Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

During the course of a traffic stop, Appellee Octavio Ortiz made incriminating statements. The trial court suppressed the statements, finding that appellee was in custody when the statements were made and that he had not been properly Mirandized. The State appealed, and the Seventh Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court's determination that appellee was in custody when he made the incriminating statements. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review to examine the court of appeals' determination that the initial traffic stop had shifted into a custodial detention. Agreeing with the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Texas v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

A jury found Mark Crabtree guilty of the second-degree felony offense of failing to comply with sex offender registration requirements. Crabtree claimed that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction because the evidence failed to demonstrate that the Department of Public Safety (DPS) determined his extra-jurisdictional conviction was substantially similar to a Texas offense requiring registration; therefore the State did not prove that he was required to register as a sex offender in Texas. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Crabtree v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant Abraham Cavazos, guilty of murder and imposed a punishment of twenty-eight years' confinement and a $5,000 fine. Appellant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction on the charge of manslaughter. The court of appeals held that manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of murder under Texas Penal Code Section 19.02(b)(2) and thus the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on manslaughter. Furthermore, the court of appeals concluded that even if manslaughter were a lesser-included offense of the type of murder charged in this case, there was no evidence in the record that if Appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of manslaughter. Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review asking the Supreme Court to consider whether the court of appeals erred in holding that manslaughter was not a lesser-included offense of the charged murder and in holding that the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's request to instruct the jury on manslaughter. Upon review, the Court agreed with Appellant that the court of appeals erred in concluding that manslaughter was not a lesser-included offense of the charged murder. However, because the Court concluded there was no evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that, if Appellant was guilty, he was guilty of only the lesser offense, the court of appeals properly held that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's request for a jury instruction on manslaughter. View "Cavazos v. Texas" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether defense counsel's misstatement in voir dire about the concurrent-sentencing law denied his client the effective assistance of counsel. The appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and two counts of indecency with a child. The Second Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment as to punishment and remanded for a new punishment trial. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review on five grounds, all of which centered on the issue of ineffective assistance. Upon review, the Court held that the misstatement did not deny appellant the effective assistance of counsel. View "Cox v. Texas" on Justia Law

In its petition for discretionary review, the State challenged the court of appeals's judgment in favor of Appellant Robert Bryant. The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking appellant's deferred-adjudication community supervision for failure to pay restitution and that appellant preserved this issue for appeal. The court of appeals applied former Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.037(h), which required that, "[i]n determining whether to revoke probation," (1) a trial court "shall" consider five factors pertaining to a defendant's financial circumstances. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals properly determined that appellant preserved his challenge and that the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applied to the trial court's decision to revoke community supervision, including its consideration of the defendant's financial circumstances. However, the Court concluded that by revoking appellant's deferred adjudication and placing appellant on regular community supervision with the continued opportunity to fulfill the restitution obligation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Because the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Bryant v. Texas" on Justia Law

The state filed a motion for rehearing in this case; the Supreme Court withdrew its opinion on original submission, substituted this opinion, and denied the state's motion for rehearing. Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. During a recess in jury deliberations on the second day of appellant's trial, the jury foreman sent a note to the trial judge stating, "We have one juror who refuses to deliberate this case any further nor take the facts, testimony, of this case into account. I request she be removed from the jury." After questioning the foreman about the juror's actions, the trial judge indicated an intent to dismiss the juror and to seat an alternate. Defense counsel requested that the trial judge question the juror directly, which the trial judge refused to do. Instead, the trial judge again questioned the foreman about the juror's issues and, finding the foreman credible, dismissed that juror over defense counsel's objection and seated an alternate. Within half an hour of replacing the juror, the jury reached a verdict. It later assessed appellant's punishment at 20 years' confinement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in removing the complaining juror and that appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to question the dismissed juror or move for a mistrial after the dismissal. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial judge and remanded the case for a new trial. The court of appeals withdrew its original opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50 and issued a revised memorandum opinion with the same results as its original opinion. The state then filed a second petition for discretionary review, and the Supreme Court granted two of the state's three grounds for review. After review, the Court found that the court of appeals correctly held that the juror was not "disabled" as defined in Art. 33.011. Even using the standard set out in Rule 44.2(b), the Court found that the error was reversible and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Scales v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to ten years in prison. Finding the evidence insufficient to support Appellant's conviction for murder under the law of parties, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered a judgment of acquittal. The State filed a petition for discretionary review arguing that the court of appeals erred in its sufficiency-of-the-evidence review by using a "divide-and-conquer" approach rather than viewing all the evidence collectively and allowing for the jury's ability to draw reasonable inferences. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court properly determined that the evidence presented against Appellant was insufficient to support his conviction for murder under the law of parties because it was reached by speculation and was not sufficiently based upon facts or evidence. "Even when the evidence is viewed cumulatively, we cannot conclude that a rational jury would find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was involved in a plan to shoot [the victim], either prior to or contemporaneously with the act. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals." View "Gross v. Texas" on Justia Law

The trial court revoked the appellant's community supervision because she failed to comply with a condition that required her either to obtain legal status to remain in this country within twelve months or else "leave the country and reside in a location where [she does] have a legally authorized status." The appellant failed to object to this condition at the time it was imposed and twice requested an extension of the time allotted for her to comply with it before the State filed its motion to revoke. The Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed the trial court's revocation order, holding that the community supervision condition that she leave the country "could not be enforced" because it invaded the prerogative of the federal government to decide whether to remove illegal immigrants from the United States. In its brief on discretionary review, the State challenged the court of appeals's interpretation of the controlling case law in this matter. Finding no error in the appellate court's interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gutierrez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas McQuarrie was convicted of sexual assault. The trial court denied his motion for new trial, which alleged that after having retired to deliberate, the jury received other evidence not then admitted by the court that was detrimental to Appellant's case. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly excluded the jurors' affidavits and testimony pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 606(b) and that Rule 606(b) was constitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the jurors' testimony and affidavits offered by Appellant at the hearing on his motion for new trial, and the court of appeals erred to hold otherwise. The internet research conducted by a juror about the effects of date rape drugs constituted an "outside influence." View "McQuarrie v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery. The evidence at trial showed that he and his two roommates hatched a scheme to steal money at gunpoint from a woman driving a food truck. Appellant was the designated getaway driver. Appellant's defense was that he was merely present when his roommates committed the robbery. The jury convicted him. The court of appeals, relying on the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in "Johnson v. Texas" found reversible error because the trial judge, over appellant's objection, declined to apply the law of parties more explicitly in the application paragraph. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to decide whether objected-to error in the application paragraph is subject to the usual "Almanza" harm analysis or a per se finding of harm. After review, the Court concluded that the usual Almanza factors applied and that any error in the present application paragraph was harmless. The Court therefore overruled Johnson to the extent that it suggests a per se finding of harm. View "Vasquez v. Texas" on Justia Law