Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Justin King was charged with evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle and with theft of a firearm. The trial court held a pre-trial hearing on Appellant’s motion in limine regarding punishment evidence. Appellant’s trial counsel attended the hearing, but Appellant was not present in the courtroom. The trial court granted the unopposed motion in limine. While appellant was still outside the courtroom, the attorneys and trial court discussed whether Appellant intended to stipulate to the enhancements alleged in the indictment and whether Appellant might be disruptive at trial. Back on the record, the trial court and attorneys discussed how they would conduct voir dire under the assumption that Appellant would plead not guilty. Appellant then entered the courtroom. The State’s attorney said he would be trying only the evading arrest charge and would use the theft of firearm charge as an unadjudicated pending offense during the punishment phase. At this point, Appellant’s trial counsel left the courtroom. The trial court advised Appellant of his right to plead not guilty and asked whether he wanted to plead not guilty and go to trial. Appellant said that he wanted to plead guilty on the evading arrest charge and have the jury assess punishment. The trial court then asked Appellant to confirm this with his trial counsel. Appellant’s trial counsel returned to the courtroom, and Appellant told his attorney, “I want to apologize to you. I want you to represent me to the fullest extent. I want to plead ‘guilty’ to the evading and use the jury for sentencing.” The court then explained that pleading guilty would affect the way the attorneys conducted voir dire. Appellant said that he understood and wanted to plead guilty. The jury found Appellant guilty and assessed punishment at twenty years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine. On direct appeal, Appellant argued that his absence from the hearing violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Article 28.01, Section 1 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Appeals agreed that Appellant’s absence was error but found the error to be harmless because Appellant’s presence did not bear a reasonably substantial relationship to his defense and his absence did not affect the outcome of the trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found no due process violation and any Article 28.01 violation was harmless. View "King v. Texas" on Justia Law

Baby L.B. was born in 2017 to her mother, Appellant Danielle Edwards, and her father, Morris Branton. At some point, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) opened an investigation into Appellant for suspected child abuse. During the course of the investigation, in June 2018, Appellant tested positive for cocaine and admitted to CPS that she had used cocaine several times in the past two weeks. In response, CPS removed L.B. from Appellant’s care and requested that a hair-follicle test be conducted on L.B. to evaluate whether she had been exposed to cocaine. The hair-follicle test revealed that L.B. had a significant amount of cocaine and cocaine metabolites in her system, with results exceeding 20,000 picograms per milligram, the maximum reportable amount. Appellant was subsequently indicted for injury to a child for recklessly causing L.B. a “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury” by “allowing [L.B.] access to cocaine and the infant was able to ingest the cocaine[.]” The issue presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' review was whether the mother, who repeatedly used cocaine while breastfeeding her baby, could be found guilty of reckless injury to a child for causing serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury when the baby becomes addicted to cocaine and suffers withdrawals. The Court found that the burden was on the State to provide the jury with sufficient evidence to prove that the cocaine, addiction, and/or withdrawal actually caused the baby serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury. Because the State in this case failed to provide such evidence, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. Texas" on Justia Law

Relator, Lubbock County District Attorney K. Sunshine Stanek, sought mandamus relief without first having sought the same relief from the Court of Appeals. Relator did not learn of this case until after the court of appeals delivered its opinion in the companion case, In re City of Lubbock, WR-93, 137-01. "While this scenario arguably justifies the exercise of this Court’s original mandamus authority," the Court declined review because Relator’s arguments were largely the same as those presented by the City of Lubbock in the companion case, and its resolution of those arguments necessarily resolved the arguments raised in this case. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the motion for leave to file as improvidently granted. "To the extent that Relator’s arguments in this case enhance the arguments raised in In re City of Lubbock, we will address them in that case by treating the filing in this case as an amicus brief." View "In re K. Sunshine Stank, Lubbock County Dist. Atty." on Justia Law

The Lubbock County Criminal District Attorney charged the Real Party in Interest, Rodolfo Zambrano, with the sexual assault of a child. The Real Party in Interest filed a pre-trial “Ex Parte Motion for Court Ordered Production of Documents and/or Things,” seeking a court order for the production of documents held by the Lubbock Police Department. The motion, filed under seal, referred to itself as “an ex parte motion for third party discovery,” and requested that the trial court order the Lubbock Police Department to “provide all records” regarding J.G., a child, “including but not limited to: records where she was reported to be a child victim of sexual abuse” to counsel for the Real Party in Interest. The motion further requested that the trial court order the Lubbock Police Department to “maintain the confidentiality of this request and not reveal it to the State.” In support of the motion, the Real Party in Interest alleged that the requested items were relevant and material to his defense without providing any factual support for his claims. Respondent, Presiding Judge of the 140th District Court, granted the motion and ordered the Lubbock Police Department to provide the requested records to the Real Party in Interest and not disclose the order to the Lubbock County District Attorney’s Office. Relator, the City of Lubbock, filed a response to the ex parte order along with a motion to stay the order. Relator argued that the request exceeded the narrow scope of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) and Williams v. Texas, 958 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), which were limited to requests for the funding of experts for indigent defendants. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court did not have the authority to hold an ex parte hearing and enter an ex parte order compelling the police department to produce documents without notice to the prosecutor. The Court therefore conditionally granted the City's petition for mandamus relief. View "In re City of Lubbock" on Justia Law

