Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Benjamin Burch was indicted for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, cocaine. At trial, the State offered into evidence a one-page lab report. The relevant findings stated that the contents of four green plastic bags were used for analysis, and that the material inside was cocaine. Analyst Jennifer Pinckard and reviewer Monica Lopez signed the report. The State called Lopez to testify; on the stand she explained that Pinckard had performed all the tests in this particular case, but Pinckard no longer worked for the laboratory where the tests were performed. No evidence was offered as to why Pinckard had left the laboratory. Lopez said that, as the reviewer, she was to ensure that the lab's policies and procedures were followed. Appellant objected to Lopez's testimony, arguing it was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to be able to confront witnesses against him. The trial court overruled his objection and admitted the report, the underlying physical evidence, and Lopez's testimony that the substance was cocaine. The Fifth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding it was an error to admit the drug analysis and Lopez's testimony, and that the error was not harmless. The case was remanded for a new trial. The State filed a Petition for Discretionary Review, which the Texas Supreme Court granted. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded Lopez was not an appropriate surrogate witness for cross-examination. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings was affirmed. View "Burch v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant, nineteen-year-old Austin Loving, was convicted of three counts of indecency with a child by contact and two counts of indecency with a child by exposure involving two sisters. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for each of the indecency-by-contact counts and ten years' imprisonment, probated for ten years, on the indecency-by-exposure counts. The Court of Appeals vacated one of Appellant's convictions for indecency by exposure on double-jeopardy grounds, and it affirmed the remainder of his convictions. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine if Appellant's vacated exposure conviction was barred by double jeopardy. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant's exposure conviction was not barred by double-jeopardy principles, and accordingly reversed the judgment of the appellate court vacating Appellant's conviction for indecency with a child by exposure in Count III of the indictment regarding the older sister, and the Court affirmed its judgment as modified. View "Loving v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was accused of soliciting sex from a minor over the internet. The girl claimed to be fifteen at the time she and appellant "met." Despite communicating for over two years, the girl still claimed to be fifteen. After the girl and appellant agreed to meet in person, appellant immediately discovered the girl was actually an undercover police detective. The issues before the Supreme Court in this case were whether appellant could use the affirmative defense in Penal Code 22.011(e), and if so, if the evidence at trial justified an affirmative defense jury instruction. The Supreme Court concluded that section 22.011(e) applied in appellant's case, and justified the instruction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sanchez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death in 1977. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial. The State unsuccessfully moved for rehearing. Though the Court's mandate had already issued, the governor commuted Petitioner's death sentence to life. Petitioner filed a pro se application for the writ of habeas corpus, and a year later, applied for the writ of mandamus to compel the new trial. The Supreme Court denied both. Petitioner then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas; the federal district court reported Petitioner was not in custody under state court judgment because the trial court's judgment of conviction ceased to exist when the Supreme Court issued its mandate and the governor's commutation came too late. However, because Petitioner was confined in the Eastern District, the case was transferred. A magistrate judge in the Eastern District recommended petitioner's application for habeas relief be denied for failing to exhaust a Speedy Trial Clause claim in state court. The district court adopted the Eastern District magistrate's recommendations and dismissed petitioner's habeas application. Petitioner appealed that decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit issued an opinion; the State was unsuccessful in moving the federal court for rehearing. Acting on its own motion, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its opinion and certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court asking the Court what was the status of Petitioner's new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the mandate it issued in Petitioner's case reversed the judgment of conviction, and no other court entered any order to alter that reversal. Because some penalty must be assessed for the authority of commutation to be exercised, and Petitioner's death sentence was erased by the Court's mandate, the governor's commutation was a nullity. Therefore the status of Petitioner's judgment of conviction was Petitioner was under no conviction or sentence. View "Hartfield v. Thaler" on Justia Law

A jury rejected Appellant Codiem Wooten's self-defense claim and convicted him of murder, for which he was sentenced to sixty years' confinement. At the punishment phase of trial, appellant requested a "sudden passion" jury instruction. The trial court denied that request. The Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction, but reversed with respect to punishment, holding the trial court erred by not giving the sudden passion instruction. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the appellate court erred in finding "some harm" simply because appellant was subjected to a greater range of punishment than he would had the jury been instructed on sudden passion. View "Wooten v. Texas" on Justia Law

