Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002, a grand jury returned two indictments in two separate cases, each charging Applicant Jonathan Kibler with three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Applicant pleaded guilty to two charges of indecency with a child by exposure as alleged in Count three in each case. Count three of both indictments alleged conduct that was committed on the same day, but against different victims. The trial court accepted the plea agreements and placed Applicant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a concurrent period of eight years. One of the conditions of Applicant’s probation required him to comply with the Sex Offender Registration Program. In 2006, the State filed motions to adjudicate Applicant’s guilt in both cases. In 2007, Applicant entered negotiated pleas of “true” to the allegations contained in each of the State’s motions to adjudicate. During the same proceeding, the trial court adjudicated Applicant guilty and sentenced him to two years confinement in each case, with the sentences to run concurrently. Applicant did not appeal his convictions. After discharging his sentences in 2008, Applicant received conflicting information regarding the duration of his duty to register as a sex offender. In 2013, an attorney with the Texas Department of Public Safety and a field representative with the Texas Department of Public Safety’s “Sex Offender Registration Unit” separately advised Applicant by email that he was required to register for life based on his two convictions for indecency with a child. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was being improperly required to register for life based on an erroneous interpretation of Article 62.101(a)(4) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The issue presented to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether a person convicted of multiple charges of indecency with a child in the same proceeding received one reportable conviction or adjudication “before or after” another, such that the person has a duty to register as a sex offender for life. The Court held yes: Article 62.101(a)(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which established when the duty to register as a sex offender expires, did not require that one conviction be final before the second conviction was received. Thus, a sex offender could be required to register for life if he or she receives two separate convictions for the offense of indecency with a child, even if they are adjudicated in the same proceeding. View "Ex parte Kibler" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Phillip Campbell of murdering Alexandria Wright (“Jade”) by manual strangulation. In his testimony at trial, Appellant contended that on the night of Jade’s death, he and Jade had engaged in rough sex involving erotic asphyxiation. Although Appellant admitted that he purposely choked Jade, he insisted that it was consensual, that he did not intend to harm her, and that her death was simply a tragic accident. In the jury instructions, over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court included a definition for “intentionally” as it related to both the “nature” of Appellant’s conduct as well as to the “result” of his conduct, even though intentional murder was a result-of-conduct offense. On appeal, Appellant argued that because of this, the charge improperly allowed the jury to convict him if it found that he intentionally choked Jade, rather than requiring the jury to find that he intentionally killed Jade. The Court of Appeals concluded that the error in the charge, if any, was harmless. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether this conclusion was in error. Based on its independent review of the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that Appellant was not actually harmed by the trial court’s failure to tailor the definition of “intentionally” to the result of Appellant’s conduct. Accordingly, it affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. View "Campbell v. Texas" on Justia Law

Carroll Weathermon saw appellant Mickey Perkins standing over Lana Hyles who was on the ground. Weathermon did not know Hyles or Appellant prior to that day. She began honking her horn and saw Appellant grab Hyles by the hair pulling her toward a car parked in the grass to the side of the road. Weathermon called 911, opened her passenger door, and Hyles crawled inside as her nose bled. Weathermon took Hyles to the emergency room. Hyles previously dated Appellant, and, according to Hyles, Appellant was to drop her off at home but began heading in the wrong direction. Hyles advised Appellant to take her home, which led to an argument. The argument became physical when Appellant pushed her head into the console of the car and choked her causing her pain and difficulty breathing. Hyles bit Appellant’s finger and exited the vehicle as it slowed down. She did not recall being on the ground or Appellant physically trying to force her back to the car. After Appellant left in Hyles’s car, she got into Weathermon’s car. But according to Appellant, Hyles caused her own injuries. He claimed that as he was driving, Hyles slammed the car into either park or reverse from the passenger seat. Appellant claimed he was forced to hit the brakes, causing Hyles to hit her face on the dash. Ultimately, Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault against a person with whom he had previously had a dating relationship. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals centered on whether the State was required to accept a defendant's stipulation of evidence regarding an unadjudicated extraneous offense offered for non-character conformity purposes, rather than introduce testimony regarding the commission of that offense into evidence during the State’s case-in-chief. The Court declined to extend its holding in Tamez v. Texas involving jurisdictional DWI convictions to the situation presented in this case. The Court affirmed the court of appeals opinion in this regard. However, the Court concurred with Appellant that the court of appeals failed to review the trial court’s decision to admit testimony of Appellant’s unadjudicated aggravated assault over Appellant’s Rule 403 objection. Consequently, the Court remanded the case for the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court’s admission of this evidence ran afoul of Rule 403. View "Perkins v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Terri Lang was convicted of organized retail theft (ORT). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently found the evidence insufficient to support Appellant’s ORT conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the judgment of conviction should have been reformed to a lesser-included offense. The court of appeals found that reformation was not available, and the State petitioned for discretionary review. Because the existence of an owner was a statutory element of theft, but the identity of the owner was not, theft was a lesser-included offense of ORT in this case, and Appellant’s conviction met the “Thornton” reformation standards. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, modified the judgment to reflect a conviction for theft, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. View "Lang v. Texas" on Justia Law

