Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

A police officer stopped Shiela Hardin for committing the traffic offense of “failing to maintain a single marked lane of traffic” when he observed the right rear tire of her rented U-Haul touch and drive on the striped line marking the right side of center lane. No circumstances made this movement unsafe. Based upon evidence collected pursuant to a search of Appellee’s vehicle after the traffic stop, the State charged Appellee with fraudulent possession of identifying information and forgery of a government instrument. Appellee moved to suppress evidence obtained after that warrantless traffic stop, and the trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concurred with the lower courts and affirmed their judgments. View "Texas v. Hardin" on Justia Law

Appellant William Rogers was originally charged in a two-count indictment for Burglary of a Habitation predicated on either the intent to commit a felony, or attempting and having committed a felony. Count I alleged Appellant possessed the intent to commit Aggravated Assault in Paragraph A. Paragraph B alleged Appellant completed the commission of the Aggravated Assault. Count II alleged in Paragraphs A and B a similar scheme, but with the intent to Murder and the commission of Attempted Murder. From the same incident but by a second indictment, Appellant was charged with Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon. During a pretrial hearing, the State informed the trial court that they would: (1) waive and abandon Count I Paragraph A, and all of Count II; and (2) proceed solely on Count I Paragraph B (Burglary of a Habitation) based on the commission of Aggravated Assault as charged in the first indictment. The State also proceeded on the second indictment alleging Aggravated Assault and both were tried together. Appellant was convicted of both Burglary of a Habitation with the underlying commission of Aggravated Assault, and Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon, for which he was sentenced to 40 years for the Burglary and 20 years for the Aggravated Assault to be served concurrently. On his first appeal, an appeals found the Burglary conviction subsumed the Aggravated Assault conviction and thus, vacated the latter. The court also held, without deciding error first, that the trial court’s failure to instruct on any defensive issues was harmless. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and unanimously held that if error existed, it was harmful error. And it remanded for the court of appeals to decide whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense and necessity. The court of appeals then concluded there was no error and that Appellant failed to provide any evidence that would entitle him to a jury instruction on self-defense or necessity. The Texas Court of Appeals granted review for a second time, this time to decide whether the error analysis was flawed. After a thorough review of the case, the Court concluded the trial court erred by refusing to grant the requested defensive charge of self-defense and, as previously held, that Appellant was harmed at every stage of the process. View "Rogers v. Texas" on Justia Law

The trial court’s certification form in this case displayed five checkboxes detailing five options regarding the right of appeal. Two options were checked, saying that the case “is a plea bargain case and the defendant has NO right of appeal” and that “the defendant has waived the right of appeal.” Left blank were: the case “is not a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has the right of appeal,” the case “is a plea-bargain case, but matters were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial and not withdrawn or waived, and the defendant has the right of appeal,” and the case “is a plea-bargain case, but the trial court has given permission to appeal, and the defendant has the right of appeal.” Applicant and his trial attorney signed the certification form. No notice of appeal was filed. In this habeas application, Applicant contended, as pertinent here, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal. Trial counsel responded that on the day of Applicant’s plea, Applicant’s mother sent a message saying that Applicant wanted to appeal; counsel requested the trial court appoint appellate counsel because trial counsel did not handle appeals. The habeas court found that though appellate counsel was appointed, not appeal was filed. The court also found that Applicant would have timely filed a notice of appeal but for counsel’s mistaken belief that his email notification to the trial court would suffice to protect Applicant’s right to appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Applicant "extinguished every possible appellate claim." The trial court’s certification said there was no right to appeal because the conviction was the result of a plea agreement; because a defendant in that situation had no right to appeal, he suffers no prejudice even if counsel performed deficiently in failing to file a notice of appeal. View "Ex parte Dennis Castillo" on Justia Law

