Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2018, a school counselor contacted the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department” or “TDFPS”) regarding her concerns about potential child abuse involving Appellant Michael Hammack’s sixteen-year-old daughter. Department Investigator Amber Davidson opened a case and called Appellant, telling him about the investigation. Later that day, Davidson went to Appellant’s home to investigate, but Appellant told her to get off his property and to come back with a court order. Davidson did obtain: (1) an Order of Protection of a Child in an Emergency (“the Order”) that awarded custody of Appellant’s child to the Department; and (2) a Writ of Attachment that commanded any sheriff or constable in Texas to take the child and deliver her to the Department’s possession. This order granted sole managing conservatorship of the child to TDFPS as well as sole right of possession and custody of the child. That same day, Davidson returned to Appellant’s residence, accompanied by another investigator, to serve Appellant the Order. The investigators identified themselves and explained to Appellant that, pursuant to the Order, they were there to take custody of the child. Appellant immediately became aggressive and ordered them off his property. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ review centered on whether the State had to prove that a defendant was served with a copy of an emergency protection order to establish that a person “Interfere[s] with Child Custody.” The Court held no: the plain terms of the statute only required proof that the person who takes or retains a child in violation of a judgment or order, including a temporary one, knows that he or she is doing so in violation of such an order. “Proof that the person has been served with a temporary order may satisfy the State’s burden to prove such knowledge, but it is not required if knowledge can be proven through other means.” In this case, the State presented sufficient evidence that Appellant knew about the existence and relevant terms of the emergency protection order even though the evidence showed he had successfully avoided service. View "Hammack v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review in these cases to clarify whether the State had to prove the commission of bigamy in order to enhance punishment of sexual assault. Penal Code section 22.011(f) enhanced sexual assault to a first-degree felony if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry, or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married. The appellants in these cases (consolidated for review) were convicted or sexual assault and enhanced under Section 22.011(f). Each was married to someone other than his victim at the time of the sexual assault, but none committed bigamy with his victim. On appeal they challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the enhancements because the State did not prove bigamy. After review, the Court held that the State did not have to prove commission of bigamy to trigger the enhancement under Section 22.011(f). View "Lopez v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 1999, appellant Marcus Matlock was judicially determined to be the father of a five-year-old girl and ordered to pay child support. From the beginning, appellant frequently failed to pay the monthly child support. Appellant was charged with sixteen counts of nonsupport for failing to pay child support on the first of each month from February 2006 through November 2006, in January 2008, in June 2008, and from September 2008 through December 2008. The evidence was undisputed that appellant did not pay the required child support during those sixteen months. The only question was whether he had the ability to make those payments. Appellant testified that he didn't make any child support payments for either his daughter or son while he was in jail because "I didn't have no money. Nobody would give me money." There was no suggestion that appellant owned a car, a house, or a bank account. The jury found appellant guilty on all sixteen counts of nonsupport and sentenced him to confinement in a state jail facility for two years with a fine of $10,000 on each count. On direct appeal, appellant claimed that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his "inability to pay" affirmative defense. The court of appeals focused on Count I-the failure to pay child support- and the undisputed evidence that appellant had been in the Smith County jail for the eleven months preceding that date. The court of appeals held that, "after considering all of the evidence relevant to Appellant's affirmative defense of inability to pay child support, . . . the jury's finding of guilt as to Count I of the indictment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust." The State appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred by applying a factual-sufficiency standard of review in deciding whether the evidence was legally sufficient to satisfy appellant's burden to prove his affirmative defense. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[b]ecause the court of appeals conflated the standards for legal and factual sufficiency review, we are uncertain if it found that appellant had conclusively established his 'inability to pay' affirmative defense as a matter of law. Given its analysis, the court of appeals may have thought that the evidence supporting the jury's implicit rejection of appellant's affirmative defense was against the great weight of the evidence under a Meraz factual sufficiency claim. If the court thought that the jury's failure to find that appellant was unable to pay child support on February 1, 2006, was against the great weight of the evidence, then it should reverse the conviction on Count I and remand the case for a new trial on that count. Or the court of appeals might reach an entirely new conclusion based upon the standards of review that we have set out." View "Matlock v. Texas" on Justia Law