Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves an appellant who engaged in online conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl named "Alyssa." The appellant's communications became romantic and sexual, leading to a solicitation for a meeting to have sex. When confronted by police, the appellant claimed he intended to warn the girl about the dangers of meeting strangers online. At trial, he testified that he did not believe "Alyssa" was a minor and thought she was lying about her identity. He introduced testimony from a past "catfisher" and sought to introduce testimony from his brothers and autism experts, which the trial court excluded.The Fifth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the excluded testimony from the appellant's brothers and Dr. Masino, an autism expert, was relevant to rebut the mens rea element of whether the appellant knowingly solicited a minor. The court found that the exclusion of this evidence was constitutional error because it prevented the appellant from fully presenting his defense. Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the expert testimony on autism did not directly rebut or negate the mens rea required for the offense. The court found that the autism evidence did not show that the appellant was incapable of perceiving the age of the person he was communicating with. The court concluded that the trial court properly excluded Dr. Masino's testimony and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address the admissibility of the brothers' testimony and Dr. Jerome's testimony. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CRUMLEY v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder after evidence was obtained from a search of his cell phone. He filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing that the warrant affidavit did not provide probable cause for the search. The trial court denied his motion, leading to his conviction. On appeal, the appellant contended that the affidavit was insufficient, and the court of appeals agreed, reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding for a new trial.The trial court initially denied the appellant's motion to suppress, resulting in his conviction. The appellant then appealed to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which found that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked sufficient particularized facts to establish probable cause. Specifically, the affidavit did not describe the murder or provide a factual nexus between the cell phone and the crime. Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case, focusing on whether the court of appeals had applied an overly stringent standard for probable cause. The higher court found that the court of appeals had misinterpreted the precedent set in State v. Baldwin, which does not require that an affidavit must always show the cell phone was used during, before, or after the crime. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation and reversed its judgment. The case was remanded for further consideration consistent with the higher court's opinion. View "STOCKER V. STATE" on Justia Law

In 1998, the appellant pled nolo contendere to indecency with a child by sexual contact and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for six years, which he completed in 2004. In 2018, following a recantation by the victim, the appellant sought habeas corpus relief, claiming actual innocence. The trial court referred the matter to a magistrate judge to issue the writ and conduct a hearing. The magistrate judge held a hearing and recommended granting relief based on actual innocence. However, the State filed a motion to reconsider, which the magistrate judge granted, later adopting the State's proposed findings and orally denying relief without a written order.The appellant filed a notice of appeal, but the court of appeals initially indicated the appeal might be dismissed for lack of a final, signed order. The State then obtained a written order from the magistrate judge, which purported to deny relief. The court of appeals proceeded on the assumption it had jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the appellant, stating the State's motion to reconsider did not extend the trial court's jurisdiction. The State's subsequent motion for rehearing argued the magistrate judge lacked authority to issue a final order, but the court of appeals rejected this argument based on the doctrine of invited error.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court had not entered an appealable order granting or denying relief. The court held that only a written order from the trial court judge, not the magistrate judge, could constitute an appealable order under Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s attempted appeal. The judgment of the court of appeals was vacated, the appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the appeal. View "EX PARTE SINCLAIR" on Justia Law

The case involves Waymon Jaeshell Stepherson, who was convicted by a Brazoria County jury. The former District Clerk, Rhonda Barchak, used a race-based system to create jury panels by sorting prospective jurors by race and residence. Stepherson, who is black, claims this process violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and an impartial jury, as well as the statutory requirement for a randomly selected jury panel.Stepherson was convicted of aggravated robbery in 2016. He did not object to the jury composition at trial. On appeal, he raised issues unrelated to jury selection, and the court of appeals upheld his conviction. After his conviction was affirmed, Stepherson filed a habeas corpus application, alleging newly discovered evidence of a race-based jury selection process. The habeas court found that while race was a factor in creating the jury panels, there was no evidence of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of any racial group. The court concluded that Stepherson's jury panels represented a fair cross section of the community and recommended denying relief.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that to prove a due process violation based on racial discrimination in jury selection, a defendant must show systematic exclusion of a particular group and that this exclusion rendered the jury plainly illegal. The court found that Barchak's process was designed to include, rather than exclude, racial groups proportionally. Therefore, Stepherson did not meet the criteria for a due process violation. The court also found no violation of equal protection or the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, as there was no evidence of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of non-whites. The court denied Stepherson's application for habeas corpus relief. View "EX PARTE STEPHERSON" on Justia Law

