Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tony Egbuna Ford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The trial court ordered El Paso County to pay for the collection and testing of a blood sample from Ford and directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to provide access to Ford for this purpose. TDCJ sought mandamus relief from both orders.Ford's conviction was affirmed on appeal, and his first habeas application was denied. Two subsequent habeas applications were dismissed. With no habeas proceeding pending, Ford filed a motion for funding for genetic testing, claiming it could prove he did not personally shoot the victim. The trial court granted the motion, ordering El Paso County to pay for the testing and TDCJ to provide access to Ford for the blood sample.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The court concluded that TDCJ did not have standing to challenge the Funding Order, as it did not demonstrate a justiciable interest in El Paso County's finances. However, the court found that TDCJ was entitled to mandamus relief on the Access Order. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the Access Order because Ford's conviction was final, and no pending proceeding or statute conferred authority on the trial court to issue such an order.The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to rescind the Access Order. The writ of mandamus would issue only if the trial court failed to comply with the opinion. View "IN RE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted for assault, with the indictment specifying that the victim was a Menard County Deputy Sheriff. The key issue was whether this indictment allowed for a conviction of assault on a peace officer. The trial court's voir dire and jury instructions referred to the offense as assault on a peace officer, and the appellant did not object until after the trial began. The jury found the appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to twelve years in prison, which is within the range for assault on a peace officer, a second-degree felony.The Fourth Court of Appeals found that the indictment only supported a conviction for assault on a public servant, a third-degree felony, and not assault on a peace officer. They concluded that the indictment did not explicitly state the victim was a peace officer and thus could not support the higher charge. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial on punishment, as the sentence exceeded the range for a third-degree felony.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals. They held that the indictment, which described the victim as a deputy sheriff, did indeed support a conviction for assault on a peace officer. The court reasoned that a deputy sheriff is defined as a peace officer under Texas law, and thus the indictment contained all necessary elements for the higher charge. The court also noted that the appellant's objections were untimely and that the jury charge and verdict form, which included the deputy sheriff designation, sufficiently supported the conviction for assault on a peace officer. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "CRAWFORD v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The applicant pled guilty to robbery and received a ten-year confinement sentence. He later filed for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his plea was involuntary because he believed he would receive shock probation after an initial period of incarceration. He also argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for shock probation, which was necessary for him to be considered for it.The 453rd District Court of Hays County reviewed the application and forwarded it to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The habeas court concluded that the applicant's plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, citing Ex parte Bittikoffer. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals found this reliance misplaced, as Bittikoffer did not address involuntary plea claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the applicant's plea was not involuntary because the counsel's advice and representation before the plea were competent. The court explained that a plea is not rendered involuntary due to counsel's post-plea actions. However, the court found that the applicant's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file the motion for shock probation, which the applicant was entitled to under his plea agreement. This failure deprived the applicant of a hearing on shock probation.As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted habeas corpus relief, vacated the applicant's sentence, and remanded him to the custody of the Sheriff of Hays County for a new punishment hearing. The court ordered that copies of the opinion be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division and Board of Pardons and Paroles. View "EX PARTE MOSQUERA" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder in July 2018 by a Harris County jury for killing Gelareh Bagherzadeh and Coty Beavers in different criminal transactions but as part of the same scheme or course of conduct. The trial court sentenced him to death based on the jury's answers to special issues. The appellant raised thirty points of error on direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.In the lower court, the appellant was tried and convicted in the 184th Judicial District Court of Harris County. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. The appellant's conviction and sentence were automatically appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the appellant's thirty points of error and found no reversible error. The court addressed various issues, including the admissibility of evidence, the conduct of the trial, and the constitutionality of the capital murder statute as applied. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior bad acts, including his attempts to kill his daughter and his involvement in drug smuggling. The court also found that the trial court properly handled the appellant's objections to the prosecution's questions and the conduct of the jurors. Additionally, the court rejected the appellant's claim that the capital murder statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "MAHMOUD v. STATE" on Justia Law

The State of Texas charged the appellee with felony assault of a peace officer. During plea negotiations, the State offered to dismiss the felony charge if the appellee agreed to plead guilty to two DWI charges. However, the appellee never agreed to this plea deal. Despite this, the State dismissed the felony and DWI charges but later refiled the felony under a new cause number. The appellee filed a motion for specific performance, seeking to enforce the dismissal of the refiled felony, alleging that the prosecutor had promised not to refile the charge.The trial court granted the appellee’s motion for specific performance, directing the State to dismiss the refiled felony assault charge. The State appealed, arguing that no enforceable plea agreement existed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that there was an immunity from prosecution agreement between the State and the appellee, which the trial court approved. Justice Jewell dissented, arguing that no such agreement existed and that there was no consideration for the prosecutor’s promise.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that there was no enforceable plea agreement. The court held that the prosecutor’s promise to dismiss the felony assault case and not refile it did not constitute an immunity agreement or a binding plea bargain agreement. The court noted that the appellee never agreed to the terms of the plea offer, and the trial court never approved any such agreement. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and entered a judgment reversing the trial court’s order granting the appellee’s motion for specific performance. View "STATE v. HATTER" on Justia Law

