Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

On April 19, 2018 in Forth Worth, Appellant Terry King assaulted a twelve-year-old girl who was on her way to the school bus. At all times relevant to this case, Appellant was working as a truck driver, operating a semi-tractor trailor (hereinafter, “truck”) owned by his employer, John Feltman. Due to the nature of his work as a long-haul truck driver, Appellant lived out of the truck while working on the road. In July 2018, Appellant was arrested in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma near the truck he drove. On the same day, the Oklahoma police searched the truck pursuant to a warrant. During the search, detectives found Appellant’s cell phone and intended to seize it, but inadvertently left the cell phone in the truck. The gathered evidence, minus the cell phone, was transported to the Fort Worth Police Department. Upon realizing the cell phone was missing, Fort Worth Police Detective Pat Henz contacted the truck owner, Feltman, and asked him to retrieve the phone and send it to the police department. Upon receipt on August 9, 2018, a search warrant for the contents of the cell phone was issued and executed. Child pornography was found on the cell phone. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether an employee retained standing to contest a search or seizure in his work vehicle several days after he was arrested and after the vehicle was returned to his employer. To this, the Court responded "possibly." But based on the facts of this case, the Court found Appellant did not meet his burden to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy as would confer standing. View "King v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2017, after Maria Delcarman Sosa-Esparza was indicted for a felony offense, she entered into a bail bond agreement with Appellant Maxie Green, doing business as A to Z Bail Bonds. Appellant paid a $25,000 bond so that Sosa-Esparza could be released from jail. A condition of the trial court in setting a bond amount was an assurance that Sosa-Esparza would appear for all of her court settings. But on March 1, 2019, Sosa-Esparza failed to appear for her pretrial conference. The trial court then signed a judgment nisi that provisionally forfeited the $25,000 bond. The judgment nisi stated that Sosa-Esparza’s name was “distinctly called at the courtroom door. Defendant was given reasonable time to appear after her name was called, but she did not appear.” The judgment nisi also provided that the judgment would be made final unless good cause could be shown for why Sosa-Esparza failed to appear. Appellant argued, among other things, that because the judgment nisi stated that the defendant’s name was called at the courtROOM door, the State’s evidence failed to conclusively establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her name was properly called at the courtHOUSE door. (emphasis added). The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether, for purposes of summary judgment in a bond forfeiture case, providing conclusive proof that the name of the defendant on bond was distinctly called at the door of the courtROOM establishes the element that “[t]he name of the defendant shall be called distinctly at the courthouse door[.]” To this, the Court held that it did: "This holding is founded on well-established precedent from this Court and the courts of appeals recognizing that calling the defendant’s name at the courtroom door constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02." View "Green v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Kevin Sheffield couldn't make bond and was placed into custody August 2019. While there, Appellant filed several pro se documents with the trial court even though he had appointed counsel. In his first letter, Appellant requested an examining trial and a personal recognizance (PR) bond until the examining trial could take place. Appellant also filed a pro se motion September 19 for a speedy trial and for discharge under article 28.061. Appellant followed the motion September 20 with another pro se letter, reasserting his requests for a speedy trial, a speedy examining trial, and a PR bond until the examining trial. On September 26, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment alleging possession, with intent to deliver, first degree felony amounts of methamphetamine and heroin; possession of a first degree felony amount of cocaine; evading arrest in a vehicle; and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On September 30, the trial court entered its pre-trial scheduling order, setting jury trial for January 23, 2020. In January, although represented by counsel, Appellant sent a pro se letter seeking a hearing on a motion for discovery and a motion for speedy trial. Proceedings were briefly paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic. By May 12, a hearing was held in which the trial court allowed Appellant to represent himself but keep standby counsel. By May 18, Appellant filed a pro se motion seeking release. This motion was ultimately denied, leading to Appellant's request for habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Appellant's speedy trial claim was not cognizable under Texas law in pretrial proceedings: "because pretrial habeas corpus litigation would not vindicate the speedy trial right and would effectively undermine that right instead. Vindication of the speedy trial right must be had through a motion to dismiss followed by appeal after trial if the motion is wrongly denied. If trial and appeal are indefinitely postponed, mandamus, not pretrial habeas, is available." View "Ex parte Sheffield" on Justia Law