At issue before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in this case was whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the State from prosecuting appellant Cedric Richardson for the aggravated assault of one victim after a jury acquitted him of capital murder, and aggravated robbery of a different victim. Both victims were shot by co-defendant Keoddrick Polk on the same day—and Appellant was present at the scene of both shootings. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that collateral estoppel (i.e., Double Jeopardy) did not apply in this case. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals which held to the contrary. View "Ex parte Cedric Richardson" on Justia Law

Appellant Harold Jefferson was indicted for one count of sexual assault and one count of indecency with a child. The State amended the indictment to add two more sexual-assault counts. On appeal, Appellant argued the trial court erred in allowing the amendment and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the amendment or otherwise preserve error. The issues presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals were: (1) whether adding a count constituted adding an additional offense to the indictment; and (2) whether counsel should have known that. To these, the Court answered both questions “yes.” The Court also concluded that the court of appeals erred in its ineffective-assistance analysis in several otherrespects. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jefferson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Silas Parker was charged with possession with intent to deliver four hundred grams or more of a controlled substance, namely, psilocybin. Appellant contested the legality of the search warrant on the ground that probable cause did not exist when it was issued since the psilocybin had not yet been delivered. This case presented a matter of first impression for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: Are all anticipatory search warrants prohibited under Texas law? The Court held that the language of article 18.01(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permitted anticipatory search warrants and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Parker v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review in this case to determine whether the court of appeals erred when it held that a criminal defendant could never waive the right to counsel at a retrospective competency hearing and proceed pro se. Appellant Edwin Antonio Osorio-Lopez was accused of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and evading arrest in November 2017. When he appeared in court to plead guilty, he changed his mind and decided to go to trial and represent himself. Before the bench trial began, the attorneys and interpreter approached the trial court with concerns about Appellant’s mental health. The trial court appointed an expert who found Appellant incompetent to stand trial, and the trial court signed an order committing Appellant to Rusk State Hospital for no more than 120 days. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the lower court erred in reaching the self-representation issue because the trial court did not deny Appellant’s request to represent himself; Appellant was permitted to proceed pro se. Therefore, the issue was not whether Appellant had a right to self-representation at a retrospective competency hearing but whether Appellant was competent to waive counsel and whether he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently did so after asserting his desire to represent himself. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for the court of appeals to undertake the necessary analysis in the first instance. View "Osorio-Lopez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Syed Nawaz was convicted on two counts of injury to a child, but under different subsections of Texas Penal Code Section 22.04: 22.04(a)(1) and 22.04(a)(2). Appellant argued on appeal that his two convictions constituted the imposition of multiple punishments for the “same” offense, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals previously concluded that, at least for purposes of a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict, Sections 22.04(a)(1) and 22.04(a)(2) constituted discrete offenses. Nevertheless, the court of appeals in this case determined that convicting Appellant for both offenses constituted multiple punishments for the “same” offense, in violation of federal double-jeopardy protections. The Court concluded that punishing Appellant in the same trial for causing serious bodily injury, under Section 22.04(a)(1), and also for causing serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury, under Section 22.04(a)(2), did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. There was some evidence that, by whatever act or acts Appellant inflicted the “whip-lash-type” injuries to the victim, those injuries included both “serious bodily injury” in the form of retinal bleeding that caused her blindness, and “serious mental deficiency” in the form of diffuse brain bleeding that has caused her developmental delays. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed insofar as it vacated Appellant’s conviction and punishment under Count II of the indictment, and the case was remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Nawaz v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Darryl Joe was charged with and convicted of cargo theft. He challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, arguing that the goods were not cargo, he was never in possession of the goods, and even if he possessed the goods, he did not conduct an activity in which he possessed stolen cargo. After review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the goods were cargo, and Appellant possessed the goods. The case was remanded for the court of appeals to consider whether Appellant conducted an activity in which he possessed stolen cargo. View "Joe v. Texas" on Justia Law