Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Applicant Michael LaHood was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault. On direct appeal, the district court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court subsequently refused his petitions for discretionary review. Applicant then filed applications for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, in part, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate his mental-health history, and if she had, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his proceeding would have been different. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Supreme Court deny relief. The Court agreed with the trial court's findings and denied relief. View "Ex parte Michael George Lahood" on Justia Law

Applicant Joe Anthony Valdez was tried as a juvenile for committing felony murder with a deadly weapon, and convicted for which he received a fifteen year sentence. Applicant was committed to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) until his eighteenth birthday and was then transferred to Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to complete his sentence. He was released from TDCJ on parole. His parole was later revoked for burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit second-degree assault, to which he pled nolo contendre and sentenced to sixteen years. Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, contending that TDCJ improperly denied him review for mandatory-supervision release based on his prior juvenile adjudication of delinquent conduct. Finding no error by the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ex parte Joe Anthony Valdez" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted on counts of capital murder, felony murder, and of injury to a child following the death of Danielle Ramos, a child under six years old. The indictment and jury charge alleged that Appellant killed Danielle in one of three ways: by shaking, by shaking and causing Danielle's head to strike an object, or by shaking and striking Danielle's head with an object. The jury convicted Appellant of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Appellant appealed, arguing the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's determination: that he acted 'recklessly;' or that 'shaking' caused Danielle's death. The appellate court affirmed, finding Appellant's statement that he threw Danielle into her crib out of frustration, and that the nature of the child's injuries also provided bases for the jury to consider. Since Appellant's petition for discretionary review was granted, the Supreme Court issued "Johnson v. State" and addressed a nearly identical issue. In light of "Johnson", the Court held that the variance between pleading and proof was immaterial in this case and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Ramos v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Benjamin Burch was indicted for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, cocaine. At trial, the State offered into evidence a one-page lab report. The relevant findings stated that the contents of four green plastic bags were used for analysis, and that the material inside was cocaine. Analyst Jennifer Pinckard and reviewer Monica Lopez signed the report. The State called Lopez to testify; on the stand she explained that Pinckard had performed all the tests in this particular case, but Pinckard no longer worked for the laboratory where the tests were performed. No evidence was offered as to why Pinckard had left the laboratory. Lopez said that, as the reviewer, she was to ensure that the lab's policies and procedures were followed. Appellant objected to Lopez's testimony, arguing it was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to be able to confront witnesses against him. The trial court overruled his objection and admitted the report, the underlying physical evidence, and Lopez's testimony that the substance was cocaine. The Fifth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding it was an error to admit the drug analysis and Lopez's testimony, and that the error was not harmless. The case was remanded for a new trial. The State filed a Petition for Discretionary Review, which the Texas Supreme Court granted. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded Lopez was not an appropriate surrogate witness for cross-examination. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings was affirmed. View "Burch v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant, nineteen-year-old Austin Loving, was convicted of three counts of indecency with a child by contact and two counts of indecency with a child by exposure involving two sisters. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for each of the indecency-by-contact counts and ten years' imprisonment, probated for ten years, on the indecency-by-exposure counts. The Court of Appeals vacated one of Appellant's convictions for indecency by exposure on double-jeopardy grounds, and it affirmed the remainder of his convictions. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine if Appellant's vacated exposure conviction was barred by double jeopardy. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant's exposure conviction was not barred by double-jeopardy principles, and accordingly reversed the judgment of the appellate court vacating Appellant's conviction for indecency with a child by exposure in Count III of the indictment regarding the older sister, and the Court affirmed its judgment as modified. View "Loving v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was accused of soliciting sex from a minor over the internet. The girl claimed to be fifteen at the time she and appellant "met." Despite communicating for over two years, the girl still claimed to be fifteen. After the girl and appellant agreed to meet in person, appellant immediately discovered the girl was actually an undercover police detective. The issues before the Supreme Court in this case were whether appellant could use the affirmative defense in Penal Code 22.011(e), and if so, if the evidence at trial justified an affirmative defense jury instruction. The Supreme Court concluded that section 22.011(e) applied in appellant's case, and justified the instruction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sanchez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death in 1977. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial. The State unsuccessfully moved for rehearing. Though the Court's mandate had already issued, the governor commuted Petitioner's death sentence to life. Petitioner filed a pro se application for the writ of habeas corpus, and a year later, applied for the writ of mandamus to compel the new trial. The Supreme Court denied both. Petitioner then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas; the federal district court reported Petitioner was not in custody under state court judgment because the trial court's judgment of conviction ceased to exist when the Supreme Court issued its mandate and the governor's commutation came too late. However, because Petitioner was confined in the Eastern District, the case was transferred. A magistrate judge in the Eastern District recommended petitioner's application for habeas relief be denied for failing to exhaust a Speedy Trial Clause claim in state court. The district court adopted the Eastern District magistrate's recommendations and dismissed petitioner's habeas application. Petitioner appealed that decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit issued an opinion; the State was unsuccessful in moving the federal court for rehearing. Acting on its own motion, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its opinion and certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court asking the Court what was the status of Petitioner's new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the mandate it issued in Petitioner's case reversed the judgment of conviction, and no other court entered any order to alter that reversal. Because some penalty must be assessed for the authority of commutation to be exercised, and Petitioner's death sentence was erased by the Court's mandate, the governor's commutation was a nullity. Therefore the status of Petitioner's judgment of conviction was Petitioner was under no conviction or sentence. View "Hartfield v. Thaler" on Justia Law