Judge George Gallagher, elected judge for the 396th District Court in the Eighth Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, was specifically assigned by Presiding Judge Mary Murphy of the First Administrative Judicial Region to preside over Texas v. Paxton in the 416th District Court in the First Administrative Judicial Region in July 2015. The issue before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, on mandamus, was whether Judge Gallagher had the constitutional and statutory authority to preside over Texas v. Paxton when he granted a change of venue to Harris County in April of 2017. To this, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that he did, regardless of any other assignment orders that were issued by Presiding Judge David Evans. The Court, therefore, conditionally granted the State’s petition for writ of mandamus. View "In re Texas, ex rel. Wice" on Justia Law

Appellant Lance Taylor was convicted of murder and tampering with evidence. On appeal, he complained that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals found that it was unable to review the issue “as the trial court did not conduct a meaningful hearing.” Appellant has filed a petition for discretionary review arguing, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to conduct a de novo review. To this, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed: "The Court of Appeals misunderstood this case law to mean that some type of specially-designated 'Speedy Trial Hearing' is required before an appellate court can weigh the Barker factors. But neither this Court nor the lower courts have required that. Instead, the only requirement is that the relevant information be in the record – the length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice." In this case, the record showed the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and Appellant’s assertion of the right. The only thing the record might not show was whether and what type of prejudice Appellant suffered. "But that potential deficiency does not prevent an appellate court from weighing the factors; it merely affects how they will be weighed." The appellate court's judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Texas" on Justia Law

After Appellant Cameron Moon was certified in juvenile court to stand trial as an adult, the juvenile court ordered his case transferred to the district court for adult criminal proceedings. Appellant then filed a pretrial application of writ of habeas corpus challenging the transfer. The district court denied relief, so Appellant took an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order denying relief, concluding the State had failed to establish the necessary statutory criteria for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and transfer into the adult criminal court. As a result, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the prosecution for lack of jurisdiction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review to consider several issues related to the juvenile court's transfer order including whether the court of appeals erred to hold that such a challenge was even cognizable in pretrial habeas. However, the Court concluded that, even if Appellant’s claims were cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding, the court of appeals lacked the authority to entertain Appellant’s interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded to that court for an order dismissing Appellant’s appeal as premature. View "Ex parte Moon" on Justia Law

After legally detaining Appellant James Massey for lack of a proper registration sticker on his truck, an officer conducted an investigative pat-down search of Appellant. When Appellant forcefully resisted that search, the officer tased and handcuffed him. The officer subsequently discovered methamphetamine on the ground near where Appellant had been standing. Appellant moved to suppress the methamphetamine. In response to that motion, the trial court decided that the officer’s investigative pat-down search (a "Terry" search) was illegal. But the trial court nevertheless concluded that the taint of the illegal Terry search was attenuated by Appellant’s commission of the dual offenses of resisting search and evading detention. As a result, the trial court denied his motion. The court of appeals reversed, finding Appellant’s commission of resisting search and evading detention in response to the officer’s unlawful pat-down did not constitute “a severe departure from the common, if regrettable, range of responses” that should be expected. It therefore concluded that these offenses did not “constitute intervening circumstances” for purposes of an attenuation-of-taint analysis. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court of appeals judgment was reversed. View "Massey v. Texas" on Justia Law

