Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eliott Nathaniel Guerrero was serving two consecutive sentences: a 12-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance and a 28-year sentence for aggravated assault. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) initially calculated his sentences to run concurrently instead of consecutively. This error was discovered after Guerrero completed his first sentence and the Parole Board voted for his release on parole for the second sentence. Guerrero requested the Parole Board to designate the date he would have been released on his first sentence had the sentences been calculated correctly, but received no response.Guerrero filed an application for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, seeking to compel the Parole Board to comply with Section 508.150 of the Government Code and designate the date he would have been eligible for release on his controlled substances conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus against the Parole Board, as the case involved a criminal law matter.The Court held that Guerrero did not have an adequate remedy at law other than mandamus and that the Parole Board had violated a ministerial duty by failing to designate the parole eligibility date as required by law. Consequently, the Court conditionally granted Guerrero’s petition for writ of mandamus, directing the Parole Board to comply with the statutory requirement. The writ would issue only if the Parole Board failed to comply with the Court's opinion. View "IN RE GUERRERO" on Justia Law

Jimmy Giddings, a drug dealer, was murdered during a home invasion at his residence in Dallas. Security cameras captured four masked men loitering near the scene before the crime. When Giddings arrived home, the men attacked, resulting in Giddings being fatally shot and his girlfriend, Nikita Dickerson, sustaining non-life-threatening injuries. The police used a "geofence" warrant to obtain location data from Google, which identified a device belonging to the appellant, Aaron Rayshan Wells, at the crime scene. This led to the identification of the other three assailants.The trial court denied Wells' motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the geofence warrant, ruling that the warrant was sufficiently particular. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that the warrant was narrowly tailored to capture only relevant data and that there was probable cause to believe the suspects carried cell phones with Google location services enabled.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the geofence warrant was supported by probable cause and met the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. The warrant was deemed sufficiently specific in terms of time and location, minimizing the risk of capturing data from uninvolved individuals. The court concluded that the warrant's three-step process did not require additional judicial oversight due to its narrow scope. View "WELLS v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Tony Egbuna Ford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The trial court ordered El Paso County to pay for the collection and testing of a blood sample from Ford and directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to provide access to Ford for this purpose. TDCJ sought mandamus relief from both orders.Ford's conviction was affirmed on appeal, and his first habeas application was denied. Two subsequent habeas applications were dismissed. With no habeas proceeding pending, Ford filed a motion for funding for genetic testing, claiming it could prove he did not personally shoot the victim. The trial court granted the motion, ordering El Paso County to pay for the testing and TDCJ to provide access to Ford for the blood sample.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The court concluded that TDCJ did not have standing to challenge the Funding Order, as it did not demonstrate a justiciable interest in El Paso County's finances. However, the court found that TDCJ was entitled to mandamus relief on the Access Order. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the Access Order because Ford's conviction was final, and no pending proceeding or statute conferred authority on the trial court to issue such an order.The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to rescind the Access Order. The writ of mandamus would issue only if the trial court failed to comply with the opinion. View "IN RE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted for assault, with the indictment specifying that the victim was a Menard County Deputy Sheriff. The key issue was whether this indictment allowed for a conviction of assault on a peace officer. The trial court's voir dire and jury instructions referred to the offense as assault on a peace officer, and the appellant did not object until after the trial began. The jury found the appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to twelve years in prison, which is within the range for assault on a peace officer, a second-degree felony.The Fourth Court of Appeals found that the indictment only supported a conviction for assault on a public servant, a third-degree felony, and not assault on a peace officer. They concluded that the indictment did not explicitly state the victim was a peace officer and thus could not support the higher charge. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial on punishment, as the sentence exceeded the range for a third-degree felony.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals. They held that the indictment, which described the victim as a deputy sheriff, did indeed support a conviction for assault on a peace officer. The court reasoned that a deputy sheriff is defined as a peace officer under Texas law, and thus the indictment contained all necessary elements for the higher charge. The court also noted that the appellant's objections were untimely and that the jury charge and verdict form, which included the deputy sheriff designation, sufficiently supported the conviction for assault on a peace officer. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "CRAWFORD v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The applicant pled guilty to robbery and received a ten-year confinement sentence. He later filed for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his plea was involuntary because he believed he would receive shock probation after an initial period of incarceration. He also argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for shock probation, which was necessary for him to be considered for it.The 453rd District Court of Hays County reviewed the application and forwarded it to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The habeas court concluded that the applicant's plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, citing Ex parte Bittikoffer. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals found this reliance misplaced, as Bittikoffer did not address involuntary plea claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the applicant's plea was not involuntary because the counsel's advice and representation before the plea were competent. The court explained that a plea is not rendered involuntary due to counsel's post-plea actions. However, the court found that the applicant's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file the motion for shock probation, which the applicant was entitled to under his plea agreement. This failure deprived the applicant of a hearing on shock probation.As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted habeas corpus relief, vacated the applicant's sentence, and remanded him to the custody of the Sheriff of Hays County for a new punishment hearing. The court ordered that copies of the opinion be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division and Board of Pardons and Paroles. View "EX PARTE MOSQUERA" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder in July 2018 by a Harris County jury for killing Gelareh Bagherzadeh and Coty Beavers in different criminal transactions but as part of the same scheme or course of conduct. The trial court sentenced him to death based on the jury's answers to special issues. The appellant raised thirty points of error on direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.In the lower court, the appellant was tried and convicted in the 184th Judicial District Court of Harris County. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. The appellant's conviction and sentence were automatically appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the appellant's thirty points of error and found no reversible error. The court addressed various issues, including the admissibility of evidence, the conduct of the trial, and the constitutionality of the capital murder statute as applied. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior bad acts, including his attempts to kill his daughter and his involvement in drug smuggling. The court also found that the trial court properly handled the appellant's objections to the prosecution's questions and the conduct of the jurors. Additionally, the court rejected the appellant's claim that the capital murder statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "MAHMOUD v. STATE" on Justia Law