The appellee was stopped and ticketed for driving 82 mph in a 60-mph zone, a Class C misdemeanor. In the Justice Court for Precinct 1 of Brazos County, he pleaded no contest and was found guilty, with the court assessing his fine and fees. He then filed a de novo appeal in the County Court at Law Number 2, pleaded not guilty, and was found guilty again. The county court suspended his sentence, deferred the disposition, and placed him on probation for 180 days.The State appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, arguing that the deferred disposition was illegal because the appellee held a commercial driver’s license, disqualifying him from community supervision. The Texas Supreme Court transferred the case to the Seventh Court of Appeals. The Seventh Court questioned its jurisdiction but followed the Tenth Court's precedent, exercised jurisdiction, and reversed the trial court’s decision, remanding for proper sentencing. The appellee then filed a petition for discretionary review.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that an order of deferred disposition is not a "sentence" under Article 44.01(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because a deferred disposition does not meet the statutory definition of a sentence, which requires an order that the punishment be carried into execution. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "STATE v. CUARENTA" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child on July 8, 2019, and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The judgment was entered on October 20, 2022, and a $185 consolidated court cost was assessed the following day. The appellant argued that the court cost should be reduced from $185 to $133 due to changes in the Cost Act statute.The Tenth Court of Appeals reviewed the case and agreed that the offense was committed before January 1, 2020, which would typically mean the lower court cost of $133 should apply. However, the court also considered Section 51.608 of the Texas Government Code, which states that the amount of court costs must be based on the law in effect on the date of conviction. Since the appellant was convicted on October 20, 2022, the court determined that the higher cost of $185 applied.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that Section 51.608 of the Texas Government Code, which bases court costs on the date of conviction, takes precedence over the "Transition and Effective Date" clause in the Cost Act. Therefore, the appellant's court costs were correctly assessed at $185, as the conviction date controls the assessment of court costs. View "BRADSHAW v. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated and was placed on probation by the trial court. As a condition of his probation, he was ordered to pay $100 to the Houston Area Women’s Shelter. The appellant did not object to this condition at the time it was imposed.The First Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the appellant was not required to object to the condition at the time it was imposed in order to raise the complaint on appeal. The appellate court relied on a statute that generally prohibits the payment of money as a condition of probation except in certain circumstances. The court concluded that the payment to the women’s shelter did not qualify under the exceptions and ordered the condition to be deleted.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the court of appeals erred in holding that the appellant did not have to object to the condition at the time it was imposed. The court held that, under the precedent set by Speth v. State, a defendant waives any complaint about a condition of probation if he fails to object at the time it is imposed, provided he was made aware of the condition in time to object. The court found that the condition of paying $100 to a women’s shelter did not constitute an “intolerable” condition that would be immune from waiver. Consequently, the appellant’s failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of his complaint.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "STEELE v. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2014, Derek Andrew Bodden pleaded guilty to first-degree felony fraudulent use or possession of 50 or more items of identifying information. In 2022, he filed for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he possessed fewer than 50 items and should be guilty of a lesser second-degree felony. He also claimed his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to a misunderstanding of the law.The 283rd District Court of Dallas County initially accepted Bodden's guilty plea and placed him on community supervision with deferred adjudication. However, less than a year later, his community supervision was revoked, and he was sentenced to 18 years in prison. In 2019, an internal audit by the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office revealed errors in the charging and prosecution of Bodden’s case, leading to the conclusion that he possessed fewer than 50 items of identifying information.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case to determine the correct method for counting items of identifying information under Penal Code Section 32.51. The court concluded that the fraudulently possessed items listed in the indictment amounted to more than 10 but fewer than 50, making the offense a second-degree felony. The court reformed the judgment to reflect a conviction for second-degree fraudulent use or possession of identifying information and remanded the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. The court did not address whether Bodden’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, as he was granted relief on due process grounds. View "Ex parte Bodden" on Justia Law

The appellee was convicted of recklessly causing serious bodily injury to her infant son, resulting in a thirteen-year prison sentence. The trial court granted her motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The court of appeals reversed this decision and reinstated the conviction, prompting the current review.The trial court found that the defense counsel's decision to admit a highly prejudicial 43-minute jail phone call recording, which included damaging statements by the appellee, constituted ineffective assistance. The recording portrayed the appellee negatively, showing her as self-centered, regretful of her son's birth, and not taking the situation seriously. The trial court concluded that without this evidence, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review. The court of appeals had acknowledged the deferential standard for new-trial rulings but applied a de novo standard for IAC prejudice claims. The higher court found that the court of appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial court's findings, which were based on credibility and demeanor assessments.The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court's ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. The trial court was in a better position to assess the impact of the prejudicial evidence on the jury. The higher court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State v. Hradek" on Justia Law