Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child on July 8, 2019, and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The judgment was entered on October 20, 2022, and a $185 consolidated court cost was assessed the following day. The appellant argued that the court cost should be reduced from $185 to $133 due to changes in the Cost Act statute.The Tenth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and agreed that the offense was committed before January 1, 2020, which would typically mean the lower court cost of $133 should apply. However, the court also considered Section 51.608 of the Texas Government Code, which states that the amount of court costs must be based on the law in effect on the date of conviction. Since the appellant was convicted on October 20, 2022, the court determined that the higher cost of $185 applied.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that Section 51.608 of the Texas Government Code, which bases court costs on the date of conviction, takes precedence over the "Transition and Effective Date" clause in the Cost Act. Therefore, the appellant's court costs were correctly assessed at $185, as the conviction date controls the assessment of court costs. View "BRADSHAW v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated and was placed on probation by the trial court. As a condition of his probation, he was ordered to pay $100 to the Houston Area Women’s Shelter. The appellant did not object to this condition at the time it was imposed.The First Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the appellant was not required to object to the condition at the time it was imposed in order to raise the complaint on appeal. The appellate court relied on a statute that generally prohibits the payment of money as a condition of probation except in certain circumstances. The court concluded that the payment to the women’s shelter did not qualify under the exceptions and ordered the condition to be deleted.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the court of appeals erred in holding that the appellant did not have to object to the condition at the time it was imposed. The court held that, under the precedent set by Speth v. State, a defendant waives any complaint about a condition of probation if he fails to object at the time it is imposed, provided he was made aware of the condition in time to object. The court found that the condition of paying $100 to a women’s shelter did not constitute an “intolerable” condition that would be immune from waiver. Consequently, the appellant’s failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of his complaint.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "STEELE v. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2014, Derek Andrew Bodden pleaded guilty to first-degree felony fraudulent use or possession of 50 or more items of identifying information. In 2022, he filed for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he possessed fewer than 50 items and should be guilty of a lesser second-degree felony. He also claimed his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to a misunderstanding of the law.The 283rd District Court of Dallas County initially accepted Bodden's guilty plea and placed him on community supervision with deferred adjudication. However, less than a year later, his community supervision was revoked, and he was sentenced to 18 years in prison. In 2019, an internal audit by the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office revealed errors in the charging and prosecution of Bodden’s case, leading to the conclusion that he possessed fewer than 50 items of identifying information.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case to determine the correct method for counting items of identifying information under Penal Code Section 32.51. The court concluded that the fraudulently possessed items listed in the indictment amounted to more than 10 but fewer than 50, making the offense a second-degree felony. The court reformed the judgment to reflect a conviction for second-degree fraudulent use or possession of identifying information and remanded the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. The court did not address whether Bodden’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, as he was granted relief on due process grounds. View "Ex parte Bodden" on Justia Law

The appellee was convicted of recklessly causing serious bodily injury to her infant son, resulting in a thirteen-year prison sentence. The trial court granted her motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The court of appeals reversed this decision and reinstated the conviction, prompting the current review.The trial court found that the defense counsel's decision to admit a highly prejudicial 43-minute jail phone call recording, which included damaging statements by the appellee, constituted ineffective assistance. The recording portrayed the appellee negatively, showing her as self-centered, regretful of her son's birth, and not taking the situation seriously. The trial court concluded that without this evidence, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review. The court of appeals had acknowledged the deferential standard for new-trial rulings but applied a de novo standard for IAC prejudice claims. The higher court found that the court of appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial court's findings, which were based on credibility and demeanor assessments.The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court's ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. The trial court was in a better position to assess the impact of the prejudicial evidence on the jury. The higher court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State v. Hradek" on Justia Law

