Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review centered on who bears the burden of showing that the trial judge erred in cumulating indecency-with-a-child sentences when some sexual abuse took place before the 1997 Penal Code amendments permitting cumulation of sentences for child sexual offenses. The Court concluded that appellant did not show, either at trial or on appeal, that the jury could not have found him guilty of an offense that occurred after September 1, 1997, the effective date of the cumulation statute. Instead, there was ample evidence to show that appellant began sexually abusing his victim. in 1995 (before the 1997 amendment permitting cumulation became effective) and continued to sexually abuse him until 2002 (at least five years after the 1997 amendment became effective). The Court therefore agreed with the court of appeals that the trial judge “did not err in stacking the sentences” because there was “some evidence” that the offenses occurred after September 1, 1997. View "Bonilla v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Jecia Moss pled guilty to aggravated assault and was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision for five years on October 4, 2000. Her community supervision was subsequently revoked, and she was sentenced to confinement in a state penitentiary. She argued on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her supervision and adjudicate her guilty because the motion to adjudicate was not timely filed and the capias was not timely issued. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that because the capias in this case was issued after the expiration of applicant’s period of supervision, the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to proceed to adjudicate applicant guilty and sentence her. In addition, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to adjudication, Applicant’s sentence was discharged. Therefore, the Court granted applicant the relief she sought. View "In re: Moss" on Justia Law

Applicant Eric Cathey was convicted of capital murder in 1997 for the kidnapping and shooting death of Cristina Castillo. Applicant received a death sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence in 1999, and denied relief on his first application for habeas relief in 2003. The day before his scheduled execution, applicant filed another writ, alleging for the first time that he was mentally retarded and therefore exempt from the death penalty. The Court stayed the execution and issued an order finding that applicant's claim satisfied the requirements of Article 11.071 section 5. The case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing on this new claim. On December 31, 2012, almost two years after the hearing and on the last day of her term of office, the trial judge signed applicant’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that applicant did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was mentally retarded, and therefore he was not exempt from the death penalty. The Court concluded the record did not support the habeas judge’s factual findings or legal conclusions: "[a]lthough we agree that factfinders may 'consider' the concept of the 'Flynn Effect' in assessing the validity of a WAIS or WAIS-R IQ test score, they may consider that effect only in the way that they consider an IQ examiner’s assessment of malingering, depression, lack of concentration, and so forth. It is a generalized consideration that could detract from the over-all validity of the score obtained. The preferred solution to an outdated IQ score is not to start subtracting from that score, it is to retest with a more recently normed IQ test. . . . the trial judge’s finding that [applicant's] 1997 IQ test score was reliable after subtracting ten points was contradicted by the evidence and led to further . . .errors, including an error in the ultimate factual finding that applicant is intellectually disabled under 'Atkins.'" View "In re: Cathey" on Justia Law

A jury found appellant Donald Aekins guilty of three counts of sexual assault. The court of appeals held that his convictions for both contacting and penetrating the adult victim’s sexual organ with his mouth violated his right against multiple punishments for the same offense because the contact and penetration were based on the same act. The State petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review to clarify: (1) when a single exposure or contact offense is "incident to and subsumed by" a penetration offense, the offenses are the "same" for double-jeopardy purposes; (2) that the Texas Legislature has not manifested its intent to allow multiple punishments for those "same" offenses; so (3) multiple convictions for those "same" offenses violate double-jeopardy principles. The Court concluded that the court of appeals properly vacated the conviction for the "contact" sexual assault count, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "Aekins v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee, Kimberly Story, was charged with forgery after police found forged checks in her car. The trial court, however, granted her motion to suppress the checks that were recovered from her vehicle, which was searched during the arrest of Appellee and her boyfriend, James Kuykendall, for unrelated offenses. The trial court determined that Appellee was arrested without probable cause and that the search of her vehicle and seizure of the evidence found there were the result of a trespass by the officer. The court of appeals affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that Appellee’s arrest was unlawful and the evidence inadmissible. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed its judgment. View "Texas v. Story" on Justia Law

