Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of misapplication of fiduciary property in excess of $200,000, sentenced to 14 years’ confinement, and given a $10,000 fine. The trial court orally pronounced at the end of the sentencing hearing that appellant would owe restitution, but he did not specify the amount. The next day, the trial judge entered an order for $591,000 restitution in the written judgment. The court of appeals vacated the order and remanded the case to the trial court for a restitution hearing. Appellant claimed on appeal that the appellate court should have simply deleted the restitution order. The issue this case presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals was reduced to: when the record is clear that the trial judge orally made restitution a part of the sentence, but either the amount or the person(s) to whom it is owed is unclear, incorrect, or insufficient, should the restitution order be deleted or should the case remanded to the trial court for a hearing on restitution? The Court held that, in such a case, appellate courts should vacate the faulty order and remand for a new restitution hearing. View "Burt v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant David Samaripas, Jr. of engaging in organized criminal activity and sentenced him, as a habitual criminal, to 53 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division, an enhanced punishment based on two alleged prior convictions. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly sustained the State’s objection to Appellant’s questions during voir dire. The court of appeals concluded that Appellant failed to preserve error. On appeal, the issues presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review were: (1) in order to preserve error relative to a limitation on voir dire examination of a prospective juror, must a defendant object after the trial court sustains the State’s objection to a proposed question?; and (2) may a non-aggravated state-jail felony conviction, previously punished under the range for a second-degree felony, be used for the purpose of enhancing punishment to that of a habitual criminal? The Court held that that the error was preserved and that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct, particularized standard regarding preservation of error during voir dire. Furthermore, the Court held that, under Sections 12.42(d) and (e) of the Texas Penal Code as it was worded at the time of Appellant’s offense in this case, the non-aggravated state-jail felony conviction that was punished as a second-degree felony was properly used for subsequent habitual-criminal punishment enhancement. View "Samaripas v. Texas" on Justia Law

In his post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus, applicant Alberto Perez argued he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and sought permission to file an out-of-time petition for discretionary review so that he could appeal his 1991 murder conviction. After applicant filed his application in 2011, and after an initial remand to the trial court for evidentiary development of applicant’s claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued an opinion in which it revised its approach to laches as that doctrine applied in the context of a long-delayed application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. It then remanded the case to the trial court a second time for consideration of applicant’s claims in light of the revised approach. On remand, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and, based on applicant’s unreasonable and unjustified delay in filing the application and the State’s assertion that it has been prejudiced as a result of the delay, it recommended that relief be denied. Having reviewed the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court's findings and conclusions. The Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Perez" on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases, the trial judge granted the defendants’ motions to suppress evidence. The State appealed each case, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeals, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction because the elected district attorney failed to timely file the statutorily required certification that the appeal was not taken for delay and that the evidence suppressed was of “substantial importance” to the case. The State filed for discretionary review, asking whether the court of appeals’ interpretation of the certification requirement was “hypertechnical” and contrary to statutory construction. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that it was neither: "the district attorney’s certification is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals. We, therefore, affirm the judgments of the court of appeals in these cases." View "Texas v. Zermeno" on Justia Law

Appellant Vanessa Cameron was convicted of murder and sentenced to 70 years plus a $5,000 fine. On appeal of that sentence, she argued her constitutional right to a public trial was violated when the trial court excluded the public from voir dire. The appellate court reversed her conviction and the State appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Criminal Appeal agreed with the appellate court and affirmed, remanding the case back to the trial court for a new trial. View "Cameron v. Texas" on Justia Law

Having concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have granted the appellant’s motion to suppress. The State argued on appeal of that suppression order that the court of appeals should not have reversed appellant’s conviction without first deciding whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Concluding that the court of appeals did not err to hold that the balance of the warrant affidavit failed to provide probable cause, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded this case to that court to address the good-faith issue in the first instance. View "McClintock v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Al Smith waited for ten years to claim in his request for habeas relief that his rights to direct appeal and effective assistance of counsel were denied. Although the State did not plead laches in its answer, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a court may consider sua sponte whether laches should bar an applicant’s claim. Furthermore, the Court held that the record in this case supported a sua sponte laches inquiry. Smith’s application was remanded to the habeas court to give Smith an opportunity to explain his delay and for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Smith v. Texas" on Justia Law

After Appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress was denied, he pled nolo contendere pursuant to a plea bargain. The written plea agreement, signed by all parties, included awaiver of appeal, and Appellant asserted that he understood this when the trial judge asked about it. The judge then sentenced Appellant as agreed and entered a certification that stated Appellant had no right of appeal. One month later, Appellant filed a motion to amend the certification to reflect that he did have a right to appeal, which the court of appeals granted, ordering the trial court to correct the certification. With the amended certification, Appellant then appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion, but also asserted that the State had not preserved its argument that the amended certification was defective, and concluded that the evidence did not support the State’s argument that Appellant had waived his right to appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure required the State to preserve its argument that Appellant waived his right to appeal, whether the court of appeals erred in dictating to the trial court the content of Appellant’s new certification, and whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that Appellant did not specifically waive his right to appeal as part of the plea bargain. The Court agreed with the State that the record showed that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the motion to suppress. The signed plea agreement that explicitly sets out the waiver, combined with Appellant’s verbal acknowledgments of the waiver support this conclusion. Given this evidence, the Court concluded the court of appeals’ conclusion that the record did not indicate that Appellant waived his right to appeal was not well supported. The court of appeals erred in failing to recognize what was a clear waiver of appeal. View "Marsh v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Delay was convicted of: (1) money laundering (a first-degree felony at the time), and (2) conspiracy to commit money laundering (then a second degree felony). At the time he allegedly committed these offenses, appellant was the Republican Majority Whip of the United States House of Representatives. The trial court sentenced appellant to five years’ confinement for first-degree laundering, though that sentence was suspended and he was placed on community supervision for ten years. The trial court sentenced the appellant to three years’ confinement for the conspiracy offense and did not suspend that sentence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed both convictions and rendered a judgment of acquittal with respect to each, having determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to support them. The State appealed, arguing that the appellate court failed to consider all of the evidence and failed to view the evidence it did consider with the proper respect for the jury’s fact-finding function. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Delay v. Texas" on Justia Law

During two vehicle burglaries, a number of items were stolen. Appellant was charged with and convicted of misdemeanor theft for stealing some items during two vehicle burglaries. The trial judge placed her on probation and, as a condition of probation, imposed restitution for some of the missing items that appellant had not been charged with stealing. Although the issue of restitution and the basis for imposing it were thoroughly discussed at trial, appellant raised no objection to the restitution requirement. The issue before the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether appellant could claim for the first time on appeal that the restitution was for items that she was not charged with stealing. The Court held that she could not, because she accepted the restitution requirement as a condition of probation by failing to object when she had an opportunity to do so. View "Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Texas" on Justia Law