Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Darren Tramell Hughes, who was on deferred adjudication community supervision. The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, alleging that Hughes had violated the terms of his supervision by committing two forgery offenses and failing to pay required fees. The hearing on the motion was conducted via Zoom due to COVID-19 restrictions. During the hearing, Hughes was muted several times when he attempted to speak. Hughes was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.On appeal, Hughes argued that his right to be present under the Due Process Clause was violated due to his muting during the hearing. The court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that his right to be present under the Confrontation Clause was violated, even though Hughes did not raise this issue in his brief. The court of appeals found that Hughes was turned into a passive observer, unable to communicate with his counsel and participate in his own defense.The case was then brought before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The court agreed with the lower court's decision that Hughes's right to be present was violated. However, it clarified that the right to be present under the Due Process Clause, not the Confrontation Clause, applies in hearings on motions to adjudicate guilt. The court further explained that this right is waivable, not forfeitable, and that Hughes did not waive this right. The court concluded that the trial court's action of muting Hughes was not harmless and affected his ability to defend himself. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "HUGHES V. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

In 1987, six young women and girls disappeared in El Paso, Texas, and were later found buried in shallow graves. In 1992, David Leonard Wood was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for these crimes. Since then, Wood has filed multiple motions for DNA testing, the first of which was granted in 2010. However, subsequent motions resulted in proceedings that stretched over a decade, with the trial court ultimately denying DNA testing in 2022.In the lower courts, Wood's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 1995. He filed a state habeas application in 1997, which was denied in 2001. Over the years, Wood filed multiple motions for DNA testing, the first of which was granted in 2010. However, the remaining DNA motions resulted in proceedings that stretched over a decade, with the trial court ultimately denying DNA testing in 2022.In the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Wood appealed the 2022 denial of testing. He raised six issues, only two of which directly addressed the question of whether he should have been granted DNA testing of biological evidence. The court concluded that none of Wood’s issues had merit and affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Wood failed to meet the second prong of Article 64.03(a)(2): he failed to show that his subsequent DNA testing requests were not made to unreasonably delay the execution of his sentence. View "WOOD V. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Larry Jean Hart, who was charged with capital murder while committing or attempting to commit the felony offense of burglary. Hart drove an acquaintance and three other individuals to an apartment complex where they robbed and shot the complainant, Michael Gardner. Hart claimed he remained in the car during the incident and was unaware of the group's intentions. The State argued that Hart knew about the planned crime and should have anticipated the outcome.The trial court admitted rap videos during the guilt phase of the trial to demonstrate Hart's character and sophistication. Hart objected, arguing that the videos' prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. The trial court overruled Hart's objections, stating that Hart's testimony opened the door to character witness evidence. The jury found Hart guilty and sentenced him to life without parole.On appeal, Hart argued that the trial court erred in admitting the rap videos, among other things. The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling, stating that the rap videos were relevant to Hart's ability to comprehend and form intent regarding the planned crime. The court also conducted a balancing test under Rule 403 and concluded that the trial court's ruling did not constitute a clear abuse of discretion.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagreed with the lower courts. It found that the rap videos' probative value was outweighed by their potential for prejudice and confusion. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Hart v. State of Texas" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a woman who was convicted of theft in 2015. The prosecution used her 2001 federal felony conviction from Alaska to enhance the theft offense to a first-degree felony, resulting in a forty-year sentence and a $10,000 fine. The woman argued that her 2001 federal conviction was not final when the theft occurred, and thus, the offense was unlawfully enhanced, leading to an illegal sentence.Prior to reaching the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the case had been reviewed by lower courts. The main issue was whether Texas law or the law of another jurisdiction should be used to determine if a prior conviction is final for the purpose of enhancing the punishment of an offense under Section 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas was asked to determine whether there was ever a time prior to a previous case, Ex parte Pue, when other states were allowed to unilaterally dictate the laws and public policy of Texas. The court held that the rule in Pue, which stated that Texas law should define whether a prior conviction is final for the purposes of enhancing the punishment of an offense, applies retroactively. Furthermore, the court held that the woman's federal felony conviction was final under the rule in Pue. The court concluded that the woman's federal conviction was final under Texas law and denied her relief. View "EX PARTE MCMILLAN" on Justia Law

The appellant, sentenced to death for capital murder, had his conviction and sentence affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. He submitted multiple motions and applications challenging his competence to be executed, all of which were denied by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court.In 2015, the appellant made a motion challenging his competence to be executed. The trial court denied the motion, but on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ruled that the appellant made a substantial showing of incompetence and stayed his execution. The case was remanded for further competency proceedings, including a mental health evaluation. After a hearing in 2017, the trial court again ruled that the appellant was competent for execution, a decision affirmed by the appellate court.In September 2019, the appellant filed another motion challenging his competency. The trial court denied the motion and the appellant appealed. In April 2020, he filed a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging intellectual disability and ineligibility for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas stayed the execution and remanded the application to the trial court for review. In February 2023, the trial court recommended relief on the intellectual disability claim. Based on the agreed findings and conclusions, the appellate court granted habeas relief by reforming the appellant's sentence from death to life imprisonment without parole.Therefore, the appellant's appeal of the trial court's determination of his competency to be executed was rendered moot, and the appeal was dismissed. The holding of the case is that the appellant's sentence was reformed from death to life imprisonment without parole due to his intellectual disability claim. View "Mays v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ruled that a peace officer can legally arrest a suspect, without a warrant, for killing another person while driving intoxicated, even if the accident did not occur in the officer's presence. This interpretation is based on the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 14.03(a)(1), which allows any peace officer to arrest a person found in a “suspicious place” and the circumstances reasonably show that the person is guilty of a felony or breach of peace.The case involved Sean Michael McGuire, who was arrested on suspicion of causing another person's death by driving while intoxicated and failing to stop and render aid. Prior to his arrest, McGuire hit a motorcycle, causing the death of its driver, then drove to a nearby gas station where he was later found by the police. The police officer noted that McGuire exhibited signs of intoxication and had "red glassy eyes" and "an odor of alcohol coming from his person." As a result, the officer formed probable cause to believe that both a felony and breach of the peace had occurred.The court found that McGuire's arrest met the requirements of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 14.03(a)(1) and thus reversed the court of appeals and the trial court’s suppression of McGuire’s arrest and all evidence arising from it. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State v. McGuire" on Justia Law