The applicant pleaded guilty to burglary of a building and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. In his application for a writ of habeas corpus, the applicant contends that he was improperly denied time credit while released on parole. The State and trial court agree with the applicant and recommend granting relief.The 210th District Court from El Paso County reviewed the case and found that the applicant was released on parole on March 20, 2020, with approximately 1,557 days remaining on his sentence. A parole violation warrant was issued on December 14, 2022, and executed on December 15, 2022. By that time, the applicant had spent approximately 1,000 days on parole, exceeding the mid-point calculation necessary to obtain the time credit.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and found that the applicant met the criteria for having his street time restored, as he is not a person described by TEX. GOV’T CODE §508.149 and had spent more than half of the remaining time on parole. The court noted that a representative from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice testified that the applicant was not receiving the time credit due to a programming issue that incorrectly combined multiple sentences. The court held that this was contrary to relevant statutes and that eligibility for street time credit should not be affected by serving more than one sentence.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted relief, ordering that the applicant's street time be credited to his sentence, resulting in the discharge of his sentence. Copies of the opinion were sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles. View "Ex parte Stark" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and pled guilty. The trial court accepted the plea and set sentencing for a later date. However, before sentencing, the appellant raised a question concerning punishment, leading the trial court to withdraw the plea and set the case for a jury trial. The appellant's counsel failed to file a timely election for jury punishment, and the trial court proceeded with the trial without the election. The appellant's counsel later filed an untimely election and a motion for recusal of the trial judge, both of which were denied.The appellant appealed to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to timely elect jury punishment. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part and remanded the case for a new punishment trial. The court of appeals found that the counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that the appellant suffered prejudice as a result, concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the deficient performance caused the waiver of the appellant's right to have the jury assess punishment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The court held that the record did not firmly establish that the appellant desired jury punishment at the time the election was required. The court noted that the only evidence of the appellant's intention came from an untimely-filed election and unsworn statements by trial counsel, which were insufficient to prove prejudice. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "GERLMAINE v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff in McMullen County, Texas, stopped a U-Haul truck driven by the appellant, Steven James Elsik, and discovered 13 individuals hiding in the truck bed. These individuals, including two minors, were identified as Mexican citizens and were taken into custody by U.S. Border Patrol. The appellant was indicted on multiple counts of human smuggling, including two counts of smuggling minors.At trial, the prosecutor claimed the witnesses were unavailable because they had been deported, but admitted he had not verified their deportation or attempted to secure their testimony. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's statements and admitted the hearsay testimony of the witnesses' names, birthdates, and nationalities under the "Statement of Personal or Family History" exception to the hearsay rule.The Fourth Court of Appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the hearsay testimony without evidence of the witnesses' unavailability. The court held that the error was harmful regarding the two second-degree felony convictions for smuggling minors, as the hearsay was necessary to prove the victims' ages, but not harmful for the third-degree felony convictions. Consequently, the court reversed the two second-degree felony convictions and remanded for a new trial on those counts.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the Fourth Court of Appeals. It held that the prosecutor's statements were insufficient to demonstrate the witnesses' unavailability under Texas Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5). The court emphasized that the State must show it made reasonable efforts to secure the witnesses' attendance or testimony, which it failed to do in this case. View "ELSIK v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

In 2021, a 14-year-old named Emanuel Ochoa was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 6, injury to a child causing serious mental injury, and kidnapping, all related to the sexual assault of a five-year-old girl. The key issue in this case was whether Ochoa's statements to law enforcement were made voluntarily. The court concluded that they were not.The trial court denied Ochoa's motion to suppress his statements, ruling that they were voluntary. The Second Court of Appeals upheld this decision, finding that Ochoa was not in custody during the pre-warnings portion of the interview and that his post-warnings statements were voluntary. The court noted that Ochoa and his mother went to the interview voluntarily, he was told he could leave at any time, and his freedom of movement was not restricted. The court also found that the statements made by the magistrate and the Texas Ranger did not render Ochoa's confession involuntary.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' judgment. The court held that Ochoa's confession was involuntary under due process principles. The court emphasized that Ochoa's youth, lack of maturity, and inexperience with the legal system made him particularly vulnerable to coercive interrogation tactics. The court found that the combined effect of the Texas Ranger's misleading statements and the magistrate's incorrect information about Ochoa's rights overbore his will and rendered his confession involuntary. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a harm analysis. View "OCHOA v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with misdemeanor assault in County Criminal Court during the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court allowed the complainant to testify while wearing a surgical mask that covered her nose and mouth, over the appellant’s objections. The appellant argued that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him. The trial court overruled the objection, and the complainant testified with the mask. The jury convicted the appellant, and he was sentenced to 300 days’ confinement and fined $4,000.The Second Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated because the trial court did not make case-specific, evidence-based findings to justify the complainant wearing a mask while testifying. The appellate court found that the trial court’s general pronouncements about the COVID-19 pandemic were insufficient to meet the requirements set forth in Maryland v. Craig, which allows for the denial of face-to-face confrontation only if it furthers an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation was denied because the complainant’s mask covered a significant portion of her face, affecting the ability to observe her demeanor. The court found that the trial court’s findings were insufficient to justify the denial of face-to-face confrontation, as they did not provide a case-specific reason why the complainant needed to wear a mask. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the complainant was the sole witness to the alleged assault, and her testimony was crucial to the prosecution’s case. View "FINLEY v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and engaging in organized criminal activity (EOCA). He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his EOCA conviction, arguing that it required proof of multiple crimes. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a single predicate crime was sufficient for an EOCA conviction.The appellant was identified as a member of the Vagos gang, which moved into Texas around 2018. In 2019, he and other Vagos members assaulted David Perez at a 7-Eleven. The appellant and his accomplices, wearing Vagos colors, punched and kicked Perez before fleeing. The police identified the appellant and another Vagos member, William Canida, from store video footage. A high-ranking Vagos member, Christopher Vick, was also observed at the scene.The Second Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the state needed to show only the appellant's individual participation in crime. The court noted that the EOCA statute enhances the severity of already-criminalized acts and does not require proof of multiple crimes. The appellant argued that the court misinterpreted a previous case, Martin v. State, which he claimed required proof of continuous criminal conduct for EOCA convictions.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the EOCA statute requires proof that a defendant, as a member of a criminal street gang, committed a single predicate crime. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to show that the appellant committed aggravated assault as a member of the Vagos gang. The court distinguished this case from Martin, noting that the EOCA statute does not criminalize otherwise lawful conduct and requires proof of individual participation in crime. View "BITTICK v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law