Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1999, appellant Marcus Matlock was judicially determined to be the father of a five-year-old girl and ordered to pay child support. From the beginning, appellant frequently failed to pay the monthly child support. Appellant was charged with sixteen counts of nonsupport for failing to pay child support on the first of each month from February 2006 through November 2006, in January 2008, in June 2008, and from September 2008 through December 2008. The evidence was undisputed that appellant did not pay the required child support during those sixteen months. The only question was whether he had the ability to make those payments. Appellant testified that he didn't make any child support payments for either his daughter or son while he was in jail because "I didn't have no money. Nobody would give me money." There was no suggestion that appellant owned a car, a house, or a bank account. The jury found appellant guilty on all sixteen counts of nonsupport and sentenced him to confinement in a state jail facility for two years with a fine of $10,000 on each count. On direct appeal, appellant claimed that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his "inability to pay" affirmative defense. The court of appeals focused on Count I-the failure to pay child support- and the undisputed evidence that appellant had been in the Smith County jail for the eleven months preceding that date. The court of appeals held that, "after considering all of the evidence relevant to Appellant's affirmative defense of inability to pay child support, . . . the jury's finding of guilt as to Count I of the indictment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust." The State appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred by applying a factual-sufficiency standard of review in deciding whether the evidence was legally sufficient to satisfy appellant's burden to prove his affirmative defense. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[b]ecause the court of appeals conflated the standards for legal and factual sufficiency review, we are uncertain if it found that appellant had conclusively established his 'inability to pay' affirmative defense as a matter of law. Given its analysis, the court of appeals may have thought that the evidence supporting the jury's implicit rejection of appellant's affirmative defense was against the great weight of the evidence under a Meraz factual sufficiency claim. If the court thought that the jury's failure to find that appellant was unable to pay child support on February 1, 2006, was against the great weight of the evidence, then it should reverse the conviction on Count I and remand the case for a new trial on that count. Or the court of appeals might reach an entirely new conclusion based upon the standards of review that we have set out." View "Matlock v. Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant Stacie Kerwick moved to suppress evidence at trial, asserting that the that the officer who detained her lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory detention which led to her arrest for driving while intoxicated. The trial judge granted Kerwick's motion and the court of appeals affirmed the ruling. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded the officer was justified in suspecting that Kerwick was involved in criminal activity and detaining Kerwick to investigate further. The Court reversed the court of appeals's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Texas v Kewick" on Justia Law

Appellant Megan Winfrey was sixteen years old in 2004. In 2007, after an investigation that included dog-scent lineups, appellant and her father and brother were taken into custody and charged with the 2004 murder of Murray Burr, a man who worked at the local high school that appellant attended, who was found dead in his home with numerous stab wounds and multiple sharp- and blunt-force injuries. Appellant's indictment contained two counts: capital murder during the course of robbery and conspiracy to commit capital murder. Her father and brother were named as co-conspirators in the conspiracy count. A jury convicted her of both counts. The trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment for the capital-murder count and forty-five years' imprisonment for the conspiracy count. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, with one justice dissenting. "Basing a finding of appellant's guilt on this evidence and all of the other evidence is, at best, 'mere theorizing or guessing' about appellant's possible guilt rather than a reasonable inference based upon evidence and facts presented." After reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, the Supreme Court held that the evidence merely raised a suspicion of appellant's guilt and was legally insufficient to support a conviction of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the Court found the evidence in the record was insufficient to sustain the agreement element of the conspiracy statute. Appellant was thus entitled to her requested relief regarding her convictions. View "Winfrey v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant pled guilty to two counts of attempted capital murder and one count of murder. The trial court imposed separate and cumulative life sentences for each conviction. In a subsequent writ of habeas corpus, applicant's murder conviction was determined to be barred by double jeopardy. On appeal, Applicant contended that he can be guilty of only one of the two alleged attempted capital murders because the second conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Applicant had shown that his conviction and sentencing for the second offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Applicant also made a prima facie showing of actual innocence of one of the two counts. Thus, the Court granted applicant's first and second grounds for relief, vacated the trial court's judgment with respect to that count, and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "Ex parte Kenneth Milner" on Justia Law

