Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether state or federal law disallows the execution of a mentally ill inmate who was previously found incompetent to be executed and later became competent only after he was involuntarily medicated pursuant to a court order. Appellant Steven Kenneth Staley applied for the writ of habeas corpus. Texas law provides that a "person who is incompetent to be executed may not be executed" and permits appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's order mandating involuntary medication of appellant was not permitted under the competency-to-be-executed statute and did not meet the requirements of other statutes that may permit involuntary medication. Because the trial court lacked authority to render it, the trial court's involuntary-medication order was vacated. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that, but for that unauthorized order, the evidence conclusively showed that appellant was incompetent to be executed, and, therefore, vacate dthe trial court's order finding appellant competent to be executed. View "Staley v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2008, appellant was involved in a violent altercation with a friend in which he stabbed the friend 11 times. Appellant was charged with aggravated assault. Appellant's case was reset several times because the appellant had difficulty getting and keeping counsel. Finally, on January 30, 2009, the trial court appointed counsel. After that, the case was reset for pretrial hearings and conferences. On January 2, 2010, the State filed an agreed motion for continuance because a witness was sick. The next day, the judge granted the State's motion and added the notation, "Def. ready." The case was reset seven more times before the trial began on March 4, 2011. In total, the case was reset 25 times over three years. Appellant agreed to every reset in this case. The State, appellant, and (when appellant had one) his trial counsel signed each reset form. At no point throughout this process did appellant object to these delays or file a speedy-trial motion. The first time the appellant raised the issue of a speedy-trial violation was on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to address whether a defendant must raise a speedy-trial claim in the trial court in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. Holding that he must, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals. View "Henson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Christopher James Wade was an electrician who was spending his lunch hour sitting in his work truck in the near-empty parking lot of the Flat Rock public boat ramp off Lake Waco in China Spring, Texas. It was mid-May in Texas; he left the truck engine running. Two wardens for the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department-pulled up their boat to the ramp right around lunchtime to investigate fishing violations. One got out and approached appellant's truck. He had noticed its engine was running and "wanted to make sure the occupant was okay." He thought that the truck was "out of place" and "suspicious" because he did not see a boat or any fishing equipment. Appellant said he was eating lunch, but the warden thought that was a lie because he did not see any "evidence"-food, wrappers, or a cooler - of a lunch. From the onset of the contact, the warden testified that appellant's demeanor was "one of nervousness." The warden asked appellant if he had any weapons, and appellant replied "why are you doing this to me". The warden though this was a strange response, then asked appellant to step out of the vehicle. After a search, the warden found a small amount of methamphetamine. The State ultimately charged appellant on a felony drug charge, and appellant filed a motion to suppress. The Supreme Court has previously held that a person's refusal to cooperate with a police request during a consensual encounter could not, by itself, provide the basis for a detention or Terry frisk. Because appellant's refusal to cooperate was accompanied only by his extreme nervousness and a game warden's hunch he was up to no good, the warden's stop-and-frisk of appellant violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeals that had upheld the stop-and-frisk. View "Wade v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for tampering with a witness. The elected district attorney recused himself because he had previously acted as appellant's attorney on a previous matter. An attorney pro tem was appointed to prosecute. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether appellant could appeal the trial court's imposition of costs for the appointed prosecutor and an investigator. Upon review, the Court concluded that appellant could raise the issue on appeal for the first time since she did not have the opportunity to object at trial. View "McNeil v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Russell Cates was convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to 24 months in a state-jail facility and assessed a $5,000 fine. The trial court found that Appellant was unable to pay costs "on this date" and ordered that the funds be withdrawn from Appellant's inmate trust account. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay court-appointed attorney's fees as part of court costs because the trial court previously found him indigent, and there was no factual basis on record that he could pay the fees. The court of appeals determined that the record supported the trial court's finding that Appellant could pay at least a portion of the fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the appellate court's judgment to delete the fees of Appellant's court-appointed attorney that were included in the order for payment of court costs. View "Cates v. Texas" on Justia Law

After she was charged with DWI, appellant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial court. Appellant pled not guilty but was convicted by a jury and received a four-month sentence. On appeal, the trial court was reversed. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an appellate court must consider all alternative legal theories raised on appeal, including those not argued at trial, that may serve as a basis to uphold a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. The State challenged the court of appeals' decision, contending that the court of appeals erred by holding that it procedurally defaulted its alternative legal theory that would serve to uphold the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals erred by determining that the State procedurally defaulted its alternative theory due to its failure to present that theory in the trial court. However, the Court did not reverse the judgment because, in spite of its statement that it would not consider any argument raised for the first time on appeal, the court of appeals actually considered and rejected all of the State's arguments, including its alternative theory, on the merits. Therefore, the Court affirmed. View "Alford v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Nancy Gail Knight sought the writ of habeas corpus, alleging there was no evidence to support (1) the trial court's entry of a cumulation order and (2) the imposition of attorney's fees in the bill of costs. As to the first ground, the Supreme Court concluded the cumulation order was supported by the evidence that the jury that convicted applicant of possession of a controlled substance made an affirmative finding that the offense occurred in a drug-free zone, which was included in the trial court's judgment. As to the second ground, the Court dismissed applicant's complaint that there was no evidence to support the imposition of attorney's fees because that claim was not cognizable on a writ of habeas corpus. View "Ex parte Nancy Gail Knight" on Justia Law

Applicant Michael LaHood was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault. On direct appeal, the district court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court subsequently refused his petitions for discretionary review. Applicant then filed applications for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, in part, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate his mental-health history, and if she had, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his proceeding would have been different. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Supreme Court deny relief. The Court agreed with the trial court's findings and denied relief. View "Ex parte Michael George Lahood" on Justia Law

Applicant Joe Anthony Valdez was tried as a juvenile for committing felony murder with a deadly weapon, and convicted for which he received a fifteen year sentence. Applicant was committed to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) until his eighteenth birthday and was then transferred to Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to complete his sentence. He was released from TDCJ on parole. His parole was later revoked for burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit second-degree assault, to which he pled nolo contendre and sentenced to sixteen years. Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, contending that TDCJ improperly denied him review for mandatory-supervision release based on his prior juvenile adjudication of delinquent conduct. Finding no error by the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ex parte Joe Anthony Valdez" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted on counts of capital murder, felony murder, and of injury to a child following the death of Danielle Ramos, a child under six years old. The indictment and jury charge alleged that Appellant killed Danielle in one of three ways: by shaking, by shaking and causing Danielle's head to strike an object, or by shaking and striking Danielle's head with an object. The jury convicted Appellant of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Appellant appealed, arguing the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's determination: that he acted 'recklessly;' or that 'shaking' caused Danielle's death. The appellate court affirmed, finding Appellant's statement that he threw Danielle into her crib out of frustration, and that the nature of the child's injuries also provided bases for the jury to consider. Since Appellant's petition for discretionary review was granted, the Supreme Court issued "Johnson v. State" and addressed a nearly identical issue. In light of "Johnson", the Court held that the variance between pleading and proof was immaterial in this case and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Ramos v. Texas" on Justia Law