Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Gregg Baird hired Dawn Killian to stay at his home and care for his dog while he was away on vacation. During her stay, Killian used appellant's computer in his master bedroom and found child pornography. At a pre-trial suppression hearing, appellant claimed that Killian's access to his bedroom and computer was illegal; therefore, the State could not use the evidence against him at his trial. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress the images taken from his computer. Specifically, the trial court found that appellant did not explicitly exclude Killian from his bedroom or from his computer; that he walked her through the master bedroom and bathroom; and that he told her to "[h]elp [her]self to anything." Based on these fact findings, the trial court determined that Killian had the appellant's effective consent to enter the bedroom and use the computer, and held that, without establishing that Killian violated the law, appellant could not exclude the material. Appellant challenged the trial court's finding, pointing to his own testimony that this comment was only made in the kitchen, and specifically in reference to food. However, after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that appellant repeated that statement at least once during the tour of the home and told her also to "[h]elp herself to everything." That supported the trial court's finding that appellant gave Killian his apparent consent: "[. . .] He did not expressly banish her from the bedroom, nor did he forbid her to use his computer. He showed her how to operate the television and stereo. He did not power the computer down or password-protect it, and he admitted that he allowed his roommate to use it regularly. Given this convergence of facts, the trial court was justified in concluding that Killian had the appellant's apparent consent--that is to say, it is clear and manifest to the understanding that she had his assent in fact-to enter his bedroom and use his computer." View "Baird v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant was found guilty of murder, and his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals in 1992. In 2011, applicant filed this application for post-conviction relief pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07. Applicant contended that he was denied the opportunity to pursue discretionary review by the Supreme Court because his appellate counsel failed to notify him of his conviction's affirmance in the court of appeals until June 1993, by which time the deadline for filing a petition for discretionary review (PDR) had passed. Applicant further contended that counsel's failure to timely notify him of his conviction's affirmance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and that he should now be afforded the opportunity to file an out-of-time PDR. In response, the State invoked the equitable doctrine of laches and argued that applicant be barred from proceeding with his application for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that appellate counsel did not provide applicant with notice of the court of appeals's opinion until after the deadline for filing a PDR, and that applicant had the information necessary to seek an out-of-time PDR as early as 1993 but failed to do so until almost two decades later. The trial court concluded that applicant failed to show that, absent counsel's conduct, he would have timely filed a PDR. "Recognizing that our current approach to laches in the habeas corpus context has imposed an unreasonably heavy burden upon the State, we now adopt a revised approach that is consistent with the Texas common-law definition of that doctrine." The Court expanded the definition of prejudice under the existing laches standard to incorporate all forms of prejudice so that a court may consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to hold an application barred by laches. In light of the revised approach to the doctrine of laches, the Supreme Court remanded this case to the trial court to give both applicant and the State an opportunity to present additional evidence. View "Ex parte Alberto Perez" on Justia Law

Appellant Christina Jones claimed her conviction for fraudulent use or possession of identifying information violated the doctrine of in pari materia because that statute conflicted with the statute defining the offense of failure to identify, carrying a lower penalty. Specifically, Appellant asserted that fraudulent use or possession of identifying information (Texas Penal Code 32.51(b)), a state jail felony, and failure to identify (Texas Penal Code § 38.02(b)), a class B misdemeanor, were in pari materia and thus she should have been charged under 38.02(b), the more lenient statute. The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that these two statutes are not in pari materia because they have different purposes, require different elements of proof, and carry different penalties. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Jones v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Jefferie Daniel was charged with the offense of forgery of a check in cause number 2000CR1247, allegedly committed on September 27, 1999. 2011, the Bexar County District Clerk issued a "Bill of Cost" with respect to that cause. In addition to the $295.25 that were specifically assessed in the judgment as court costs in 2002, the belated "Bill" also assessed a cost for "APPOINTED ATTY" in the amount of $7,945.00. The applicant subsequently filed a pleading denominated as a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus challenging the district clerk's apparently unilateral assessment of appointed attorney fees as a cost of court on due process grounds. Rather than immediately accepting that recommendation, and without specifically addressing the trial court's concern with the cognizability of the applicant's claim, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further fact development. The trial court forwarded amended findings of fact and conclusions of law. Relying upon "personal recollection," but without addressing whether the applicant was indigent and represented by appointed counsel at trial, the trial court made an express finding of fact that the applicant was determined to be indigent for purposes of appeal on May 6, 2002, and that counsel was duly appointed to represent him for appellate purposes on May 21, 2002. Moreover, the trial court determined, "[t]here [was] no record that the court conducted any hearing or findings into [the applicant's] ability to pay his court-appointed attorney fees after [he] was determined to be indigent." On the basis of these amended findings, the trial court recommended that the Supreme Court grant habeas corpus relief by deleting the "Bill of Cost." Mandamus relief was conditionally granted. View "In re Jefferie Daniel, Relator" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Lemuel Burt of misapplication of fiduciary property and assessed his punishment at 14 years' incarceration and a $10,000 fine. The trial court orally pronounced this sentence on January 15, 2009, after which the trial court commented to the parties, "The sooner we can get that restitution matter taken care of, the better." The judgment, dated January 16, 2009, contains a restitution order for $591,785. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on January 15, 2009, but it was denied. Appellant appealed, arguing that the restitution order must be vacated because the trial court did not orally pronounce restitution in open court, and the written judgment therefore did not properly reflect the orally pronounced sentence. Appellant argued in the alternative that the trial court improperly calculated restitution to include losses from individuals not named in the indictment. The court of appeals held that appellant failed to preserve the restitution issues by failing to raise them in the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because appellant did not have an opportunity to object to the restitution order in the trial court, he could not have preserved the error for review and that the error was therefore not forfeited. The court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for consideration of the merits of the appellant's restitution claims. View "Burt v. Texas" on Justia Law

