Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellee Victoria Velasquez was charged with possessing a usable quantity of marijuana. She moved to suppress evidence, and the trial court decided to hear the motion on the day of trial, right before jury selection. The State objected under Article 28.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, claiming it had received insufficient notice of a pre-trial hearing. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Article 28.01 did not entitle the State to any additional notice beyond what it received in this case. View "Texas v. Velasquez" on Justia Law

In October 2014, a jury convicted appellant Steven Thomas of capital murder for the November 1980 murder by strangulation of seventy-three-year-old Mildred McKinney in the course of committing or attempting to commit the burglary, robbery, or aggravated rape of McKinney. Appellant was sentenced to death for his crimes. Appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was automatic; the Court conducted its review of this case and appellant’s arguments on appeal. Finding no merit to these contentions, the Court affirmed appellant’s sentence of death. View "Thomas v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Jose Cortez was stopped by a State Trooper for unlawfully driving on the improved shoulder of the highway because the tires on Cortez’s minivan purportedly touched the white painted “fog line” separating the roadway from the shoulder. Upon searching Cortez’s vehicle, the Trooper found drugs and arrested Cortez. Finding that the Trooper did not have a lawful basis for the traffic stop, the trial court granted Cortez’s motion to suppress. The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s suppression order. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed the Trooper did not have a reasonable basis to stop Cortez’s vehicle, and affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Texas v. Cortez" on Justia Law

Appellant Ernesto Lerma was charged with possession of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams, of cocaine. After the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the cocaine, he pled guilty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officer’s frisk of Appellant, made during an unjustifiably prolonged traffic stop, was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, holding that the initial frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion and the original stop was not unduly prolonged. View "Lerma v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Luis Hernandez was convicted of murder and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The victim, Devin Toler, was sleeping with Quionecia Barber, the wife of his neighbor, Appellant. After Appellant learned of the affair, he and Toler had several verbal confrontations. Barber turned her back to chase after her toddler, and by the time she returned, the fist-fight had ended, and Appellant had gone back to his apartment. Toler then collapsed to the ground. Barber saw blood coming from a wound on Toler’s chest and called 911. Paramedics administered first aid and transported Toler to the hospital, but he died. The issue before the Court of Criminal Appeal in this matter was whether he preserved his complaint about the State’s jury argument even though he did not pursue his objection to an adverse ruling. The Court granted the State Prosecuting Attorney’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the right not to be subjected to improper jury argument is forfeitable and whether there was a word so inflammatory that its mention in closing argument when unsupported by the evidence incurably tainted the entire trial. The Court held that the right is forfeitable and that the mention of even a very inflammatory word that is outside the record does not dispense with error preservation requirements. Consequently, the Court reversed the court of appeals. View "Hernandez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant James Jones pled guilty to and was convicted of aggravated assault of a peace officer with a deadly weapon. In this subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus, Applicant sought relief on the ground that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Because the factual basis for this claim was not available when Applicant filed his previous applications for habeas corpus relief, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not procedurally barred. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court’s findings and conclusions that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, Applicant was granted habeas corpus relief. View "Ex parte James Douglas Jones" on Justia Law

In Moon v. Texas, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the court of appeals that a juvenile court’s transfer order waiving its exclusive jurisdiction is subject to legal and factual-sufficiency appellate review. The issues in this case were whether "Moon" was retroactive, and if so, whether the transfer order in this case was legally and factually insufficient. Applicant Miguel Navarro was fifteen years old when he was charged with murder and two counts of aggravated assault. When the party got too large, the host told a group of people, including Navarro, to leave because he did not know them. An altercation ensued during which three people were stabbed, including the host, who died at the scene. Navarro fled in a car with his friends and returned to his home later that night. The next morning, detectives showed up at Navarro’s home after they were told that he may have stabbed the people at the party. Navarro was eventually taken into custody. The Court did not reach the question of "Moon" because Navarro failed to show that his subsequent writ applications satisfy the Article 11.07 Section 4 subsequent-writ bar of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result, the Court dismissed his writ applications. View "Ex parte Miguel Angel Navarro" on Justia Law

Robert Rodriguez assaulted a man, shattering the victim’s knee and causing him serious bodily injury. Rodriguez contended on appeal that, while he intended to cause some bodily injury to the victim, he did not honestly believe that his actions would result in serious bodily injury. Rodriguez claimed he should have received a jury instruction that, if his belief was reasonable under the circumstances, he should be convicted only of misdemeanor assault. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and affirmed Rodriguez's conviction. View "Rodriguez v. Texas" on Justia Law

A Houston police officer witnessed defendant Andreas Marcopoulos walk into a bar known for narcotics activity, stay for three to five minutes, and then leave. When Marcopoulos committed a traffic violation, the officer stopped him, searched his vehicle, and found cocaine. The court of appeals concluded that this search was justified under the automobile exception. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly held that furtive gestures alone are not a sufficient basis for probable cause. Consequently, the focus of the Court's analysis in this appeal was whether Marcopoulos’s furtive gestures, when considered alongside his brief appearance at a known narcotics establishment, gave rise to probable cause. After review of the facts entered into evidence, the Court concluded they did not. View "Marcopoulos v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 746, a bill that amended several provisions within the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act contained within the Health and Safety Code. The amendments removed a provision that had made it a criminal offense for a sexually violent predator who had been civilly committed to fail to comply with the terms of his sex offender treatment. Furthermore, the Legislature included a savings clause in S.B. 746 that made the legislation apply to anyone who had been convicted of the offense of violating the terms of his civil commitment and whose direct appeal of that criminal conviction was pending at the time the legislation became effective. When Governor Abbott signed S.B. 746 into law, it became effective immediately. Appellant Roger VanDyke's direct appeal of his criminal conviction for violating the terms of his civil commitment was pending at that time. After S.B. 746 became effective, Appellant filed a supplemental brief with the court of appeals arguing that his conviction was not a final conviction and it should, therefore, be reversed because the amendment to Section 841.085 decriminalized his conduct. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the savings clause in S.B. 746 violated the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellant’s petition for discretionary review on the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the savings clause in S.B. 746 usurped the governor’s clemency power. The Court reversed and vacated the judgment: "Both our Legislature and our governor have decided that a sexually violent predator’s failure to comply with his sex offender treatment program as part of his civil commitment should be resolved through the civil commitment program rather than give rise to a new criminal conviction. The Legislature was within its power to make this difficult legislative change and apply that change to defendants whose criminal cases were pending on appeal at the time the amendment became effective. We defer to the statute crafted by our Legislature and signed by our governor because this legislative act did not violate the Separation of Powers Clause in the Texas Constitution. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of conviction." View "VanDyke v. Texas" on Justia Law