A jury found appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated. At trial, the state sought to introduce videotape evidence of appellant's admission that he had ingested hydrocodone earlier that day, along with expert testimony about the effects of combining hydrocodone and alcohol. Appellant objected but, after a hearing on the objection, the trial court allowed the state to introduce the videotape evidence and the expert testimony. After trial, appellant appealed, arguing inter alia, that "the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of drug use without a proper foundation showing its relevance." The court of appeals held that appellant did not properly preserve that issue for appeal and overruled the issue. Appellant raised two issues before the Supreme Court on appeal: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in finding that appellant did not properly preserve error; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the expert testimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in finding that appellant did not properly preserve error and sustain appellant's first issue. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration of appellant's second issue. View "Everitt v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant of aggravated sexual assault of a child. During the punishment phase, appellant testified and admitted that he had had an ongoing sexual relationship with the child. The court of appeals held that, under the "De Garmo" doctrine, appellant was estopped from complaining about the State's jury argument during the guilt phase because he had later admitted his guilt. Therefore, the court was precluded from addressing the merits of appellant's claim. The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to decide whether "Leday's" exceptions to the De Garmo estoppel doctrine should "be extended to a broader class of guilty-phase errors." Upon review, the Court concluded that Leday's reasoning applied to all guilt-stage claims of error, not merely "fundamental" claims, and it overruled "any last vestiges" of the De Garmo doctrine. "Therefore, a defendant who testifies at the punishment stage of trial and admits his guilt does not forfeit his right to complain on appeal about errors occurring during the guilt stage." The Court remanded this case to the court of appeals to address the merits of appellant's complaint. View "Jacobson v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant David Cook of manslaughter and returned a verdict of six years' confinement with a recommendation that it be probated. The trial judge then formally sentenced appellant. Forty-five minutes later, the same "jury" returned a second punishment verdict of six years' confinement with no recommendation that it be probated. The trial judge again sentenced appellant. What happened between those two formal sentencing pronouncements was only partially reflected in the record. On appeal, appellant sought reinstatement of his probated sentence. The court of appeals held that the trial judge's decision to reconvene the jury under the particular facts in this case was harmful error, and it remanded the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. Both the State and appellant appealed that decision. The State argued that the court of appeals should have found the error forfeited. Appellant argued that the court of appeals should have reinstated his original, probated sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that appellant preserved the re-sentencing issue for appellate review, and reinstated his original, probated sentence. View "Cook v. Texas" on Justia Law

This mandamus action arose from a capital-murder prosecution that reached the jury-charge portion of the guilt stage of trial. The trial judge's proposed charge would have submitted to the jury the "conspiracy" theory of the law of parties but not the "intent to promote or assist" theory of the law of parties. In submitting the "conspiracy" theory, the trial judge's proposed charge would have required the State to prove that the defendant should have anticipated the particular manner and means by which his co-conspirator killed the victim. The State sought the writ of mandamus to require the submission of the "intent to promote or assist" theory and to require the submission of the "conspiracy" theory without any manner-and-means restriction. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief: with respect to the "intent to promote or assist" theory, the court of appeals concluded that the trial judge's "assessment of the evidence to determine whether it supported the inclusion of an instruction under section 7.02(a) in the court's charge was not a ministerial act, but rather an exercise of [his] judgment and judicial determination" and "to the extent that there is a dispute about the state of the evidence, [the Supreme Court] may not resolve it in an original mandamus proceeding." Irrespective of the indictment's manner-and-means allegation, no statutory or case law supported its inclusion. Furthermore, two of the recognized criminal pattern jury charge books did not include it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the court of appeals to grant mandamus relief directing the trial court to submit the theory of party liability in the jury charge without requiring the State to show that the defendant should have anticipated the particular method by which the murder was carried out. The writ of mandamus would issue only in the event that the court of appeals failed to comply with this opinion. View "In re Texas ex rel David Weeks" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain with the State, the applicant was placed on deferred adjudication for the offense of sexual assault of a child. The convicting court later found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment because, among other things, he allegedly committed two new offenses. Applicant did not appeal. The applicant then filed an initial post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, where he claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Supreme Court denied the initial writ application without written order. This case was a subsequent post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. Here, applicant alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his deferred adjudication community supervision because the capias for his arrest did not issue until three days after his community supervision period expired. While the Court was "not unsympathetic to the applicant's claim," it lacked authority to grant him relief through the "abuse of the writ doctrine," codified by Section 4 of Article 11.07. Applicant failed to state facts that contain facts that established either new law, new facts, or actual innocence. Accordingly, the Court dismissed applicant's application. View "Ex Parte Casey Sledge" on Justia Law

Appellant, David Mark Temple was convicted of the murder of his wife, Belinda Temple, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction. On direct appeal Appellant argued, among other issues, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for murder and that the jury was rationally justified in finding Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Temple v. Texas" on Justia Law