"Anne" was six years old at the time of an incident with appellant, her step-grandfather. Anne and her young relatives, Emily and Charlotte, were watching television with appellant in his living room. While Charlotte and Emily sat across the room from them, appellant touched Anne's genitals as she sat on his lap. When she pushed his hand away, he restrained Anne so that she could not leave. Charlotte started yelling, "He won't let her go, he won't let her go." The commotion was heard by several adults who were outside of the house, including appellant's wife, who is also Anne's grandmother, and Anne's parents. Appellant was charged with indecency with a child by contact and he pleaded not guilty. The case was tried to the bench along with other accusations of sexual abuse committed against Emily and Charlotte. At trial, the State called a designated outcry witness and offered a 30-minute videotape of Anne's interview. Over appellant's hearsay objection, the trial court admitted the recording in its entirety, and it was played for the court. The outcry witness did not testify about any of Anne's statements; the sole evidence of the statements Anne made to the witness was the videotape of the interview. On the State's petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court held that Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (the outcry statute) is a hearsay exception statutorily limited to live testimony of the outcry witness. The child-complainant's own videotaped statement did not meet the requirements for being admitted under that statute. Because the trial court impermissibly admitted the child's videotaped statement under the outcry statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's judgment reversing appellant's conviction. View "Bays v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Tony Betts was indicted for cruelty to animals. The trial court granted appellee's motion to suppress, which complained of a warrantless search and seizure. The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to address: (1) whether an accused has standing to challenge a search and seizure conducted in a relative's backyard where he had permission to house dogs when he did not live at the house and the yard was entirely exposed to the public; (2) whether the majority of the court of appeals improperly ignored the trial court's dispositive factfinding in ruling that the search and seizure was not justified under the plain view doctrine; and (3) whether the majority erred by failing to follow the mandates of "State v. Elias," (339 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)), and remanding the case to the trial judge to make fact findings and legal conclusions on the issue of whether entry onto the property was justified under the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Court concluded appellee had standing to contest the warrantless search and seizure conducted in his aunt's backyard. The search and seizure were not justified by the plain view doctrine, and the State could not rely on the community caretaking doctrine, which it did not raise to the trial court or the court of appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Texas v. Betts" on Justia Law

Charged with offenses committed against two complainants, appellee Robert Rosseau was indicted for 29 counts of sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child. In his petition for discretionary review, appellee challenged the judgment of the court of appeals that reversed the trial court's order quashing a portion of his indictment. On appellee's motion, the trial court quashed multiple paragraphs of the indictment, which were based on a "bigamy provision" that elevated the range of punishment for sexual assault whenever "the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under [Texas Penal Code] Section 25.01." With respect to appellee's jurisdictional challenge, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that it had jurisdiction to address the State's appeal of the trial court's order granting the motion to quash. With respect to appellee's argument that the bigamy provision at Texas Penal Code Section 22.011(f) was facially unconstitutional, the Court disagreed with the court of appeals's conclusion that appellee did not present a facial challenge, but agreed with its alternative holding that appellee failed to show that the statute operates unconstitutionally in all its applications. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Rosseau" on Justia Law

When appellee Anthony Duran made a left-hand turn in front of a speeding police car, the police officer braked, turned to follow, pulled the car over, and eventually arrested appellee for DWI. Appellee filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. The trial judge granted the motion, the State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the trial judge's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an appellate court must defer to a trial judge's factual findings which, when viewed piecemeal and in isolation, may be ambiguous, but, when read in their totality, reasonably support his legal conclusion. The Court concluded it must. "A reviewing court must apply the same non-technical, common-sense deference-not only to the trial judge's individual factual findings, but also to the totality of those findings-that it uses to assess a magistrate's determination of probable cause. This case depends upon a single fact, not any legal issue: Did the police officer actually see a traffic violation before he detained Mr. Duran? The trial judge's findings indicate that he did not. We must defer to that determination of fact." View "Texas v. Duran" on Justia Law

The State applied for the Supreme Court's discretionary review to address what constituted exigent circumstances permitting police officers to enter a home without a warrant. The Court agreed with the appellate court's holding that probable cause to believe that illegal drugs were in a home coupled with an odor of marijuana from the home and a police officer making his presence known to the occupants did not justify a warrantless entry. However, because the court of appeals did not address the State's alternative ground for finding exigent circumstances regarding child safety, the Court remanded the case to that court to do so. View "Turrubiate v. Texas" on Justia Law