A jury rejected Appellant Codiem Wooten's self-defense claim and convicted him of murder, for which he was sentenced to sixty years' confinement. At the punishment phase of trial, appellant requested a "sudden passion" jury instruction. The trial court denied that request. The Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction, but reversed with respect to punishment, holding the trial court erred by not giving the sudden passion instruction. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the appellate court erred in finding "some harm" simply because appellant was subjected to a greater range of punishment than he would had the jury been instructed on sudden passion. View "Wooten v. Texas" on Justia Law

During voir dire, the trial judge said that he personally would want to testify if accused of a crime but admonished the prospective jurors that others might have a different perspective, that a defendant could have good reasons not to testify that were unrelated to guilt, and that the law prohibited the jurors from holding a defendant's failure to testify against him. Defense counsel belatedly requested a mistral but did not ask for an instruction to disregard the trial judge's comments. Holding that the comments constituted fundamental error, the court of appeals reversed the conviction. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the trial judge's comments constituted fundamental error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that appellant's request for a mistrial did not preserve error because any harm flowing from error in this case could have been cured by an instruction to disregard and in fact was cured by the totality of the trial judge's instructions. Accordingly the appellate court was reverse and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Unkart v. Texas" on Justia Law

The appellee was convicted of driving while intoxicated, and he timely filed a motion for new trial. The motion stated, in relevant part, that the appellee was requesting a new trial, in the interest of justice, because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. The judge recused himself because the appellee had donated to his campaign, and a visiting judge was appointed to hear the motion. While the appellee's counsel was in the visiting judge's home courtroom and while no representative of the State was present, the judge requested that both parties file memoranda of law on the motion. No one informed the State of the judge's request. The day before the hearing appellee filed a "memorandum of law" in support of his motion. During the hearing, the State strenuously objected to the appellee's memorandum of law on the grounds that it was an untimely amendment to the appellee's motion for new trial and alleged new grounds. The State further argued that the original motion, standing alone, was not sufficient to put the State on notice that pretrial matters would be argued. Counsel for appellee responded that one of the grounds in the original motion (that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence) was a sufficient pleading because it encompassed the evidentiary issues. Counsel said that the memorandum was not an amendment to the motion but merely a more detailed argument as requested by the judge. The judge overruled the State's objections and allowed the hearing to proceed. The appellee argued only that the verdict was "contrary to the law and the evidence" because of the suppression issues. At the end of the hearing, the trial court granted a new trial. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the test in "State v. Herndon" for reviewing granted motions for new trial. A trial court generally does not abuse its discretion if the defendant (1) sets forth a specificˇand valid legal ground for relief in their motion, (2) points to evidence in the record (or sets forth evidence) that substantiates the same legal claim, and (3) shows prejudice under the harmless-error standards of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this case, the appellee did not present evidence of the same claim that was raised in his motion, and the State properly objected. Consequently, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the appellee's motion and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming. View "Texas v. Zalman" on Justia Law