After Michael Grado pleaded guilty to possession of 400 grams or more of amphetamine, he was sentenced him to ten years’ confinement. The punishment was suspended and Grado received community supervision for a ten-year period and a $10,000 fine. Grado later pleaded true to the violations the State alleged in its motion to revoke his community supervision. There was no plea bargain between the parties on punishment after revocation. Before the admission of evidence, findings on the violations, and sentencing, the parties informed the judge of their belief on the correct punishment range applicable to Grado’s conviction. The community supervision was revoked, and the judge sentenced Grado to ten years’ confinement, believing that it was the statutory minimum for Grado’s offense when in fact it was five. Grado did not object. Is the right to be sentenced by a judge who considers the entire range of punishment subject to procedural default? Concluding that it is a waiver-only right, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that it is not. View "Grado v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Farrain Comeaux was charged with burglary of a habitation in an indictment that included eight enhancement paragraphs. During voir dire, potential juror number 23 (PJ 23) expressed some concern about his ability to be fair because he had been the victim of a prior burglary and had strong feelings about the subject. After both sides spoke with the venire panel, the trial judge requested that PJ 23 stay for additional questioning. In response to the prosecutor’s asking if he already thought Comeaux was guilty, PJ 23 stated, "I just don’t feel I can be fair." Appellant moved to strike PJ 23 for cause. Following a dialogue, appellant used all ten of his peremptory strikes, including a peremptory strike on PJ 23. He then asked for an additional strike, which the trial judge denied. Appellant stated on the record that he would have used the additional strike on potential juror number 27 (PJ 27). Although appellant did not use a peremptory strike on PJ 27, he did use a peremptory strike on PJ 34, who was not within the "strike zone," the group of potential jurors who could actually sit on the jury. PJ 27, however, did serve on the jury, which convicted appellant of burglary, found the enhancement paragraphs true, and sentenced him to 50 years in prison. On appeal, appellant claimed that the trial judge erred by denying his challenge for cause on PJ 23. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that this was a case of first impression in Texas: because the court of appeals found that appellant failed to preserve error on the challenge for cause because, although he exhausted his peremptory strikes and identified an objectionable juror, he used a peremptory strike on a potential juror outside of the “strike zone,” and thus suffered no detriment. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether appellant indeed preserved his claim of an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause for appellate review. "The issue, however, is one of harm, not preservation." The Court held that appellant failed to show harm because he could have, but chose not to, strike the objectionable juror. View "Comeaux v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of misapplication of fiduciary property in excess of $200,000, sentenced to 14 years’ confinement, and given a $10,000 fine. The trial court orally pronounced at the end of the sentencing hearing that appellant would owe restitution, but he did not specify the amount. The next day, the trial judge entered an order for $591,000 restitution in the written judgment. The court of appeals vacated the order and remanded the case to the trial court for a restitution hearing. Appellant claimed on appeal that the appellate court should have simply deleted the restitution order. The issue this case presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals was reduced to: when the record is clear that the trial judge orally made restitution a part of the sentence, but either the amount or the person(s) to whom it is owed is unclear, incorrect, or insufficient, should the restitution order be deleted or should the case remanded to the trial court for a hearing on restitution? The Court held that, in such a case, appellate courts should vacate the faulty order and remand for a new restitution hearing. View "Burt v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant David Samaripas, Jr. of engaging in organized criminal activity and sentenced him, as a habitual criminal, to 53 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division, an enhanced punishment based on two alleged prior convictions. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly sustained the State’s objection to Appellant’s questions during voir dire. The court of appeals concluded that Appellant failed to preserve error. On appeal, the issues presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review were: (1) in order to preserve error relative to a limitation on voir dire examination of a prospective juror, must a defendant object after the trial court sustains the State’s objection to a proposed question?; and (2) may a non-aggravated state-jail felony conviction, previously punished under the range for a second-degree felony, be used for the purpose of enhancing punishment to that of a habitual criminal? The Court held that that the error was preserved and that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct, particularized standard regarding preservation of error during voir dire. Furthermore, the Court held that, under Sections 12.42(d) and (e) of the Texas Penal Code as it was worded at the time of Appellant’s offense in this case, the non-aggravated state-jail felony conviction that was punished as a second-degree felony was properly used for subsequent habitual-criminal punishment enhancement. View "Samaripas v. Texas" on Justia Law

In his post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus, applicant Alberto Perez argued he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and sought permission to file an out-of-time petition for discretionary review so that he could appeal his 1991 murder conviction. After applicant filed his application in 2011, and after an initial remand to the trial court for evidentiary development of applicant’s claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued an opinion in which it revised its approach to laches as that doctrine applied in the context of a long-delayed application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. It then remanded the case to the trial court a second time for consideration of applicant’s claims in light of the revised approach. On remand, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and, based on applicant’s unreasonable and unjustified delay in filing the application and the State’s assertion that it has been prejudiced as a result of the delay, it recommended that relief be denied. Having reviewed the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court's findings and conclusions. The Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Perez" on Justia Law