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Appellant was charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Appellant's motion to suppress asserted that: his seizure was made without any reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in any criminal activity. In making its ruling, the trial judge specifically found that appellant had been detained, saying that she believed that "the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances and did have articulable facts that justified the minimal detention," but also denied appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant then plead guilty to the offense and, pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to twenty days in jail. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the suppression motion and affirmed the trial court's judgment. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals sustained appellant's grounds for review and reversed and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to determine whether the detention was valid. View "Johnson v. Texas" on Justia Law

A magistrate issued a warrant to search Appellant's house for crack cocaine based on an affidavit detailing a controlled purchase in which police used a reliable confidential informant to purchase narcotics through an unknown third party. The third party was not aware of the police operation. However, because there was no information on the credibility or reliability of the unknowing third party, Appellant argued on appeal of his conviction that the magistrate could not have concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the crack cocaine came from Appellant's house. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to find probable cause. View "Moreno v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Samantha Britain of manslaughter and injury to a child for recklessly causing the death of her step-daughter. The Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence that appellant was "aware of but consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk" as required to prove recklessness. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court and entered a judgment of acquittal on both counts. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review of whether the Court of Appeals should have reformed the verdict to the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide rather than rendering a verdict of acquittal. The Supreme Court concluded there was no evidence concerning the standard of care an ordinary person should be held to or that showed the appellant should have been aware of the risk to the child. Given this lack of evidence and the conflicting testimony of the medical experts concerning the ease with which such a serious risk was identified, the Court could not say that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant acted with negligence. The Court of Appeals did not err in rendering a judgment of acquittal, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. View "Britain v. Texas" on Justia Law

In his initial application for habeas relief, applicant Erick Alberto Oranday-Garcia alleged his guilty for possession of cocaine was involuntary because trial counsel rendered deficient performance by advising him that conviction for that offense would not result in deportation. Applicant was deported as a result of his offense. He contended that had he understood the effect that the guilty plea would have on his immigration status, he would not have pled guilty but insisted on going to trial. Applicant's trial counsel filed an affidavit with the convicting court specifically refuting the applicant's allegations and maintaining that he had informed the applicant that his conviction would result in deportation. Based on the affidavit, the convicting court recommended denying relief. In a subsequent writ application, applicant argued that the same circumstances in support of his claim that his plea was given involuntarily due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel was supported under the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Padilla v. Kentucky." Applying the requirement of an allegation of prima facie facts to this petition, the Supreme Court dismissed it as non-compliant with Article 11.07, Section 4. The new law that applicant invoked was Padilla, but the Court concluded he did not establish that Padilla applied to the facts of his case because of Texas precedent "Ex parte De Los Reyes," and the United States Supreme Court's opinion in "Chaidez v. United States." Because the applicant's conviction was final before the Supreme Court announced the rule in Padilla, it could not apply to him in any event. View "Ex parte Oranday-Garcia" on Justia Law

The trial court found appellant was indigent and appointed trial counsel for him. Subsequently, the court accepted appellant's guilty plea for hindering apprehension and sentenced him to eight years' confinement in the penitentiary. Thereafter, the trial court suspended the appellant's sentence and imposed eight years' community supervision. Without making a finding that the appellant had the present resources to repay the county for his court appointed trial attorney, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay court costs, which, according to a bill of costs attached to the written judgment, included attorney fees. Appellant did not appeal at the time of the imposition of community supervision. But when the appellant's community supervision was later revoked and he was sentenced to eight years' incarceration, that's when appellant raised the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's order to repay attorney fees. The court of appeals acknowledged that the evidence was insufficient to order the repayment of those initial attorney fees, but held that the appellant procedurally defaulted this claim by failing to raise an objection in the trial court at the time that community supervision was imposed. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded appellant procedurally defaulted his claim. View "Wiley v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of second-degree felony possession of marijuana. She initially preserved error by way of a motion to suppress the evidence, which she claimed had been seized during the course of an illegally prolonged roadside detention. But when the evidence was later proffered by the State during the punishment portion of the unitary proceeding following her non-negotiated plea of guilty to the charge, her attorney expressly declared that he had "no objection" to the admission of the evidence. The trial court nevertheless manifested its understanding that the appellant persisted in her wish to appeal the denial of her pretrial motion to suppress and expressly granted her permission to do so. The court of appeals refused to reach the merits of her claim, relying upon longstanding precedent that her attorney had "waived" the previously preserved objection to the evidence for purposes of appeal when he declared that he had "no objection" to its admission. Given the record as a whole, the Supreme Court concluded court of appeals erred by stating that when appellant stated she had "no objection" to the introduction of certain evidence during the punishment portion of the proceedings in this case, she "waived" appellate review of the propriety of the trial court's ruling on her pretrial motion to suppress. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant Vaughn Bell contended the court of appeals erred in finding the trial judge's error that ordered him shackled during trial was harmless. Over a lunch break during the guilt phase of Bell's trial for the offense of possession of a controlled substance, the judge ordered Bell shackled. Accordingly, Bell was shackled with cuffs and "a chain that is linked between his two ankles." Bell objected to the shackling, arguing that using the device in front of the jury, if seen, would deprive him a presumption of innocence, fair trial, "and his rights under United States and Texas Constitution." The State responded by asking the judge to have the court's bailiff sit in various seats in the jury box to see if jurors would be able to see Bell's shackles. Complying, the bailiff told the judge that he could not see the chain or ankle cuffs. Bell countered that the jury would be able to hear the chains rattle if Bell moved during the trial. The judge overruled Bell's objection. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in shackling Bell, but that the error was not constitutional error because there was no evidence the jury saw his restraints. Despite the court of appeals' erroneous application of a constitutional-error harm analysis, the Court affirmed its judgment. View "Bell v. Texas" on Justia Law