Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the defendant, Jemadari Chinua Williams, was charged with aggravated promotion of prostitution. The indictment against him followed the language of the relevant statute, which enumerated six potential methods of committing the offense. Williams filed a motion to quash the indictment on the grounds that the State was required to specify which of the six methods it would rely on to establish his guilt. The trial court denied the motion and Williams was convicted.On appeal, Williams argued that the indictment was insufficient as it failed to specify the manner and means of committing the offense. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the State was required to pick one of the methods allowed by statute and alleged in the indictment to satisfy the notice requirement.Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals, holding that the State is not required to elect between alternative statutory methods of committing an offense alleged in an indictment. The Court noted that the maxim requiring the State to specify the manner of commission applies when a statute defines an offense in multiple ways and is an exception to the general rule that statutory definitions do not have to be included in a charging instrument. The Court clarified that this rule can require the State to allege more detail in a charging instrument, but it does not require the State to abandon a manner or means in the charging instrument. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Williams's remaining points of error. View "Williams v. State of Texas" on Justia Law

In Bowie County, Texas, Zimbabwe Raymond Johnson was involved in a car accident where he collided with a utility pole and an antique truck. He continued to drive away from the scene until his vehicle was no longer operational. Upon the arrival of the police, Johnson provided identification information but did not have insurance. Consequently, he was charged with failure to comply with duties to provide information after an accident and was convicted of attempting to commit those offenses. The trial judge imposed a $200 fine for each offense and ordered Johnson to pay restitution of $200 for the utility pole damage and $10,000 for the vehicle damage.On appeal, Johnson contested the restitution order, arguing that the offenses for which he was convicted did not cause the pole and truck damage. The court of appeals agreed and deleted the restitution awards. The State of Texas petitioned for a discretionary review of the decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that, under Article 42.037 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, restitution could be ordered only when the offense for which the defendant was convicted caused the damage. The court stated that there was no evidence to suggest that Johnson's failure to comply with his duties of providing information after the accident caused any of the damage. Although the court acknowledged that in some situations, a failure to provide information could cause damage (such as by delaying necessary medical help), such was not the case here. The court dismissed the State's concern that limiting restitution might motivate overcharging just to obtain restitution, stating that such concern could not dictate the resolution of the issue. View "JOHNSON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A Texas man, Brian Christopher Reed, was charged with sexual assault for allegedly penetrating the victim's sexual organ with his own without her consent. At trial, the jury convicted him of a lesser-included offense of attempted sexual assault. The jury charge for the lesser offense did not limit the means of penetration to his sexual organ, and the charge's definition of sexual assault mentioned that penetration could be committed "by any means." The jury also heard some evidence that Reed may have used his mouth, not his sexual organ. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, stating that the jury charge was erroneous and caused egregious harm to Reed because it expanded the theory of liability beyond the language of the indictment. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' finding of egregious harm. The Court noted that while there was conflicting evidence as to whether Reed used his sexual organ or his mouth, the main issue in the case revolved around consent, not the means of penetration. The Court also emphasized that neither the prosecution nor the defense suggested to the jury that it could convict Reed if it thought he used his mouth. The Court thus concluded that the possibility that the jury charge error led the jury to find the defendant guilty of attempting to sexually assault the victim with his mouth instead of his sexual organ was "hypothetical at best." As such, the Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to consider Reed's remaining issues. View "REED V. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Roberto Medina Flores, was convicted of second-degree felony sexual assault and later filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court had 75 days to rule on the motion, but due to the COVID-19 emergency order, the court extended the deadline. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion for a new trial. Flores appealed, and the court of appeals found the trial court erred in extending the deadline, as this 75-day period is jurisdictional, not procedural, and a trial court cannot create jurisdiction for itself where it would otherwise be absent, even based on an Emergency Order. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas unanimously agreed with the court of appeals, stating that the requirement for a court to have jurisdiction is not procedural and the 75-day jurisdictional deadline cannot be suspended. The trial court did not have the authority to preside over the hearing on the motion for a new trial, and its ruling is void. Therefore, the appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled by operation of law when the 75-day plenary period expired. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "FLORES v. THE STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The Appellants in consolidated cases filed pretrial writs of habeas corpus challenging the facial constitutionality of portions of the statutes they were charged under. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide the cognizability of their pretrial claims and the meaning of “immediate release”—release from what? The Court held the facial challenges were cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if a grant of relief would result in immediate release from prosecution for an alleged offense. Release from prosecution for every alleged offense is not required. In Appellant Tonya Couch's case, the claim was not cognizable: if her indictments alleged one offense committed via four different, alternative, statutory manner and means, she challenged the constitutionality of two of those purported manner and means in her habeas application, leaving two unchallenged. If she were granted relief, her single-count indictment would still stand, and trial on it could still proceed. A grant of relief on her claim would not result in her release from prosecution for the offense alleged in her indictment. In Appellant Glenda Hammons’ case, her claim was cognizable because she challenged the constitutionality of the statute defining two counts of her three-count indictment. If she were granted relief, she would be released from prosecution for two alleged offenses, and trial on those counts could not proceed though trial on the third one could. View "Ex parte Couch, Hammons" on Justia Law

