Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Ike Brodnex was charged with tampering with physical evidence and possession of a controlled substance after he was stopped by police and found to be carrying crack cocaine. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court denied. After a bench trial, the trial court acquitted Appellant of the tampering offense but found him guilty of the possession offense. Appellant pled true to three enhancement paragraphs, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years’ confinement. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have sufficient grounds to come into contact with him and that the discovery of the drugs was the result of an excessive pat-down search. The court of appeals affirmed. After refusing Appellant’s petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted review on its own motion in order to determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain a suspect based upon observing the suspect walking with another person at 2 a.m. in an area known for narcotics activity and based upon the officer’s unsubstantiated belief the suspect was a “known criminal.” Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court held that the facts apparent to the arresting officer at the time he detained Appellant did not provide him with a reasonable suspicion for the detention. Thus, Appellant was illegally detained, and the crack cocaine that was found in the subsequent search should have been suppressed. The court of appeals was therefore reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Brodnex v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Patricia Harkcom was charged with possession of one gram or less of methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed her appeal. Appellant petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed: "[t]he Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended in 2002 to prevent trivial, reparable mistakes or defects from divesting appellate courts of the jurisdiction to consider the merits of both state and defense appeals in criminal cases. … We do not require 'magic words' or a separate instrument to constitute notice of appeal. …In this instance, appellant used the materials available to her while incarcerated. We know that, by adding the simple word 'APPEAL' to the Order requesting counsel, appellant was able to make clear to the trial-court judge that she was attempting to invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction because the judge further amended the document by adding the words 'ON APPEAL' after the phrase 'Order Appointing/Denying Counsel,' crossing out 'Denying,' and appointing appellate counsel. The trial-court judge thereby recognized appellant’s intent to give a notice of appeal and request appellate counsel. Construing the Rules of Appellate Procedure liberally leads us to conclude that appellant gave sufficient notice of appeal to invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction." View "Harkcom v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Henry Skinner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for killing his girlfriend and her two sons in the home that they shared. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed. Subsequent to his conviction, DNA testing was conducted, and the trial court found that the test results were not favorable to Appellant. He appealed that finding, arguing whether it was reasonably probable that, had the DNA results been available at trial, he would not have been convicted. "In light of Appellant’s advisory and the nature of this issue," the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that further fact-finding and analysis by the trial court was in order. The Court abated this appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Skinner v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of murder for killing her former boyfriend. She appealed, arguing that her right to a public trial was violated. The Fourth Court of Appeals agreed and reversed her conviction, holding that Appellant’s right to a public trial was violated during voir dire because the public was asked to leave the courtroom to accommodate a large venire panel. On discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals. The State subsequently filed a timely motion for rehearing, in which it argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision would be nearly impossible for trial judges to implement and that the Court erroneously dismissed its burden-of-proof ground for review despite the fact that it granted Appellant relief. Deferring to the trial court’s findings of fact that were supported by the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a necessary prerequisite before an appellate court can resolve whether a defendant met his burden to show his trial was closed to the public based on the totality of the evidence was to make a finding. Only then can an appellate court resolve the ultimate legal question of whether a defendant’s public-trial right was violated. No such finding that appellant met her burden was made in the record, so the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for additional findings of fact. View "Cameron v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether appellant Jose Vasquez preserved his objection to the two-step nature of his custodial interrogation when he lodged a delayed objection that put neither opposing counsel nor the trial court on notice as to its legal basis. Because the Court concluded that he did not, it reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Vasquez v. Texas" on Justia Law

At William Finley’s bench trial, the judge convicted him for resisting arrest when opposing police attempts to handcuff him. The court of appeals found the evidence legally sufficient to support Finley’s conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that judgment because Finley used force “against” the officers in opposing his arrest. View "Finley v. Texas" on Justia Law

Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas Transportation Code required an officer who arrested a driver for the offense of Driving While Intoxicated to take a specimen of that driver’s breath or blood for an analysis of blood alcohol concentration when the officer has reliable information that the driver already has two or more prior DWI offenses. The DWI offender with two prior DWI convictions may not refuse, and the police must compel him to give a specimen, even in the absence of his assent-in-fact. Appellant Michael McGruder's sole argument in this case was that Section 724.012 violated the Fourth Amendment on its face because it required an arresting officer to take a specimen for blood-alcohol analysis regardless of whether he either: (1) first obtains a warrant or else (2) acts upon particularized exigent circumstances that would obviate the need for a warrant. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided to vacate the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. When the court of appeals was considering the merits of this case, it did not have the benefit of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in "City of Los Angeles v. Patel," (determining the standard of review for facial constitutionality) or the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in "Texas v. Villarreal." View "McGruder v. Texas" on Justia Law

The charges against appellant James Richard “Rick” Perry arose from actions taken while he was governor of the State of Texas. A grand jury returned a two-count indictment against him. Count I alleged the offense of “abuse of official capacity,” and Count II alleged the offense of “coercion of a public servant." In sum, Count I alleged that Governor Perry abused his official capacity by misusing funds appropriated to the Public Integrity Unit of the Travis County District Attorney’s Office, and Count II alleged that he coerced a public servant, District Attorney Rosemary Lehmberg, by threatening to veto the funds for that unit if she did not resign. Whether the State could prosecute the governor for these acts depended on: (1) whether prosecuting the exercise of a veto under the “abuse of official capacity” statute is a violation of the Separation of Powers provision of the Texas Constitution; and (2) whether the relevant portion of the “coercion of a public servant” statute, being used to prosecute the threat to exercise a veto was facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. Before reaching the first question, a threshold question for the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the governor could raise his separation of powers complaint as an as-applied challenge in a pretrial habeas application followed by an interlocutory appeal. Answering these three questions in the affirmative, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals with respect to count one, affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals with respect to count two, and ordered the dismissal of the indictment. View "Ex parte James Richard "Rick" Perry" on Justia Law

Reginald Nixon was charged in separate indictments with the offenses of burglary of a habitation and evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. The indictments were consolidated and tried before a jury. Nixon pleaded guilty to both indictments and pleaded true to each indictment’s enhancement provisions. the jury returned punishment verdicts of seven years’ and nine years’ confinement for two charged offenses to run consecutively. The judge instructed the jury that, by law, the sentences would be served concurrently. After additional deliberations, the jury returned verdicts of sixteen years’ confinement for each charge. According to statute, however, the judge was required to accept the original verdicts and reform them in accordance with the law. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals’ judgments and reformed the trial court’s judgments to reflect the original verdicts to be served concurrently. View "Nixon v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Bryan Palmberg pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), and the trial court sentenced him to ninety days’ confinement in county jail. He did not appeal his conviction. Seven and a half years later, however, Applicant filed a post-conviction application for habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea was involuntarily made because at the time he entered it, he mistakenly believed that if he proceeded to trial, the State would be able to prove the substance he possessed was cocaine. The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case back to the trial court for additional findins of fact. On return to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and after reviewing Applicant’s arguments in turn, the Court concluded that his particular set of circumstances did not fit any scenario in which the Court typically granted relief. As such, relief was denied. View "Ex parte Bryan Palmberg" on Justia Law