Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Harris County jury convicted Appellant Orlando Salinas of causing injury to an elderly individual, for which he was sentenced to five years in prison. After sentencing appellant, the trial court assessed a consolidated court cost of $133 pursuant to Texas Local Government Code section 133.102. Relying on this Court’s decision in "Ex parte Carson," (159 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942)), appellant argued that the consolidated court cost of Tex. Local Gov’t Code section 133.102 was a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. The trial court overruled appellant’s objection. On appeal, the court of appeals considered appellant’s complaints about two evidentiary issues and his challenge to the constitutionality of the consolidated court costs and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. In appellant’s petition for discretionary appeal, he raised only the challenge to the constitutionality of the consolidated court costs. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court so that it could consider appellant’s claim of facial un View "Salinas v. Texas" on Justia Law

The court of appeals affirmed appellant Leo Robinson's conviction for failing to report under the sex-offender registration requirements. The issue this case presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review centered on what degree of mental culpability the statute requires and whether to consider a trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in a sufficiency of the evidence review. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Court held that a conviction under Article 62.012 required knowledge or recklessness only to the duty-to-register element of the offense, and that an appellate court should disregard the trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence. The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ opinion. View "Robinson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers, suspecting Appellee of drug trafficking, placed a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device on his car in an attempt to ascertain when and where he was obtaining his supply. They monitored his movement as he traveled at speeds exceeding the posted speed limit. They independently verified that he was speeding by pacing his car in their own unmarked vehicles. Later, another officer who was aware of the narcotics investigation, verified by radar that Appellee was speeding and pulled him over for that traffic offense. Without ever issuing Appellee a speeding citation, the officers obtained his consent to search his car and discovered a quantity of methamphetamine in the trunk. A short time later Appellee confessed that it was his. The State prosecuted Appellee for possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Appellee moved to suppress both the methamphetamine and his confession. The trial court held that both were rendered inadmissible, pursuant to Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, because the search was accomplished through the installation and monitoring of the GPS tracker. It granted Appellee’s motion to suppress. Rejecting the State’s argument that the independent verification of Appellee’s speeding offense constituted an “intervening circumstance” that attenuated the taint of the illegal search, the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State Prosecuting Attorney’s (“SPA”) petition for discretionary review to examine its contention that, in so holding, the court of appeals misapplied "Texas v. Mazuca," (375 S.W.3d 294 (Tex.Crim. App. 2012)). After review, the Court reversed: both the second and third "Brown" factors favored the conclusion that the taint of the unconstitutional GPS tracking device search had dissipated by the time Appellee consented to the search of his vehicle and confessed that the methamphetamine discovered was his. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of indecency with a child. On appeal he contended that his conviction for indecency with a child by exposure improperly subjected him to double jeopardy. The court of appeals agreed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals surmised that court held, categorically, that that the offense of indecency by exposure “would necessarily be subsumed” within the offense of indecency by contact. The Court granted the State Prosecuting Attorney’s (SPA) petition for discretionary review to decide whether, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, indecency by exposure was “necessarily subsumed” within indecency by contact when, during the same incident, the defendant first exposes himself and masturbates in front of the child victim and then causes the child victim to touch his penis. Finding no Double Jeopardy violation, the Court reversed to court of appeals to the extent that it rendered a judgment of acquittal for indecency with a child by exposure, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Speights v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for murder. The jury ultimately convicted assessed his punishment at forty-three years’ confinement in the penitentiary. He raised four points of error on appeal, all of which the court of appeals rejected. In his fourth point of error, Appellant argued that the trial court erred during voir dire by refusing to allow him to propound a specific question in a specific way to the venire. His counsel asked essentially the same question three times. Each time, the State objected to the “form” of the question as Appellant’s counsel had proposed to ask it. Each time the court sustained the State’s objection. Appellant argued on direct appeal that he was prevented from asking a proper question to the venire during jury selection. The court of appeals refused to address the merits of his complaint, however, holding that Appellant later waived any error he might have earlier preserved. When the names of the twelve jurors were called out and the jury was empaneled, the trial court immediately asked whether either party had “an objection to the panel or as to the jury as selected[.]” Appellant answered, “No, Your Honor.” The court of appeals agreed with the State that, by his response, Appellant waived “any complaints about the [conduct] of voir dire[.]” The Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellant’s petition for discretionary review to examine whether the court of appeals correctly regarded Appellant’s answer to constitute a waiver of his appellate complaint that he had been denied the opportunity to pose a proper question. After review of the record, the Court held that a reply of “None” or “No, Your Honor,” to the question of whether there is an objection to “the seating of the jury,” or “to the panel,” or “to the jury as selected” at the conclusion of jury selection does not constitute a waiver of any previously preserved claim of error during the voir dire proceedings. The Court overruled "Harrison v. Texas," (333 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App. 2010)) to the extent that it conflicted with this holding. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case for further proceedings. View "Stairhime v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was an instructor for a life-guarding class at a club swimming pool where the complainant worked as a receptionist during that summer. The two became involved in a romantic relationship that involved sexual contact and “sexting” messages, some of which included nude photos. A jury later convicted appellant of possession of child pornography, two counts of sexual assault of a child, and online solicitation of a minor and sentenced him to serve three years’ incarceration for each count of sexual assault and eight years’ incarceration for the possession and solicitation counts. Both eight-year sentences were suspended, and all of the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Appellant appealed, and the court of appeals reformed the trial court’s judgments to delete the specific amount of assessed costs and affirmed the judgments as reformed. Both appellant and the State filed petitions to the Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review, which were granted. The State argued: (1) the court of appeals erred in holding that the sufficiency of the evidence justifying the assessment of court costs should be based on the clerk’s “bill of costs” rather than on the statutory predicate for the assessment of such costs; and (2) the court of appeals erred in failing to reform the judgment to adjudge the correct assessment of court costs as mandated by the relevant statutes. Appellant argued that his conviction under Texas Penal Code Section 33.021(b) was void because the Court of Criminal Appeals held this statutory subsection facially unconstitutional. Appellant acknowledged that he did not raise this claim on appeal, but pointed out that "Ex parte Lo" "was decided four months after [he] filed his brief,” and that his failure to object to the constitutionality of this statute at the trial-court level was irrelevant because an “unconstitutional and void law may be attacked regardless of whether the complaining party objected at the trial or appellate stage.” The Court concluded appellant was entitled to relief, "[b]ecause we have previously held that Section 33.021(b) is facially unconstitutional, [. . .] it was 'stillborn' and void ab initio." The Court sustained appellant’s ground for review in petition number PD-1793-13, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in its case number 14-11-00841-CR, and rendered a judgment of acquittal for the online-solicitation offense based on Section 33.021(b). With regard to the State's petitions, the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the appellate court's judgments and remanded three cases for reconsideration in light of "Johnson v. Texas," (423 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. Crim. App 2014). View "Smith v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age. The jury fined him $10,000 and sentenced him to fifty years in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. During a break in the punishment-phase proceeding, an unidentified woman that was “part of the defense” approached a juror and asked, “How does it feel to convict an innocent man?” At a conference that followed the comment and outside the presence of the jury, the judge determined that the best way to assuage jury intimidation fears was to exclude all members from the gallery for the remainder of the punishment phase. On appeal, Appellant argued that he preserved a complaint for review that his right to a public trial was violated and that the closure of the courtroom violated that right Appellant argued further that the proposed remedy was too broad and would “create the impression in the jury’s mind that [Appellant] has absolutely no support whatsoever here.” The State argued that a defendant’s public-trial right is subject to forfeiture, and that Appellant’s complaint was not properly preserved. The court of appeals agreed with Appellant that he preserved his claim, reversed the trial-court judgment as to punishment, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Court agreed with Appellant that he was not required to use “magic language” to preserve his public-trial complaint for review, but Appellant had the burden to “state[] the grounds for the ruling . . . sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” But it appeared to the Court that Appellant "was worried about the perception of the jury if no one was present in the gallery to support him, but it is hardly clear from the record that Appellant’s argument was the functional equivalent of asserting that his constitutional right to a public trial was being violated." View "Peyronel v. Texas" on Justia Law

