Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jesse Villafranco, Jr. was charged with aggravated sexual assault, attempted indecency with a child, and indecency with a child by exposure. At trial, Appellant sought to ask the victim about a previous incident of sexual abuse by someone else to rebut medical evidence offered by the State. The trial court questioned the victim outside the presence of the parties and ruled the evidence of prior sexual abuse inadmissible. The State and defense agreed the trial court failed to follow the proper procedure for a hearing under Rule of Evidence 412 (the “rape shield” rule), and erred in excluding the State, defense counsel, and Appellant from the hearing. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, concluding that Appellant did not show harm. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to consider whether the court of appeals erred in failing to remand this case to the trial court to remedy its error as required by LaPointe v. Texas, 225 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), and whether the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To this, the Court held the court of appeals erred in failing to follow LaPointe. The appeal was abated and the case remanded to the trial court for an adversarial hearing on the admissibility of the evidence of prior sexual abuse. This resolution rendered moot Appellant’s second ground for review, and the Court did not consider the issue of harm. View "Villafranco v. Texas" on Justia Law

At the punishment stage of AppellantJuan Macedo’s trial, a police report regarding an extraneous offense was admitted into evidence over a hearsay objection. Although the judgment convicting Appellant of that extraneous offense was also admitted into evidence, the police report was the only item of evidence that included details of the offense. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that in light of the evidence of the offense and the severity of the other punishment evidence, any error in admitting the police report was harmless. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Macedo v. Texas" on Justia Law

The trial court suppressed two of Appellee Erlinda Lujan's three recorded, custodial statements, and the State appealed those rulings. The court of appeals upheld the suppression of one of the statements. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the suppression of that one statement. The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment because the statement at issue was not "warned and waived." View "Texas v. Lujan" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether an incarcerated defendant was entitled to the 10-day grace period for filing a notice of appeal when he omitted the words “district clerk” from the envelope he used to send his notice of appeal. In this case, no. Because Appellant’s notice of appeal does not satisfy the mailbox rule or the prisoner mailbox rule, the notice was untimely. Without timely notice of appeal, the court of appeals properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Anderson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Oscar Sanchez, Jr. was convicted of failure to stop and render aid, and he was placed on probation. He filed an Article 11.072 habeas proceeding, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce testimony from passengers who were in his car at the time of the alleged offense. He provided habeas affidavits from some of the passengers. The trial court denied relief after reviewing the trial record and the habeas affidavits. In its review of the trial court’s determination, the court of appeals stated that a de novo review was appropriate because “the habeas judge was not the trial judge and there was no evidentiary hearing” and consequently, “the judge is not in an appreciably better position than the reviewing court to resolve the matter.” But because a court of appeals acts solely as an appellate court in reviewing a trial court’s ruling in an Article 11.072 proceeding, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the court of appeals’s statement of the standard of review was inaccurate. "Even affidavits and documentary evidence must be viewed with deference to the trial court’s ability to resolve questions of fact." Consequently, the court of appeals' judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Oscar Sanchez, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Herron, a sex offender, was released on parole after signing pre-release paperwork reflecting that upon release he would reside in a halfway house in El Paso County. The pre-release paperwork also indicated that Appellant should register as a sex offender with the Horizon City Police Department upon establishing his residence at the halfway house. But instead of going to El Paso County, Appellant absconded to another county where he was apprehended a few weeks later. Appellant was subsequently charged with and convicted of failure to register as a sex offender in El Paso. The question presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether Appellant could be convicted of that offense when the uncontested evidence showed that Appellant never went to El Paso following his release. "The answer is no." The Court found the evidence failed to establish that Appellant resided or intended to reside in El Paso County for more than seven days. Therefore, pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 62.051(a), Appellant was not statutorily obligated to register as a sex offender in El Paso as alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, as a matter of law, he cannot be guilty of the failure-to-register offense as alleged. The Court affirmed the court of appeals holding the evidence insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and rendering a judgment of acquittal. View "Herron v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Allen Lanclos was arrested on August 23, 2020, for assault on a public servant. The trial court set his bonds at a total of $2,250,000. Appellant could not post bonds in that amount and unsuccessfully sought their reduction. After he had been detained for 90 days without having been indicted, he filed an application for writ of habeas corpus under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.151 seeking reduction of the bonds to an amount he could afford or release on personal bond. The habeas court then reduced the bonds to $1,500,000. Appellant appealed the habeas court’s failure to reduce the bonds to an amount that he could afford, and the court of appeals affirmed the habeas court’s order. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed: "Article 17.151 is mandatory; if the State is not ready for trial within 90 days of the beginning of the defendant’s detention, the defendant accused of a felony must be released on personal bond or by reducing the required bail amount. ... Under those circumstances, the judge has only two options: either release the accused on personal bond or reduce the required bail amount. If the court chooses to reduce the amount of bail required, it must reduce it to an amount that the record reflects the accused can make." The court of appeals erred in failing to require Appellant’s release on bond that he could afford. View "Ex parte Lanclos" on Justia Law

