Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Adbihakim Hassan was tried for a misdemeanor traffic offense before a six-person jury. At jury selection, the State and Appellant were each allocated three peremptory strikes. The venire consisted of fourteen people: five African-Americans, two Asians, three Caucasians, and four Hispanics. The State used its only three peremptory challenges to strike two African-Americans and an Asian. The resulting six-person jury consisted of two African-Americans, one Asian, two Hispanics, and one Caucasian. Defense counsel objected that the State's strikes were racially motivated in violation of "Batson v. Kentucky." Appellant was convicted. He filed a motion for new trial, which included a Batson allegation, but that motion was denied. In the motion, appellant faulted the State for striking two African-American venire members when there were only five on the panel. He also claimed that the strike of one particular juror could not be justified because "[m]ost of the jurors in the panel rated police less than 8 on a 1-10 scale including many non-black jurors that the State did not strike." There was no hearing on the motion for new trial. The court of appeals held that appellant had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under "Batson v. Kentucky." The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the appellate court's prima facie ruling: "because appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case, the State was not required to advance race-neutral reasons for its strikes. The court of appeals erred in abating this case for a retrospective Batson hearing and erred in finding a Batson violation." The case was remanded to address additional issues Appellant raised on appeal. View "Hassan v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Narada Hicks was charged with intentional or knowing aggravated assault after he and Angelo Jackson got into a fight over borrowed shoes that ended with Angelo being shot in the leg. The trial judge instructed the jury on "intentional" or "knowing" aggravated assault, as charged in the indictment, and he also gave a separate instruction for reckless aggravated assault. The jury convicted appellant of reckless aggravated assault. The court of appeals held that the trial judge erred in giving any instruction on reckless aggravated assault because: (1) the original indictment did not charge a reckless state of mind, and (2) reckless aggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of intentional aggravated assault. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to resolve a conflict between the courts of appeals on whether "reckless aggravated assault" is a lesser-included offense of intentional or knowing aggravated assault. Applying the plain language of Article 37.09 and adhering to the Court's opinion in "Rocha v. State," the Court concluded that it is. Therefore, the trial judge did not err by instructing the jury on reckless aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense. View "Hicks v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellants Crystal Michelle Watson and Jack Wayne Smith were charged with the offense of attack by dog resulting in death. The jury found them guilty and sentenced each to seven years' confinement and a $5,000 fine. They appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgments of the trial court. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellants' petitions for discretionary review and consolidated the cases to consider whether Texas Health and Safety Code Section 822.005(a)(1) was unconstitutionally vague and therefore void, and whether the convictions violated both the unanimous jury guarantee of the Texas Constitution and the "substantial majority" requirement of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the Attack by Dog statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Appellants' convictions did not violate the unanimous jury guarantee of the Texas Constitution or the substantial majority requirement of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Watson v. Texas" on Justia Law

The issue before the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case was a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus brought under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Applicant Jesse Chaddock challenged his conviction for aggravated assault on the grounds that it was the product of a successive prosecution following a judgment of conviction for a greater-inclusive offense, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In 2004, the applicant was indicted for the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity. The indictment alleged that as a member of a criminal street gang, he committed aggravated assault "by intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing serious bodily injury to DAVID CUNNIFF by striking DAVID CUNNIFF to and against the floor . . . and by striking DAVID CUNNIFF with [his] hand[.]" The same day, the applicant was indicted for aggravated assault. The only difference in the two indictments is that the applicant was alleged to have committed the assault "as a member of a criminal street gang." After a jury trial, the applicant was convicted on the engaging-in-organized-criminal-activity offense and sentenced to nineteen years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. He pled guilty and was convicted on the aggravated assault offense, and sentenced to ten years' confinement. The applicant argued on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals that his conviction for the aggravated assault offense in should be set aside because his prosecution for that offense, after he was convicted of the greater-inclusive offense violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against being "subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" Upon review, the Court agreed, and held that the applicant was entitled to relief. View "Ex parte Chaddock" on Justia Law

Appellant David Burke was a police officer in Jefferson County. He was indicted for the offense of official oppression, a class A misdemeanor, and the judge moved the case to Bexar County sua sponte. A jury convicted Appellant of the charged offense, and the trial court assessed his punishment at 90 days in jail, probated for one year, and a $350 fine. Appellant appealed, arguing among other things, the trial court's denial of his challenge for cause of a prospective juror after that juror indicated that his past experience with law enforcement would make it difficult for him to be fair and impartial. The Ninth Court of Appeals rejected this claim, finding that the juror's earlier statement that he could follow the law as given to him qualified him as a vacillating juror and that the reviewing court must therefore defer to the trial court. "Because the trial court . . . could reasonably conclude that prospective juror one's declaration did not clearly evince a bias against the law, the trial court was entitled to conclude that prospective juror one could actually follow its instructions . . .." The Court of Criminal Appeals granted appellant's sole ground on petition for discretionary review, claiming that "The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's challenge for cause to the prospective juror after his responses left no room for doubt that he could not be a fair and impartial juror given his past experience with law enforcement." Upon review, the Court agreed with Appellant's argument and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "Burke v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Donald Blanton appealed the nunc pro