Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The State charged Appellants with second-degree felony assault on a public servant. The State alleged in Eluid Lira’s indictment that he had previously been convicted twice for felony possession of a controlled substance and twice for felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The State alleged in Scott Huddleston’s indictment that he had previously been convicted for murder. Both Appellants were represented by the State Counsel for Offenders. Both Appellants reached plea agreements with the State and their cases were set for back-to-back pleas via a “zoom/video-conference plea docket.” Prior to the hearing, counsel for Appellants filed identical motions objecting to the trial court’s setting the cases for plea hearings via a Zoom videoconference. In the motions, Appellants argued that pleading by videoconference would violate their constitutional right to counsel, right to public trial, and statutory rights under Articles 27.18 and 27.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Ultimately, the State argued that Emergency Orders issued by the Supreme Court of Texas controlled over the Code of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Appellants argued that their statutory right to enter a guilty plea in person in open court was a substantive right. Because of this, it was not subject to the Texas Supreme Court’s emergency orders regarding the modification or suspension of deadlines and procedures. The State argued that, if preserved, Appellants’ arguments failed because the Texas Supreme Court had the authority to modify or suspend “the act of criminal defendants appearing live in live courtrooms[.]” The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals surmised the question in Appellants' cases boiled down to the "simple question of whether the Supreme Court’s Emergency Order granted a trial court authority to preside over videoconferenced plea hearings when the Appellants had not consented." To this, the Court concluded: no, a trial court has no authority to hold a videoconferenced plea hearing when the defendant has not consented. The court of appeals was affirmed and the matters remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Lira v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address whether the requirements for the inference of falsity that this Court adopted in Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) should apply in cases involving a police officer with a demonstrated pattern of misconduct in drug-related cases. The Court concluded that it should, and remanded the case for the habeas court to determine whether evidence substantiated Applicant Aaron Mathews’ Coty claim. In particular, the Court was concerned with whether there was evidence that Officer Goines committed repeated acts of misconduct in pursuit of illicit-drug investigations. This was relevant to the second Coty prong; depending on when a second instance of misconduct occurred, it might also be relevant to the fifth Coty prong. After the case was remanded, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Ex parte Jeffery, 2022 WL 4088689 (Tex. Crim. App. September 7, 2022). The habeas court found that all the Coty prongs were met in Applicant’s case and that a presumption of falsity applied. The habeas court also determined the misconduct was material. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined the habeas court's finding were supported by the record, and thus, granted relief. View "Ex parte Aaron Mathews" on Justia Law

Appellee Sanitha Hatter was charged with felony assault against a peace officer, and two misdemeanor cases of driving while intoxicated (DWI). The felony prosecutor and defense counsel on the assault case reached an agreement in which the prosecutor promised to dismiss the assault case in exchange for Appellee’s promise to plead guilty to the DWI cases. The prosecutor later assured Appellee’s counsel that, no matter what happened to the DWI cases, he would dismiss the assault case and not re-file it. The assault case was dismissed, but shortly thereafter the DWI cases were also dismissed instead of Appellee entering guilty pleas. The felony prosecutor re-filed the assault case. Appellee moved for specific performance, asking the trial court to order the State to move to dismiss the assault case in accordance to the earlier promise not to re-file. The trial court granted the motion, and the re-filed assault case was dismissed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the State and Appellee had entered into an enforceable immunity agreement. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the agreement between Appellee and the State was in the nature of a plea bargain agreement—not an immunity agreement—the court of appeals applied an inapplicable test for determining whether the trial court erred in granting the motion for specific performance. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded this matter to the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court’s order could be sustained by a theory of law applicable to the case. View "Texas v. Hatter" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals filed and set this application to determine the appropriate disposition in light of Applicant Phillip Dennis’ pleadings for post-conviction habeas relief. In 2017, Applicant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. In 2018, he filed an application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether Applicant’s prior Arkansas DWI conviction should have been used as a jurisdictional enhancement in this case. Upon receiving the 2018 application the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case, but it did not receive the supplemental record with findings of fact and conclusions of law from the habeas court until 2020. Applicant’s sentence discharged in 2019 while his writ application was pending. Having considered the habeas court’s findings, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and concluded that Applicant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit. View "Ex parte Phillip Dennis" on Justia Law