In separate indictments, a grand jury charged Appellant Stoyan Anastassov with two instances of second-degree-felony indecency with a child by sexual contact. The indictments alleged that Appellant, a professional tennis coach, unlawfully engaged in sexual contact with one of his female students, a child younger than seventeen years old, with the intent to arouse and gratify his sexual desire by contacting her genitalia and her breast with his hand. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, and the two cases were tried together in a single proceeding. The jury found Appellant guilty of the offenses alleged and assessed his punishment at confinement for nine years on one charge, three years on the other, and a $10,000 fine in each case. The trial court accepted the jury’s verdicts and sentenced Appellant accordingly. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether, if a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses stemming from the same criminal episode in a single proceeding, the trial court imposes fines as part of the sentence for each offense, and the sentences are to be discharged concurrently, should each judgment include the fine actually imposed, or should only one of the judgments include a fine to ensure that the defendant pays only once? The Court concluded each judgment must include the fine actually imposed. The court of appeals erred here by deleting one of Appellant’s two lawfully-assessed concurrent fines of $10,000 for his indecency-with-a-child convictions under the mistaken belief that including both fines in the judgments would improperly indicate that they were to be stacked. Accordingly, the Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment deleting the fine in case number F-1550350-V, and reinstated the $10,000 fine that the trial court originally included in the written judgment for that offense. The Court otherwise affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. View "Anastassov v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Henry Skinner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He filed numerous Chapter 64 motions seeking post-conviction DNA testing. Most recently, the convicting court found that he did not show ti was reasonably probable that he would not have been convicted had the results been available during his trial. Appellant appealed that finding to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. While Appellant’s appeal was pending, he asked the Court to remand the case so that prior DNA test results obtained by the Department of Public Safety (DPS) could be reanalyzed using a new protocol for interpretations of DNA mixtures.The Court agreed and remanded the case. After the reanalysis was complete, the convicting court again found against Appellant. After reviewing the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the convicting court that Appellant failed to satisfy his Article 64.04 burden. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Skinner v. Texas" on Justia Law

Police organized a “controlled buy” of drugs wherein a confidential informant purchased crack cocaine from Appellant April Williams. Based on her sale of drugs to the informant, Appellant was indicted for delivery of a controlled substance, Penalty Group 1, in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. At Appellant’s jury trial, the State first called Detective Jaime Diaz as a witness. Following Diaz’s testimony, the State planned to call the informant as a witness. But before the informant, the State requested that a spectator, Appellant’s brother Jerry Williams, be temporarily excluded from the courtroom during the testimony. The State contended that it had “credible and reliable information” that Williams’s presence would intimidate the informant, which would affect his testimony. The State also provided caselaw to the court “supporting closing the courtroom because of the intimidation factor.” To minimize the effects of the closure, the State offered to set up a live video feed in another room of the courthouse so that Williams could watch the informant's testimony in real time. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the temporary physical exclusion from a courtroom of a defendant’s family member for the testimony of one witness at trial violate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when the excluded individual was virtually included by permitting him to observe the witness’s testimony via a live video feed from a neighboring courtroom. Under the specific facts of this case, the Court held it did not, but cautioned that trial courts should rarely exclude any member of the public from a courtroom during criminal case proceedings: "under the narrow circumstances presented here...even assuming that the trial court’s actions resulted in a partial closure of the courtroom, any such closure was so trivial or de minimis that it did not infringe on the values served by the Sixth Amendment." View "Williams v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Floyd Woods was charged by two indictments with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Each indictment alleged possession of a different firearm. The indictments alleged the same date for the offenses and the same underlying conviction that made Applicant a felon. The indictments also included two enhancement paragraphs, with the second enhancement paragraph alleging sequence to confer habitual status. This resulted in a punishment range of 25 to 99 years or life for each offense. In exchange for Applicant’s open pleas of guilty, the State abandoned one enhancement paragraph in each indictment, dropping the punishment range for each offense to 2 to 20 years. The trial court sentenced Applicant to 18 years on each offense, to run concurrently. In the plea papers, Applicant waived his right to appeal. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was the proper unit of prosecution: for the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, if a person possesses two firearms, has he committed one offense or two? To this, the Court responded "one" and found Appellant was entitled to relief. The conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "Ex parte Woods" on Justia Law