tunc judgment of the Kaufman County District Court. The Fifth Court of Appeals dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction after concluding that Appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Appellant was indicted for burglary of a habitation. Prior to that, he was indicted for burglary of a building for which he entered a negotiated plea of guilty and was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision for five years. A few months later, he violated the terms of his community supervision by entering a habitation with the intent to commit theft. Appellant entered a plea of true at a probation-revocation hearing for the earlier offense and also entered a negotiated plea in his more recent indictment. He was sentenced to seven years' confinement and ordered to pay restitution for each offense. In August 1988, the trial court realized that the final written judgment for Appellant's first burglary did not include the restitution payment that had been orally ordered in open court. The court entered the first of three nunc pro tunc judgments, adding the amount of restitution that Appellant had been orally ordered to pay by the trial court. In March 2009, Appellant filed a motion to challenge the judgment nunc pro tunc in his latest case alleging that the first nunc pro tunc judgment incorrectly entered his first conviction. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that Appellant timely appealed the nunc pro tunc judgment, and accordingly, remanded the case to the appellate court for further proceedings. View "Blanton v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the petitions of Appellants Kimberly Garrett and Sequeasia Turner for discretionary review, and consolidated them in order to determine whether a trial court had the authority to extend the original term of community supervision of an accused who has been placed on deferred adjudication for a state-jail felony. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had such authority, though it arrived at its conclusions in each case based upon different statutory provisions. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial court indeed has the authority by virtue of Article 42.12 sections 5(a) and 22(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. View "Garrett v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Mario Castillo filed his notice of appeal one day late. His notice of appeal and motion for extension of time were picked up by Federal Express after business hours on the last day of filing and delivered to the trial court the next day. The court of appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Appellant argued that the "timely mailed, timely filed" mailbox rule of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure (TRAP) 9.2(b) is antiquated and should be read to include private couriers, such as Federal Express. Upon review, the Court concluded that the plain, unambiguous language of the rule requires timely mailing with the U.S. Postal Service, not a private courier. "Until and unless the Supreme Court of Texas and this Court change the language of Rule 9.2(b), the 'timely mailed, timely filed' mailbox rule applies only to documents delivered to the U.S. Postal Service." View "Ex Parte Mario Castillo v. Texas" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant Joseph Dangelo pled guilty to the felony offense of injury to a child. In accordance with a plea agreement and after accepting his plea, the trial court placed Appellant on deferred-adjudication community supervision for seven years. Appellant signed a document that stated that the trial court could modify the conditions of supervision at any time during the period of community supervision. The original terms of appellant's community supervision did not require him to complete sex-offender treatment. In May 2008, the trial court modified those conditions to include provisions that required appellant to submit to sex-offender treatment and evaluation, as directed by his supervision officer, complete sex-offender psychological counseling, and submit to, and show no deception on, any polygraph examination ordered by the court or his supervision officer. In January of 2009, the trial court again modified appellant's conditions and required appellant to reside in Tarrant County and to restart his sex-offender treatment, as directed by the supervision officer, but it dismissed the state's petition to proceed to adjudication of appellant's guilt. In March 2009, appellant's attorney sent to Appellant's mandated psychological testing center a letter that stated his objections to any required treatment programs that lay outside those required or have no relationship to the crime to which Appellant plead, stating that Appellant "ha[d] no objections to polygraph examinations which in the course of your program he may be subjected to," but that he "has Fifth Amendment protection against making any incriminating statements and has a right to so state, relating to any conduct for which he has not pled or for which he is not on deferred adjudication." The state subsequently filed its second petition to proceed to adjudication, which alleged that Appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his supervision by failing to complete a sex-offender evaluation and that he had been discharged from sex-offender treatment without completing it. Appellant filed a motion to quash the second petition. The court of appeals held "that appellant may not be compelled, over the invocation of his Fifth Amendment right, to participate in any portion of the objected-to community supervision conditions, including the requirement of answering questions two through four of the planned polygraph examination, that would provide a link to his criminal prosecution for any offense unrelated to the injury to a child offense that he pled guilty to." But it also held that appellant "may be compelled to discuss the facts particularly related to counts one through four of his indictment because the State may not use those facts in a future criminal prosecution." The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review of the first two grounds of Appellant's petitions for discretionary review. In light of the State's concession that double-jeopardy principles precluded it from prosecuting Appellant for the four sex-related offenses, the Court agreed with the court of appeals's determination that "appellant may be compelled to discuss the facts particularly related to counts one through four of his indictment because the State may not use those facts in a future criminal prosecution." Appellant had no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer legitimate questions that were a condition of his community supervision regarding those offenses. Accordingly, the Court overruled Appellant's grounds one and two and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Ex Parte Joseph Dangelo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Court in this case was whether the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar a prosecution for a criminal offense in one county after a prosecutor in another county unsuccessfully attempted to revoke the defendant's community supervision on the ground that he commmitted the same offense. The Third Court of Appeals "h[e]ld that it does not, as [a] Brazos County [community-supervision] revocation hearing did not involve the same parties that the Travis County theft prosecution does." Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the two prosecutions did involve the same parties. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Dustin Doan" on Justia Law