In late June 2013, Appellant Danna Cyr and her husband, Justin Cyr, took their four-month-old child, J.D., to the emergency room in Lubbock. Upon their arrival, medical staff quickly discovered J.D. was suffering from life-threatening brain hemorrhaging. Physicians were able to save J.D.’s life, but the bleeding resulted in permanent physical and cognitive dysfunction. The cause of the child’s injuries was uncontroverted: J.D. was violently assaulted by her father. Appellant was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for reckless injury to a child by omission. The State sought its general verdict under two theories: (1) Appellant failed to protect J.D. from Justin; or (2) Appellant failed to seek reasonable medical care despite her duty to act as J.D.’s parent. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review to decide whether Appellant was entitled to a jury instruction under Texas Penal Code § 6.04(a)’s concurrent causation provision for acts “clearly insufficient” to cause the proscribed harm. Because the Court found concurrent causation was not raised by the evidence presented at trial under Texas Penal Code § 22.04(a) and § 6.04(a), it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Cyr v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Gustavo Sandoval was charged with the capital murder of Javier Vega, Jr. (“Harvey”), by intentionally causing his death in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. A jury found Appellant guilty, for which he was sentenced to death. Appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was automatic. Appellant raised twenty-seven points of error. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence. View "Sandoval v. Texas" on Justia Law

A number of defendants in misdemeanor cases arising in Kinney County, Texas filed habeas applications in a district court in Travis County (the District Court). The District Court permitted those applications to remain pending after granting relief on one of them. Relator, the Kinney County Attorney, sought to prohibit the District Court from considering or resolving the remaining applications. Because a district court in Travis County was not a local court for these misdemeanor cases arising out of Kinney County, the District Court was required to refrain from resolving the merits in these habeas cases. Consequently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Relator was entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition. View "In re Texas ex rel. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant Saul Ranulfo Herrera Rios was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child. He appealed, arguing that he did not waive his federal constitutional right to a jury trial and that the state statutory procedures for waiving a jury were not followed. The court of appeals abated the case, and the trial court concluded that Appellant waived his right to a jury. A divided court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Appellant filed a pro se petition for discretionary review, arguing that the court of appeals erred because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury. After review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded for a new trial. The Court concluded the trial court record did not expressly show Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury, and that error was structural. View "Rios v. Texas" on Justia Law

After a trial court denied his suppression motion, Appellant Tairon Jose Monjaras pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his interaction with law enforcement was an investigative detention without reasonable suspicion rather than a consensual encounter. A majority of the court of appeals disagreed, finding that the interaction was a consensual encounter. After its review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Appellant’s interaction with law enforcement, which started as a consensual encounter, escalated into an investigative detention. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court to determine whether the investigative detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. View "Monjaras v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Genovevo Salinas Salinas appealed the denial of his application for habeas relief. He argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel at his second murder trial. The underlying offense involved the double homicide of Juan and Hector Garza, committed in December 1992. Aware that the police suspected him of the crime, Applicant absconded and was not arrested until 2007. Applicant’s first trial, in 2008, resulted in a hung jury. A different jury found him guilty at his second trial in 2009. Applicant’s trial attorneys were the same for both trials. He argued here that they performed deficiently at his second trial, primarily by allowing the admission of evidence that he stood mute when investigating officers posed one particular question during an interview at the station house in January of 1993. Applicant, who had waived his right to silence and readily responded to their questions up to that point, would not answer. At Applicant’s second trial, in 2009, trial counsel objected to the admission of this evidence based upon Applicant’s Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, arguing that his pretrial silence could not constitutionally be used against him regardless of whether he was in custody at the time of the interview. Applicant now argued that trial counsel at the second trial performed in a constitutionally deficient manner by failing to object to the use of his pre-trial silence on two other grounds: (1) counsel should have objected that admission of the evidence of his silence violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as “fundamentally unfair” because it came after he was given his Miranda warnings; and (2) trial counsel could and should have kept the evidence of his refusal to answer out because it was elicited as part of an oral statement made while Applicant was in police custody, and such statements are inadmissible as a matter of state law unless they are electronically recorded. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Applicant’s claims did not demonstrate deficient performance under Strickland, and that his remaining claims did not satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong because there was no reasonable probability that they would have altered the outcome of Applicant’s trial. Accordingly, the Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Genovevo Salinas" on Justia Law