Applicant Jaime Covarrubias was convicted in 2000 of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison for killing his one-time girlfriend, Erica Estrada, and her father, Enrique Estrada. He filed a habeas application in 2019, alleging that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for a number of reasons. To show prejudice, an applicant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Hindsight can eliminate prejudice, if what was once thought to be a meritorious claim is later determined to not have had merit after all." The habeas court recommended that relief be granted, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that none of Applicant’s claims had merit. View "Ex parte Jaime Covarrubias" on Justia Law

Appellant Kennie Cook, Jr. was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. He argued on appeal the trial court erred in admitting an officer's direct opinion on the complainant’s credibility, which he contended, harmed Appellant. The Sixth Court of Appeals found the evidence legally sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict, but found the trial court erred in admitting the officer's opinion on whether the complainant was testifying truthfully. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed Appellant was harmed by the admission. Finding this ground dispositive, the Court dismissed the State's first two grounds for review as improvidently granted. The judgment was reversed and remanded to the court of appeals to reach the merits of Appellant’s remaining grounds. View "Cook v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Mark Dunham, was a door-to-door salesman for Capital Connect. On or about June 15, 2016, Appellant rang the doorbell of Eloise Moody, an 81- year-old lady recently widowed and diagnosed with cancer. When Moody answered, Appellant pointed at the “Central Security Group” alarm sign in Moody’s front yard and said: “I’m here to update your security.” Appellant also said, referring to the Central Security Group sign, “I’ll put a light on it, make it visible from the street” which he explained would be helpful to “update the neighborhood.” Appellant was not wearing a uniform or name tag and did not say what company he worked for. Moody, therefore, understood Appellant to be employed by her alarm company (Central) and that he was intending to place a light on the sign in her front yard. Appellant managed to gain access to Moody's home and convinced her to cancel her existing security contract and enter a five-year agreement with Capital Security at a higher cost. Appellant was charged with deceptive business practices to which he pled not guilty. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to one year in jail. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and whether the jury charge erroneously authorized a non-unanimous verdict. Based on its construction of Texas Penal Code § 32.42(b), and its review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court agreed with the court of appeals on both points: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (2) jury unanimity was not required on the specific manner and means of the offense because it was not an “essential element” of the offense. View "Dunham v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Vital Garcia was convicted by jury of first-degree aggravated assault on a family member resulting in serious bodily injury for shooting his then- girlfriend with a firearm. The question presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the court of appeals improperly acted as a thirteenth juror by concluding that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that the two gunshot wounds inflicted on the victim caused serious bodily injury, namely, because neither bullet hit a vital organ. Here, the Court found the evidence presented to the jury demonstrated that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds to her thigh and chest; she suffered significant bleeding to the point that she blacked out and believed she would die; her injuries were described as “deep lacerations” which required twelve surgical staples to close; and her treating physician believed that her wounds constituted “serious bodily injury.” Considering the cumulative force of the evidence and allowing the drawing of reasonable inferences, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the victim faced a substantial risk of death as a result of her injuries. Therefore, the court of appeals erred by concluding that the jury acted irrationally in finding that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. The Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law

The State charged Appellants with second-degree felony assault on a public servant. The State alleged in Eluid Lira’s indictment that he had previously been convicted twice for felony possession of a controlled substance and twice for felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The State alleged in Scott Huddleston’s indictment that he had previously been convicted for murder. Both Appellants were represented by the State Counsel for Offenders. Both Appellants reached plea agreements with the State and their cases were set for back-to-back pleas via a “zoom/video-conference plea docket.” Prior to the hearing, counsel for Appellants filed identical motions objecting to the trial court’s setting the cases for plea hearings via a Zoom videoconference. In the motions, Appellants argued that pleading by videoconference would violate their constitutional right to counsel, right to public trial, and statutory rights under Articles 27.18 and 27.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Ultimately, the State argued that Emergency Orders issued by the Supreme Court of Texas controlled over the Code of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Appellants argued that their statutory right to enter a guilty plea in person in open court was a substantive right. Because of this, it was not subject to the Texas Supreme Court’s emergency orders regarding the modification or suspension of deadlines and procedures. The State argued that, if preserved, Appellants’ arguments failed because the Texas Supreme Court had the authority to modify or suspend “the act of criminal defendants appearing live in live courtrooms[.]” The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals surmised the question in Appellants' cases boiled down to the "simple question of whether the Supreme Court’s Emergency Order granted a trial court authority to preside over videoconferenced plea hearings when the Appellants had not consented." To this, the Court concluded: no, a trial court has no authority to hold a videoconferenced plea hearing when the defendant has not consented. The court of appeals was affirmed and the matters remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Lira v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address whether the requirements for the inference of falsity that this Court adopted in Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) should apply in cases involving a police officer with a demonstrated pattern of misconduct in drug-related cases. The Court concluded that it should, and remanded the case for the habeas court to determine whether evidence substantiated Applicant Aaron Mathews’ Coty claim. In particular, the Court was concerned with whether there was evidence that Officer Goines committed repeated acts of misconduct in pursuit of illicit-drug investigations. This was relevant to the second Coty prong; depending on when a second instance of misconduct occurred, it might also be relevant to the fifth Coty prong. After the case was remanded, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Ex parte Jeffery, 2022 WL 4088689 (Tex. Crim. App. September 7, 2022). The habeas court found that all the Coty prongs were met in Applicant’s case and that a presumption of falsity applied. The habeas court also determined the misconduct was material. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined the habeas court's finding were supported by the record, and thus, granted relief. View "Ex parte Aaron Mathews" on Justia Law