Police were told that the house at 318 Avenue A in South Houston was a site of drug dealing. During a week of surveillance, narcotics K-9 officers arrested four people leaving the house in possession of methamphetamine, and police got a warrant to search the house. While uniformed officers in marked police cars blocked both ends of the street, 20 to 25 HROU officers surrounded the house, announced via loudspeaker from an armored vehicle that they had a search warrant, and directed occupants to exit the house. Appellant Suzanne Wexler came out and was detained by HROU officers and put in the back of a patrol car. While HROU did a protective sweep of the house, narcotics detective Jerome Hill questioned Appellant. Hill suspected that Appellant and someone named Jimmy were involved in distributing drugs, but Hill did not tell Appellant that she was a suspect, and he did not give her any warnings. Hill testified that he said, "We have a search warrant. Tell me where the narcotics are. It will save us some time doing the search. We're going to find it no matter what." Appellant told him that the drugs were Ain her bedroom in a dresser drawer. Appellant challenged the admissibility of that statement she made to police during the execution of a search warrant, claiming that the statement was a product of custodial interrogation. The court of appeals determined that Appellant made the statement before she was in custody, and it was properly admitted by the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court. View "Wexler v. Texas" on Justia Law

After hotel management smelled marijuana smoke coming from a guest room, a hotel employee knocked on the door in an attempt to evict the guests. After this attempt was unsuccessful, a manager later requested police assistance with evicting the guests. In assisting with the eviction, police entered the hotel room and witnessed drugs in plain view. Police then arrested the occupants of the room, conducted a search of the room incident to arrest, and seized the drugs. Appellant Michael Tilghman appealed his ultimate conviction, arguing police's entry into his rented room violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals, which held the trial court erred in failing to grant Appellant's motion to suppress evidence of the drugs. View "Tilghman v. Texas" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old girl was kidnapped. Appellee Ricardo Mata called the girl’s mother and demanded a ransom of $300 for her release. He said this was the amount he had “paid” for her. A sheriff's investigator posed as a friend of the mother to negotiate the trade. While on the phone, the investigator had Appellee's cell phone "pinged," and they were able to trace the phone's location. Appellee left the house in a vehicle, and the phone’s “pinged” location matched his movements. At some point Appellee mentioned that his battery was dying; investigators had a marked police car stop Appellee’s vehicle. Investigators arrived on the scene and questioned Appellee regarding the kidnapped girl. They did not administer Miranda warnings. One investigator immediately accused Appellee of being the kidnapper and said that “they got him.” After further “aggressive interrogation,” Appellee said he would help locate the girl if they let him go. The investigator responded that Appellee would not be free to leave. After continued interrogation, Appellee revealed the child’s location. Once she was found, Appellee was transported to the sheriff’s office. Appellee filed a motion to suppress statements made by him to law enforcement, contending the investigators did not give him Miranda warnings. The trial court agreed, suppressing any “statements alleged to have been made by [Appellee] at the time he was detained on the side of the road and in response to direct questioning from Investigator Porraz, Chavez, and or Deputy Canales.” The trial court found that Appellee was “not free to leave the side of the road” at the time he gave the roadside statements and that Miranda warnings had not been given. On appeal, the State argued that the roadside questioning fell within the public safety exception to the Miranda rule and that the resulting statements were admissible. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the public safety “exception is a narrow one, and it has only been used in situations involving the use of guns.” The appellate court concluded that “the officers had no indication of a weapon or gun being involved or used to endanger the safety of the public,” and the court declined to construe the public safety exception more broadly because that “may lessen the clarity of the Miranda rule.” The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both the trial and appellate courts, finding the "public safety" exception to Miranda extended to attempts to find a kidnapped child. View "Texas v. Mata" on Justia Law