The State of Texas charged the appellee with felony assault of a peace officer. During plea negotiations, the State offered to dismiss the felony charge if the appellee agreed to plead guilty to two DWI charges. However, the appellee never agreed to this plea deal. Despite this, the State dismissed the felony and DWI charges but later refiled the felony under a new cause number. The appellee filed a motion for specific performance, seeking to enforce the dismissal of the refiled felony, alleging that the prosecutor had promised not to refile the charge.The trial court granted the appellee’s motion for specific performance, directing the State to dismiss the refiled felony assault charge. The State appealed, arguing that no enforceable plea agreement existed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that there was an immunity from prosecution agreement between the State and the appellee, which the trial court approved. Justice Jewell dissented, arguing that no such agreement existed and that there was no consideration for the prosecutor’s promise.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that there was no enforceable plea agreement. The court held that the prosecutor’s promise to dismiss the felony assault case and not refile it did not constitute an immunity agreement or a binding plea bargain agreement. The court noted that the appellee never agreed to the terms of the plea offer, and the trial court never approved any such agreement. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and entered a judgment reversing the trial court’s order granting the appellee’s motion for specific performance. View "STATE v. HATTER" on Justia Law

The appellee was stopped and ticketed for driving 82 mph in a 60-mph zone, a Class C misdemeanor. In the Justice Court for Precinct 1 of Brazos County, he pleaded no contest and was found guilty, with the court assessing his fine and fees. He then filed a de novo appeal in the County Court at Law Number 2, pleaded not guilty, and was found guilty again. The county court suspended his sentence, deferred the disposition, and placed him on probation for 180 days.The State appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, arguing that the deferred disposition was illegal because the appellee held a commercial driver’s license, disqualifying him from community supervision. The Texas Supreme Court transferred the case to the Seventh Court of Appeals. The Seventh Court questioned its jurisdiction but followed the Tenth Court's precedent, exercised jurisdiction, and reversed the trial court’s decision, remanding for proper sentencing. The appellee then filed a petition for discretionary review.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that an order of deferred disposition is not a "sentence" under Article 44.01(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because a deferred disposition does not meet the statutory definition of a sentence, which requires an order that the punishment be carried into execution. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "STATE v. CUARENTA" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child on July 8, 2019, and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The judgment was entered on October 20, 2022, and a $185 consolidated court cost was assessed the following day. The appellant argued that the court cost should be reduced from $185 to $133 due to changes in the Cost Act statute.The Tenth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and agreed that the offense was committed before January 1, 2020, which would typically mean the lower court cost of $133 should apply. However, the court also considered Section 51.608 of the Texas Government Code, which states that the amount of court costs must be based on the law in effect on the date of conviction. Since the appellant was convicted on October 20, 2022, the court determined that the higher cost of $185 applied.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that Section 51.608 of the Texas Government Code, which bases court costs on the date of conviction, takes precedence over the "Transition and Effective Date" clause in the Cost Act. Therefore, the appellant's court costs were correctly assessed at $185, as the conviction date controls the assessment of court costs. View "BRADSHAW v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated and was placed on probation by the trial court. As a condition of his probation, he was ordered to pay $100 to the Houston Area Women’s Shelter. The appellant did not object to this condition at the time it was imposed.The First Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the appellant was not required to object to the condition at the time it was imposed in order to raise the complaint on appeal. The appellate court relied on a statute that generally prohibits the payment of money as a condition of probation except in certain circumstances. The court concluded that the payment to the women’s shelter did not qualify under the exceptions and ordered the condition to be deleted.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the court of appeals erred in holding that the appellant did not have to object to the condition at the time it was imposed. The court held that, under the precedent set by Speth v. State, a defendant waives any complaint about a condition of probation if he fails to object at the time it is imposed, provided he was made aware of the condition in time to object. The court found that the condition of paying $100 to a women’s shelter did not constitute an “intolerable” condition that would be immune from waiver. Consequently, the appellant’s failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of his complaint.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "STEELE v. STATE" on Justia Law