In Texas, the appellant was stopped by an officer for failing to remain in a single lane of traffic. After the officer smelled alcohol on the appellant's breath and observed signs of intoxication, he obtained a warrant for a blood sample, which showed a blood alcohol content of .174. The appellant was subsequently indicted for felony driving while intoxicated. The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellant was convicted. The appellant appealed, and the Third Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was unlawful because the appellant's failure to maintain a single lane was not unsafe.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered whether a mistake of law should apply when an officer conducts a search or seizure under an ambiguous law. The court held that the officer's reasonable misinterpretation of the law did not undermine the reasonable suspicion required to conduct the traffic stop. The court noted that at the time of the stop, there was no controlling interpretation of the relevant section of the Texas transportation code from the Court of Criminal Appeals and the intermediate courts were split in their interpretations. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Daniel v. State" on Justia Law

In a case reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the trial court mistakenly permitted an alternate juror to participate in the jury's deliberations and vote on the defendant's guilt. The defendant, charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, argued that this violated constitutional and statutory provisions requiring a jury to consist of twelve people and prohibiting any person from being with the jury while it was deliberating. On review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the presence and participation of an alternate juror during jury deliberations did not violate the constitutional or statutory requirements regarding the size of a jury. However, the Court held that the alternate juror’s presence and participation during deliberations did violate the statutory prohibitions against a “person” being with the jury while it is deliberating and conversing with the jury about the case. As such, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to conduct a harm analysis, i.e., to determine whether the alternate juror's presence and participation during deliberations had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict. View "BECERRA v. STATE" on Justia Law

In this consolidated case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the 2017 amendments to Texas Penal Code Section 32.21, the forgery statute. The statute provides that a basic forgery offense is a Class A misdemeanor but includes provisions that can raise the offense to a state-jail felony or a third-degree felony based on the type of writing forged. The 2017 amendments added a new subsection (e-1) or the "value ladder" provision, which sets forth offense classifications based on the value of property or services the defendant sought to obtain through the forgery, ranging from a Class C misdemeanor to a first-degree felony. The court held that the value ladder provision is not discretionary but mandatory whenever a defendant forges a writing with the intent to obtain property or services. The court further held that the value ladder constitutes an element of the offense rather than a punishment-phase issue. However, the court disagreed with the court of appeals' application of Apprendi principles and rejected its conclusion that the State must plead and prove a non-statutory "purpose" element in a forgery prosecution under subsections (d) or (e). The court of appeals' judgments were vacated and the cases were remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

Harry Donald Nicholson Jr. was sitting in his parked truck at a gas station when he began throwing tissues out of his window. An officer noticed the litter, approached Nicholson, and asked him to pick up the tissues. After Nicholson provided his driver's license number and began picking up the litter, the officer was informed by dispatch that Nicholson had active felony warrants. It was disputed whether Nicholson heard this over the officer's radio. When the officer attempted to handcuff and arrest Nicholson, he managed to get back into his truck and drive away, crashing into another officer's vehicle in the process.Nicholson was charged with aggravated assault of a public servant and evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. He was convicted on both charges and sentenced to 60 years in prison. On appeal, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the aggravated assault charge but found that the jury instructions on the evading arrest or detention charge were improper and egregiously harmed Nicholson. The court reversed the evading arrest conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted Nicholson's petition for discretionary review on the conviction for evading arrest to clarify the elements of the evasion statute. The court reviewed the statute, which provides that a person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from someone he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator trying lawfully to arrest or detain him. The court had to determine whether the defendant must know that the attempted arrest or detention is lawful. The court concluded that the defendant does not need to have such knowledge.The court found that the statute is ambiguous because it is susceptible to multiple interpretations. Considering the legislative history and purpose of the statute, the court interpreted the statute to not require the mental state of knowledge to be applied to the lawfulness of the detention or arrest. The court determined the elements of the evasion statute are: (1) a person (2) intentionally flees (3) from a peace officer or federal special investigator (4) with knowledge he is a peace officer or federal special investigator (5) with knowledge the peace officer or special investigator is attempting to arrest or detain the defendant, and (6) the attempted arrest or detention is lawful. The court affirmed the lower appellate court's decision to reverse Nicholson's evasion of arrest conviction and remand the case for a new trial. View "NICHOLSON v. STATE" on Justia Law