Ronald Ray, the victim in this case, was engaged in a tumultuous, on-again-off-again relationship with Appellant Robert Hart’s adult daughter, Stephanie. According to Stephanie, the relationship was one filled with violent abuse. On September 22, 2016, shortly before 1 p.m., Ray showed up unannounced in the street outside the Hart family home. Inside the home at the time were Appellant, his wife Elizabeth, Stephanie, and his other daughter. The family’s home had a security camera with a viewing monitor inside. Ray parked his vehicle across the street, got out, removed his shirt, and began smoking a cigarette. Panicked, the girls told their father that Ray was outside. In video footage, Ray was seen standing next to the open driver-side door of his car in the street. Appellant walked towards Ray while holding a gun at his side. Appellant and Ray briefly yell at one another, but it was unknown what exactly was said. Within seconds, Appellant pointed the pistol at Ray, who put his hands up and shrugged his shoulders. Appellant then almost immediately began firing at Ray, who ran towards the back of his vehicle and around to the passenger side. After pacing for a few seconds, Ray collapsed near the back of his vehicle. Appellant was ultimately convicted of murder, and he appealed, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for declining the trial court’s offer to include a sudden-passion jury instruction in the punishment-phase charge. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined the existing direct-appeal record was inadequately developed. "Had the record contained a motion for new trial raising an ineffectiveness claim, counsel would have had an opportunity to explain why he declined the sudden-passion instruction. Such an explanation could have contained a plausible strategic reason for counsel’s decision." Therefore, based on the trial court record, the Court of Criminal Appeals could not hold that counsel’s decision to decline the sudden-passion instruction was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. The Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment granting Appellant a new punishment trial, and the case was remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Hart v. Texas" on Justia Law

When Appellee Sebastian Torres was sixteen years old, he was brought before a magistrate and read his statutory Miranda warnings. Pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 51.095(f), the magistrate requested that law enforcement officers return Appellee and the video recording of Appellee’s interview to the magistrate at the conclusion of questioning so that he could determine whether any statements Appellee gave during interrogation were voluntary. Following interrogation, the officers did not comply with the magistrate’s request. Appellee was never returned, and the magistrate never made a determination. A few months after Appellee’s interview with law enforcement, a juvenile court transferred Appellee’s case to the appropriate district court for adult criminal proceedings. Appellee filed a pretrial motion to suppress his recorded statements, arguing that since the magistrate did not ultimately make a determination whether the statements were given voluntarily, the statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress, and the State made an interlocutory appeal. The issue presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the court of appeals erred to agree with the trial court that Appellee’s statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). To answer this question, the Court first had to construe the meaning of Section 51.095(f): what does it mean for a magistrate to “use” the procedure described by Subsection (f)? The Court ultimately concluded that the magistrate did “use” the procedure, and since the magistrate did not determine whether Appellee’s statements were given voluntarily, Appellee’s statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). View "Texas v. Torres" on Justia Law

In 2016, complainant Jose Jimenez was home alone playing video games and smoking marijuana when someone knocked on the door and asked for William Benicaso. Benicaso lived at the house with Jimenez and sold marijuana. Jimenez presumed the person was there to buy drugs, so Jimenez told the person that nobody else or any marijuana was in the house. Later that night, Jimenez was still alone at the house when he heard another knock on the door. When he opened the door, he saw the end of a shotgun barrel. Jimenez tried to close the door, but four individuals forced their way inside. One of the men shot Jimenez in the head. Jimenez survived, but suffered a fractured skull with fragments permanently lodged in his brain, permanent vision loss, and lost “some gray matter,” which was found at the crime scene. Although his description of his assailant to investigators was consistent with Appellant Markerrion Allison’s appearance, Jimenez was unable to identify Appellant in a photospread lineup. Jimenez did identify two of the other individuals involved in the robbery from a photographic lineup: Sean Owens-Toombs and Trekeymian Allison (referred to as T.K.). In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Detective Reed established that he had been in law enforcement for twenty-eight years and that his career focused on counter-drug operations. Reed also undertook specialized training on criminal gangs, and became familiar with the use of certain slang terms. Reed explained that when he was unfamiliar with a particular slang term, he would ask informants or his sources what the term or word meant. The issue in this case reduced to whether Appellant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the expert testified to the meaning of a slang phrase he learned from other people. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the admission of the expert's opinion did not violate evidentiary rules or Appellant’s constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. The Court reversed the court of appeals' holding to the contrary. View "Allison v. Texas" on Justia Law