Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The State appealed for discretionary review, arguing that the court of appeals erred in reversing appellant Juan Blea's conviction for first-degree aggravated assault of a family member against his then-girlfriend, Justina Fassett. The appellate court determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the element of "serious bodily injury." The State maintained that the court of appeals should have examined the injuries as they were inflicted by appellant, rather than assessing the injuries in their improved or ameliorated condition after medical treatment. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State: the evidence showed that appellant’s actions lacerated Fassett’s liver and collapsed her lung; that Fassett was taken to the hospital due to her trouble breathing; that she was hospitalized for four days; that her lung injury required a tube to permit breathing; and in light of the testimony describing her risk of death from the type of injuries that she sustained, the jury could have rationally inferred that Fassett’s injuries caused her a substantial risk of death. Concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient, the Court reversed the court of appeals, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment against appellant. View "Blea v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Ricky Molina applied for habeas relief, asserting eight claims as basis for such relief, including one claim alleging that the judgment in his case did not adequately reflect credit for the time he served in county jail before his sentence was pronounced. Applicant, however, did not claim to have exhausted all his administrative remedies to this alleged error. Under Section 501.0081 of the Texas Government Code, an applicant must exhaust all administrative remedies before he may bring a claim in an 11.07 writ application that he was not being properly credited with time served on his sentence. This writ application centered on the issue of whether applicants must exhaust their administrative remedies under Section 501.0081 of the Texas Government Code before they may bring a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the judgment is incorrect for failing to credit them for time that they served in jail before their sentence was imposed. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that such claims were not subject to the Section 501.0081 exhaustion requirement. View "Ex parte Ricky Molina" on Justia Law

In an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to adequately advise appellant Manuel Torres regarding the presumptively mandatory deportation consequences of his guilty plea. Appellant was a Mexican national whose parents brought him to the United States as a young two- or three-year-old child. In 2006, appellant obtained lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, which gave him legal permission to reside and work in this country. In February 2011, appellant, on two occasions, went to Whataburger restaurants and stole money from the cash registers. At the time of his arrest for those offenses, appellant was found to be in possession of cocaine and marijuana. He was subsequently charged with the felony offenses of robbery and possession of cocaine. Appellant entered into a plea bargain with the State. In exchange for appellant’s plea of guilty to both offenses, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of ten years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision on the robbery charge and five years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision on the possession charge. In addition, the State agreed to forgo prosecution of a related burglary-of-a-building charge and to decline prosecution on a misdemeanor possession-of-marijuana charge. The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea, and it sentenced him in accordance with the State’s recommendations. Several days after the plea hearing, appellant was re-arrested on separate charges. At that point, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) became aware of appellant’s plea to the robbery and possession offenses, and it placed a detainer on him that would prevent him from being released from law-enforcement custody. ICE subsequently transferred appellant to a federal immigration detention facility, and it initiated removal proceedings against him. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that appellant was not prejudiced as a result of counsel’s error because appellant failed to show that he would have pursued a trial had he been correctly advised about the immigration consequences of his plea. Accordingly, the Court overruled the State’s third ground in its petition for discretionary review that contended that trial counsel did not render deficient performance, and the Court sustained the first two grounds that asserted that the court of appeals erred by determining that appellant was prejudiced. The trial court's judgment was reinstated, denying relief. View "Ex parte Manuel Torres" on Justia Law

In February 2014, a jury convicted appellant Brandon Daniel of the capital murder of peace officer Jaime Padron, for which he was sentenced to death. Appeal to the court of Criminal Appeals was automatic; appellant raised three alleged errors to challenge his sentence. Finding no merit to any of the challenges, the Court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Daniel v. Texas" on Justia Law

In January 1991, a jury convicted appellant Carl Buntion of capital murder for an offense committed in June 1990. He was given the death sentence. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal; appellant's initial request for habeas relief was denied. A subsequent application was granted, and the case remanded for a new punishment hearing. The new hearing was held in February 2012, the conclusion of which was again the death sentence. Appellant raised twenty-seven alleged errors in appeal of the second punishment hearing. Finding no merit to any, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the death sentence. View "Buntion v. Texas" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain, applicant Gilmore Cox plead guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance (Count I) and no contest to one count of possession of certain chemicals with intent to manufacture a controlled substance (Count II). The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment on Count I and thirty-five years’ imprisonment on Count II, with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, applicant challenged his conviction on Count II, alleging that it failed to sufficiently allege an offense. The state argued that the court of appeals should have dismissed this appeal because he had entered his pleas and waived appeal as part of a plea bargain. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that, because the plea bargain was a package deal and part of this plea bargain could not be fulfilled, the entire plea bargain was unenforceable, thus the parties must be returned to their original positions. This case was remanded back to the trial court for re-sentencing. View "Ex parte Gilmore Cox" on Justia Law

In June 2012, a jury convicted appellant Stanley Griffin of the 2010 capital murder of Jennifer Hailey. Based on the jury’s answers to special issues (set forth in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e)), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. After reviewing appellant’s arguments on appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the record did not support the offense of capital murder. Consequently, the Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and sentence and remanded this case back to the trial court for reformation of the judgment and a new punishment hearing. View "Griffin v. Texas" on Justia Law

In January 1991, a jury convicted appellant Carl Buntion of capital murder for an offense committed in June 1990. Based upon the jury’s answers to special issues (set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e)), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant’s initial state application for habeas corpus relief was denied. Appellant’s subsequent application was granted, and the case was remanded for a new punishment hearing. The trial court held a new punishment hearing in February 2012. Based on the jury’s answers to the special issues, the trial judge again sentenced appellant to death. Appellant raised twenty-seven points of error in this automatic appeal. After reviewing appellant’s points of error, the Court of Criminal Appeals found no merit to any, and affirmed appellant's death sentence. View "Buntion v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Patrick Marshall of felony assault against a family member. On appeal, the court of appeals held the evidence legally sufficient but the omission of the words “bodily injury” from the jury charge’s application paragraph egregiously harmed Marshall. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the evidence was sufficient, but disagreed that the jury charge egregiously harmed Marshall because the jury charge sufficiently required the jury to find bodily injury by impeding normal breathing (a bodily injury per se). The Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Marshall v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant James Fernandez was a Justice of the Peace in Val Verde County in 2012. In February 2012, appellant directed his chief deputy clerk, Veronica Mojica, to make travel arrangements for him to attend a conference in Orlando in June 2012. Mojica booked a nonrefundable plane ticket for appellant on a Southwest Airlines. The ticket was paid for with a county-owned credit card, issued in appellant’s name. After falling ill, appellant instructed Mojica to cancel all his travel arrangements associated with the June conference, including the Southwest Airlines flight. When Mojica cancelled the Orlando ticket, its $381.60 purchase price was converted into a ticket voucher for the same amount. This voucher was in appellant’s name and was set to expire on February 5, 2013. Later that year, the county auditor contacted Southwest Airlines and attempted to get a refund for the plane ticket Mojica had purchased, and then cancelled, for appellant. The auditor learned that the voucher had been used for a flight to Phoenix on August 8, 2012. Believing the Southwest Airlines voucher had been used for non-county-related travel, the auditor reached out to the Val Verde County Attorney, who in turn reached out to the Attorney General’s office. Appellant was ultimately convicted of theft by a public servant by way of deception. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether a public servant commits theft by deception when he purchases an airline ticket for county-approved travel with a county credit card but later uses the voucher resulting from the cancellation of the ticket for personal travel, without correcting the impression that the ticket would be used for county-approved business. The Court answered that question in the affirmative, and, consequently, affirmed the court of appeals. View "Fernandez v. Texas" on Justia Law