Investigators from the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force conducted an undercover operation and found child pornography on the appellant's cell phone. The appellant was indicted under Section 43.262(b) of the Texas Penal Code for knowingly possessing visual material depicting the lewd exhibition of the pubic area of a clothed child under 18 years old, which appealed to the prurient interest in sex and had no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.The appellant filed a pretrial writ application arguing that Section 43.262(b) was unconstitutional on several grounds, including that it was an impermissible content-based restriction on protected speech and was overbroad. The trial court denied the application, concluding that the statute was a content-based restriction but passed strict scrutiny, regulated only obscenity and child pornography, and was not void for vagueness.The First Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Section 43.262(b) was unconstitutional because it regulated protected speech, did not survive strict scrutiny, and was overbroad. The court of appeals concluded that the statute did not regulate only child pornography or obscenity and that the State failed to show a compelling interest in regulating child erotica.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the court of appeals' decision. It held that Section 43.262(b) regulates only child pornography, an unprotected category of speech. The court concluded that the statute was not an unconstitutional restriction on protected speech because it met the criteria established by the United States Supreme Court for regulating child pornography. The court also held that the appellant failed to preserve his overbreadth claim for appellate review. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to address the remaining points of error. View "EX PARTE LOWRY" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Shanea Lynn Reeder, who was convicted for Unlawful Possession of Firearm and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment. At the time of his arrest, Reeder was serving deferred-adjudication community supervision for a felony offense of distributing a controlled substance. Reeder, representing himself, argued that his conviction was improper as he had not been convicted of a felony at the time of his arrest.Prior to the current review, two hearings were held on the same day. In the first, Reeder pled guilty to Unlawful Possession of Firearm and was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment. In the second, the State alleged Reeder violated conditions of his deferred-adjudication community supervision for the controlled-substance offense. Reeder pled true to the violations, and the court found him guilty, sentencing him to a concurrent term of 5 years' imprisonment. Later, Reeder filed a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his conviction was improper because he was not a convicted felon at the time he was arrested for Unlawful Possession of Firearm.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and had to decide whether serving deferred-adjudication community supervision constitutes being convicted of a felony for the purpose of Unlawful Possession of Firearm. The court concluded that it does not. Therefore, the court agreed that Reeder was not convicted of a felony at the time of his arrest for Unlawful Possession of Firearm. The court also held that Reeder's plea was involuntary due to a fundamental misunderstanding by all parties of the law in relation to the facts at the time the plea was made. As a result, the court set aside the judgment of conviction for Unlawful Possession of Firearm, and Reeder was allowed to withdraw his plea. The judgment on the motion to adjudicate the underlying offense of distributing a controlled substance remained undisturbed, with Reeder serving 5 years' imprisonment for that violation. View "EX PARTE SHANEA LYNN REEDER" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an applicant who pleaded guilty to causing serious bodily injury to a child. The trial court deferred finding her guilty and placed her on community supervision. However, two months later, she was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The applicant raised two claims in her habeas application. First, she argued that her guilty plea was involuntary because her attorney did not inform her that the victim had not suffered serious bodily injury. Second, she claimed that her attorney was ineffective at the adjudication stage for not offering evidence in support of a conviction for the lesser-included offense of causing bodily injury to a child.The trial court had recommended denying relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas found the trial court's findings to be faulty. The primary issue was whether the applicant pleaded guilty without knowing that the medical expert believed there was no serious bodily injury. The trial court found otherwise, but the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, finding that the defense attorney did not inform the applicant about the medical expert's opinion.The secondary issue was whether the applicant would have insisted on trial if she had known about the true state of the evidence of serious bodily injury. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the record supported the applicant's claim that she would have insisted on trial, as she had a good chance of an acquittal of the serious bodily injury element and would have faced much less punishment without it.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted relief, setting aside the judgment in the case and remanding the applicant to the custody of the Sheriff of Harrison County to face the charges against her. View "EX PARTE MICHELLE LEE HAYES" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant who was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child and sentenced to sixty years in prison. The defendant was the victim's mother's boyfriend, and they lived together for about five years. The victim testified that the defendant sexually abused her when she was six or seven years old. The abuse was reported to the Polk County Sheriff’s Department by Alyssa Crawford, who learned about it from the victim. Two years later, during the trial, the State moved to present Crawford’s testimony via Zoom due to her fear of retaliation, her responsibility of caring for her husband with a broken back, and a conflicting court appearance in Colorado. The defendant objected, arguing that allowing Crawford to testify remotely would violate his right to confront her face to face.The trial court overruled the defendant's objection and allowed Crawford to testify via Zoom. The court of appeals, however, reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court’s necessity finding in support of its ruling was too general and unjustified by any public-policy interest.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals. It held that the trial court’s necessity finding was sufficient and justified by the witness’s fear of retaliation. The court noted that retaliation is a crime and protecting witnesses from retaliation is an important public-policy interest. The court also pointed out that Crawford had provided a basis for her fear—death threats and break-ins at her home soon after her report to the sheriff. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MCCUMBER v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Texas and Dwayne Robert Heath, who was indicted for injury to a child in 2016. Heath's counsel requested discovery from the District Attorney's Office, which provided law enforcement records, child protective services records, and photographs. However, a 911 call made by the complainant's mother on the date of the alleged offense was not disclosed until six days before the fourth trial setting, despite being in the possession of law enforcement since 2016. Heath's counsel filed a motion to suppress the 911 call, alleging that the evidence was improperly withheld in violation of Article 39.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and various constitutional provisions.The trial court granted Heath's motion to suppress the 911 call, concluding that the State violated Article 39.14(a) by failing to disclose the 911 call "as soon as practicable" after Heath's timely request for discovery. The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The State then sought discretionary review from the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that under Article 39.14, "the state" means the State of Texas, which includes law enforcement agencies. The court also held that "as soon as practicable" means as soon as the State is reasonably capable of doing so. Therefore, the State violated its duty under Article 39.14 by failing to timely disclose the 911 call. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 911 call due to the State's untimely disclosure. View "Texas v. Heath" on Justia Law

The case involves William Alan Null, who was convicted of second-degree felony sexual assault. A DNA analyst testified that Null was linked to a previous sexual assault by comparing his DNA profile to profiles developed by a third-party laboratory. Null objected, arguing that the analyst's testimony was unreliable as she had no personal knowledge about the third-party laboratory or its data. The trial court overruled Null's objection, and he was sentenced to 60 years' confinement. Null appealed, and the court of appeals ordered a new punishment trial.The court of appeals had previously affirmed the trial court's decision, but later overturned part of its decision, granting a new punishment trial. The State petitioned for discretionary review, arguing that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court held that the DNA analyst's testimony was reliable under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, as she had relied on data produced by technicians and a forensic analyst employed by a well-known and accredited third-party forensic laboratory. The court also held that the court of appeals should not have decided the judicial notice issue, as it was moot given that Null had forfeited the arguments the issue was based on. View "Null v. Texas" on Justia Law