Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

When appellee Anthony Duran made a left-hand turn in front of a speeding police car, the police officer braked, turned to follow, pulled the car over, and eventually arrested appellee for DWI. Appellee filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. The trial judge granted the motion, the State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the trial judge's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an appellate court must defer to a trial judge's factual findings which, when viewed piecemeal and in isolation, may be ambiguous, but, when read in their totality, reasonably support his legal conclusion. The Court concluded it must. "A reviewing court must apply the same non-technical, common-sense deference-not only to the trial judge's individual factual findings, but also to the totality of those findings-that it uses to assess a magistrate's determination of probable cause. This case depends upon a single fact, not any legal issue: Did the police officer actually see a traffic violation before he detained Mr. Duran? The trial judge's findings indicate that he did not. We must defer to that determination of fact." View "Texas v. Duran" on Justia Law

The State applied for the Supreme Court's discretionary review to address what constituted exigent circumstances permitting police officers to enter a home without a warrant. The Court agreed with the appellate court's holding that probable cause to believe that illegal drugs were in a home coupled with an odor of marijuana from the home and a police officer making his presence known to the occupants did not justify a warrantless entry. However, because the court of appeals did not address the State's alternative ground for finding exigent circumstances regarding child safety, the Court remanded the case to that court to do so. View "Turrubiate v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Herring was 16 years old when he was arrested for, and charged with, aggravated robbery. Because he was a juvenile, he was given his Miranda warnings by a magistrate. There was conflicting testimony as to whether two armed police officers were present when appellant was given these warnings. After the warnings, appellant was questioned by two police officers, and he confessed to the charged robbery, as well as other robberies and burglaries. The confession was reduced to writing by one of the officers, and appellant signed it. At trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the signed statement, and argued, among other things, that the statement was taken in violation of Family Code Section 51.095 because armed law-enforcement officers were present when he was given the magistrate's warnings. The motion was denied, and a jury found appellant guilty, sentencing him to 20 years' confinement. Appellant appealed and asserted that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed appellant's conviction. Appellant argued one issue to the Supreme Court: whether Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) permitted law-enforcement officers to be present when a juvenile is initially read his rights. The Court concluded that Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) does not prohibit the presence of law-enforcement officers, and accordingly affirmed. View "Herring v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to ninety-nine years' imprisonment. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal. Applicant's petition for discretionary review was denied by the Supreme Court. Applicant then filed this application for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel when trial counsel failed to preserve the issue of the validity of the search warrant for appellate review. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Supreme Court deny relief. After review, the Supreme Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Darron Moore" on Justia Law

Appellant Rickey Dewayne Abney filed a motion to suppress evidence after he was found in possession of marijuana during a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant subsequently pled nolo contendere to the marijuana possession charge. He was sentenced to fifteen days in county jail. Appellant appealed the conviction, and the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress. Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review, which the Supreme Court granted to determine whether the court of appeals erred when it held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant for the traffic code violation of driving in the left lane without passing. Having determined that the officer did not provide specific, articulable facts that would lead him to reasonably suspect that Appellant was engaged in a traffic offense, the Court concluded that the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress. View "Abney v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Sean Anderson of three counts of sexual assault and one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. At sentencing, the trial judge ruled that appellant's 2004 North Carolina conviction for "Taking Indecent Liberties With Children" had "substantially similar" elements to the Texas offense of "Indecency with a Child." Because of that prior North Carolina conviction, the trial judge sentenced appellant to the statutorily required life sentence for each count of sexual assault. On appeal, appellant claimed, among other things, that the trial judge erred in finding "substantial similarity" between the Texas and North Carolina offenses, but the court rejected appellant's claim and affirmed his three life sentences. The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the lower court's analysis under "Prudholm v. Texas" was: (1) incomplete because it did not explicitly include a comparison of the "impact of the elements on the seriousness of the offenses;" or (2) mistaken because the North Carolina statute encompasses a markedly different range of conduct. Upon review, the Court concluded that the two offenses did not contain elements that are substantially similar. View "Anderson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Cynthia Hudson appealed her conviction by jury for capital murder. The court of appeals sustained her complaint that the trial court erred in failing to submit a lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court, after its review of the matter, found that the appellate court conducted its error analysis without considering possible intermediate lesser-included offenses that the evidence might have supported, and it conducted its own harm analysis without considering the lesser-included offenses that were actually submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hudson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Tony Manjares, Edgar Aguilar, and appellant Jay Yzaguirre entered a house and robbed the victims. At least two of the men displayed firearms during the robbery. One of the victims testified that appellant pointed a gun at her head, and a police officer testified that appellant dropped a rifle as he was trying to escape. Appellant testified that he did not bring a gun to the robbery, that he did not hold a gun to anyone's head, and that he was not the person who dropped the rifle. At trial, the abstract portion of the jury charge included an instruction on the law of parties, but the application portion did not. Further, appellant was denied a lesser-included-offense instruction on robbery. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was proper, in determining whether the lesser-offense instruction should have been given, to take into account the omission of the law of parties in the application portion of the charge. Because the law of parties was contained in the abstract portion of the jury charge and was supported by sufficient evidence, it was an issue that should have been taken into account for the purpose of determining whether to submit a lesser-included offense. And because, as the court of appeals explained, there was no evidence in light of the law of parties, that appellant committed only the crime of robbery, the trial court was correct to deny the submission of the lesser-included offense. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed the trial court. View "Yzaguirre v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Michael Bonds moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant by contesting the warrant's validity. The trial judge overruled his motion finding the errors in the warrant's description of the location to be searched did not invalidate the warrant. The court of appeals found the warrant lacked probable cause and reversed. Finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals's judgment. View "Bonds v. Texas" on Justia Law

After rejecting a plea bargain of eight years imprisonment, the applicant pleaded guilty in open court and was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child by contact. The judge assessed punishment of twenty years' confinement for each charge, to run concurrently. The applicant filed two applications for writs of habeas corpus alleging that constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to reject the State's plea-bargain offer. The judge of the convicting court found that trial counsel incorrectly told the applicant that he was eligible for judge-ordered community supervision and shock probation, when only a jury's verdict recommending probation could result in shock probation and the judge could order only deferred adjudication. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the determination of the correct standard for granting habeas-corpus relief for ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Sixth-Amendment standard for determining prejudice in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process, the implications of that decision impacted the Texas Court's review of this case. After further review, the Texas Court held that to establish prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in which a defendant is not made aware of a plea-bargain offer, or rejects a plea-bargain because of bad legal advice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that: (1) he would have accepted the earlier offer if counsel had not given ineffective assistance; (2) the prosecution would not have withdrawn the offer; and (3) the trial court would not have refused to accept the plea bargain. This case was remanded to the habeas court so that it could make findings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Ex parte Andrew Argent" on Justia Law