The Office of Capital and Forensic Writs (OCFW) sought and received two sealed ex parte orders from the District Court of Jones County on behalf of Real Party in Interest, Dillion Compton. One order compelled Relator University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston (UTMB) to conduct brain imaging on the Real Party in Interest and directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to arrange transportation for that brain imaging. The other order (which was no longer at issue), compelled TDCJ to provide certain confidential records to OCFW. OCFW sought the orders pursuant to its post-conviction investigation into the Real Party in Interest’s capital murder conviction and sentence. UTMB and TDCJ challenged the ex parte orders by filing a motion to set aside the discovery orders in the trial court. After initially granting the motion to set aside the discovery orders and then holding a hearing, the trial court ultimately denied the motion to set aside the discovery orders and entered an order reinstating the original ex parte orders. Relator sought leave from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to petition for mandamus relief: to vacate the remaining ex parte order regarding the brain imaging and transportation for the brain imaging of the Real Party in Interest. Because the trial court was without authority to enter the order at issue ex parte, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted Relator’s motion for leave to file and conditionally granted mandamus relief. View "In re University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston" on Justia Law

Appellant Francisco De la Rosa was tried by jury for the non-consensual sexual assault and sexual assault of a child. The body of Appellant’s indictment charged him with three counts of sexual assault for non-consensual contact between his sexual organ and that of "LAM," and the abstract portion of the jury charge defined “sexual assault of a child” in terms of non-consensual sexual contact. The indictment’s caption called the counts sexual assault of a child, its application paragraph authorized conviction for sexual assault of a child, and the case was tried as if it were such a case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to uphold the convictions. To this, the Court concluded the appellate court did, reversed the lower court’s judgments and entered a judgment of acquittal for each count of sexual assault. View "De La Rosa v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant DeSean McPherson was convicted of tampering, but the court of appeals agreed with him that the evidence of concealment was legally insufficient. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals misapplied the standard of review. To this, the Court found that it did: it re-weighed the evidence, rationalized its result by hypothesizing a weaker case than that presented in the record, and overlooked dispositive distinctions between this case and Stahmann v. Texas, 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The Court therefore reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed that of the trial court. View "McPherson v. Texas" on Justia Law

The United States Supreme Court remanded this case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider Applicant Areli Escobar’s false-testimony claim in light of the State’s confession of error. After receiving a motion suggesting that the parties had evidence not previously considered in these habeas proceedings, the Texas Court held the case for 30 days to allow supplementation of the record. Applicant filed supplemental materials with a cover sheet that listed five items. He failed to comply with the applicable appellate rule because he did not explain the significance of any of these items or why they could not have been filed earlier, but the Court nevertheless considered the new material. Upon consideration, the Court concluded the new material did not change its original assessment of Applicant’s false-testimony claim. View "Ex parte Areli Escobar" on Justia Law

In July 2021, Appellant Lucas Vieira was indicted for aggravated assault by threat while acting as a public servant. The indictment alleged that the offense occurred on or about July 7, 2019. Appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, claiming the indictment was time-barred because it was filed more than two years after the date of the offense. The trial court denied Appellant’s habeas application, and Appellant appealed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the indictment was not brought within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and reversed judgments of the courts below. View "Ex parte Lucas Vieira" on Justia Law