Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court had authority to grant a motion for reconsideration or reduction of sentence and modified the original sentence without a hearing and outside the presence of the parties. The court held that the absence of an oral pronouncement of the modified sentence in the presence of all parties affected only defendant's punishment, so the appropriate remedy in this case was to allow the plea of guilty to remain and to remand the case to the trial court for the proper assessment of punishment. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for reassessment of punishment. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted by a jury of family-violence assault on the victim, who was about thirty-eight weeks pregnant with his child at the time of the assault. The State Prosecuting Attorney (SPA) subsequently argued that this court should reassess the appropriateness of certain factors set forth in Harris v. State in assessing the harmfulness of constitutional error. In addressing the first Harris factor, the court held that it failed to see how purporting to identify the State as a "source" of constitutional error revealed anything about whether, or to what extent, the error could have contributed to the conviction. The court also held that it failed to see the utility of the last Harris factor, namely, whether declaring the error harmless would encourage repeat performances by the State. The court held, however, that the remaining Harris factors - the nature of the error, whether it was emphasized by the State, the probable implications of the error, and the weight the jury would likely have assigned to it in the course of deliberations - remained as viable considerations in deciding whether trial error of a constitutional dimension contributed to the conviction or punishment in many cases. Under these circumstances, the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that any residual prejudice emanating from the prosecutor's illegitimate guilt-phase remark that called the jury's attention to appellant's lack of in-court remorse contributed not at all to its assessment of his punishment. View "Snowden v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant sought habeas corpus relief, alleging that, because he had never been convicted of a sex offense, he was entitled to the requisite due process procedures when the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Parole Division (TDCJ) placed sex-offender conditions on his parole. The court held that no process was due to defendant because his computerized criminal history (CCH) file, maintained by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), and which was corroborated by police agency records, established that defendant had prior sex-offense convictions from Illinois that qualified under Texas's sex-offender registration law. Therefore, the court denied relief. View "Ex Parte Warren" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted for possession of more than five but less than fifty pounds of marijuana and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. At issue was whether Brady was applicable when the State failed to disclose to appellant the portion of a videotape containing exculpatory statements he made to police. The court held that because the audio portion of the videotape was favorable evidence that would be material to appellant's case and the State failed to disclose such evidence to appellant, the State violated appellant's constitutional right as expressed in Brady. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "Pena v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in December of 1995 of capital murder and subsequently, the trial court held a new punishment hearing in May 2009. Based on the jury's answers to the special issues, the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. On appeal, appellant raised five points of error. The court held that, so long as the federal district court's order set aside or invalidated the sentence, Article 44.29(c) authorized the trial court's action. The court also held that because appellant had not shown that the trial court improperly denied his challenges to at least two venirepersons, he could not show reversible error. Therefore, the court need not address appellant's third point of error regarding another venireperson. The court overruled appellant's fourth point of error that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to declare the 12-10 Rule unconstitutional. The court finally held that appellant's final point of error regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty was not ripe for review. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Gonzales v. State" on Justia Law

Four police officers came to defendant's welding shop looking for a person wanted in another county. Defendant gave the officers consent to search for that person. The officers, over defendant's objection, ended up searching a van on his property and finding drugs in it. The trial judge granted defendant's motion to suppress because he found that the search of the van exceeded the scope of defendant's consent. The court of appeals, over a dissent, affirmed. The court held that because it agreed that the resolution of the case turned on the scope of defendant's consent, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and that of the court of appeals. View "State v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Applicant applied for a writ of habeas corpus where he pled guilty to two counts of reckless injury to a child where his two baby girls suffered serious physical injuries in applicant's care and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Parole Division ("TDCJ") placed "Special Condition X" ("sex-offender conditions") on him after he had been released on mandatory-supervision parole. At issue was whether TDCJ improperly, and without due process, placed the sex-offender conditions on applicant. The court agreed with the habeas judge and held that applicant was entitled to the relief he sought in light of Meza v. Livingston and entitled to immediate reinstatement of his release on mandatory supervision and removal of the sex-offender conditions from the terms of his parole.

Appellant was convicted of evading arrest or detention and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. At issue was whether the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals in light of the court's recent opinion in Brooks v. State holding that the Jackson v. Virgina standard of legal sufficiency was the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining that evidence was sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted only ground six of the state's petition for discretionary review and vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to be considered in light of Brooks.

Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his participation in the robbery and murder of an 85-year-old woman. Appellant raised five issues on appeal related to the denial of his motion for counsel and the denial of the motion for DNA testing. The court affirmed and held that appellant was not entitled to appointed counsel where reasonable grounds did not exist for the filing of a motion for post-conviction DNA testing. The court also held that because DNA testing was available to appellant before trial on the very items that he requested to be tested now, the trial judge did not err in finding that appellant failed to meet unavailability requirements. The court further held that appellant had not shown that the "single loose hair" that he would like to have tested currently existed or could be delivered to the convicting court. The court also held that the trial judge acted within his discretion in finding that identity was not and is not an issue in the case. The court finally held that appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been convicted of capital murder if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence found in a pill bottle containing marijuana where a police officer stopped appellant's car for a traffic offense and during a consensual search of appellant's pocket, found the pill bottle. At issue was whether the trial court was due deference in its factual findings of voluntary consent to search under the totality of the circumstances. The court reversed the court of appeals and held that the trial judge, in viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the trial judge's ruling, did not abuse his discretion in finding that appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his car.