During voir dire, the trial judge said that he personally would want to testify if accused of a crime but admonished the prospective jurors that others might have a different perspective, that a defendant could have good reasons not to testify that were unrelated to guilt, and that the law prohibited the jurors from holding a defendant's failure to testify against him. Defense counsel belatedly requested a mistral but did not ask for an instruction to disregard the trial judge's comments. Holding that the comments constituted fundamental error, the court of appeals reversed the conviction. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the trial judge's comments constituted fundamental error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that appellant's request for a mistrial did not preserve error because any harm flowing from error in this case could have been cured by an instruction to disregard and in fact was cured by the totality of the trial judge's instructions. Accordingly the appellate court was reverse and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Unkart v. Texas" on Justia Law

The appellee was convicted of driving while intoxicated, and he timely filed a motion for new trial. The motion stated, in relevant part, that the appellee was requesting a new trial, in the interest of justice, because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. The judge recused himself because the appellee had donated to his campaign, and a visiting judge was appointed to hear the motion. While the appellee's counsel was in the visiting judge's home courtroom and while no representative of the State was present, the judge requested that both parties file memoranda of law on the motion. No one informed the State of the judge's request. The day before the hearing appellee filed a "memorandum of law" in support of his motion. During the hearing, the State strenuously objected to the appellee's memorandum of law on the grounds that it was an untimely amendment to the appellee's motion for new trial and alleged new grounds. The State further argued that the original motion, standing alone, was not sufficient to put the State on notice that pretrial matters would be argued. Counsel for appellee responded that one of the grounds in the original motion (that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence) was a sufficient pleading because it encompassed the evidentiary issues. Counsel said that the memorandum was not an amendment to the motion but merely a more detailed argument as requested by the judge. The judge overruled the State's objections and allowed the hearing to proceed. The appellee argued only that the verdict was "contrary to the law and the evidence" because of the suppression issues. At the end of the hearing, the trial court granted a new trial. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the test in "State v. Herndon" for reviewing granted motions for new trial. A trial court generally does not abuse its discretion if the defendant (1) sets forth a specificˇand valid legal ground for relief in their motion, (2) points to evidence in the record (or sets forth evidence) that substantiates the same legal claim, and (3) shows prejudice under the harmless-error standards of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this case, the appellee did not present evidence of the same claim that was raised in his motion, and the State properly objected. Consequently, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the appellee's motion and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming. View "Texas v. Zalman" on Justia Law

Appellee, an undocumented alien seeking to remain eligible for "cancellation of removal" from the United States, filed a motion to vacate his 1998 deferred-adjudication misdemeanor judgment for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. The motion alleged that appellee's guilty plea had been involuntary because it was made without an attorney giving appellee advice regarding deportation. After hearing from appellee's current counsel, the trial judge granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, pointing to "evidence" that appellee did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's (SPA's) petition to answer two questions: (1) could counsel's statements be considered "evidence"?; and (2) was appellee's 1998 waiver of counsel constitutionally invalid because he was not informed of the possible deportation consequences of his plea? After a brief note on the nature of the pleading filed here, the Court answered both questions no. Therefore the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's original judgment. View "Texas v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Applicant Jesus De Leon filed two applications for the writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to plea agreements, Applicant pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child, one count of sexual performance by a child, and twenty-two counts of possession of child pornography. The trial court granted Applicant permission to appeal, even though the State argued that Applicant waived all rights to appeal pursuant to a waiver in the plea agreements. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Applicant's guilty pleas were rendered involuntary because the State reindicted Applicant's brother. Accordingly, the Court granted relief. View "Ex parte Jesus de Leon" on Justia Law

In 2009, appellant Anthony Davison entered an open plea of guilty to burglary of a building. Prior to accepting his plea, the trial court admonished appellant as to the range of punishment for such an offense. Both in a written "Guilty Plea Memorandum" and orally, the trial court informed appellant that "a state jail felony has a possible punishment of not less than 180 days and no more than two years in a state jail facility and a fine not to exceed $10,000." But appellant also pled true to three felony enhancement paragraphs, which made him susceptible to punishment as a second-degree felon. On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellant contended that the court of appeals erred in holding that: (1) the failure to administer one of the admonishments of Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was harmful under Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure; (2) his guilty plea was therefore rendered involuntary for the purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore forfeited because not raised by objection at trial; and (3) any constitutional error was harmless under the same rule that governs the standard for harm analyses for claims of statutory error under Article 26.13. Though the Supreme Court rejected certain aspects of the court of appeals' reasoning, the Court ultimately affirmed its judgment. View "Davison v. Texas" on Justia Law