Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted appellant Sean Anderson of three counts of sexual assault and one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. At sentencing, the trial judge ruled that appellant's 2004 North Carolina conviction for "Taking Indecent Liberties With Children" had "substantially similar" elements to the Texas offense of "Indecency with a Child." Because of that prior North Carolina conviction, the trial judge sentenced appellant to the statutorily required life sentence for each count of sexual assault. On appeal, appellant claimed, among other things, that the trial judge erred in finding "substantial similarity" between the Texas and North Carolina offenses, but the court rejected appellant's claim and affirmed his three life sentences. The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the lower court's analysis under "Prudholm v. Texas" was: (1) incomplete because it did not explicitly include a comparison of the "impact of the elements on the seriousness of the offenses;" or (2) mistaken because the North Carolina statute encompasses a markedly different range of conduct. Upon review, the Court concluded that the two offenses did not contain elements that are substantially similar. View "Anderson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Cynthia Hudson appealed her conviction by jury for capital murder. The court of appeals sustained her complaint that the trial court erred in failing to submit a lesser-included offense. The Supreme Court, after its review of the matter, found that the appellate court conducted its error analysis without considering possible intermediate lesser-included offenses that the evidence might have supported, and it conducted its own harm analysis without considering the lesser-included offenses that were actually submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hudson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Tony Manjares, Edgar Aguilar, and appellant Jay Yzaguirre entered a house and robbed the victims. At least two of the men displayed firearms during the robbery. One of the victims testified that appellant pointed a gun at her head, and a police officer testified that appellant dropped a rifle as he was trying to escape. Appellant testified that he did not bring a gun to the robbery, that he did not hold a gun to anyone's head, and that he was not the person who dropped the rifle. At trial, the abstract portion of the jury charge included an instruction on the law of parties, but the application portion did not. Further, appellant was denied a lesser-included-offense instruction on robbery. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was proper, in determining whether the lesser-offense instruction should have been given, to take into account the omission of the law of parties in the application portion of the charge. Because the law of parties was contained in the abstract portion of the jury charge and was supported by sufficient evidence, it was an issue that should have been taken into account for the purpose of determining whether to submit a lesser-included offense. And because, as the court of appeals explained, there was no evidence in light of the law of parties, that appellant committed only the crime of robbery, the trial court was correct to deny the submission of the lesser-included offense. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed the trial court. View "Yzaguirre v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Michael Bonds moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant by contesting the warrant's validity. The trial judge overruled his motion finding the errors in the warrant's description of the location to be searched did not invalidate the warrant. The court of appeals found the warrant lacked probable cause and reversed. Finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals's judgment. View "Bonds v. Texas" on Justia Law

After rejecting a plea bargain of eight years imprisonment, the applicant pleaded guilty in open court and was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child by contact. The judge assessed punishment of twenty years' confinement for each charge, to run concurrently. The applicant filed two applications for writs of habeas corpus alleging that constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to reject the State's plea-bargain offer. The judge of the convicting court found that trial counsel incorrectly told the applicant that he was eligible for judge-ordered community supervision and shock probation, when only a jury's verdict recommending probation could result in shock probation and the judge could order only deferred adjudication. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the determination of the correct standard for granting habeas-corpus relief for ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Sixth-Amendment standard for determining prejudice in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process, the implications of that decision impacted the Texas Court's review of this case. After further review, the Texas Court held that to establish prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in which a defendant is not made aware of a plea-bargain offer, or rejects a plea-bargain because of bad legal advice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that: (1) he would have accepted the earlier offer if counsel had not given ineffective assistance; (2) the prosecution would not have withdrawn the offer; and (3) the trial court would not have refused to accept the plea bargain. This case was remanded to the habeas court so that it could make findings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Ex parte Andrew Argent" on Justia Law

Applicant Joel De Los Reyes filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise him that he was almost certainly subject to deportation after he pled guilty to a second crime of moral turpitude. The trial court denied the application, but the El Paso Court of Appeals granted relief, holding that the rule from "Padilla" should be applied retroactively and that trial counsel was ineffective under that rule. After review, the Supreme Court recognized that it could give retroactive effect to "Padilla" as a matter of state habeas law. But the Court declined to do so. The Court adhered to the prevailing retroactivity analysis in Texas and held that "Padilla" did not apply retroactively. The appellate court's judgment was reversed in this case, and the trial court's original denial of applicant's application was reinstated. View "Ex parte Joel de Los Reyes" on Justia Law

After rejecting his entrapment defense, a jury convicted appellant Jose Vega of three drug offenses. On appeal, he argued that the trial judge reversibly erred by not instructing the jury accurately on his entrapment defense because the application instruction did not list inducement by the confidential informant as well as inducement by an undercover officer. The court of appeals held that appellant's failure to request that specific application instruction, or object to its omission, forfeited the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court granted review to reiterate that, "when a trial judge instructs on a defensive issue, he must do so correctly; thus any error in the charge actually given is subject to review under 'Almanza.'" In this case, the Court found that the judge's failure to list the confidential informant in the application charge was harmless because the entrapment instructions, taken as a whole, provided the jury with an adequate vehicle to fully consider and give effect to appellant's entrapment defense. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Vega v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Paul Krajcovic was charged with a murder committed in 2007. A jury found him guilty and sentenced him to fifty-five years' confinement. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for a jury instruction on the "Castle Doctrine," which went into effect on September 1, 2007. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review to address: (1) whether the Court of Appeals' panel majority improperly applied the law on defensive instructions where there was no evidence that supported an inference that the requested defensive instruction on the "Castle Doctrine" applied to the case; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals' panel majority erred by holding the lack of the requested instruction was harmful where there was no evidence whatsoever of "retreat," and where a self-defense claim would have failed regardless of whether Appellant was legally required to retreat or not. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in failing to consider whether the evidence supported the inference that the Castle Doctrine applied to this case. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Krajcovic v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant David Moulton was convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty years in prison. Finding that Appellant suffered "some harm" by the erroneous submission of the "by manner and means unknown" jury charge, the Sixth Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. The State filed a petition for discretionary review, which the Supreme Court granted. Finding "no harm" by the jury charge, and no error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Moulton v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant John Frangias of sexual assault and assessed his punishment at eight years' confinement in the penitentiary. Represented by different counsel on appeal, appellant filed a motion for new trial in which he argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when they failed: (1) to secure the presence of a critical witness at the guilt phase of the trial; (2) take his deposition in order to memorialize his testimony for presentation to the jury; or (3) alternatively, seek a continuance in order to secure that witness's testimony. The trial court allowed the motion for new trial to be denied by operation of law. The appellate court upheld that ruling, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the appellant did not establish that his trial counsel performed deficiently. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the appellate court erred to conclude that trial counsel's performance did not fall below the threshold of reasonableness, "[t]his does not necessarily mean, of course, that the trial court erred to deny the appellant's motion for new trial. There remains the question of whether it was within the trial court's considerable discretion to allow the motion for new trial to be denied by operation of law on the ground that the appellant failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of 'Strickland.' . . . the court of appeals did not reach the prejudice prong of Strickland. Moreover, in addressing the question of prejudice, it may also be necessary to resolve the competing contentions with regard to the evidentiary status of the various affidavits submitted by the parties--another issue that was raised, at least incidentally, but not resolved originally by the court of appeals." The Court reversed the appellate court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Frangias v. Texas" on Justia Law