In 2002, a grand jury returned two indictments in two separate cases, each charging Applicant Jonathan Kibler with three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Applicant pleaded guilty to two charges of indecency with a child by exposure as alleged in Count three in each case. Count three of both indictments alleged conduct that was committed on the same day, but against different victims. The trial court accepted the plea agreements and placed Applicant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a concurrent period of eight years. One of the conditions of Applicant’s probation required him to comply with the Sex Offender Registration Program. In 2006, the State filed motions to adjudicate Applicant’s guilt in both cases. In 2007, Applicant entered negotiated pleas of “true” to the allegations contained in each of the State’s motions to adjudicate. During the same proceeding, the trial court adjudicated Applicant guilty and sentenced him to two years confinement in each case, with the sentences to run concurrently. Applicant did not appeal his convictions. After discharging his sentences in 2008, Applicant received conflicting information regarding the duration of his duty to register as a sex offender. In 2013, an attorney with the Texas Department of Public Safety and a field representative with the Texas Department of Public Safety’s “Sex Offender Registration Unit” separately advised Applicant by email that he was required to register for life based on his two convictions for indecency with a child. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was being improperly required to register for life based on an erroneous interpretation of Article 62.101(a)(4) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The issue presented to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether a person convicted of multiple charges of indecency with a child in the same proceeding received one reportable conviction or adjudication “before or after” another, such that the person has a duty to register as a sex offender for life. The Court held yes: Article 62.101(a)(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which established when the duty to register as a sex offender expires, did not require that one conviction be final before the second conviction was received. Thus, a sex offender could be required to register for life if he or she receives two separate convictions for the offense of indecency with a child, even if they are adjudicated in the same proceeding. View "Ex parte Kibler" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Phillip Campbell of murdering Alexandria Wright (“Jade”) by manual strangulation. In his testimony at trial, Appellant contended that on the night of Jade’s death, he and Jade had engaged in rough sex involving erotic asphyxiation. Although Appellant admitted that he purposely choked Jade, he insisted that it was consensual, that he did not intend to harm her, and that her death was simply a tragic accident. In the jury instructions, over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court included a definition for “intentionally” as it related to both the “nature” of Appellant’s conduct as well as to the “result” of his conduct, even though intentional murder was a result-of-conduct offense. On appeal, Appellant argued that because of this, the charge improperly allowed the jury to convict him if it found that he intentionally choked Jade, rather than requiring the jury to find that he intentionally killed Jade. The Court of Appeals concluded that the error in the charge, if any, was harmless. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether this conclusion was in error. Based on its independent review of the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that Appellant was not actually harmed by the trial court’s failure to tailor the definition of “intentionally” to the result of Appellant’s conduct. Accordingly, it affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. View "Campbell v. Texas" on Justia Law

Carroll Weathermon saw appellant Mickey Perkins standing over Lana Hyles who was on the ground. Weathermon did not know Hyles or Appellant prior to that day. She began honking her horn and saw Appellant grab Hyles by the hair pulling her toward a car parked in the grass to the side of the road. Weathermon called 911, opened her passenger door, and Hyles crawled inside as her nose bled. Weathermon took Hyles to the emergency room. Hyles previously dated Appellant, and, according to Hyles, Appellant was to drop her off at home but began heading in the wrong direction. Hyles advised Appellant to take her home, which led to an argument. The argument became physical when Appellant pushed her head into the console of the car and choked her causing her pain and difficulty breathing. Hyles bit Appellant’s finger and exited the vehicle as it slowed down. She did not recall being on the ground or Appellant physically trying to force her back to the car. After Appellant left in Hyles’s car, she got into Weathermon’s car. But according to Appellant, Hyles caused her own injuries. He claimed that as he was driving, Hyles slammed the car into either park or reverse from the passenger seat. Appellant claimed he was forced to hit the brakes, causing Hyles to hit her face on the dash. Ultimately, Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault against a person with whom he had previously had a dating relationship. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals centered on whether the State was required to accept a defendant's stipulation of evidence regarding an unadjudicated extraneous offense offered for non-character conformity purposes, rather than introduce testimony regarding the commission of that offense into evidence during the State’s case-in-chief. The Court declined to extend its holding in Tamez v. Texas involving jurisdictional DWI convictions to the situation presented in this case. The Court affirmed the court of appeals opinion in this regard. However, the Court concurred with Appellant that the court of appeals failed to review the trial court’s decision to admit testimony of Appellant’s unadjudicated aggravated assault over Appellant’s Rule 403 objection. Consequently, the Court remanded the case for the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court’s admission of this evidence ran afoul of Rule 403. View "Perkins v. Texas" on Justia Law