In November 1998, police discovered the body of Jorge Pena while on early morning patrol in a secluded area of the Baytown Nature Center. Pena was found lying face down in a pool of blood with an apparent gunshot wound to the head. Initially, investigators had few leads in the case. It was not until approximately one year later that detectives received a tip from a confidential informant suggesting that applicant had been involved in Pena’s murder. Based on the informant’s tip, officers arrested applicant’s son-in-law, Juan De La Garza, and De La Garza’s friend Marcos Torres, both of whom were said to have been present at the time of the shooting of Pena. Based on incriminating statements given by De La Garza and Torres, applicant was indicted for Pena’s murder. In this application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, the issue before the Court of Criminal Appeals centered on a claim that the use of false testimony in a criminal trial violated a defendant’s due-process rights. Furthermore, the Court considered whether such a claim might be subject to procedural default for failure to raise it at some earlier stage of the proceedings. Concluding that applicant’s claim was not procedurally barred because he had no prior opportunity to fully litigate it, the Court reached the merits of his claim and determined that the record failed to demonstrate that applicant’s conviction was procured on the basis of false testimony, and, alternatively, even assuming that false testimony was admitted at applicant’s trial, that testimony was not material to his conviction. Accordingly, the Court denied relief. View "Ex parte DeLaCruz" on Justia Law

On or about March 25, 1995, applicant shot and killed Alexander Lopez. Applicant was sixteen years of age at the time. As a result of that incident, the State filed a juvenile-delinquency petition. On April 26, the State filed a motion to waive jurisdiction in the juvenile court and a petition to certify applicant to be tried as an adult. The next day, the case was reset for magistrate warnings to be given to applicant on May 4 and for a transfer hearing to be held on June 7. Applicant received magistrate warnings on May 4, but the transfer hearing was subsequently reset to July 27. On July 27, both parties announced “ready,” and the parties and witnesses were sworn to return at 10:00 a.m. on August 1 for “trial.” On appeal, applicant argued he was not properly served with a summons to the transfer hearing in the juvenile court. He further claimed that, as a consequence of that failure, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to transfer him and the district court did not have jurisdiction to try him. The Court of Criminal Appeals filed and set this application “to determine whether the district court lacked jurisdiction and whether this claim should be barred under the doctrine of laches.” After review, the Court concluded that the record did not affirmatively establish the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and consequently, it denied relief. View "Ex parte Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review centered on whether the application paragraph in jury instructions was properly phrased. In his petition for discretionary review, appellant Damien Cortez contended that the court of appeals erred in its determination that the application paragraph of the jury instructions for fraudulent use or possession of identifying information properly described the applicable law. In particular, appellant argued that the instructions were erroneous because they failed to instruct the jury that the term “item of identifying information” requires a “grouping of identifying information” such as is represented in a check, bank statement or credit card. Furthermore, appellant contended that he was egregiously harmed by the alleged error because, had the jury been properly instructed, he would have been subjected to a lower punishment range that would have permitted the jury to find that he possessed fewer items of identifying information by deciding, for example, that fraudulent possession of a check would be counted as one item rather than the identifying information on the check being considered as multiple items. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning, but agreed with the ultimate conclusion that the trial court’s instructions properly did not limit the jury with respect to the number of separate tangible documents on which the identifying information appears. The Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Cortez v. Texas" on Justia Law